Afghanistan's Drug Problem

[Tom Odom]

Here is the link to the Purdue report.

http://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/ncnu02/v5-284.html

Good report and interesting. Seems to me though that the proposed industry assumes a benign security environment, a functioning commercial structure, and an accepted, practiced, and functional government to support such an endeavor. None of those assumptions apply to Afghanistan and are not likely to in the next decade.

Tom

[Entropy]

Interesting report here showing how Afghanistan's nouveau-rich are stylin'

[bismark17]

Fitting example of how we will never be able to compete with the other side in the "war" on drugs as we currently wage it.

[bourbon]

U.N. Reports That Taliban Is Stockpiling Opium, By KIRK KRAEUTLER. The New York Times, November 27, 2008.

UNITED NATIONS — Afghanistan has produced so much opium in recent years that the Taliban are cutting back poppy cultivation and stockpiling raw opium in an effort to support prices and preserve a major source of financing for the insurgency, Antonio Maria Costa, the head of the United Nations drug office, says.

Mr. Costa made his remarks to reporters last week as his office prepared to release its latest survey of Afghanistan’s opium crop. Issued Thursday, it showed that poppy cultivation had retreated in much of the country and was now overwhelmingly concentrated in the 7 of 34 provinces where the insurgency remains strong, most of those in the south.

Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, November 2008. (187 Page PDF)

[120mm]

That, because of it's helicopter-centric slant, kind of glosses over a bunch, but it describes what "yours truly" has been up to since January.

http://www.verticalmag.com/control/n.../?a=10797&z=11

Change From Above
Thursday, May 14, 2009 - Graham Lavery, Vertical 911


In this story that appears in the current issue of Vertical 911, Graham Lavery reports on the U.S. Department of State Air Wing's counternarcotics mission in Afghanistan.


Part of a three-ship formation as it makes its way
across the Red Desert. This flight includes gunship
support and SAR capability, safety precautions
that the Air Wing takes whenever possible.
Graham Lavery Photo.
From a side seat in the “penalty box” of a United States Department of State (DoS) Huey, cruising 1,000 feet over Afghanistan's infamous Helmand Valley, it's easy to see how this southern province produces up to half the world's total supply of opium poppies. With huge areas of the country being rocky and barren, most Afghan farmers must cultivate every square inch of arable land through an ingenious system of terracing, levies and dykes. But, the broad, flat Helmand Valley was the focus of intensive American engineering efforts in the mid-20th century, and part of the legacy from that is a network of irrigation canals which allows agriculture to flourish here.

During the poppy season (which runs, roughly, from January through June), Helmand is vividly green. Even in the off-season, the scene from overhead is inviting, exotic — and deceptively peaceful. The reality on the ground, of course, is dramatically different.

More at the link...

[davidbfpo]

Thanks. A different viewpoint and informative - even if officially sanctioned. The role of Helmand Province in producing so much heroin is something the UK government would prefer not to publicise here.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

I am sure other threads have carried views on Afghan drug production since the last update, anyway this seems a good place to add this: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...iban-drugs.htm

Aside from the amounts seized, the operation involved the entire UK Helmand mobile force, an infantry battallion (Royal Scots, ex-Black Watch), plus a 100 ANA and all landed by helicopter. No details on whose helicopters used, I suspect UK and US.

Following procedure I suspect the drugs will be handed over to the Afghan government, hopefully burnt quickly before leakage.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

The SWJ blog article: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...fitab/#c003212 appeared June 14th and was missed being in Chicago.

Recalled this alternative view, which advocates melons: http://www.spectator.co.uk/the-magaz...ashnikov.thtml

Makes an interesting contrast! Later author's background not readily found.

davidbfpo

[AnalyticType]

One which I will add to!

September to November 2007 I was on a team of four students (capstone course for my undergrad program) in which we were tasked with assessing poppy eradication methods which had been successful in a few areas, to determine their utility for the rest of Afghanistan. We were to examine what Governor Atta had done in the Balkh province (which was "officially" poppy-free at that point) and see if his methods were duplicatable. This assessment was for a gentleman in the General Counsel's office at the Pentagon.

By the way, before anyone gets concerned, this was an OSINT project and it was not classified once we presented our findings, so I can share it.

It was apparent quickly that there is no "cookie-cutter" solution. Too many complexities are involved, between ethnicities, geography/geology, weather patterns, tribal structures, not to mention a couple thousand years of history... So I retooled our Terms of Reference to encompass any and all solutions which can be interlinked, thereby multiplying the benefit of any one program.

On this team of students, we had two 21-year olds who had good research and analytical skills, but not much of a "global" outlook. The third member of the team was a 24-year old Marine Scout Sniper with two tours in Afghanistan...definitely an asset! And then there was me...over 40 and a type-A personality! We didn't officially have a team leader, but I filled the role...

Having been owned by horses for 30 years, I'm pretty conversant in agricultural matters, so I took that sector. The Marine was the obvious choice for Security. And I delegated the other two to Industry and Mineral/Petroleum Exploitation.

So having laid out the basic scenario, I thought I'd share with y'all our Executive Summary...

Executive Summary:
What viable poppy elimination and replacement programs are likely to succeed in Afghanistan?
Any successful opium poppy replacement program will likely include several integrated programs in the areas of agriculture, mineral and fuel deposit exploitation, the construction of infrastructure, and industrial manufacturing. It is highly likely that an interconnected set of programs will benefit both the local and national economies. The potential for success of any coordinated program is in direct proportion to the level of interdiction, border security, and prosecution of drug lords and corrupt officials. It is highly unlikely that eradication, the physical destruction of poppy crops, is sufficient for successful elimination of opium and sustainable replacement. One single replacement program, industry or crop is highly unlikely capable of replacing poppy, for the complexities of the situation, geography and culture require a multifaceted and interconnected solution.

[AnalyticType]

Well, I was going to upload the full report for those who would be interested in reading it, but it's too large (even as a pdf, and zipped.) So, should you be curious, let me know and I'll email it to you.

Victoria

[davidbfpo]

Following a G8 Afghanistan meeting, with Richard Holbrooke announcing an end to US policy on crop destruction: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationwo...,7732272.story (one of many). A UK press report shows that the Afghan government and the UK do not agree: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-reversal.html

Nothing like joined up thinking and working as an alliance!

davidbfpo

[AnalyticType]

While it's true that lack of synchronized effort among the coalition nations tends to slow down forward progress, the U.S. decision is best.

Here's why:

The situation of the average Afghani farmer that grows poppy can be likened to that of the Depression Era coalminer... he owes his soul "to the company store." When it's time to plant poppies, most of the farmers have no money, and no food. They borrow money against the poppy crop from the local drug lord, so that they can feed themselves and their families.

When eradication teams come along and obliterate the crop, by dragging the fields with weighted sections of chainlink fence behind ATVs, or flailing it, or chemically killing it, the farmer is put in an untenable position which he cannot fix - that of not having a crop to pay his debt with, nor money to do so. Additionally, he watches the balance of the money he would have received at harvest (with which to sustain his family for the balance of the year) 'die on the vine' as well. It's a downward spiral that can only be slowed by growing more poppy. It's also far too late in the season, at the typical time that the eradication teams do their thing, for the farmers to recoup their losses in another fashion.

The often offered alternative that people in the US like to discuss, that of buying the crop and selling it to pharmeceutical companies for legitimate use, is not a realistic option simply because that market is already fully supplied. There is no demand to be filled, in the legal market, for Afghani opium.

Yes, the trafficking/processing/transportation elements must be dealt with, most often by lethal means. The corrupt provincial government officials, from the Governor down, must be jailed or otherwise removed, as Governor Atta did in the Balkh province. Truth be known, he also offered to replace the lost poppy crops with cannabis... But when he announced that Balkh was "poppy-free," he spoke the truth... Also, being in the Northern Plateau, where poppy was a very small percentage of the agricultural efforts, there wasn't much poppy production to deal with in the first place.

The bottom line with the southern poppy-growing regions is economics. An Afghani farmer who does not grow poppies will make approximately 300 USD per year. A farmer next door who grows poppies on a couple hectares (ha) of land will make 3,000 USD per year. When you look at it in real numbers, of course it makes sense that they're growing poppies! But you (meaning governments) cannot pay the farmers not to grow poppies. Unlike (in welfare states) the tendency of those with their hands out for money to be ruled by the law of inertia, Afghanis are fairly industrious people.

I spoke with former Minister of the Interior Ali Jalali in 2007 about this very issue. He said flat out that if farmers are paid not to grow poppy, they will tend to take the money and grow poppies rather than leaving the fields fallow. But Jalali was very specific; he said that this is pure economics. There is no longstanding tradition of opium use in the Afghani (et al) culture. The solution lies in replacing the poppy cultivation with either another high-value crop or jobs that will earn them at least as much as the poppy crop would. They need to be busy and productive.

So when I was researching alternative crops, I used 3,000 USD/2 ha as a benchmark to find economically advantageous alternatives. I also had a team member research non-agricultural industries which were likely to pay as well, while utilizing the agricultural products of the alternative crops. I found some very interesting and viable crop options.

The one at the top of the list: saffron. As the world's most costly spice (retail avg 300USD/oz), the economic benefit of cultivating saffron crocuses is clear. Granted, three stigma (the female part of the flower) per flower are the sole source of the spice, and it takes approximately 75,000 flowers to produce one pound of saffron threads. However, saffron crocuses are indigenous to the Iran/Afghanistan/Pakistan/Northern India swath, meaning that this is not a crop which would require specialized cultivation/fertilization. As with opium poppies, the key to economic benefit is the export value. Furthermore, being a late summer to fall crop, food crops can be cultivated on the same ground earlier in the spring and summer, effectively producing for the farmer both income and sustenance on the same piece of ground.

Another crop with high value is flax, which is already grown all over Afghanistan. However, it is only grown as an oil seed crop (linseed oil). One crop can produce two products if flax is also utilized for an indigenous textile industry.

Other high value export crops include pomegranates, grapes (exported as raisins and juice), nuts, and the 'animal husbandry piece de resistance'... cashmere. Though only 11% of Afghanistan's landmass is arable ground the total pasture grazing land available, exclusive of arable farmland, is approximately 45% or 291,375 km sq. But what of the market for cashmere?

Afghanistan is the third largest producer of this high value, renewable commodity, behind China and Mongolia. The importance of the cashmere industry to the Mongolian economy is clear: it provides income and employment for over a third of the population and raw cashmere and cashmere products are Mongolia’s third largest export. A vibrant cashmere industry has the potential to contribute to the growth of the economy, of the manufacturing sector, of employment at both the herder and the manufacturing levels, and of exports. It is important here to note that in Mongolia the herding sector and processing sectors are in deep trouble. In 2005, the herding sector surpassed the total herd size that can be sustained by Mongolia’s pasturelands, and overgrazing began to cause desertification. Many firms in the processing sector ceased to operate or downsized their operations over the past 10 years, yet processors still operate on average at less than 50% capacity.

This is to Afghanistan’s advantage. Despite being ranked third in cashmere production, Afghanistan’s share of the cashmere market is approximately 5%. As horticultural crop productivity increases, and irrigation systems are renovated, Afghanistan’s capability to sustain larger numbers of goats will increase. There is a growing market to be tapped by Afghan farmers who produce cashmere as Mongolian production continues to drop.

Contrary to the media-provided impression of agricultural sterility, Afghanistan is fully capable of sustaining regionally specialized agriculture. Afghanis have for millenia made effective use of their limited water resources for growing a wide variety of food crops. These include tree crops such as pomegranates, figs, mulberries, walnuts, pistachios, almonds and apricots; field crops such as cotton, peanuts, kidney beans, chickpeas, melons, herbs and grapes; and cereal grains such as wheat, barley, millet, rice and maize.

The key to success with any of these crops is the repair and revitalization of the surface irrigation and kareze systems which were demolished by the Soviets, and of which approximately 65% remain in disuse.

The more energy, money, and time that we pour into fixing the agricultural infrastructure (particularly the water supply systems) concurrently with interdiction efforts, the more quickly and easily we can wean the Afghani agricultural sector (85% of the whole) off of opium poppies and on to sustainable and economically feasible crops.

[davidbfpo]

I think legal cultivation of the opium poppy has cropped up before, most recently that it was grown in Australia and Turkey. This article refers to cultivation in the UK and asks why not legally cultivate in Afghanistan: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/c...ghanistan.html

(The author is the Mayor of London and a Conservative).

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Just in case it is lost, this SWJ item needs to be retained: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...s-when-is-pop/

davidbfpo

[goesh]

- just the odd comment and opinion but I rather doubt farmer Joe simply pays back any money borrowed to plant and harvest his crop, he is probably paying a protection fee as well and steep interest. Drugs and extortion cross all cultural barriers, pretty much a universal thing. I wouldn't advocate buying the opium, rather paying fair market value for it then destroying it on the spot via non chemical means. No doubt this has been hashed over and ruled out for various reasons and I haven't researched it. It just seems darn odd that a Bn Commander for instance can go forth and do all kinds of things in the name of the mission and change peoples lives forever, drastic things. Yet the same Commander can't go driving up to Farmer Joe's place, hop out with some cash in his hand, tell him in affect ' here is the high end value for your crop, we are going to destroy it now' and unleash a Hummer with chain link fence behind it on the crop, sit back and see what develops down the line with farmer Joe and some of his fellow growers. I don't think much would change really - Joe would still end up paying extortion money to the taliban and drug lords to be used against us but who is he going to like more in the process? Bottom line, farmer Joe does half the work for the same end results because of Uncle Sam.

[jcustis]

(Copied to here from the Afghan agriculture thread) I'm about to drop an AAR in the Afghanistan PTP thread, but I just attended a lecture by Gretchen Peters (author of Seeds of Terror, and she made the point that opium cultivated in Afghanistan would have to go through a shift in collection and production methods in order to come close to the hygienic methods required for medicinal purposes. She also added that unless the whole shebang was subsidized, medicinal opium would not likely garner prices higher than the farmer would get for growing wheat.

I found those points very interesting.

[jcustis]

I had the chance to sit in on a lecture on 7/11/09, sponsored by the 1st Marine Division as part of a lecture series which will eventually include David Kilcullen and Greg Mortensen of Three Cups of Tea renown. The lecturer was Gretchen Peters, the author of Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Participants were provided with a copy of the book and I am reading it slowly, but I made several notes that i offer up here as an after action review of sorts. I'll likely post a book review later, because I think she has some important things ton say, though they cut against the grain in terms of our current strategy.

My notes are in no particular order, and some are actually just notes to self:

-Ms. Peters began the lecture with several images of Afghan militants, and stated that most of the West views the Taliban as a bedraggled, bearded fighter toting a Kalashnikov, and sworn to protect Islam. She prefers the image of the mafioso, however, since the Taliban, from her research, are profiting from the drug trade despite other claims that they are anti-drug. They are less an ideologue, and more a basic thug. Although they are thugs, they are better equipped, better organized, and more capable than they were in late 2001 when the US first went in to Afghanistan. The reason is the profits made from the explosion of opium production.
-Methods of interrogation oriented on eliminating criminal elements, would in fact be better than the techniques we might use otherwise, because crime and corruption is at the heart of the insurgency while opium production skyrockets.
-In reported cases, the Taliban and peripheral drug kingpins have purchased, up front, a poppy crop's opium output. This results in occasions where farmers (who do not make significant profits from growing poppy) end up in debt to the trafficker and Taliban when we swoop in an d eradicate crops.
-We (read as coalition) need to be careful of how we are viewed when we cast our lot in with the ANA and ANP. [as in Iraq] the ANP are not as respected as the ANA, and are seen as the more corrupt of the two. Morale of the story: think about the IO aspect of your alliance with security forces, before you descend on a village with them in tow.
-Distribution, smuggling, extortion, and contract protection are making more money than the revenue created at the lower-level from growth of poppy and the initial production of opium from the poppy resin. We should be expending energy at disrupting these middle to upper-level activities, and interdict the trade after it leaves the farm.
-With the improvement of distribution networks, we need to conduct an analysis of drug trafficking ratlines first. Will a new road help us in our interactions with the local populace, or help the Taliban?
-In order to make our impact worthwhile, we might need to focus on corruption that is rampant within the civil servants and local official the strapped government, s. The reason for this is that too many people rely on instability in order to keep the illicit activities going, and their actions are more dangerous (although still corruption on the surface) than the policeman who pockets a few bucks while running a checkpoint. Ms. Peters was talking about instances where entire police forces are absent from certain roads that eventually see drug convoys pass through on the way to Pakistan or points west.
-The coalition would do itself a favor to take pictures of the drug kingpins homes in Quetta and other border areas who are living lavishly on the backs of poor farmers, and then use them as part of the IO campaign in poppy-rich areas.
-Proposals to legalize the Afghan opium production don't survive the rigor of the hygienic requirements needed in medicinal opiate production. Even if it did, the process would have to be subsidized in order to make the profit margin better than what can be gained from growing wheat, or we need to subsidize agricultural alternatives. Her point to that is "why not?" Why not totally reshape our counter-drug policy to put money into into alternative agriculture while focusing on interdiction at the same time.
-By and large, the problem in Afghanistan is more easily compared to Colombia, and therefore we should look at the COIN efforts conducted against the FARC to glean TTPs and operational-level policy.
-We can remove the terrorists through force, or maybe even hearts and minds, but unless we remove the narco-state, we still lose.

Ms. Peters utilized HN research assistants, paid with United States Institute of Peace grant money, to conduct primary source research in the study she conducted, which led to the book. She made several statements that we need to do a better job of killing the bad guys who need to be killed, so I don't take her assessments as tinfoil conspiracy theory that seeks to undercut any administration's effort. The simple fact that she advocates interdiction along the flow of opium, and not destruction at the source (since that is a problem too large to defeat), causes me to rethink my understanding of the problem, because I am going to be dealing with this at the farmer and local governance level during my next deploy. And since Helmand Province is the scene of the greatest poppy growth, I can expect to be dealing with a slice of the populace tied to the drug trade.

[davidbfpo]

Jon,

Thanks for that and to help education via SWJ, here is the author's website: http://gretchenpeters.org/ ; on a quick skim her blogsite has some useful pointers on relations with Afghans and a critical review of her book: http://www.registan.net/index.php/20...etchen-peters/ I note she responds at length to this on her blogsite: http://blog.gretchenpeters.org/

I will place a pointer to the book on the 'open' SWJ.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Economy of effort: here is the author's website: http://gretchenpeters.org/ ; on a quick skim her blogsite has some useful pointers on relations with Afghans and a critical review of her book: http://www.registan.net/index.php/20...etchen-peters/ I note she responds at length to this on her blogsite: http://blog.gretchenpeters.org/

davidbfpo

[Red Rat]

Jon, Dave,

Thanks for the AAR and the links.

I think that the focus is changing in theatre from the cultivation to refining and distribution networks. The advice I had in-theatre (from a senior UK counter-narcotics official) was not to bother with poppy eradication but to look for the processing labs and chemicals. The latter were described to me as instantly recognisable as they did to your oral/nasal passages what scraping your nails on a blackboard does to your ears

Poppy eradication is a quick way to rile the locals at all levels. We had an incident where a benign district went red after poppy eradication. It transpired that the farmers had mortgaged themselves to the hilt to get the land and the seed for what was for them the most lucrative crop. When we started to eradicate the poppy they fought tooth and nail when all the known matrices (viable alternative crops, no prolonged history of poppy cultivation etc) said they should not. It transpired that the collateral on the mortgages was their children (mostly daughters), several of whom it was reliably reported ended up in bondage.

We are looking at the possibility of having some units mentoring the ANP. Problem is that we do not have enough MP to do this. How much police training does one need to mentor the ANP? Presumably basic forensics and an idiots guide to the Afghan legal system?