Afghanistan's Drug Problem

[Ken White]

And these huge problems would be?

in post 148 above. Recall my comment on US domestic concerns. Add those two together.

About 1/3 of the US is saying as you do, eradicate! Another third are just terribly concerned that the poor Farmers, their families and income should take precedence over those Western Kids who are of concern to you -- they think their kids would never have a drug problem (I know -- but they don't realize the little monster already does or is dealing in too many cases... ). The remaining third are leaners in both directions but basically undecided.

Thus, in the US, there is no consensus on what should be done so our typically American solution is to do little. Always been our way -- until someone goes too far or a consensus is reached.

I suspect most of NATO has the same splits but with a Parliamentary system, the government has much more decision authority than they do in a constitutional republic with a purposely designed dysfunctional governmental and electoral system.

We putter around until its almost too late, thus Churchill's statement: "You can always trust the Americans will do the right thing -- after they have tried every conceivable alternative."

[JMA]

To begin with, you're talking about 50% of Afghanistan's GDP and the primary source of income for very many regular Afghans. People have to eat and feed their families - if you destroy their means to do that, what do you think they'll do? You can't kill half a nation's economy and expect positive effects from that - even assuming it were possible to do so.

Secondly, the scale of poppy cultivation is vast. Diverting resources to really try to destroy all the crops would negatively impact every other effort in Afghanistan because the resources required would be so large. We don't have the resources to do everything we might like to do in Afghanistan, so we must make priorities.

Third, it's a counterproductive COA, as are most which try to impose our own values on other people. We're not in Afghanistan to fight a drug war and that goal is not worth spilling our soldier's blood for, especially since I don't think there's been a single case where crop eradication was successful.

Does the same rationale apply to Mexico? ... (I await your response)

I never thought I would see the day when the US (and NATO) would support a narco economy openly aggressively and without shame. My of my how times have changed.

[JMA]

in post 148 above. Recall my comment on US domestic concerns. Add those two together.

About 1/3 of the US is saying as you do, eradicate! Another third are just terribly concerned that the poor Farmers, their families and income should take precedence over those Western Kids who are of concern to you -- they think their kids would never have a drug problem (I know -- but they don't realize the little monster already does or is dealing in too many cases... ). The remaining third are leaners in both directions but basically undecided.

Thus, in the US, there is no consensus on what should be done so our typically American solution is to do little. Always been our way -- until someone goes too far or a consensus is reached.

I suspect most of NATO has the same splits but with a Parliamentary system, the government has much more decision authority than they do in a constitutional republic with a purposely designed dysfunctional governmental and electoral system.

We putter around until its almost too late, thus Churchill's statement: "You can always trust the Americans will do the right thing -- after they have tried every conceivable alternative."

Ken as I responded to Entropy above does this way of thinking apply to whats happening in Mexico right now?

The problem after eradication starts would be in Afghanistan for the Afghans the middlemen and the international dealer network. But since when has the US developed a concern for the welfare of those in the drug production cycle?

So I am growing dope in a hothouse in my basement and it accounts for 100% of my earnings the police will just leave me be? Poor guy they would say, can't take away his livelihood.

The US being a great litigation society I can't wait to follow the first law suit where parents sue the US government (and maybe the military) for providing support for the production of the stuff that killed their son. Sure to be a good one.

[JMA]

Third, it's a counterproductive COA, as are most which try to impose our own values on other people. We're not in Afghanistan to fight a drug war and that goal is not worth spilling our soldier's blood for, especially since I don't think there's been a single case where crop eradication was successful.

Good, I'm glad you brought this up.

Maybe you can help me here by answering these two questions:

* What was the original aim of US military involvement in Afghanistan?

* What is the current aim of US military involvement in Afghanistan?

Many thanks

[Ken White]

and films lead many in the world to believe...

Ken as I responded to Entropy above does this way of thinking apply to whats happening in Mexico right now?

Yes.

But since when has the US developed a concern for the welfare of those in the drug production cycle?

Along the line of those 'thirds' I cited above, it's always been present. Search here and on Google for 'War on Drugs' or 'Legalizing drugs'...

So I am growing dope in a hothouse in my basement and it accounts for 100% of my earnings the police will just leave me be? Poor guy they would say, can't take away his livelihood.

Depends on the jurisdiction. This is a big country. Some areas are tolerant, others less so. The Cops do what the law says IF their Bosses push them to do it. In some places, the citizens (with varying views) are the 'Bosses,' in others not so much.

The US being a great litigation society I can't wait to follow the first law suit where parents sue the US government (and maybe the military) for providing support for the production of the stuff that killed their son. Sure to be a good one.

Probably will. There'll probably be several. So?

The neat thing about the very large, very diverse 300 million plus person nation that is the US is that there are some people who agree with you and believe your approach is best. There are others who probably would think you're an idiot. Still others fall in between those poles. Many, like me, who believe that you don't understand all you think you know know about your stated positions on many things -- particularly the US and how it operates (which is erratically... ) and that the answers to most things aren't nearly as simple as you make them -- or as some also wish they were.

Pity they aren't...

[Entropy]

Does the same rationale apply to Mexico? ... (I await your response)

Yep, same rationale. I don't think the US has any business sending soldiers into Mexico to do crop eradication.

I never thought I would see the day when the US (and NATO) would support a narco economy openly aggressively and without shame. My of my how times have changed.

Except that's not what anyone is arguing. No one in this thread is suggesting that opium production is not a problem. What has been suggested is that it's a secondary problem and, furthermore, that going after the middle-men and "big fish" (when possible) is a better strategy than attempting to eradicate the crop in the fields for all the reasons cited upthread.

I would go further and argue that supply-side drug interdiction is ineffective - at least that's the US experience with 30 years of the "drug war." Can you point to any example where an eradication strategy has been successful?

So, if you want to convince me that eradication is the best policy, then you need to at least demonstrate that it's a feasible, achievable COA and have a plan to mitigate all the negative consequences.

[JMA]

Yep, same rationale. I don't think the US has any business sending soldiers into Mexico to do crop eradication.

Except that's not what anyone is arguing. No one in this thread is suggesting that opium production is not a problem. What has been suggested is that it's a secondary problem and, furthermore, that going after the middle-men and "big fish" (when possible) is a better strategy than attempting to eradicate the crop in the fields for all the reasons cited upthread.

I would go further and argue that supply-side drug interdiction is ineffective - at least that's the US experience with 30 years of the "drug war." Can you point to any example where an eradication strategy has been successful?

So, if you want to convince me that eradication is the best policy, then you need to at least demonstrate that it's a feasible, achievable COA and have a plan to mitigate all the negative consequences.

Good, lets look at how on this basis the problem in Mexico should be handled.

(Note: I am only half joking here)

My reference for stats etc is Wikipedia.

OK, so lets cut out the middle man. 90% of cocaine entering the US transits Mexico. So why not allow the Colombians direct access through Florida? No more Mexican middle man.

Now that the US is active with the protection of poppy growers in Afghanistan why not let them export direct to the US (one would think there was plenty of space on US military planes to bring in the stuff for them. Again you cut out the Mexican middleman.

Ok so what to do about cannabis? Legalise it. After all its much less of a problem than the heavy stuff. The government can even plant it on state and national land so as to force the price down through availability. Out go the Mexicans.

So that leaves us with methamphetamine. Ok, you got to take the Mexicans out of the equation. They run the labs on both sides of the border. So why not licence the drug companies to produce the stuff to ensure quality control and put a health warning on the label.

That's the Mexicans done for. Drug problem... no change but will be able to get some tax revenue now. Probably billions. Build a few rehab clinics, make a few education videos...

[JMA]

The neat thing about the very large, very diverse 300 million plus person nation that is the US is that there are some people who agree with you and believe your approach is best. There are others who probably would think you're an idiot. Still others fall in between those poles. Many, like me, who believe that you don't understand all you think you know know about your stated positions on many things -- particularly the US and how it operates (which is erratically... ) and that the answers to most things aren't nearly as simple as you make them -- or as some also wish they were.

Pity they aren't...

Of course I don't understand the US, never been there.

All I am relaying is a view of how the US is seen by a good few billion people who don't live in the US. Surely by now you realise that no matter what the truth is it is the perception that matters in the end.

May I differ from you on one thing?

The answers are indeed obvious. It is the solutions which are often very difficult to implement.

[Ken White]

Of course I don't understand the US, never been there.

All I am relaying is a view of how the US is seen by a good few billion people who don't live in the US. Surely by now you realise that no matter what the truth is it is the perception that matters in the end.

All of it -- except that in many cases, their sometimes accurate and sometimes not perception and vision of 'truth' creates all sorts of problems for us. All our fault for not doing a better job of getting out a more accurate picture but we've always been terribly poor at that; unlikely to change in the near future. Not a 'woe is us' sort of thing, just reality and not a major problem IMO.

Older American are used to it, the younger ones nowadays often seem to get their shorts in a wad over it for no great reason. In the eyes of some, the bad thing is that we know of the mispercpetions, could correct them but just don't care to bother.

May I differ from you on one thing...The answers are indeed obvious. It is the solutions which are often very difficult to implement.

Sometimes. Some times the answers that seem obvious and would be good for some or even many will not work for others.

Occasionally, as in this case, the solution is or could be easily implemented but the answer is to the wrong question.

[JMA]

(Edited out for this thread; originally appeared on Children in War thread).

I'm trying to figure out the reason why Afghanistan was allowed to develop into a narc state. So I look at Mexico and then LA (and others). The simple deduction is that if its OK so close to home then who cares about Afghanistan, right?

Then again maybe not

[davidbfpo]

JMA asked:

I'm trying to figure out the reason why Afghanistan was allowed to develop into a narc state.

We have talked around the subject of Afghanistan and narcotics, IIRC on several threads, but not

why Afghanistan was allowed to develop into a narc state..

I am not an expert on the issue, so from the comfort of a faraway "armchair" here goes.

Afghanistan has always grown narcotics, I suspect heroin production is a relatively new phenomenon (will look for clues another time) and for a very long time neither external powers (neighbours mainly), let alone those with internal power have sought to hamper production. It is not an area that lends itself naturally to heroin poppy cultivation, I recall back in the 1970's the focus was on 'The Golden Triangle', but it shares a lack of good governance.

Roll-on the Soviet invasion and the campaign against them. Growing heroin then became a resistance enabler, nay an Islamic duty (dispite the Koran's stricures on narcotics) and quickly became a veritable money machine. Read Gretchen Peter's book 'Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda' for far more detail and opinion (and a thread on the book: ).

Note that in Helmand Province the "breadbasket" for poppy cultivation the original 'Cold War' era of US-sponsored irrigation and development I doubt ever considered poppies as a crop. I am sure there are reliable sources that show other crops were grown there into the Soviet era.

Post-9/11 and the West's intervention for a host of reasons, mainly political, no-one wanted to consider narcotics - again refer to Gretchen Peter's book. This part we have covered in previous threads as to why so little action was taken. 120mm in particular was "boots on the ground". The main thread being: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1234

IMHO we decided to fight other enemies and not upset too many Afghans, from the poor farmer who sells his children when disaster strikes (eradication visitations), who may take up arms too (if paid enough or hates us) to the narco-barons and otehrs entrenched in Afghan government and more. It is one of the weaknesses - to the public - of the UK's involvement in Afghanistan that we have flunked this issue, why are we fighting and doing very little to stop heroin production? Note we share a mutual concern with heroin supply with Iran, which has millions of addicts.

Hope that helps and if others far more expert chime in hurrah.

[huskerguy7]

JMA asked:

We have talked around the subject of Afghanistan and narcotics, IIRC on several threads, but not

I am not an expert on the issue, so from the comfort of a faraway "armchair" here goes.

Afghanistan has always grown narcotics, I suspect heroin production is a relatively new phenomenon (will look for clues another time) and for a very long time neither external powers (neighbours mainly), let alone those with internal power have sought to hamper production. It is not an area that lends itself naturally to heroin poppy cultivation, I recall back in the 1970's the focus was on 'The Golden Triangle', but it shares a lack of good governance.

Roll-on the Soviet invasion and the campaign against them. Growing heroin then became a resistance enabler, nay an Islamic duty (dispite the Koran's stricures on narcotics) and quickly became a veritable money machine. Read Gretchen Peter's book 'Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda' for far more detail and opinion (and a thread on the book: ).

Note that in Helmand Province the "breadbasket" for poppy cultivation the original 'Cold War' era of US-sponsored irrigation and development I doubt ever considered poppies as a crop. I am sure there are reliable sources that show other crops were grown there into the Soviet era.

Post-9/11 and the West's intervention for a host of reasons, mainly political, no-one wanted to consider narcotics - again refer to Gretchen Peter's book. This part we have covered in previous threads as to why so little action was taken. 120mm in particular was "boots on the ground". The main thread being: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1234

IMHO we decided to fight other enemies and not upset too many Afghans, from the poor farmer who sells his children when disaster strikes (eradication visitations), who may take up arms too (if paid enough or hates us) to the narco-barons and otehrs entrenched in Afghan government and more. It is one of the weaknesses - to the public - of the UK's involvement in Afghanistan that we have flunked this issue, why are we fighting and doing very little to stop heroin production? Note we share a mutual concern with heroin supply with Iran, which has millions of addicts.

Hope that helps and if others far more expert chime in hurrah.

I'm no expert, but I've had the chance to talk with my neighbor who is more familiar with the situation (he's an adviser for a reconstruction project).

Surprisingly, pomegranates have been very popular in Afghanistan. They were grown throughout the early 20th century and there was substantial demand (especially in Pakistan and India). Pomegranates not only have nutritional value, but they can be used to produce different medicines and cures; essentially, it was a successful crop. However, during the Soviet occupation, much of the land was destroyed. The different mines, explosions, battles, crashes, debris, and "war junk" caused a substantial amount of the land to be difficult to grow pomegranates. As a result, farmers turned to poppies which are easier to grow (plus, getting ahold of the seed in that region isn't difficult). The next thing you know, poppies are being grown and heroin is being produced (prior to the OEF, the Taliban claimed to have clamped down on heroin production because it violates Sharia law, but this was relaxed when they were overthrown).

His project's goal is to revive the pomegranate crop in Afghanistan. They've been able to set up distribution centers for the seeds, but they've discovered another problem. Since some of their funding comes from USAID, there is a "Hello from the US" sticker on the bags. Obviously, when the Taliban see the farmers with these stickers, violence erupts. Their current goal is to remove all signs of international involvement, but that is difficult.

This kind of got off track, but I think it shows partially why Afghanistan became a narco state. Their were not many agricultural options available.

[JMA]

This kind of got off track, but I think it shows partially why Afghanistan became a narco state. Their were not many agricultural options available.

As an explanation that may work but as an excuse it does not.

Poor neighbourhoods it is often said resort to drugs to survive or make a living. Well that is at the expense of other people and therefore unacceptable.

The fact that the US and the European countries involved in Afghanistan have reached the point where there is tacit acceptance of poppy cultivation even though it kills probably more of their kids than the war does and partially funds the Taliban war against their forces in the country absolutely boggles the mind.

Eradication of the poppy crop is probably the only good reason for ISAF to remain in Afghanistan.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den to finding a report by URD, the French government's development agency, on Afghan's drug problem:http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/Strategie...fghanistan.pdf

The blogsite comments:

They conclude that "Though slow, practices are changing and there is growing recognition that there is no one replacement crop, nor any one “alternative” form of development, but that only holistic socio-economic and political development will make it possible to reduce dependence on opium poppy cultivation in a sustainable manner.

[davidbfpo]

On the CIMIC website there is open access to 'Afghanistan Provincial Indicators' and an array of data, including Opium: Area under cultivation (in Hectares). More resources are available on CIMIC after registration:https://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/cimicwebWelcome.aspx


For Helmand Province and Kandahar:

2003 015,371 03,005
2005 026,500 12,989
2007 102,770 16,615
2009 No data 19,811
2010 No data 25,835

Helmand:https://www.cimicweb.org/Afghanistan...s/Helmand.aspx

Kandahar:https://www.cimicweb.org/Afghanistan.../Kandahar.aspx

Clearly something is wrong here, I just - vainly I fear - hope that US$ millions have not been spent on drug control projects.

[Bill Moore]

David,

I thought the UK had the lead on the effort against drugs in Afghanistan? I know the DEA is also involved, but overall in charge of synching the effort, who does that?

The numbers you show are alarming and surprising (while I didn't think we were winning, I didn't know the problem was actually getting a lot bigger).
Unlike terrorism, a good bit of the narcotics trade is facilitated by lack of viable economic alternatives for the farmers. I recall a few years back the USG made a deal with some of the Afghan opium farmers to provide seeds, fertilizer, etc. for a replacement crop, and then at the 11th hour the State Department pulled funding from the program, so once again it appears we can be our own worst enemies.

[jcustis]

Unlike terrorism, a good bit of the narcotics trade is facilitated by lack of viable economic alternatives for the farmers. I recall a few years back the USG made a deal with some of the Afghan opium farmers to provide seeds, fertilizer, etc. for a replacement crop, and then at the 11th hour the State Department pulled funding from the program, so once again it appears we can be our own worst enemies.

Unless there are teeth to force compliance and planting of the free/subsidized seeds, the farmers have little incentive to actually plant the replacement crop, so the lack of funding might have saved us from wasting the money all together.

The governor of Helmand had a counter-narcotics campaign during my unit's deploy (in advance of the winter wheat season) that consisted of four pillars or treatment of addiction, education about the deleterious effects of growing narcotics, a replacement crop program (consisting of wheat seed and some vegetable seeds, and eradication (this was billed as a precision effort to eradicate select fields in order to send a deliberate message).

In the district my unit had responsibility for, the program of bringing in seed and fertilizer to distribute at a slashed price, barely made it off the ground due to terrible logistics. Farmers queued up for it when it did arrive, following some semblance of an organized distribution that was led by the DG's tashkiel, but in the end, we had to stand back and merely observe. We had no ability to verify who the seed and fertilizer outputs were going to, relative to need, and whether the recipients were even the right target population of farmers who might otherwise grow poppy that season. It was clear though that low-grade corruption was certainly in play when the police chief found a few extra rupees in his pocket from men who were allowed to slide into the line despite their names not being on the register.

The bare fact remains that these programs don't have the necessary enforcement components, and if a farmer is going to get more $$$ per hectare by growing opium, and can grow it easier than the water-intensive wheat or corn, there is no reason he would grow it as a cash crop outside of a smaller plot that allows him to feed his family. He stands to gain more by buying it at the subsidized price, haul it out and sell it at a higher price, and pocket the cash, all the while as he prepares for the upcoming opium season.

The larger plots of land that saw wheat and corn grown were clearly owned by wealthy landowners who could diversify, but they still had a variety of hectares planted with marijuana and poppy, often further back from the natural lines of drift.

Until the coalition and GIRoA are willing to make some painful decisions, and assume the risk that some farmers are going to be put out and pissed when their crops are destroyed, whether in the plot or after the harvest, the opium cycle will continue. Disrupting the cycle after the harvest has begun, and the distribution network is active, is terribly difficult when you have a troops-to-task ratio that isn't in you favor.

So therein lies our Catch-22. You can burn it in the field and eyes get wide because conventional wisdom has it that you will grow insurgents as quickly as the poppy bulbs burn. You can alternately attempt to capture the drugs after they are refined into opium tar or hashish and formed into the 10 kilo bricks. Despite the limited road network, trying to interdict that traffic is terribly difficult, especially when you consider that possessing 10 kilos of heroin was not considered by GIRoA to be an offense worthy of detention, adjudication by trial, sentencing, and imprisonment. The theme was that growing and possessing drugs was bad, but we could never pin the district governor down on what precisely the law prescribed and what GIRoA was actually going to do about it. We had a few big hauls when we caught the traffickers in the expanses of the southern desert, but I think we were barely scratching the surface.

I'll admit that our district and my unit's situation (the southernmost coalition unit in Helmand), compounded by the lack of police influence beyond the district center and the few traffic control points that the border police manned, may have been unique. I don't know how common our situation was across the other districts or provinces, but I'd for sure be happy to hear from other folks who had a tie in to the drug issue during their deploy.

You know, the most difficult thing to swallow for me and the OIC of our CA team was the fact that the use of wheat as an attempt to replace opium was not based on any scientific process as far as we could tell. The two shared the same growing season, but poppy is a weed and will grow anywhere. Wheat takes a little bit more finesse, and it wasn't even clear that the majority of the soil and water sources could support wheat growth. It was simply shoved down our throats, despite our efforts to try to find a solution that was better tuned to our local situation.

[davidbfpo]

David,

I thought the UK had the lead on the effort against drugs in Afghanistan? I know the DEA is also involved, but overall in charge of synching the effort, who does that?

The numbers you show are alarming and surprising (while I didn't think we were winning, I didn't know the problem was actually getting a lot bigger).

Bill,

Yes that is my understanding that the UK 'leads' on counter-narcotics and the 'lead' agency on the ground is the Serious & Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), which did have a substantial outpost in Helmand two years ago plus. SOCA is a criminal intelligence and law enforcement agency; one that has a very mixed reputation. SOCA's international partner is the US DEA.

..alarming and surprising..the problem..getting a lot bigger.

Yes, an understatement, scandal is mild and a disaster for UK public policy - in Afghanistan and at home.

I do not watch for coverage on counter-narcotics, which IMHO is rarely in the public domain and I doubt if HMG, SOCA and the DEA would appreciate the public, let alone politicians knowing the problem is getting bigger. Later I will see if there are any official, HMG statements on the situation.

[davidbfpo]

Jon,

Thanks for that insight and your arguments reinforce my view that we should simply buy the initial opiate product on site, then destroy it. This suggestion has appeared on another thread and led to a debate.

The challenge then would be to identify a local replacement crop, perhaps an international competition? Assuming an opium poppy alternative crop in such terrain has not been found before, just that we've all forgotten.

[jcustis]

The Afghans grow vegetables and some hardy cash crops, along with wheat and corn (which are water-intensive as I mentioned), so things can be grown. The output is variable depending on the access to canal irrigation from the Helmand, which is at a lower state at that time of year due to control policies at the Kajaki Dam and the lack or rainfall. The locals literally dam the Helmand and "push water uphill" in order to get it to their pumps, and the canals are at times silted over something fierce. The local answer is to employ village and migrant labor to clean them, perhaps reinforced with a caterpillar-tracked backhoe. The elders are very adept by now at trying to get the coalition to drop money for a canal cleaning or repair project, when they would likely be doing it regardless.

The poppy harvest experienced a lower haul in the Spring of 2010, and many of the locals spread the rumor that the coalition had done something to spike the poppy. Turns out, if I remember correctly, that the poppy simply experienced either some blight or pest that year.

We were hopeful that the possibility of lower output or even worse blight would drive farmers to move to a replacement crop, but the exact opposite seemed to happen, because the price of opium tar ended up going higher due to the impact the poor harvest had on supply. It was hard to turn away from poppy when the price was climbing and expected to go even higher.

This is all complicated by the fact that in our district, much of the land was owned by men who lived far away, in some cases Lashkar Gah or Goreshk. Finding them would be necessary if you wanted to buy the crop. And what then of paying the locals who live on the land and care for it as it grows, or the migrants who swarm in with their cutting knives to score the bulbs and scrape the resin off? Those are larger eradication policy questions that I never saw a cohesive plan, or even coherent policy paper, for; and I spent a lot of time with my team scouring the secure networks looking for someone's proposal.