Owning Battlespace

[82redleg]

that 'control' word and that statement are, perhaps, part of the problem I see that led to my first post.

I'm not at all sure ANY Commander can truthfully 'control' "all parts of their area not assigned to subordinates" and I suspect many US Commanders do not fully trust some of their subordinates and that this all leads to OVER control -- or attempts to do so. Certainly some recent contacts from the 'Stan have said that is a problem -- and not just in one area. That's a bad and dangerously worded paragraph that merits review -- as IMO does that BSO bit...

As I read that paragraph (and I fully admit to reading the snippet posted here and not going back to the manual), I understand it to mean that, if a commander is assigned an AO, and decides not to further assign responsibilities for portions of that AO to a subordinate, he/she retains responsibility for all the coordination required in controlling that AO (clearing fires, tracking movement, etc).

[Ken White]

As I read that paragraph (and I fully admit to reading the snippet posted here and not going back to the manual), I understand it to mean that, if a commander is assigned an AO, and decides not to further assign responsibilities for portions of that AO to a subordinate, he/she retains responsibility for all the coordination required in controlling that AO (clearing fires, tracking movement, etc).

However, my belief -- and fear -- is that some (that 10-20%...) will latch onto the words "Further, commanders must control all parts of their area of operations not assigned to subordinates..." and overdo it. Some will take it to mean they must literally control the entire area by occupation. Others will be excessive in their exercise of control authority by insisting on excessive coordination or adherence to their restrictions and tactical direction. I have it on good authority that is occurring and that some are being quite rigorous in their exercise of 'control' (that wording makes me a master of political correctness... ).

'Control' the verb is overly loved by too many in the US Army -- it leads to micromangement, reluctance or even refusal to delegate and / or to trust subordinates and increases the societal tendency toward risk aversion. I do not question the necessity for use of the word but know that overuse of the word and the concept can lead to the inadvertant stifling of initiative and innovation. I'm firmly convinced that its employment in doctrine should minimal and quite specific.

I fully realize that no doctrinal pub can account for all possibilities for misuse but I do strongly believe two things in this regard:

- The proliferation of terms, be they shorthand, slang or whatever should be avoided as such terms have a way of making their way into publications, largely written by Snowbirds, Blackbirds and civilian writers who hear but do not always understand the context. This proven tendency can create confusion and can among other things provide the unwary latitude for unwise directives and measures.

- The current trend toward ever more wordy manuals can also lead to such confusion as the critical points often become physically separated and lose impact.

I know there's little hope in educating the 10% -- my concern is to keep it at that level or lower if possible instead of allowing, even encouraging, it to hit the 20% level.

I'm also concerned that while adaptation to the current fight is certainly necessary, such adaptation excessively pursued can lead to blinders for other fights in other times and places against far different opponents. I saw many bad habits acquired by the US Army (and Marines) in Viet Nam. Some -- too many -- of those one war peculiar and undesirable traits are still around. My hope is that the potential for even worse habits from the current wars not get embedded to our future detriment.

[Fuchs]

I say "let them fail". That's what the economy does.
There are gazillions of business owners past the age of 50 who have a business model that would allow for 50 employees but they cannot go beyond 5-10 because they have the urge to micromanage.

They'll never sustain a growth beyond their ability to micromanage, that's the punishment of the markets.

Armies should keep handicapped leaders small as well. let them fail, send them back to last position where they didn't fail. A Col who cannot resist the urge to micromanage should be turned into a section leader.

That's way easier than to develop work-around everywhere in order to mitigate their failures.

[Ken White]

Even prosper -- after all, the flawed run may be a tax write-off, the items may be sold at a discount, perhaps there can be some recycling and the management team can be sent back to the drawing board and will likely produce a better production method or process.

In war, flawed processes will almost certainly mean unnecessary deaths. So while there is merit to letting leaders fail and recycling them, it's got to be tempered with full knowledge of the costs and a sense of time and place. A better solution would be improved selection of leaders and to not presume that everyone can do the job if not well, at least acceptably. They cannot.

[Bob's World]

Of course, worth considering is that the Afghans may well be amused to hear that some Coalition Commander considers some area to be his "battlespace," much as many a nation is likely "amused" to hear that their entire nation and its territorial waters lie within some GCC's "Area of Responsibility" as well. Point being, we may well take our overly grandiose proclamations of control more seriously than do those who actually have control/responsibility for those spaces.

In a place like Afghanistan one can layer dozens of such stakeholders, foreign and domestic, on any particular area; few really coordinating with the others, and many quite likely not even aware of who all the claimants are or how to coordinate with them if they were so inclined to do so to begin with.

Which brings us back to the largest problem with battlespace being that coalition commanders believe they all have such space and are in control over the same.

Such space is critical in operations where someone must be able to account for the presence of friendly forces and clear fires. If Afghanistan such fires are virtually always observed. One need no "own" battlespace to clear such fires. In fact most battlespace has been abandoned to SOF, with the conventional forces focused on a fraction of their entire AOR, leaving SOF commanders to take calls from roving helicopters requesting permission to engage some target or another that they swear is "the enemy." Too often it is not, and once again SOF has produced a CIVCAS while the helicopter boys return to base with all the Teflon that not being a BSO provides in such incidents. So a change that makes the air guys "clear" their own fires and take responsibility for what they break would be a nice change.

I have no bright scheme for clearing this mess up, but I do recognize it is far messier and more complex than it need be.

[SJPONeill]

I have no bright scheme for clearing this mess up, but I do recognize it is far messier and more complex than it need be.

As above it may be as 'simple' as "

...A better solution would be improved selection of leaders and to not presume that everyone can do the job if not well, at least acceptably...

"

I don't agree with Fuchs on recyling...natural selection in this profession should be as harsh as the consequences of getting it wrong...and I'm sure (based on past practice) that most of those 'out-cycled' will survive very nicely in the outside world, worse case in some dodgy thinktank...

[Rifleman]

While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.

Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.

The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.

The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.

Just wanted to make that observation.