Owning Battlespace

[Ken White]

Even prosper -- after all, the flawed run may be a tax write-off, the items may be sold at a discount, perhaps there can be some recycling and the management team can be sent back to the drawing board and will likely produce a better production method or process.

In war, flawed processes will almost certainly mean unnecessary deaths. So while there is merit to letting leaders fail and recycling them, it's got to be tempered with full knowledge of the costs and a sense of time and place. A better solution would be improved selection of leaders and to not presume that everyone can do the job if not well, at least acceptably. They cannot.

[Bob's World]

Of course, worth considering is that the Afghans may well be amused to hear that some Coalition Commander considers some area to be his "battlespace," much as many a nation is likely "amused" to hear that their entire nation and its territorial waters lie within some GCC's "Area of Responsibility" as well. Point being, we may well take our overly grandiose proclamations of control more seriously than do those who actually have control/responsibility for those spaces.

In a place like Afghanistan one can layer dozens of such stakeholders, foreign and domestic, on any particular area; few really coordinating with the others, and many quite likely not even aware of who all the claimants are or how to coordinate with them if they were so inclined to do so to begin with.

Which brings us back to the largest problem with battlespace being that coalition commanders believe they all have such space and are in control over the same.

Such space is critical in operations where someone must be able to account for the presence of friendly forces and clear fires. If Afghanistan such fires are virtually always observed. One need no "own" battlespace to clear such fires. In fact most battlespace has been abandoned to SOF, with the conventional forces focused on a fraction of their entire AOR, leaving SOF commanders to take calls from roving helicopters requesting permission to engage some target or another that they swear is "the enemy." Too often it is not, and once again SOF has produced a CIVCAS while the helicopter boys return to base with all the Teflon that not being a BSO provides in such incidents. So a change that makes the air guys "clear" their own fires and take responsibility for what they break would be a nice change.

I have no bright scheme for clearing this mess up, but I do recognize it is far messier and more complex than it need be.

[SJPONeill]

I have no bright scheme for clearing this mess up, but I do recognize it is far messier and more complex than it need be.

As above it may be as 'simple' as "

...A better solution would be improved selection of leaders and to not presume that everyone can do the job if not well, at least acceptably...

"

I don't agree with Fuchs on recyling...natural selection in this profession should be as harsh as the consequences of getting it wrong...and I'm sure (based on past practice) that most of those 'out-cycled' will survive very nicely in the outside world, worse case in some dodgy thinktank...

[Rifleman]

While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.

Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.

The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.

The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.

Just wanted to make that observation.

[Cole]

While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.

Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.

AOR would be more like the entire large city jurisdiction the Police Chief is responsible for, while a precinct would be more like an operational area, and series of beats are the individual areas of operation (AO).

The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.

This raises the point that the commander of the area of operation has responsibilities listed in FM 3-0 for that area. That does not mean they "own" that space anymore than the police or precinct chief owns the space they operate in.

The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.

It also is analogous to how a police officer treats citizens and how (I would presume) a Soldier/Marine practicing COIN should treat foreign citizens...with respect. If police officers play rambo and treat citizens with disrespect, my bet is they don't last long on the job. It should be the same way for Soldiers and commanders in an AO with respect to average citizens. Police don't assume that everyone is a criminal. Troops can't treat every Pashtun like they are Taliban...IMHO the whole disconnect of those who advocate enemy-centric COIN.

Enemy-centric COIN implies an assumption that you can take greater liberties with the population as a whole and screw the collateral damage as long as you ferret out and kill the bad guys. Would a cop take that attitude?

[Rifleman]

Police don't assume that everyone is a criminal.

Police don't, or shouldn't, automatically treat everyone as a criminal.

But I'm convinced the following quote is the way to go:

"Conduct every traffic stop extending the olive branch of peace; while having a tactical plan to kill everyone inside the vehicle." - Gordon Graham

[Bob's World]

Bob: "Resolving such situations is another matter entirely, and it cannot be resolved through the principles of war or through the conduct of warfare."

WILF: "History does not support that statement."

Actually I argue the opposite is true, but toss a couple examples out there and lets take a look at them. My only condition is that we look at least 20 years beyond any military "victory" and see how the subsequent peace turned out. Mere suppression of a particular insurgent group or ideology for some narrow window of time does not count.

[Ken White]

"21. Be polite. Be professional. But, have a plan to kill everyone you meet."

Always, of course, accompanied by Nrs 19 and 20:

"19. Decide to be aggressive ENOUGH, quickly ENOUGH.
20. The faster you finish the fight, the less shot you will get"

[SJPONeill]

While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.

Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.

The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.

The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.

Just wanted to make that observation.

And a good observation it is...while we have CIMS (C for Coordinated) down here instead of NIMS, I expect that they are essentially similar...one of the key lessons we found (the hard way, of course) when dealing with rotating ICs was the essential need for regular liaison and training between all the various agencies involved at both the area/regional command level and at the boots on the ground work-face level...once some egos got put in their box, it worked well, to the extent that, when the lahar kicked off in 2007, it was almost ho-hum-whatever as ALL the agencies involved were so used to working together...

The difference though is that most of the relationships that develop for incident management are long-term as most of the agencies involved don't rotate people in and out on a 2-3 year basis...the military always seemed to be ones playing catch-up in terms of continuity because of this...