Owning Battlespace

[Rifleman]

While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.

Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.

The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.

The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.

Just wanted to make that observation.

[Cole]

While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.

Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.

AOR would be more like the entire large city jurisdiction the Police Chief is responsible for, while a precinct would be more like an operational area, and series of beats are the individual areas of operation (AO).

The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.

This raises the point that the commander of the area of operation has responsibilities listed in FM 3-0 for that area. That does not mean they "own" that space anymore than the police or precinct chief owns the space they operate in.

The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.

It also is analogous to how a police officer treats citizens and how (I would presume) a Soldier/Marine practicing COIN should treat foreign citizens...with respect. If police officers play rambo and treat citizens with disrespect, my bet is they don't last long on the job. It should be the same way for Soldiers and commanders in an AO with respect to average citizens. Police don't assume that everyone is a criminal. Troops can't treat every Pashtun like they are Taliban...IMHO the whole disconnect of those who advocate enemy-centric COIN.

Enemy-centric COIN implies an assumption that you can take greater liberties with the population as a whole and screw the collateral damage as long as you ferret out and kill the bad guys. Would a cop take that attitude?

[Rifleman]

Police don't assume that everyone is a criminal.

Police don't, or shouldn't, automatically treat everyone as a criminal.

But I'm convinced the following quote is the way to go:

"Conduct every traffic stop extending the olive branch of peace; while having a tactical plan to kill everyone inside the vehicle." - Gordon Graham

[Bob's World]

Bob: "Resolving such situations is another matter entirely, and it cannot be resolved through the principles of war or through the conduct of warfare."

WILF: "History does not support that statement."

Actually I argue the opposite is true, but toss a couple examples out there and lets take a look at them. My only condition is that we look at least 20 years beyond any military "victory" and see how the subsequent peace turned out. Mere suppression of a particular insurgent group or ideology for some narrow window of time does not count.

[Ken White]

"21. Be polite. Be professional. But, have a plan to kill everyone you meet."

Always, of course, accompanied by Nrs 19 and 20:

"19. Decide to be aggressive ENOUGH, quickly ENOUGH.
20. The faster you finish the fight, the less shot you will get"

[jmm99]

As a segué into this, I've been slogging at the early development of Operational Law since its "conception" in the 1980s-1990s (legal doctrines material to military operations in war and in "other than war"). As part of that, I've been looking at ROE development; e.g., Rules of Engagement (ROE) Handbook for Judge Advocates (CLAMO 2000); and, from the international humanitarian law viewpoint, Rules of Engagement Handbook (Sanremo 2009).

Needless to say, after burying my head in those august publications, Ken's post was a breath of fresh air - and the entire "Marine Rules of Combat" are an oxygen tent. So, here are all of them for perusal by "battlespace owners, occupiers and possessors" (and those who might represent them in consequent courts-martial proceedings):

Rules of Combat

USMC

1. Bring a weapon. Preferably, bring at least two. Bring all of your friends who have weapons. Bring their friends who have weapons.

2. Anything worth shooting is worth shooting twice. Ammo is cheap. Life is expensive.

3. Only hits count. Close doesn't count. The only thing worse than a miss is a slow miss.

4. If your shooting stance is good, you're probably not moving fast enough, nor using cover correctly.

5. Move away from your attacker. Distance is your friend. (Lateral and diagonal movement are preferred.)

6. If you can choose what to bring to a gunfight, bring a big weaponand a friend with a big weapon.

7. In ten years nobody will remember the details of caliber, stance, or tactics. They will only remember who lived and who didn't.

8. If you are not shooting, you should be communicating, reloading, and running.

9. Accuracy is relative: most combat shooting is more dependent on "pucker factor" than the inherent accuracy of the weapon.

10. Use a weapon that works EVERY TIME. "All skill is in vain when an Angel pisses in the flintlock of your musket."

11. Someday someone may kill you with your own weapon, but they should have to beat you to death with it because it is empty.

12. In combat, there are no rules, always cheat; always win. The only unfair fight is the one you lose.

13. Have a plan.

14. Have a back-up plan, because the first one won't work.

15. Use cover or concealment as much as possible. The visible target should be in FRONT of YOUR weapon.

16. Flank your adversary when possible. Protect yours.

17. Don't drop your guard.

18. Always tactical load and threat scan 360 degrees.

19. Watch their hands. Hands kill. (In God we trust. Everyone else, keep your hands where I can see them).

20. Decide to be aggressive ENOUGH, quickly ENOUGH.

21. The faster you finish the fight, the less shot you will get.

22. Be courteous to everyone, friendly to no one.

23. Be polite. Be professional. But have a plan to kill everyone you meet.

24. Your number one Option for Personal Security is a lifelong commitment to avoidance, deterrence, and de-escalation.

25. Do not attend a gunfight with a handgun, the caliber of which does not start with a ".4."

Army

1. See USMC Rules for combat

2. Add 60 to 90 days

3. Hope the Marines already destroyed all meaningful resistance

Navy

1. Spend three weeks getting somewhere

2. Adopt an aggressive offshore posture

3. Send in the Marines

4. Drink Coffee

5. Bring back the Marines

Air Force

1. Kiss the spouse good-bye

2. Drive to the flight line

3. Fly to target area, drop bombs, fly back.

4. Pop in at the club for a couple with the guys

5. Go home, BBQ some burgers and drink some more beer

My own summary of the Golden Twenty-Five: Carry a Big Hunting License, but don't kill everything in the forest.

Regards

Mike

[SJPONeill]

While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.

Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.

The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.

The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.

Just wanted to make that observation.

And a good observation it is...while we have CIMS (C for Coordinated) down here instead of NIMS, I expect that they are essentially similar...one of the key lessons we found (the hard way, of course) when dealing with rotating ICs was the essential need for regular liaison and training between all the various agencies involved at both the area/regional command level and at the boots on the ground work-face level...once some egos got put in their box, it worked well, to the extent that, when the lahar kicked off in 2007, it was almost ho-hum-whatever as ALL the agencies involved were so used to working together...

The difference though is that most of the relationships that develop for incident management are long-term as most of the agencies involved don't rotate people in and out on a 2-3 year basis...the military always seemed to be ones playing catch-up in terms of continuity because of this...