Owning Battlespace

[Bob's World]

(Rifleman when I mean US Army SF I say SF; I use SOF when I mean the entire array of joint and mulitnational forces.)

Concur with Dave completely about the host nation. I will only add that that is absolutely NOT how ISAF thinks about this, and it is a huge problem. There is that dang "control" word again. We are addicted to control in these operations, and it is the very fact that we seek to control outcomes that make the problems as large as they are. (That classic principle from Lawrence that everyone can quote, but no one wants to apply to their own slice of the equation regarding any HN solution, regardless of how poor being superior to any foreign solution, regardless of how good).

I was the point man for a couple months leading up to Marjah to take beatings from the RC leadership and staff for the insistence of SF on facilitating much larger Afghan units to function more effectively under their own C2 and structures; rather than disempowering their leadership and merging Afghan soldiers into Coalition units in a 1-1 ratio. (On my mental OER support form it states "Did not say 'are you F'n kidding me?' to any generals; and 'did not punch out the snarky USMC Lt Col who lectured me on how the SF model was outdated and that now partnering is defined as the 1-1 technique being employed by the Marines in Helmand.')


I am sure the rationale is along the lines of "we can't put the HN in the lead in their own country now because there is too much that needs to be done so that we can withdraw and leave them in charge on their own then."

(Warning, self-induced rant to follow. Chalk this up to PTSD: God. Colonial intervention counter guerrilla operations cloaked as "COIN" makes my head hurt. We would never pull this crap if it was at home. We would not even attempt to pull this crap if we were supporting a "first world" nation. We only pull this crap when we go some place we assess as inferior. We are arrogant a-holes, and our doctrine is a codification of that arrogance derived from the arrogant lessons of the European colonial experience. Trying to sugar coat that with "pop-centric" tactics is like putting sugar sprinkles on a bowl of dog####.)

[Ken White]

(Rifleman when I mean US Army SF I say SF; I use SOF when I mean the entire array of joint and mulitnational forces.)

Me too. Though I'm contemplating adding CRAF and WTFMF. Those would be 'CIFs Running Amok Forces' and 'Wrong Time For [this] Mission Forces' (another expansion of the abbreviation may be alternatively used). They seem to be amalgams and over present...

There is that dang "control" word again. We are addicted to control in these operations, and it is the very fact that we seek to control outcomes that make the problems as large as they are.

Yes!

Colonial intervention counter guerrilla operations cloaked as "COIN" makes my head hurt. We would never pull this crap if it was at home. We would not even attempt to pull this crap if we were supporting a "first world" nation. We only pull this crap when we go some place we assess as inferior. We are arrogant a-holes, and our doctrine is a codification of that arrogance derived from the arrogant lessons of the European colonial experience. Trying to sugar coat that with "pop-centric" tactics is like putting sugar sprinkles on a bowl of dog####.)

Yes!

[Fuchs]

(Warning, self-induced rant to follow. Chalk this up to PTSD: God. Colonial intervention counter guerrilla operations cloaked as "COIN" makes my head hurt. We would never pull this crap if it was at home. We would not even attempt to pull this crap if we were supporting a "first world" nation. We only pull this crap when we go some place we assess as inferior.

I'm not so sure about that. The counter-insurgency influence of the U.S. in Greece wasn't exactly diplomatic either.

[Bob's World]

Greece fell in a unique time and place. Still establishing the lines for post WWII spheres of influence; and still in the realist "contain expansion of Sovietness" era of the Cold War. It was a few years later after the fall of Nationalist China that we began to morph to what I see as a much more Idealist "contain communism" era the dominated the Cold War proper; and shapes how we look at Islamism today. Still trying to contain ideologies, when the real energy fueling most of the conflicts were people seeking a liberty not controlled by some Colonial power or their appointed successor.

People are still seeking such liberty today. Tunisia is a current testament to that fact. Everyone is asking "where are the Islamists?" Meanwhile the people are talking in terms of "Liberty" "Democracy" "Justice" and "Self-Determination." Appears that the intel guys and ideologues are wrong again. No big surprise there.

So, back to my original point. We need to trade in the relentless pursuit of control for the relentless pursuit of influence. Once we make that paradigm shift, the rest will begin to fall in place. Oh, and that influence must be with populaces and non-state actors as well as with official governments. We're going to need a new playbook.

[Infanteer]

So, back to my original point. We need to trade in the relentless pursuit of control for the relentless pursuit of influence. Once we make that paradigm shift, the rest will begin to fall in place. Oh, and that influence must be with populaces and non-state actors as well as with official governments. We're going to need a new playbook.

I feel like I'm reading something by Joseph S. Nye....

[Ken White]

You noticed...

[Cole]

OPSEC guys, Ken White said it was OK to post it and I answer to that higher authority.

"Assigning areas of operations to subordinate commanders maximizes decentralized execution by empowering those commanders to exercise initiative. Mission command gives commanders the authority to create any effects necessary to accomplish the mission (consistent with the rules of engagement) within their areas of operations. However, commanders cannot create effects outside their areas of operations without permission from the commander assigned the area of operations in which those effects will occur.
Further, commanders must control all parts of their area of operations not assigned to subordinates. Assignment of an area of operations includes authority to perform the following:
.. Terrain management.
.. Intelligence collection.
.. Civil affairs activities.
.. Air and ground movement control.
.. Clearance of fires.
.. Security."

Believe "battlespace" has been ruled a non-term in Army doctrine although the Marines still use it.

My questions are many. Does a BCT or battalion's boundaries constitute its area of operations (AO)? If so, what of the larger area of influence for indirect fires? And if area of interest is even farther out, this quote seems to imply you are busting boundaries beyond your "intelligence collection" AO. BTW, Wilf believe AOR only applies to combatant command and other upper echelon units although you frequently see it used at lower level.

Does it come down to a battalion having noncontiguous AO boundaries within a larger BCT AO so that the organic artillery battalion can shoot targets inside the battalion's area of influence but actually in the brigade AO? Likewise, does the Fires Brigade shoot targets in division unassigned areas that are the BCT's area of influence? Confused yet? There's more.

I've been told in the past that units are allowed to employ direct fires across a boundary anytime if positive ID is established but not indirect fires without permission? Yet this quote seems to imply no "effects" outside your AO/boundaries??

Finally, what happens if a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is located instead a battalion's AO? Can a Brigade Support Battalion have an AO?

Cliff, I made the same comment to Ken in a PM about coordinating altitude being the cut-off for ground commander's air control. I only recently learned about blue (ground up) and purple (lower and higher altitude) kill boxes. Is anyone out there using the term Joint Fires Area in the real Army/Joint world? Is the Air Force allowing Kill Boxes to be split up to allow airspace users to share the same area by restricting themselves to just one Keypad within a Kill Box? Did that UH-60 in your video bust a Position Area for Artillery big time...or is that artillery unit never going to get resupplied by air again?

[SJPONeill]

I think that we are in danger here of applying an over-specific brush to what is 'only' doctrine and which should not attempt to prescribe specific situations...the examples being quotes of 'but what if? are the sorts of issues that should be resolved on a case-by-case basis using existing command and control processes...I find it hard to believe that brigade staffs are so dumb or doctrinally-driven that they can not and do not recognise and mitigate such situations - noting, of course, that is such mitigations, not every departs happy (i.e. got what they wanted) and so the staff responsible are tagged as biased, slanted, ticket-punching, unresponsive, out-of-the-loop, etc etc...

[Cliff]

Cliff, I made the same comment to Ken in a PM about coordinating altitude being the cut-off for ground commander's air control. I only recently learned about blue (ground up) and purple (lower and higher altitude) kill boxes. Is anyone out there using the term Joint Fires Area in the real Army/Joint world? Is the Air Force allowing Kill Boxes to be split up to allow airspace users to share the same area by restricting themselves to just one Keypad within a Kill Box? Did that UH-60 in your video bust a Position Area for Artillery big time...or is that artillery unit never going to get resupplied by air again?

Cole-

The ALSA website has links to FM 3-09.34 Kill Box Tactics and Multiservice Procedures... distribution is restricted, so you will need a CAC card to look at it.

Kill Boxes can in theory be opened and closed by keypad, but that is not as likely due to the smaller size of the keypads. I'll have to ask my sources to see what is happening right now in the field... Kill boxes are a pretty flexible means of doing FSCMs, and they work well for a fluid fight like Afghanistan because you can open and close them with less work since everyone (in theory!) already knows where they are- unlike a ROZ.

As for the video, I have heard (anecdotally) that the artillery folks hadn't coordinated their fires, but I don't know all the details. That is a case of Army vs. Army coordination, so I can only speculate...

My only other comment is that it seems like the "ownership" issue gets pretty emotional... like I said before (and I'm agreeing with the majority here I think), having a system of coordination seems to be more important than who owns what.

I'll post again if I can get some current data from bros at the CAOC.

V/R,

Cliff

[IntelTrooper]

I find it hard to believe that brigade staffs are so dumb or doctrinally-driven that they can not and do not recognise and mitigate such situations - noting, of course, that is such mitigations, not every departs happy (i.e. got what they wanted) and so the staff responsible are tagged as biased, slanted, ticket-punching, unresponsive, out-of-the-loop, etc etc...

There are some brigade staffs that have deployed and have been pretty unanimously determined to be biased, ticket-punching, unresponsive, and out-of-the-loop. That's certainly not universal but when talking about "ownership," it can seriously impede progress and when it goes on for a year or more, that's a lot of damage to all the progress that had been and could have been made.

I recall one particularly absurd case where the brigade commander was so adamant at enforcing his "no night ops" rule that he wouldn't let another government agency with all of their own assets and support snatch a guy at 3 AM. They were told they had to wait until dawn to go after him, of course rendering the whole mission moot.

This kind of stuff goes on all the time, unfortunately.

[Ken White]

OPSEC guys, Ken White said it was OK to post it and I answer to that higher authority.

Partly so I could laugh at this:

"Assigning areas of operations to subordinate commanders maximizes decentralized execution by empowering those commanders to exercise initiative. Mission command gives commanders the authority to create any effects necessary to accomplish the mission (consistent with the rules of engagement) within their areas of operations. However, commanders cannot create effects outside their areas of operations without permission from the commander assigned the area of operations in which those effects will occur.

I think that says "you're in charge except when you're not..."

Still, I get the intent and that's not too bad. Here's the part that does bother me:

Further, commanders must control all parts of their area of operations not assigned to subordinates...

That 'control' word and that statement are, perhaps, part of the problem I see that led to my first post.

I'm not at all sure ANY Commander can truthfully 'control' "all parts of their area not assigned to subordinates" and I suspect many US Commanders do not fully trust some of their subordinates and that this all leads to OVER control -- or attempts to do so. Certainly some recent contacts from the 'Stan have said that is a problem -- and not just in one area. That's a bad and dangerously worded paragraph that merits review -- as IMO does that BSO bit...

As to your questions, not an OpSec violation in them to my mind though others may not agree and thus not answer. So I'll give you the pre-2001 answers.

A BCT or battalion's boundaries do constitute its area of operations (AO) but it is important to recall that boundaries as a control measure differ from the use of a unit AO. They used to be called a Tactical Area of Operations (TAOR) and were the lower echelon equivalent of the AO used for echelons above reality. The paragraph following your quote, Para 5-79 and illustration 5-2 give a clearer picture than does 5-78. I think that also answers your Fires question asked later.

The larger area of influence for indirect fires relies on coordination, pure and simple. An area of interest is even farther out does imply one is busting boundaries beyond ones "intelligence collection" AO but again the key is coordination -- and as always, METT-TC...

Units have to be allowed to employ direct fires across a boundary anytime if positive ID is established. As for indirect fires without permission, the quote seems to imply no "effects" outside the AO but I suspect that's sloppy writing and that somewhere in that oversized tome, it's clarified.

At least, I hope it is...

I think SJPONeill is correct -- most Commanders will work it out and not get too hung up over the doctrine. My concern is simply that one must be careful with doctrine to limit the damage caused by those few Commanders who cannot (or, more often, just will not) work it out.

I also think Cliff is spot on with the comment that "the 'ownership' issue gets pretty emotional... like I said before (and I'm agreeing with the majority here I think), having a system of coordination seems to be more important than who owns what." That emotional aspect exists and luckily will only adversely affect a few. The importance of using known and standard names and processes is that system he wants. He's totally correct and about 80 to 90% of all folks know and will do that.

Those existing processes are unfortunately necessary and quite critical to limit the damage that other 10 to 20% can do. We aren't talking hurt feelings and bruised egos here -- people get killed unnecessarily due to such screwups and its easy to miss that point in peacetime or in low intensity conflicts. Such errors are far too costly in a mid or high intensity fight. Hopefully no one will have to endure one or more of those.

But don't bet the farm you or people you train will not have to do so...

[82redleg]

that 'control' word and that statement are, perhaps, part of the problem I see that led to my first post.

I'm not at all sure ANY Commander can truthfully 'control' "all parts of their area not assigned to subordinates" and I suspect many US Commanders do not fully trust some of their subordinates and that this all leads to OVER control -- or attempts to do so. Certainly some recent contacts from the 'Stan have said that is a problem -- and not just in one area. That's a bad and dangerously worded paragraph that merits review -- as IMO does that BSO bit...

As I read that paragraph (and I fully admit to reading the snippet posted here and not going back to the manual), I understand it to mean that, if a commander is assigned an AO, and decides not to further assign responsibilities for portions of that AO to a subordinate, he/she retains responsibility for all the coordination required in controlling that AO (clearing fires, tracking movement, etc).

[William F. Owen]

We need to trade in the relentless pursuit of control for the relentless pursuit of influence. Once we make that paradigm shift, the rest will begin to fall in place. Oh, and that influence must be with populaces and non-state actors as well as with official governments. We're going to need a new playbook.

What worked in wars 3,000 years ago, works today. War is politics. Break will, gain control, and support follows. Influence comes from the application of force, to force compliance. Influence is control, and it is should be articulated as control.

Focus on killing and all else follows. Kill the people opposed to your policy. if that doesn't work the policy, not the killing, was wrong. Leave the population alone. Focus effort of breaking the will of enemy armed force, be they regular or irregular.

There is no confusion as to what works and how to do it.

[Bob's World]

What worked in wars 3,000 years ago, works today. War is politics. Break will, gain control, and support follows. Influence comes from the application of force, to force compliance. Influence is control, and it is should be articulated as control.

Focus on killing and all else follows. Kill the people opposed to your policy. if that doesn't work the policy, not the killing, was wrong. Leave the population alone. Focus effort of breaking the will of enemy armed force, be they regular or irregular.

There is no confusion as to what works and how to do it.

"Give unto Caesar that which is Caesar's" Wise words. I would take the liberty to derive from that "Give unto Mars that which is Mar's."

What I just posted on the thread regarding globalization applies, and I won't repeat here. My case is yes, war is war; but NO insurgency is not war; and foreign intervention is not COIN. History is littered with the ruins of empires who never grasped this fine point.

I say it's time to break the trend. So, when at war, wage war. Crush your enemies and the will of his populace to even consider attempting such a thing ever again (or at least for a generation or two). But when faced with illegal challenges at home by one's own populace tread lightly in re-establishing security and focus on understanding and addressing the true causes (most of which will track right back to the government itself) of the uprising. When going overseas to assist a friendly government faced with such challenges give them this friendly advice as well. Tell them you will not assist them in the suppression of their own people, but rather that you are willing to help them in a neutral manner to mediate the differences between the people and their government. If that is not enough for that government, or if that government then seeks to screw you over by turning to your enemies for such support in suppressing the populace the answer is easy: Switch to UW and support the people against the government. At the end of the day, our national interests are in the resources and support of the land and the people. Governments come and go.

[Bob's World]

(oh yeah, and now I have a homework assignment from Infanteer and Ken to go find out who the heck Joseph S. Nye is, and read some of his stuff.)

[max161]

See his original Foreign Policy article: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...e-jr/get-smart

This is where Secretary Clinton derives the concept of Smart Power she talks about.

See also the CSIS Smart Power initiative: http://csis.org/program/smart-power-initiative

[Infanteer]

(oh yeah, and now I have a homework assignment from Infanteer and Ken to go find out who the heck Joseph S. Nye is, and read some of his stuff.)

Much of what you say resonates to his writings on soft power and its difference from hard power.

[sullygoarmy]

(oh yeah, and now I have a homework assignment from Infanteer and Ken to go find out who the heck Joseph S. Nye is, and read some of his stuff.)

Link to Joseph Nye's book, Soft Power. A good, quick read.

[William F. Owen]

"Give unto Caesar that which is Caesar's"

From the Christian book?

My case is yes, war is war; but NO insurgency is not war; and foreign intervention is not COIN. History is littered with the ruins of empires who never grasped this fine point.

Insurgency is really baby-talk for a rebellion. Rebellions is when folks seek to alter the political power being exercised over them. How is that not war?

Empires, nations and ideas are sustained by wiping out the the rebels. Rebellion is War. Faced with a rebellion, you break the armed factions will to fight and force them conduct peaceful negotiations for their political objectives, under terms you dictate.

[Bob's World]

Yes, yes, I am quite aware of the recipe for sustaining illegitimate and despotic rule over ones own populace or the populace of others. Nothing new or insightful there.

What I speak to is how to actually address the root causes. Suppression of those who dare to challenge you is easy enough. Resolving such situations is another matter entirely, and it cannot be resolved through the principles of war or through the conduct of warfare.