Owning Battlespace

[Cole]

OPSEC guys, Ken White said it was OK to post it and I answer to that higher authority.

"Assigning areas of operations to subordinate commanders maximizes decentralized execution by empowering those commanders to exercise initiative. Mission command gives commanders the authority to create any effects necessary to accomplish the mission (consistent with the rules of engagement) within their areas of operations. However, commanders cannot create effects outside their areas of operations without permission from the commander assigned the area of operations in which those effects will occur.
Further, commanders must control all parts of their area of operations not assigned to subordinates. Assignment of an area of operations includes authority to perform the following:
.. Terrain management.
.. Intelligence collection.
.. Civil affairs activities.
.. Air and ground movement control.
.. Clearance of fires.
.. Security."

Believe "battlespace" has been ruled a non-term in Army doctrine although the Marines still use it.

My questions are many. Does a BCT or battalion's boundaries constitute its area of operations (AO)? If so, what of the larger area of influence for indirect fires? And if area of interest is even farther out, this quote seems to imply you are busting boundaries beyond your "intelligence collection" AO. BTW, Wilf believe AOR only applies to combatant command and other upper echelon units although you frequently see it used at lower level.

Does it come down to a battalion having noncontiguous AO boundaries within a larger BCT AO so that the organic artillery battalion can shoot targets inside the battalion's area of influence but actually in the brigade AO? Likewise, does the Fires Brigade shoot targets in division unassigned areas that are the BCT's area of influence? Confused yet? There's more.

I've been told in the past that units are allowed to employ direct fires across a boundary anytime if positive ID is established but not indirect fires without permission? Yet this quote seems to imply no "effects" outside your AO/boundaries??

Finally, what happens if a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is located instead a battalion's AO? Can a Brigade Support Battalion have an AO?

Cliff, I made the same comment to Ken in a PM about coordinating altitude being the cut-off for ground commander's air control. I only recently learned about blue (ground up) and purple (lower and higher altitude) kill boxes. Is anyone out there using the term Joint Fires Area in the real Army/Joint world? Is the Air Force allowing Kill Boxes to be split up to allow airspace users to share the same area by restricting themselves to just one Keypad within a Kill Box? Did that UH-60 in your video bust a Position Area for Artillery big time...or is that artillery unit never going to get resupplied by air again?

[SJPONeill]

I think that we are in danger here of applying an over-specific brush to what is 'only' doctrine and which should not attempt to prescribe specific situations...the examples being quotes of 'but what if? are the sorts of issues that should be resolved on a case-by-case basis using existing command and control processes...I find it hard to believe that brigade staffs are so dumb or doctrinally-driven that they can not and do not recognise and mitigate such situations - noting, of course, that is such mitigations, not every departs happy (i.e. got what they wanted) and so the staff responsible are tagged as biased, slanted, ticket-punching, unresponsive, out-of-the-loop, etc etc...

[Cliff]

Cliff, I made the same comment to Ken in a PM about coordinating altitude being the cut-off for ground commander's air control. I only recently learned about blue (ground up) and purple (lower and higher altitude) kill boxes. Is anyone out there using the term Joint Fires Area in the real Army/Joint world? Is the Air Force allowing Kill Boxes to be split up to allow airspace users to share the same area by restricting themselves to just one Keypad within a Kill Box? Did that UH-60 in your video bust a Position Area for Artillery big time...or is that artillery unit never going to get resupplied by air again?

Cole-

The ALSA website has links to FM 3-09.34 Kill Box Tactics and Multiservice Procedures... distribution is restricted, so you will need a CAC card to look at it.

Kill Boxes can in theory be opened and closed by keypad, but that is not as likely due to the smaller size of the keypads. I'll have to ask my sources to see what is happening right now in the field... Kill boxes are a pretty flexible means of doing FSCMs, and they work well for a fluid fight like Afghanistan because you can open and close them with less work since everyone (in theory!) already knows where they are- unlike a ROZ.

As for the video, I have heard (anecdotally) that the artillery folks hadn't coordinated their fires, but I don't know all the details. That is a case of Army vs. Army coordination, so I can only speculate...

My only other comment is that it seems like the "ownership" issue gets pretty emotional... like I said before (and I'm agreeing with the majority here I think), having a system of coordination seems to be more important than who owns what.

I'll post again if I can get some current data from bros at the CAOC.

V/R,

Cliff

[IntelTrooper]

I find it hard to believe that brigade staffs are so dumb or doctrinally-driven that they can not and do not recognise and mitigate such situations - noting, of course, that is such mitigations, not every departs happy (i.e. got what they wanted) and so the staff responsible are tagged as biased, slanted, ticket-punching, unresponsive, out-of-the-loop, etc etc...

There are some brigade staffs that have deployed and have been pretty unanimously determined to be biased, ticket-punching, unresponsive, and out-of-the-loop. That's certainly not universal but when talking about "ownership," it can seriously impede progress and when it goes on for a year or more, that's a lot of damage to all the progress that had been and could have been made.

I recall one particularly absurd case where the brigade commander was so adamant at enforcing his "no night ops" rule that he wouldn't let another government agency with all of their own assets and support snatch a guy at 3 AM. They were told they had to wait until dawn to go after him, of course rendering the whole mission moot.

This kind of stuff goes on all the time, unfortunately.

[Ken White]

OPSEC guys, Ken White said it was OK to post it and I answer to that higher authority.

Partly so I could laugh at this:

"Assigning areas of operations to subordinate commanders maximizes decentralized execution by empowering those commanders to exercise initiative. Mission command gives commanders the authority to create any effects necessary to accomplish the mission (consistent with the rules of engagement) within their areas of operations. However, commanders cannot create effects outside their areas of operations without permission from the commander assigned the area of operations in which those effects will occur.

I think that says "you're in charge except when you're not..."

Still, I get the intent and that's not too bad. Here's the part that does bother me:

Further, commanders must control all parts of their area of operations not assigned to subordinates...

That 'control' word and that statement are, perhaps, part of the problem I see that led to my first post.

I'm not at all sure ANY Commander can truthfully 'control' "all parts of their area not assigned to subordinates" and I suspect many US Commanders do not fully trust some of their subordinates and that this all leads to OVER control -- or attempts to do so. Certainly some recent contacts from the 'Stan have said that is a problem -- and not just in one area. That's a bad and dangerously worded paragraph that merits review -- as IMO does that BSO bit...

As to your questions, not an OpSec violation in them to my mind though others may not agree and thus not answer. So I'll give you the pre-2001 answers.

A BCT or battalion's boundaries do constitute its area of operations (AO) but it is important to recall that boundaries as a control measure differ from the use of a unit AO. They used to be called a Tactical Area of Operations (TAOR) and were the lower echelon equivalent of the AO used for echelons above reality. The paragraph following your quote, Para 5-79 and illustration 5-2 give a clearer picture than does 5-78. I think that also answers your Fires question asked later.

The larger area of influence for indirect fires relies on coordination, pure and simple. An area of interest is even farther out does imply one is busting boundaries beyond ones "intelligence collection" AO but again the key is coordination -- and as always, METT-TC...

Units have to be allowed to employ direct fires across a boundary anytime if positive ID is established. As for indirect fires without permission, the quote seems to imply no "effects" outside the AO but I suspect that's sloppy writing and that somewhere in that oversized tome, it's clarified.

At least, I hope it is...

I think SJPONeill is correct -- most Commanders will work it out and not get too hung up over the doctrine. My concern is simply that one must be careful with doctrine to limit the damage caused by those few Commanders who cannot (or, more often, just will not) work it out.

I also think Cliff is spot on with the comment that "the 'ownership' issue gets pretty emotional... like I said before (and I'm agreeing with the majority here I think), having a system of coordination seems to be more important than who owns what." That emotional aspect exists and luckily will only adversely affect a few. The importance of using known and standard names and processes is that system he wants. He's totally correct and about 80 to 90% of all folks know and will do that.

Those existing processes are unfortunately necessary and quite critical to limit the damage that other 10 to 20% can do. We aren't talking hurt feelings and bruised egos here -- people get killed unnecessarily due to such screwups and its easy to miss that point in peacetime or in low intensity conflicts. Such errors are far too costly in a mid or high intensity fight. Hopefully no one will have to endure one or more of those.

But don't bet the farm you or people you train will not have to do so...

[82redleg]

that 'control' word and that statement are, perhaps, part of the problem I see that led to my first post.

I'm not at all sure ANY Commander can truthfully 'control' "all parts of their area not assigned to subordinates" and I suspect many US Commanders do not fully trust some of their subordinates and that this all leads to OVER control -- or attempts to do so. Certainly some recent contacts from the 'Stan have said that is a problem -- and not just in one area. That's a bad and dangerously worded paragraph that merits review -- as IMO does that BSO bit...

As I read that paragraph (and I fully admit to reading the snippet posted here and not going back to the manual), I understand it to mean that, if a commander is assigned an AO, and decides not to further assign responsibilities for portions of that AO to a subordinate, he/she retains responsibility for all the coordination required in controlling that AO (clearing fires, tracking movement, etc).

[Ken White]

As I read that paragraph (and I fully admit to reading the snippet posted here and not going back to the manual), I understand it to mean that, if a commander is assigned an AO, and decides not to further assign responsibilities for portions of that AO to a subordinate, he/she retains responsibility for all the coordination required in controlling that AO (clearing fires, tracking movement, etc).

However, my belief -- and fear -- is that some (that 10-20%...) will latch onto the words "Further, commanders must control all parts of their area of operations not assigned to subordinates..." and overdo it. Some will take it to mean they must literally control the entire area by occupation. Others will be excessive in their exercise of control authority by insisting on excessive coordination or adherence to their restrictions and tactical direction. I have it on good authority that is occurring and that some are being quite rigorous in their exercise of 'control' (that wording makes me a master of political correctness... ).

'Control' the verb is overly loved by too many in the US Army -- it leads to micromangement, reluctance or even refusal to delegate and / or to trust subordinates and increases the societal tendency toward risk aversion. I do not question the necessity for use of the word but know that overuse of the word and the concept can lead to the inadvertant stifling of initiative and innovation. I'm firmly convinced that its employment in doctrine should minimal and quite specific.

I fully realize that no doctrinal pub can account for all possibilities for misuse but I do strongly believe two things in this regard:

- The proliferation of terms, be they shorthand, slang or whatever should be avoided as such terms have a way of making their way into publications, largely written by Snowbirds, Blackbirds and civilian writers who hear but do not always understand the context. This proven tendency can create confusion and can among other things provide the unwary latitude for unwise directives and measures.

- The current trend toward ever more wordy manuals can also lead to such confusion as the critical points often become physically separated and lose impact.

I know there's little hope in educating the 10% -- my concern is to keep it at that level or lower if possible instead of allowing, even encouraging, it to hit the 20% level.

I'm also concerned that while adaptation to the current fight is certainly necessary, such adaptation excessively pursued can lead to blinders for other fights in other times and places against far different opponents. I saw many bad habits acquired by the US Army (and Marines) in Viet Nam. Some -- too many -- of those one war peculiar and undesirable traits are still around. My hope is that the potential for even worse habits from the current wars not get embedded to our future detriment.

[Fuchs]

I say "let them fail". That's what the economy does.
There are gazillions of business owners past the age of 50 who have a business model that would allow for 50 employees but they cannot go beyond 5-10 because they have the urge to micromanage.

They'll never sustain a growth beyond their ability to micromanage, that's the punishment of the markets.

Armies should keep handicapped leaders small as well. let them fail, send them back to last position where they didn't fail. A Col who cannot resist the urge to micromanage should be turned into a section leader.

That's way easier than to develop work-around everywhere in order to mitigate their failures.

[Ken White]

Even prosper -- after all, the flawed run may be a tax write-off, the items may be sold at a discount, perhaps there can be some recycling and the management team can be sent back to the drawing board and will likely produce a better production method or process.

In war, flawed processes will almost certainly mean unnecessary deaths. So while there is merit to letting leaders fail and recycling them, it's got to be tempered with full knowledge of the costs and a sense of time and place. A better solution would be improved selection of leaders and to not presume that everyone can do the job if not well, at least acceptably. They cannot.

[Bob's World]

Of course, worth considering is that the Afghans may well be amused to hear that some Coalition Commander considers some area to be his "battlespace," much as many a nation is likely "amused" to hear that their entire nation and its territorial waters lie within some GCC's "Area of Responsibility" as well. Point being, we may well take our overly grandiose proclamations of control more seriously than do those who actually have control/responsibility for those spaces.

In a place like Afghanistan one can layer dozens of such stakeholders, foreign and domestic, on any particular area; few really coordinating with the others, and many quite likely not even aware of who all the claimants are or how to coordinate with them if they were so inclined to do so to begin with.

Which brings us back to the largest problem with battlespace being that coalition commanders believe they all have such space and are in control over the same.

Such space is critical in operations where someone must be able to account for the presence of friendly forces and clear fires. If Afghanistan such fires are virtually always observed. One need no "own" battlespace to clear such fires. In fact most battlespace has been abandoned to SOF, with the conventional forces focused on a fraction of their entire AOR, leaving SOF commanders to take calls from roving helicopters requesting permission to engage some target or another that they swear is "the enemy." Too often it is not, and once again SOF has produced a CIVCAS while the helicopter boys return to base with all the Teflon that not being a BSO provides in such incidents. So a change that makes the air guys "clear" their own fires and take responsibility for what they break would be a nice change.

I have no bright scheme for clearing this mess up, but I do recognize it is far messier and more complex than it need be.