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Thread: Owning Battlespace

  1. #41
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default You and I are in agreement. Most Commanders will agree and do that wisely.

    Quote Originally Posted by 82redleg View Post
    As I read that paragraph (and I fully admit to reading the snippet posted here and not going back to the manual), I understand it to mean that, if a commander is assigned an AO, and decides not to further assign responsibilities for portions of that AO to a subordinate, he/she retains responsibility for all the coordination required in controlling that AO (clearing fires, tracking movement, etc).
    However, my belief -- and fear -- is that some (that 10-20%...) will latch onto the words "Further, commanders must control all parts of their area of operations not assigned to subordinates..." and overdo it. Some will take it to mean they must literally control the entire area by occupation. Others will be excessive in their exercise of control authority by insisting on excessive coordination or adherence to their restrictions and tactical direction. I have it on good authority that is occurring and that some are being quite rigorous in their exercise of 'control' (that wording makes me a master of political correctness... ).

    'Control' the verb is overly loved by too many in the US Army -- it leads to micromangement, reluctance or even refusal to delegate and / or to trust subordinates and increases the societal tendency toward risk aversion. I do not question the necessity for use of the word but know that overuse of the word and the concept can lead to the inadvertant stifling of initiative and innovation. I'm firmly convinced that its employment in doctrine should minimal and quite specific.

    I fully realize that no doctrinal pub can account for all possibilities for misuse but I do strongly believe two things in this regard:

    - The proliferation of terms, be they shorthand, slang or whatever should be avoided as such terms have a way of making their way into publications, largely written by Snowbirds, Blackbirds and civilian writers who hear but do not always understand the context. This proven tendency can create confusion and can among other things provide the unwary latitude for unwise directives and measures.

    - The current trend toward ever more wordy manuals can also lead to such confusion as the critical points often become physically separated and lose impact.

    I know there's little hope in educating the 10% -- my concern is to keep it at that level or lower if possible instead of allowing, even encouraging, it to hit the 20% level.

    I'm also concerned that while adaptation to the current fight is certainly necessary, such adaptation excessively pursued can lead to blinders for other fights in other times and places against far different opponents. I saw many bad habits acquired by the US Army (and Marines) in Viet Nam. Some -- too many -- of those one war peculiar and undesirable traits are still around. My hope is that the potential for even worse habits from the current wars not get embedded to our future detriment.

  2. #42
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    I say "let them fail". That's what the economy does.
    There are gazillions of business owners past the age of 50 who have a business model that would allow for 50 employees but they cannot go beyond 5-10 because they have the urge to micromanage.

    They'll never sustain a growth beyond their ability to micromanage, that's the punishment of the markets.

    Armies should keep handicapped leaders small as well. let them fail, send them back to last position where they didn't fail. A Col who cannot resist the urge to micromanage should be turned into a section leader.

    That's way easier than to develop work-around everywhere in order to mitigate their failures.

  3. #43
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default If a commercial production run is flawed one can survive.

    Even prosper -- after all, the flawed run may be a tax write-off, the items may be sold at a discount, perhaps there can be some recycling and the management team can be sent back to the drawing board and will likely produce a better production method or process.

    In war, flawed processes will almost certainly mean unnecessary deaths. So while there is merit to letting leaders fail and recycling them, it's got to be tempered with full knowledge of the costs and a sense of time and place. A better solution would be improved selection of leaders and to not presume that everyone can do the job if not well, at least acceptably. They cannot.

  4. #44
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Of course, worth considering is that the Afghans may well be amused to hear that some Coalition Commander considers some area to be his "battlespace," much as many a nation is likely "amused" to hear that their entire nation and its territorial waters lie within some GCC's "Area of Responsibility" as well. Point being, we may well take our overly grandiose proclamations of control more seriously than do those who actually have control/responsibility for those spaces.

    In a place like Afghanistan one can layer dozens of such stakeholders, foreign and domestic, on any particular area; few really coordinating with the others, and many quite likely not even aware of who all the claimants are or how to coordinate with them if they were so inclined to do so to begin with.

    Which brings us back to the largest problem with battlespace being that coalition commanders believe they all have such space and are in control over the same.

    Such space is critical in operations where someone must be able to account for the presence of friendly forces and clear fires. If Afghanistan such fires are virtually always observed. One need no "own" battlespace to clear such fires. In fact most battlespace has been abandoned to SOF, with the conventional forces focused on a fraction of their entire AOR, leaving SOF commanders to take calls from roving helicopters requesting permission to engage some target or another that they swear is "the enemy." Too often it is not, and once again SOF has produced a CIVCAS while the helicopter boys return to base with all the Teflon that not being a BSO provides in such incidents. So a change that makes the air guys "clear" their own fires and take responsibility for what they break would be a nice change.

    I have no bright scheme for clearing this mess up, but I do recognize it is far messier and more complex than it need be.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  5. #45
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    I have no bright scheme for clearing this mess up, but I do recognize it is far messier and more complex than it need be.
    As above it may be as 'simple' as "
    ...A better solution would be improved selection of leaders and to not presume that everyone can do the job if not well, at least acceptably...
    "

    I don't agree with Fuchs on recyling...natural selection in this profession should be as harsh as the consequences of getting it wrong...and I'm sure (based on past practice) that most of those 'out-cycled' will survive very nicely in the outside world, worse case in some dodgy thinktank...

  6. #46
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    Default Off topic, but somewhat related:

    While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.

    Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.

    The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.

    The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.

    Just wanted to make that observation.
    "Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper

  7. #47
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Yes, yes, I am quite aware of the recipe for sustaining illegitimate and despotic rule over ones own populace or the populace of others. Nothing new or insightful there.
    ...but you cannot say what is despotic or illegitimate. The US President tells you what is legitimate and what is not. He is a politician and his statements are very relative, changeable and imprecise.

    There is no bench-mark for legitimacy. You just have a political opinion as to what is legitimate.
    What I speak to is how to actually address the root causes. Suppression of those who dare to challenge you is easy enough.
    ...but you are no qualified to address them or know what the root causes are. You just want your version of power in place, which would be pro-US and thus in the eyes of many could in no way be legitimate.
    Resolving such situations is another matter entirely, and it cannot be resolved through the principles of war or through the conduct of warfare.
    History does not support that statement.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  8. #48
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    Default Close and also brings up another point

    Quote Originally Posted by Rifleman View Post
    While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.

    Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.
    AOR would be more like the entire large city jurisdiction the Police Chief is responsible for, while a precinct would be more like an operational area, and series of beats are the individual areas of operation (AO).

    The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.
    This raises the point that the commander of the area of operation has responsibilities listed in FM 3-0 for that area. That does not mean they "own" that space anymore than the police or precinct chief owns the space they operate in.

    The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.
    It also is analogous to how a police officer treats citizens and how (I would presume) a Soldier/Marine practicing COIN should treat foreign citizens...with respect. If police officers play rambo and treat citizens with disrespect, my bet is they don't last long on the job. It should be the same way for Soldiers and commanders in an AO with respect to average citizens. Police don't assume that everyone is a criminal. Troops can't treat every Pashtun like they are Taliban...IMHO the whole disconnect of those who advocate enemy-centric COIN.

    Enemy-centric COIN implies an assumption that you can take greater liberties with the population as a whole and screw the collateral damage as long as you ferret out and kill the bad guys. Would a cop take that attitude?
    Last edited by Cole; 01-26-2011 at 01:42 PM. Reason: typo

  9. #49
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    Default Uh, kinda sorta:

    Quote Originally Posted by Cole View Post
    Police don't assume that everyone is a criminal.
    Police don't, or shouldn't, automatically treat everyone as a criminal.

    But I'm convinced the following quote is the way to go:

    "Conduct every traffic stop extending the olive branch of peace; while having a tactical plan to kill everyone inside the vehicle." - Gordon Graham
    "Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper

  10. #50
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Bob: "Resolving such situations is another matter entirely, and it cannot be resolved through the principles of war or through the conduct of warfare."

    WILF: "History does not support that statement."


    Actually I argue the opposite is true, but toss a couple examples out there and lets take a look at them. My only condition is that we look at least 20 years beyond any military "victory" and see how the subsequent peace turned out. Mere suppression of a particular insurgent group or ideology for some narrow window of time does not count.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  11. #51
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Marine Rules of Combat:

    "21. Be polite. Be professional. But, have a plan to kill everyone you meet."

    Always, of course, accompanied by Nrs 19 and 20:

    "19. Decide to be aggressive ENOUGH, quickly ENOUGH.
    20. The faster you finish the fight, the less shot you will get"

  12. #52
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    Default Marine Rules of Combat Redux

    As a segué into this, I've been slogging at the early development of Operational Law since its "conception" in the 1980s-1990s (legal doctrines material to military operations in war and in "other than war"). As part of that, I've been looking at ROE development; e.g., Rules of Engagement (ROE) Handbook for Judge Advocates (CLAMO 2000); and, from the international humanitarian law viewpoint, Rules of Engagement Handbook (Sanremo 2009).

    Needless to say, after burying my head in those august publications, Ken's post was a breath of fresh air - and the entire "Marine Rules of Combat" are an oxygen tent. So, here are all of them for perusal by "battlespace owners, occupiers and possessors" (and those who might represent them in consequent courts-martial proceedings):

    Rules of Combat

    USMC

    1. Bring a weapon. Preferably, bring at least two. Bring all of your friends who have weapons. Bring their friends who have weapons.

    2. Anything worth shooting is worth shooting twice. Ammo is cheap. Life is expensive.

    3. Only hits count. Close doesn't count. The only thing worse than a miss is a slow miss.

    4. If your shooting stance is good, you're probably not moving fast enough, nor using cover correctly.

    5. Move away from your attacker. Distance is your friend. (Lateral and diagonal movement are preferred.)

    6. If you can choose what to bring to a gunfight, bring a big weaponand a friend with a big weapon.

    7. In ten years nobody will remember the details of caliber, stance, or tactics. They will only remember who lived and who didn't.

    8. If you are not shooting, you should be communicating, reloading, and running.

    9. Accuracy is relative: most combat shooting is more dependent on "pucker factor" than the inherent accuracy of the weapon.

    10. Use a weapon that works EVERY TIME. "All skill is in vain when an Angel pisses in the flintlock of your musket."

    11. Someday someone may kill you with your own weapon, but they should have to beat you to death with it because it is empty.

    12. In combat, there are no rules, always cheat; always win. The only unfair fight is the one you lose.

    13. Have a plan.

    14. Have a back-up plan, because the first one won't work.

    15. Use cover or concealment as much as possible. The visible target should be in FRONT of YOUR weapon.

    16. Flank your adversary when possible. Protect yours.

    17. Don't drop your guard.

    18. Always tactical load and threat scan 360 degrees.

    19. Watch their hands. Hands kill. (In God we trust. Everyone else, keep your hands where I can see them).

    20. Decide to be aggressive ENOUGH, quickly ENOUGH.

    21. The faster you finish the fight, the less shot you will get.

    22. Be courteous to everyone, friendly to no one.

    23. Be polite. Be professional. But have a plan to kill everyone you meet.

    24. Your number one Option for Personal Security is a lifelong commitment to avoidance, deterrence, and de-escalation.

    25. Do not attend a gunfight with a handgun, the caliber of which does not start with a ".4."

    Army

    1. See USMC Rules for combat

    2. Add 60 to 90 days

    3. Hope the Marines already destroyed all meaningful resistance

    Navy

    1. Spend three weeks getting somewhere

    2. Adopt an aggressive offshore posture

    3. Send in the Marines

    4. Drink Coffee

    5. Bring back the Marines

    Air Force

    1. Kiss the spouse good-bye

    2. Drive to the flight line

    3. Fly to target area, drop bombs, fly back.

    4. Pop in at the club for a couple with the guys

    5. Go home, BBQ some burgers and drink some more beer
    My own summary of the Golden Twenty-Five: Carry a Big Hunting License, but don't kill everything in the forest.

    Regards

    Mike

  13. #53
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rifleman View Post
    While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.

    Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.

    The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.

    The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.

    Just wanted to make that observation.
    And a good observation it is...while we have CIMS (C for Coordinated) down here instead of NIMS, I expect that they are essentially similar...one of the key lessons we found (the hard way, of course) when dealing with rotating ICs was the essential need for regular liaison and training between all the various agencies involved at both the area/regional command level and at the boots on the ground work-face level...once some egos got put in their box, it worked well, to the extent that, when the lahar kicked off in 2007, it was almost ho-hum-whatever as ALL the agencies involved were so used to working together...

    The difference though is that most of the relationships that develop for incident management are long-term as most of the agencies involved don't rotate people in and out on a 2-3 year basis...the military always seemed to be ones playing catch-up in terms of continuity because of this...

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