Is Globalization the Answer or Culprit?

[William F. Owen]

But not all armed rebellions are politics. Some are for power, some are for money; both of which will affect politics, but neither of which are politically driven.

If its for power, then it is political. Politics is power over people. It is not just what politicians do. All conflict is driven by politics, because all conflict seeks to alter political power. Populations rebel for that reason.

3. Insurgencies require a popular base. Many armed rebellions, particularly those of the type described in #2 above, do not require and typically do not possess such a base. To lump these all together leads to inappropriate responses.

Example? All the definitions of insurgency I know of, make no such distinction. The appropriateness of the response is defined by the policy, not the conflict.

I strongly believe that the presence or absence of violence is a poor way to define a conflict.

Well no violance, no conflict.

5. knowing if the rebels are armed and violent is important for the design of my "counter-rebel" operations; but offers no clues as to what conditions must be addressed, or how those undefined conditions might best be addressed to resolve the causation for the rebellion.

It is not the job of the Army to resolve the problem. Defeat the rebels, then the government can do what it wants.

Dealing with an "armed rebellion" in some colonial enterprise is completely different than dealing with an "armed rebellion" at home. The stakes at home are much higher; and the residual consequences of tactical choices, win or lose, are both much higher at home.

Well the logic of that is infantry tactics in a civil war are different from that of a war with another nation. The only difference between foreign and domestic is the policy.

None of this can be fairly described by such a broad and inartful distinction as "armed rebellion."

Broad and inartful? Those words have sufficed for 5,000 years. I see no reason to change.

[M.L.]

Gents-

Perhaps it might be useful to delineate our terminology a bit.

An armed group who seeks purely economical ends is a criminal gang, cartel, mafia, or something similar. They are not insurgents, nor are they rebels.

Insurgency is always political, as Mr. Owen states. If it is not political, it is not warfare and must be something else. War always has political ends.

The insurgent or rebel always seek a political objective. These objectives fall into two broad categories: Those who wish to overthrow a government and replace it with another (usually the insurgent/rebel leadership), or, those who wish to force a government to change a policy/policies, but do not wish to overthrow that government.

I'm not an expert, but my sense of it is that the definitions of these terms depends on who you ask - therefore arguing semantics probably isn't useful. However, my general sense is that insurgency is a sub-category of rebellion in which the insurgent group seeks the overthrow of a government. Rebellions may or may not be insurgencies. Rebels may simply demand a change in policy, or perhaps, secession from a nation-state, without being an insurgency.

[slapout9]

Gents-

Perhaps it might be useful to delineate our terminology a bit.

An armed group who seeks purely economical ends is a criminal gang, cartel, mafia, or something similar. They are not insurgents, nor are they rebels.

Insurgency is always political, as Mr. Owen states. If it is not political, it is not warfare and must be something else. War always has political ends.

The insurgent or rebel always seek a political objective. These objectives fall into two broad categories: Those who wish to overthrow a government and replace it with another (usually the insurgent/rebel leadership), or, those who wish to force a government to change a policy/policies, but do not wish to overthrow that government.

I'm not an expert, but my sense of it is that the definitions of these terms depends on who you ask - therefore arguing semantics probably isn't useful. However, my general sense is that insurgency is a sub-category of rebellion in which the insurgent group seeks the overthrow of a government. Rebellions may or may not be insurgencies. Rebels may simply demand a change in policy, or perhaps, secession from a nation-state, without being an insurgency.

M.L. separating the two is a western idea that is generally not shared by the rest of the world which is why Marx said "You can't separate Politics from Economics." IMO this is the source of every problem we have inside America and Outside America.

[Bob's World]

Or, when one wants to shut down an opponent without offering any real substance to do so, they can go to a range of "shut-down phrases", such as:

1. "That's tactical, I'm talking strategic here..."

2. "That's a Western perspective..."

3. " That can't be true because Dave Kilcullen said..."

4. "Well, according to Clausewitz..."

5. "When I was in Iraq..."

6. "That is an idealist position..."

7. (or conversely) "When one takes a pragmatic, realist approach..."

8. And most conclusively: "Don't make me bring Ken White in on this!"

(Bonus points for combining two or more in a single sentence!)

[William F. Owen]

2. "That's a Western perspective..."

That is very often a huge problem. Democracy and legitimacy for example.

3. " That can't be true because Dave Kilcullen said..."

Well when I next meet Dave, I'm going to point out to him that his two book and numerous articles have done far more harm than good, in my opinion.

4. "Well, according to Clausewitz..."

If he said it, it was probably right and no one better has come along.

"Don't make me bring Ken White in on this!"

I think of Ken as a Intellectual Reserve. Thus have simple ideas, that Ken White agrees with....

[Ken White]

2. "That's a Western perspective..."

6. "That is an idealist position..."

8. And most conclusively: "Don't make me bring Ken White in on this!"

(Bonus points for combining two or more in a single sentence!)

He is here...

Bonus claiming sentence:

The western perspectives on globalization, economic matters in general (but in particular as it relates to Taarof, Hong Bao and their relatives) and even on most aspects of warfare are essentially idealistic and are thus often incorrect and perceived as arrogance and / or ignorance in the eyes of many in the East.

Followed by:

As Samuel Huntington said: "...Asian societies and Muslim societies are increasingly resentful of our efforts to induce them to adopt our values.” Anyone who fails to comprehend that reality is doomed to state that it is but a strawman, to be ignored -- and they will. They'll ultimately pay for it, too...

You know this, Bob. Witness:

Fast forward to today. The size of bounties placed on HVTs in the Southern Philippines was (and likely is) a big problem. The amounts were too large. Tell someone you will pay them $6 Million for a guy and they don't get it. Tell them you'll pay them $6,000 and suddenly you have their attention. Like an inverse scene from Austin Powers.

Yep, you know it -- you just like to ignore it in some of your posts as it complicates your argument...

I generally agree with Selil. However, this from him:

The adage that the military went to war and American went to the mall is a truism. Fed in part by the disconnection of the Military and political process from the populace and the rapidly escalation of a growing divide caused by globalization.

Merits a quibble. Except that he adroitly corrects or at least adjusts it later:

... Consider the civil/military relationship and then consider the globalization relationships. Would we expect a government or military that doesn't understand the former to have any clue about the latter?

Good question. I'd only add that the lack of understanding of the civil/military relationship is a two way street, that both sides tacitly encourage that lack and that -- as Selil knows -- misundertanding or misperceptions on that relationship and both parties to it in the Academic world exacerbate the problem. That, BTW is not an attack, merely an observation. It is also an observation that agendas drive understanding or an apparent lack thereof and that even pure intentions can legitimately diverge among communities.

Which is what makes globalization complex. And drives western and eastern mutual failures to comprehend...

[Bob's World]

Ken,

Its not that my arguments are complicated, but the world, people, and the US's perceived role vs it's necessary role certainly is.

We have interests, we have requirements, and we are (by a considerable margin) the big dog on the block. We also have a tremendous (though short) evolving history as a nation. Most fascinating parts being the formation of the nation and then the emergence post WWII to lead the Western portion of the Cold War.

With all of that in the rearview mirror we have come to realize in recent years that we have no entitlement to such a role, and that if we are careless in our approaches to that role it can likely speed our come uppence.

So while we do still need to manage our interests around the globe, I recommend that we recognize our Cold War experience for the anomaly that it was and get a little bit closer to the perspectives that we originally built this nation upon. Part of that perspective is recognizing the power of the populace and the liability of governance when such relationships go bad. We're older and far more like our parents these days than we were back in our idealistic youth, but that's ok. We do still enjoy a good windmill to tilt at every now and then though.

So while there may appear to be some inconsistencies between what we should do and what we probably must do, I'm ok with that. Besides, no one has the answer, I'm just trying to break through the good old boys group think to add a fresh perspective.

[Dayuhan]

So while we do still need to manage our interests around the globe, I recommend that we recognize our Cold War experience for the anomaly that it was and get a little bit closer to the perspectives that we originally built this nation upon. Part of that perspective is recognizing the power of the populace and the liability of governance when such relationships go bad.

I agree. I also think we have to recognize the constraints on our ability to restructure governance/populace and populace/populace relations in other countries, and the enormous potential for unintended consequences associated with such attempts. We can't "fix" other countries, and we're likely to step in something nasty if we try.

That's not saying we should be trying to preserve an unsustainable status quo, but trying to initiate or direct changes to that status quo is as bad. We are not anyone's saviour or champion and we cannot appoint ourselves to those roles.

[M.L.]

M.L. separating the two is a western idea that is generally not shared by the rest of the world which is why Marx said "You can't separate Politics from Economics." IMO this is the source of every problem we have inside America and Outside America.

I wasn't separating the two. I was simply stating that any armed group that has economic ends without political ends that operates outside the law is a criminal, not insurgent group.

This does not mean that economics is not part of insurgency, rebellion, etc...

[Bob's World]

Wilf,

Exactly my point when you mention the state of current definitions of insurgency and COIN. They are all derived from and colored by the colonial intervention experience. For one to argue that other perspectives are flawed because they challenge time-honored perspectives puts one in a large, but not necessarily good company with those who:

1. Ignored the need for cleanliness and separation of the sick to avoid infection and transmission of diseases. After all, centuries of medical journals "Prove" that the development of illness is the will of god.

2. Laughed at Columbus' proposal to sail west to reach the east, though there was much evidence that this was true, all of the official works declared it impossible.

3. Same for those who suggested the earth rotated around the sun, etc.

Bottom line, is that centuries of a particular influence and history will shape thinking on timeless concepts that man really has little or no influence over. The colonial experience shapes how those who's culture derives from Western Europe think about insurgency. How could it not?

But to throw out trite lines like "politics is power" is kind of like holding your breath until you turn blue and stomping your feet until I agree with you. So let's look at some of those definitions, ok??

FM3-24:

"insurgency: (joint) An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)."

Ok, I would argue that that is the military shaping a definition to fit their paradigm (and that virtually all joint definitions are a compromise between service positions on a topic and usually suffer from that process). Two aspects that have little to do with causation and everything to do with how it actually manifests in a manner that makes it a military problem to solve are the phrases "constituted government" and "and armed conflict." Is it any less an insurgency if this occur in some culture that does not "constitute" it's governments? No, but such "non-state" problems are too messy, so the military excludes them from being their problem to deal with. "..and armed conflict." Well, the military claims that COIN is a form of warfare, so therefore insurgency must only be where "armed conflict" exists right? There is a "chicken and the egg" dynamic at work here as well as strong shades of our colonial roots. After all, if we go to some foreign land, and constitute a government to rule over them, and then the populace challenges that government with armed conflict, we have an insurgency on our hands and need to wage warfare to reestablish our foreign mandated status quo, right??

Galula (page 1 and 2 of "Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice) takes a more exploratory approach:

"a revolutionary war is primarily an internal conflict...the strategically important fact that they were challenging a local ruling power controlling the existing administration, police and armed forces."

"the conflict results from the action of the insurgent aiming to seize political power..."

"Paraphrasing Clausewitz, we might say that 'Insurgency is the pursuit of of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means.' It is not like an ordinary war - a 'continuation of the policy by other means' - because an insurgency can start long before the insurgent resorts to the use of force."

I think Galula is correct in this insight, and as noted above, the U.S. Army abandoned this perspective for one that better fits their paradigm. Insurgency does indeed start long before the insurgent resorts to violence. Where Galua and I will quibble a bit is on his definitions of COIN. He contends that:

"only one - the insurgent- can initiate a revolutionary war, for counterinsurgency is only an effect of insurgency."

Ok, come on Dave, really? This is that tendency of governments refusing to take responsibility for the effects of their actions, and begs the question "what is insurgency the effect of"?? I contend that all governance is essentially "COIN" but that prior to the growth of subversion and violence it is primarily pre-insurgent and preventative in nature. But as the "goodness" of governance degrades in critical areas (the ones I find most important are legitimacy, justice, equity and hope) that governance becomes less preventative of insurgency and more responsive to insurgency as the populace begins to act out in illegal ways.

[Bob's World]

ML

I see three broad categories of insurgency (all three of which exist in Iraq, btw and each requires a unique approach to resolve)

1. Revolutionary: To overthrow or change the policies of an existing nationalist government through illegal means.

2. Separatist: To break some part of a sovereign nation (or tribal territory) off and bring it under new and distinct governance through illegal means.

3. Resistance: Efforts of a populace to overthrow a foreign presence that is controlling their national governance. Again, these efforts are through illegal means.

Both of your options fall under option 1 here. These can come in a variety of blends.

[M.L.]

ML

I see three broad categories of insurgency (all three of which exist in Iraq, btw and each requires a unique approach to resolve)

1. Revolutionary: To overthrow or change the policies of an existing nationalist government through illegal means.

2. Separatist: To break some part of a sovereign nation (or tribal territory) off and bring it under new and distinct governance through illegal means.

3. Resistance: Efforts of a populace to overthrow a foreign presence that is controlling their national governance. Again, these efforts are through illegal means.

Both of your options fall under option 1 here. These can come in a variety of blends.

I think your construct provides an interesting way to look at the problem, however, in the end all of these either

A: Want to overthrow the existing government
-or-
B: Want to change a policy, but do not want to overthrow the existing government.

Your three categories are all variations on these two basic themes - the member groups are just different.

For example, separatist is category B. The Anystan government policy is that all districts will remain a part of Anystan. The North District wants to become Northstan. They don't want to overthrow the Gov't of Anystan - they simply want to change the Anystan policy vis a vis Northstan.

[Bob's World]

Distillations are valuable up to the point that they lead to over generalizations that hinder clear thinking.

I stop at the three categories I settled at because I believe that to combine those together I begin to lose distinctions that are essential to COIN process. Now, if I am merely a "counterinsurgent" or conducting "counter guerrilla" operations, it does not matter if I lump these three distinct categories of causal motivation together, as all I want to do is destroy those who dare to challenge the government with illegal violence.

It is this type of thinking that leads to combining the rural, largely apolitical, resistance insurgency in Afghanistan along with the highly political revolutionary insurgency of the Taliban leadership in Pakistan. We then go on to engage one in hopes of curing the other; conflate them as a monolith; and generally end up applying the wrong solutions to the problems, or applying a potentially workable solution to one end of the problem, while addressing the other end in a manner that neutralizes the good effects and makes the entire problem worse.

If you consider the real success behind the surge was that Gen Petraeus essentially recognized these three distinct segments and tailored his approach to each. He left the Kurds alone and did not press the issue of the central Iraqi government exerting its sovereignty over them. Satisfied, this largely took them out of the fight. For the Sunni it was largely a resistance. They had held power, and were now excluded and in danger of being dominated by a Shia/Kurd government. By reaching out to the Sunni and addressing their concerns at being excluded he began to take them out of the fight as well. For the Shia it was a mix of resistance and revolutionary; wanting the foreigners to leave and to exert their own dominion over the government. (AQ really was not part of this. They were never "insurgents," they were foreign fighters who traveled to Iraq to inflict pain on the West and advance their own political agenda. The majority of those foreign fighters being members of nationalist insurgent movements (revolutionary) in the various Arab states they came from (Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, etc). AQ was conducting UW with the Iraqi populace as well.

If we would have continued to apply a "one size fits all" approach we would still be mired in high level combat there. Surging troops and pop-centric tactics are all ancillary to the larger strategic understanding of the problem. As is so often the case in insurgencies and interventions, often the greatest aspect of the cure receives the least credit.