Is Globalization the Answer or Culprit?

[Dayuhan]

Is Globalization the Answer or Culprit?

Must it be one or the other? Or a little of both, a little of neither, and a lot in between.

Connectivity and interdependence among states certainly reduces the threat of state-on-state violence. On the other hand, economic and social change often generates friction and violence, both within and among states. These dynamics play out at the same time with varying effects.

I don't see "globalization" (as Wilf says, a very general term) as something that we chose to start and can choose to reject. It simply is; we have to learn to manage it but the genie ain't going back in the bottle. Likely to be rough at some parts and smooth at others, but the question is not "to globalize or not to globalize". That's already decided. The question is how to maximize the advantages and neutralize the disadvantages.

[William F. Owen]

Why use the word "globalization" at all? It is neither an accurate or useful description. It has no set definition and means many mostly useless things to many mostly no so reflective people who don't tend to hold such ideas to rigour.

I agree it "is," but again, so what?

[Bob's World]

Globalization is like steroids. Now one can argue if the use of steroids in baseball favors pitchers or hitters more, but they're still playing baseball.

Same with insurgency and terrorism. The game is faster, some players are stronger or recover more quickly, but the game itself has not changed. Governments are about status quo and insurgents are about change, so I suspect this favors the party seeking change.

Wilf: I completely understand your position, and it is a reasonable one. It just isn't very helpful (in fact, it is quite harmful) for understanding insurgency. If one sees war as war and insurgency as a form of war, then seeing the de jure legitimacy of officialness as the only kind that matters makes sense. But such thinking is, IMO, a hindrance to resolving insurgency on terms that are acceptable for both the populace and the government.

I recommend that one should:
1. Separates insurgency from warfare (which I realize you won't do, not trying to convince you, just stating my perspective);

2. Recognize that causation radiates out from the "official" government and falls upon a diverse populace, many of whom may well question the "legitimacy" of said government;

3. Understand that "control" of the populace is not a security operation to be waged against them, but rather describes the general state of a populace that is satisfied with its form and nature of governance;

4. Realize that COIN is really the day to day efforts of the HN government to create or preserve perceptions of their legitimacy among the populace, and thereby establish a state of control; and

5. Appreciate that the efforts of an external intervening power that comes to the assistance of a government faced with insurgency with a focus of establishing security through defeat of the insurgent is neither conducting COIN nor helping the HN conduct COIN. In fact, such operations serve primarily to enable the HN to avoid conducting COIN and sustain a state of forced, illegitimate officialness.

This approach in point 5 was the model throughout the age of colonialism, and it is a model that largely survives and dominates our COIN doctrine today. It's not COIN at all though, and it probably is actually closer to being warfare as we currently implement it. We believe that if we sustain the current government, defeat the insurgent and establish security we have "won." The only group that "wins" in that situation is the puppet regime we have propped up through our intervention. Certainly the populace as a whole does not win, and when members of that populace are recruited by AQ to wage terrorist attacks against the homeland of the intervening party, it is that populace that suffers as well. The steroids of globalization enhance that last part.

So I remain convinced that it is time to retire the Colonial Intervention (COIN) playbook for foreign interventions. Just as Steam travel and telegraph technology facilitated both the rise and fall of the British Empire; so too has the latest generations of information and transportation technologies facilitated the rise and potential fall of the American age of control as well.

[Dayuhan]

So I remain convinced that it is time to retire the Colonial Intervention (COIN) playbook for foreign interventions. Just as Steam travel and telegraph technology facilitated both the rise and fall of the British Empire; so too has the latest generations of information and transportation technologies facilitated the rise and potential fall of the American age.

I remain convinced that it's time to retire foreign interventions, except where absolutely necessary... and in those cases the intervention should be at the lowest possible level and the shortest possible duration, and multilateral where possible. Occupying territory, changing regimes, installing governments, telling others how they should be governed, meddling in the internal affairs of other nations... these are problems, not solutions.

The British needed an empire to prosper. We do not.

[Bob's World]

Ahh, but empire-like controls help corporations to prosper. Prosperous corporations have powerful lobbies, as do the governments that prosper from these same corporations.

Capital may well be a coward, but it loves a good dictatorship.

But I agree that we do not need an empire to prosper, and in fact, our nation as a whole is far more secure and prosperous if we retire such approaches and simply get out there and compete.

[Joske]

An important thing to note when using the concept of globalisation (indeed a bit of a confused concept) is not something that happened overnight or in the last twenty years, the concept of "globalisation" as in the greater interconnectivity between geographical and/or cultural areas in fields of communication, (political) ideas, connection between economical markets..etc (not necessarily a fixed definition) can be regarded as something that continuously occured troughout history.

You can see this on a local scale in the middle ages, where previously isolated rural markets were connected through among other things improvement in transport capablilities and allowed for specialisation and the formation of cities and later industrialisation. You can see this in the colonialisation and later in the imperialism by certain states, and then back to decolonization.

This way i dont find much revolutionary ideas in the "new" concept of globalisation, the economic markets were already connected and the ideas were already spreading. In other words the steamship was way more important then the internet might ever be.

Also the presence of an globally connected free-market economy doesnt necessarily mean an increase in the economical prosperity or peace, it could mean poverty for the people and one of the causes cited for the start of world war 1 is the imperialism of European countries (lenin even said that imperialism was the highest form of capitalism and that it was to blame for world war 1)

[William F. Owen]

Wilf: I completely understand your position, and it is a reasonable one. It just isn't very helpful (in fact, it is quite harmful) for understanding insurgency.

Bob, I'm not confused as to how to defeat a rebellion. I understand how its done. I am just staggered at the line of thinking that prevents others seeing it. For example, why do you keep saying "Insurgency" instead of "armed rebellion."

I recommend that one should:
1. Separates insurgency from warfare (which I realize you won't do, not trying to convince you, just stating my perspective);

An insurgency is an armed rebellion. Warfare is the conduct of war. Rebellion requires warfare. How is it useful to engage in separation?

2. Recognize that causation radiates out from the "official" government and falls upon a diverse populace, many of whom may well question the "legitimacy" of said government;

Politics is the cause of all war. Not governments.

3. Understand that "control" of the populace is not a security operation to be waged against them, but rather describes the general state of a populace that is satisfied with its form and nature of governance;

Power is control. The populaces acquiescence just alters to degree of control needed.

4. Realize that COIN is really the day to day efforts of the HN government to create or preserve perceptions of their legitimacy among the populace, and thereby establish a state of control;

When you defeat an armed rebellion, you do so by re-imposing control via the rule of law.

So I remain convinced that it is time to retire the Colonial Intervention (COIN) playbook for foreign interventions. Just as Steam travel and telegraph technology facilitated both the rise and fall of the British Empire; so too has the latest generations of information and transportation technologies facilitated the rise and potential fall of the American age of control as well.

So basically you are saying that technology drives politics? I can't agree with that.

[Steve Blair]

So basically you are saying that technology drives politics? I can't agree with that.

I don't think he's saying that at all, Wilf. I think you may be over-simplifying what he's saying to make your own point, though.

Technology often acts as an accelerator or enabling device for political moves or trends. This can be traced throughout recorded history, with examples ranging from the development of better navigation techniques and rigging enabling the Portuguese and later Spanish imperial drives to improved rail transport networks and their impact on US western expansion (to toss out just two examples...there are many more out there). As certain things became either possible or easier, the political ambitions of governments can often accelerate. Technology can also shape the directions such ambitions and expansions take.

[Bob's World]

Wilf,

Fair question as to why I distinguish between "armed rebellion" and "insurgency"

Several reasons go into this, and I will attempt to lay some of that out here (in no particular order as I think of them):

1. An insurgency may well manifest as an armed rebellion, and likewise an armed rebellion may well be an insurgency: But neither is necessarily the other.

2. As you say, insurgency is politics. Agreed. But not all armed rebellions are politics. Some are for power, some are for money; both of which will affect politics, but neither of which are politically driven.

3. Insurgencies require a popular base. Many armed rebellions, particularly those of the type described in #2 above, do not require and typically do not possess such a base. To lump these all together leads to inappropriate responses.

4. I strongly believe that the presence or absence of violence is a poor way to define a conflict. It is not unlike employing the presence or absence of sex to define a relationship. It is a good indicator, but it is in no way definitive.

5. knowing if the rebels are armed and violent is important for the design of my "counter-rebel" operations; but offers no clues as to what conditions must be addressed, or how those undefined conditions might best be addressed to resolve the causation for the rebellion. To simply defeat the rebels is to simply suppress the symptoms. The problem lies unaddressed and will re-emerge once the suppressive efforts relax.

6. Insurgency is internal politics rather than external politics. That is a very important distinction. If my own child is acting out improperly it is far different than if it is my neighbor's son or some stranger. Each requires unique approaches and each carries unique consequences. To ignore such distinctions is to apply a "one size fits all" solution that will likely not fit any of the three very well.

7. Western thinking on insurgency is muddied considerably by the colonial experience. Most of our COIN doctrine is based on such experiences. The US does not have COIN doctrine based on lessons learned from the founding fathers decision to scrap the Articles of Confederation in favor for our current constitution; or on the governmental strategy for resolving the growing civil rights rebellion. I suspect Great Britain does not have much COIN doctrine that is derived from her inner turmoils either (and Ireland does not count, as it was treated as a colonial operation). Instead we focus on what we learned from our efforts overseas to build and sustain colonial enterprises. That is simply not COIN at all. Dealing with an "armed rebellion" in some colonial enterprise is completely different than dealing with an "armed rebellion" at home. The stakes at home are much higher; and the residual consequences of tactical choices, win or lose, are both much higher at home.

8. Insurgency does not "just happen," nor is it the work of some "malign actor" or "ideology". Similarly insurgencies are not caused by poverty. Well governed populaces do not rise up against their governments because they are evil or because they are temporarily insane, or because they are poor. This is governmental propaganda. This is why I look at "conditions of insurgency" on a continuum from "good governance" with a satisfied populace and very low conditions of insurgency; rising up to an insurgent populace, experiencing poor governance with very high conditions of insurgency. Even a populace with high conditions of insurgency may be suppressed into inaction through governmental oppression. Such a populace may choose either violent or non-violent tactics when they do act out. Such a populace may organize and be led by internal actors, or they may be incited and supported by external actors conducting UW.

None of this can be fairly described by such a broad and inartful distinction as "armed rebellion."

[slapout9]

Copied this from John Robb's Global Guerrillas site. Black Globalization is the transnational criminalization of global markets.



http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.03/view.html?pg=4

[Dayuhan]

2. As you say, insurgency is politics. Agreed. But not all armed rebellions are politics. Some are for power, some are for money; both of which will affect politics, but neither of which are politically driven.

How is the pursuit of power anything but politics?

Ahh, but empire-like controls help corporations to prosper. Prosperous corporations have powerful lobbies, as do the governments that prosper from these same corporations.

Capital may well be a coward, but it loves a good dictatorship.

True enough in the 60s and 70s, far less true today. The corporate side has evolved a good deal, though it would be most un-American to give them credit for it. Certainly they'll work with dictators where they must, but the illusion that dictatorship = stability is long gone. You see this often in oil-producing dictatorships, where western companies prefer to work on service contracts rather than owning resources or physical plant, even where that means lower profits. Basic risk mitigation: everyone now knows that dictatorships are a risk and you have to consider what happens when some colonel decides that Allah desires that the dictator meet with a bullet or the population rises in the streets.

If the government and the corporation are both prospering, that sounds pretty much win-win and a desirable situation. Of course the government may elect to stash its prosperity in the Cayman Islands, but that's hardly something the corporation can control.

As to economics, I don't ignore them, they are a critical part of the equation. But people will tolerate crushing poverty if they believe that it is fair. But even the wealthy rise up in rebellion when the conditions of insurgency reach a certain point.

Varies from case to case, but it is possible to buy off a populace. We see it today: both China and Saudi Arabia could be considered ripe for insurgency, but I doubt you'll see either hit critical mass unless there's a serious economic upheaval.

We also can't forget fear as a motivating factor pressing populaces to reject insurgency. The Chinese, for example, have a quite vivid national memory of what happened when a nominally progressive movement toppled a fading government in 1911, but lacked the capacity to govern themselves. The result was devastating. They also have memories of what happened when Chiang Kai-Shek's fading effort at despotism was toppled by a group who did have the capacity to govern. They look at current conditions and know they aren't great, but they know too well what the alternative can be. In Saudi Arabia desire for change is balanced against an acute awareness that they sit on something lots of people want, and an overwhelming fear that if change brings weakness and division they may simply be swallowed up by some larger outside force. I can't count how many time I've been told, in the Gulf, that "America wants us to be democratic and tolerate opposition so the CIA can rig our elections and manipulate the opposition and take over". Conspiracy theory perhaps, but powerful nonetheless.

[William F. Owen]

But not all armed rebellions are politics. Some are for power, some are for money; both of which will affect politics, but neither of which are politically driven.

If its for power, then it is political. Politics is power over people. It is not just what politicians do. All conflict is driven by politics, because all conflict seeks to alter political power. Populations rebel for that reason.

3. Insurgencies require a popular base. Many armed rebellions, particularly those of the type described in #2 above, do not require and typically do not possess such a base. To lump these all together leads to inappropriate responses.

Example? All the definitions of insurgency I know of, make no such distinction. The appropriateness of the response is defined by the policy, not the conflict.

I strongly believe that the presence or absence of violence is a poor way to define a conflict.

Well no violance, no conflict.

5. knowing if the rebels are armed and violent is important for the design of my "counter-rebel" operations; but offers no clues as to what conditions must be addressed, or how those undefined conditions might best be addressed to resolve the causation for the rebellion.

It is not the job of the Army to resolve the problem. Defeat the rebels, then the government can do what it wants.

Dealing with an "armed rebellion" in some colonial enterprise is completely different than dealing with an "armed rebellion" at home. The stakes at home are much higher; and the residual consequences of tactical choices, win or lose, are both much higher at home.

Well the logic of that is infantry tactics in a civil war are different from that of a war with another nation. The only difference between foreign and domestic is the policy.

None of this can be fairly described by such a broad and inartful distinction as "armed rebellion."

Broad and inartful? Those words have sufficed for 5,000 years. I see no reason to change.