Is Globalization the Answer or Culprit?

[William F. Owen]

To quote the article:

But recent events in Tunisia and Algeria remind us that the vast bulk of history's revolutions are fueled by economics, not politics. In this, the struggle for Islam's soul is no different than that of any other civilization in this age of globalization's rapid expansion...

Rubbish. I cannot take that seriously.

I find Globalisation is an imprecise term of almost no actual utility.
Additionally I submit it has little or no relevance to conflict.
Wars are caused by Politics. Globalisation is irrelevant.

Basically, when people say "Globalisation" they are strongly indicating they are confused by things they see, but do not understand. Everything people state as being or as being a product of "Globalisation" has a better and more useful explanation else where.

[davidbfpo]

Cliff,

Elsewhere on SWC I have posted links to work on this theme, notably by Paul Rogers and Mary Kaldor, see this thread's opening post:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=12224

I do think that rushing to explain what happened in Tunisia as proving theory 'Global' is a mistake, plus media reporting on a "tidal wave" of protest sweeping through North Africa and beyond.

History in Africa notably has ample evidence of global interconnections leading to grim times, so I see no reason why PRC should be exempt - although I do not foresee the IMF and others arriving with a stabilisation programme.

[Bob's World]

I think about this a great deal. Frankly, there is very little evidence that "revolutions are caused by economics." For every situation you find a populace in poor or declining economic situations, far more are politically stable than unstable. It's like arguing that poverty causes spousal abuse or alcoholism. Some things are "equal opportunity" for rich and poor alike, and these dynamics that are rooted in human nature and group dynamics fit with in that category.

As Wilf says, insurgency is politics. He's absolutely right on that score. So we'll agree on those first two mile markers as we head down this path. 1. insurgency is not about economics (though certainly once the conditions of insurgency exist, economics come into play); and that insurgency is politics (Note, this means that political upheaval that is created by individuals seeking power or money with their small gang; such as drug cartels in Mexico, range wars between ranchers in the old American West, and perhaps even Diamond gangs in Sierra Leone are not true "insurgencies."

Our trails begin to diverge, and ahead is the fork in the road of "war" vs "civil emergency." Our doctrine tells us it is war, and our doctrines on war tells us war is politics. This is the majority path taken in looking at insurgencies. This is where I diverge. I could make a case for either one, but historically when one looks at situations where insurgency is approached as war and warfare is waged against the insurgent (often by an external power conducting counter guerrilla operations) it tends to ignore the root political causes and focus on re-establishing the status quo while suppressing the challengers. That model has proven to be temporarily effective many times and places. It is the base model captured in US COIN doctrine derived from the European Colonial experience, shaped during our own colonial experience (to which we added TTPS learned in defeating the native American populaces); and then colored again by our post WWII and post Cold War intervention experiences. All approached as war, with the goal of sustaining in power some government that is committed to supporting our interests in a particular region/populace deemed critical to US national interests.

I see insurgency as simply "illegal politics" that sometimes rise to very war-like levels of violence. I also believe that degree of violence is not an effective way to categorize such activities, but that one does a better job when they do it by the nature and relationship of the parties, and the basis of causation for the conflict (be it violent or non-violent).

Now to "Globalization" and does it help or hurt. Short answer is "YES, it does both"

Consider how the development of Roman roads facilitated the rise of Romes ability to subdue and manage an unprecedented empire; and similarly how such roads facilitated the rise of effective challengers from those subdued populaces that ultimately brought Rome down.

Consider how the development of the printing press facilitated the rise of the populaces of Western Europe to break the strangle hold of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church and their monopoly on education and religion.

Consider how British laid a vast network of telegraph wires and employed a steam powered navy and commercial fleet to expand and control an empire that rivaled Rome; and how populaces within those suppressed and divergent locations employed the same world-shrinking tools to encourage and sustain a ever expanding resistance that ultimately made sustaining such an empire cost-prohibitive, rolling back the overt controls to allow greater self-determination and legitimacy of government locally and a far less controlling role by Britain.

Now consider the American experience. Exerting our own brand of controlling influence across the globe on the backs of our own tremendous naval and commercial fleets; first in the name of "containing" existential threats of Soviet expansion into Europe; then evolving to a much broader and looser containment of the ideology of communism that was being embraced by so many post-colonial countries to facilitate their continued march to independence. Then there is the Middle East, a critical Cold War "battlefield" of resources, sea lanes, and choke points that had to be denied to the Soviets at any costs, and the governmental relationships that were nurtured and then protected against all enemies, foreign and domestic, to secure.

Then the Cold War ends and so does our express rationale for much of this engagement. Control measures are visibly rolled back in the West and Far East; but in the Middle East the Status Quo endured. The governments weren't complaining there (who complains about being insanely rich and powerful?), and the populace there has no voice (conversely poor and powerless), so their cries were muted. But along comes the information tools of "globalization." They lit the fuse that allowed the Eastern European populaces to free themselves from Soviet dominion. They also enabled bin Laden to turn AQ into a UW headquarters that could employ networked operations to extend a global reach without the benefit (or vulnerable burden) of a state to operate from. Like with the British experience before us, formerly isolated and disconnected populace groups rallied off of each others experiences to find courage and encouragement to stand up and resist illegitimate governments at home. It also empowered AQ's ability to recruit across a broad base of supportive populaces to converge energy against the West in an effort to break our support to these governments they were seeking to challenge at home. No more a "global insurgency" than the Cold War was; but rather a set of nationalist insurgencies with a common religion and common opponent that are leveraged by AQ as the UW hub to support their own political agenda as well.

So, yes, globalization is an important aspect of the current upheavals of Sunni Muslim populaces. Just as it was for the suppressed populaces of every previous empire as well.

But if you go down the "warpath" you begin to lose objectivity. If you don't look at history, you lose perspective. If you can't look at your own actions and contributions to the political conditions that are being challenged through illegal politics, you lose your empire...

[John T. Fishel]

On the subject of insurgency and its causes: Ted Robert Gurr, back in 1970, published what is still the best explanation in Why Men Revolt. In its essence, Gurr's argument was that revolutions take place when after a period of economic growth there is a sudden and sharp decline and the perception of the populace (or significant members thereof) that this is the fault of the venal and unjust government. He calls this "perceived relative deprivation." As a political scientist, I agree that this is politics, but economics is both relavant and the trigger mechanism expolited for political purposes.

Cheers

JohnT

[Bob's World]

John,

You just described the United States. But though we have all of these "classic symptoms" there is no real danger of insurgency. I would offer that Gurr's position is sound, but that if he would have dug a little deeper he would have gotten closer to the true roots of causation.

As we discussed, you bundle the four primary causal factors that I look to under the single umbrella of "Legitimacy." That is one of those words that carries far too many meanings, I think it is critical to break it down into four more focused bundles when assessing insurgency:

Legitimacy: The populace must recognize the right of the government to govern.

Justice: The populace must perceive that the rule of law as applied to them is just.

Respect: No significant segment of the society can perceive that they are excluded from participation in governance and opportunity as a matter of status.

Hope: The populace must perceive that they have a trusted, effective and legal means of changing governance, when they believe such change to be necessary.

When these conditions exist and hope is absent, conditions of insurgency will grow. Certainly economic hardship adds fuel to this mix, but it is a mix rooted in domestic policies and politics assesssed through the eyes of "the populace" (which is never a monolith). At point all it takes is a spark. Some internal or external leader armed with an effective ideology; or some event (as in Tunisia). Whether it then goes violent or non-violent is a choice of tactics, with little bearing on the nature of the problem.

Hope is codified and preserved in our Constitution. This is the role of a Constitution. Any constitution that creates such hope in a populace is the kind of effective COIN tool our founding fathers intended and designed our own constitution to be.

Cheers!

Bob

[J Wolfsberger]

Bob,

Let me add to John's comment with some thoughts on the progress of revolution from The Anatomy of Revolution by Crane Brinton:

financial breakdown, [to] organization of the discontented to remedy this breakdown ... revolutionary demands on the part of these organized discontented, demands which if granted would mean the virtual abdication of those governing, attempted use of force by the government, its failure, and the attainment of power by the revolutionists. These revolutionists have hitherto been acting as an organized and nearly unanimous group, but with the attainment of power it is clear that they are not united. The group which dominates these first stages we call the moderates .... power passes by violent ... methods from Right to Left.

Brinton's book was used in the class I took as a companion to Gurr. (As an aside, and it's been a long time since I read it, as I recall Gurr does dig pretty deep and addresses the issues you raise.)

[William F. Owen]

Legitimacy: If you win, you are legitimate. Power creates support.

Justice: Rule of Law. When you control the population, you say what is legal and what is not. All Governments exercise legitimate power via the rule of law.

Respect: If you have a monopoly on lethal force, you get respect, because folks fear you.

Hope: Deny the enemy hope and they'll give up!

Saddam Hussein was the Legitimate ruler of Iraq. The Taliban were the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. The people who thought otherwise were their political opponents. Legitimacy and legality are an entirely political and thus subjective construct.

Anyone want to say that the regime in Saudi Arabia is not legitimate or legal?

[Bob's World]

Wilf, you confuse "official" with "legitimate."

A strongman can deem himself to be "official;"

A puppet can be deemed "official" by some strong external power;

But only a governed populace can bestow "legitimacy" upon their government.

Vast sweeps of the populace of Saddam's Iraq did not recognize his legitimacy, they only feared his offical power. Same is true in Saudi Arabia today, and that number is growing as the gulf between the people and the Royals continues to expand and pleas of the people for change are not merely ignored, but attacked.

Do indeed look at Egypt as Slap suggests, but if one cannot see past the poverty to the factors of governance that I lay out, then all one is going to see is the surface issues. The people have always been poor in Egypt, even when the kingdom was rich. But as I recall, Pharaohs placed and sustained in power by Greek and Roman armies were far more susceptible to popular uprisings. They were inherently illegitimate in the eyes of the populace.

When Egypt explodes it will not be because the people are poor or because many are Muslim. It will be because they do not recognize the right of Mubarak to govern. By his own selfish actions he has robbed his office of legitimacy. It will be because many feel that they are excluded from full participation in economic and governmental opportunity as a matter of status. It will be because many feel that the rule of law as applied to them is unjust. It will be because hope has been removed from the political process there.

It will not be because they are poor.

[Cliff]

John,

You just described the United States. But though we have all of these "classic symptoms" there is no real danger of insurgency. I would offer that Gurr's position is sound, but that if he would have dug a little deeper he would have gotten closer to the true roots of causation.

As we discussed, you bundle the four primary causal factors that I look to under the single umbrella of "Legitimacy." That is one of those words that carries far too many meanings, I think it is critical to break it down into four more focused bundles when assessing insurgency:

Legitimacy: The populace must recognize the right of the government to govern.

Justice: The populace must perceive that the rule of law as applied to them is just.

Respect: No significant segment of the society can perceive that they are excluded from participation in governance and opportunity as a matter of status.

Hope: The populace must perceive that they have a trusted, effective and legal means of changing governance, when they believe such change to be necessary.

When these conditions exist and hope is absent, conditions of insurgency will grow. Certainly economic hardship adds fuel to this mix, but it is a mix rooted in domestic policies and politics assesssed through the eyes of "the populace" (which is never a monolith). At point all it takes is a spark. Some internal or external leader armed with an effective ideology; or some event (as in Tunisia). Whether it then goes violent or non-violent is a choice of tactics, with little bearing on the nature of the problem.

Hope is codified and preserved in our Constitution. This is the role of a Constitution. Any constitution that creates such hope in a populace is the kind of effective COIN tool our founding fathers intended and designed our own constitution to be.

Cheers!

Bob

Bob-

I think you could make an arguement that the Tea Party represents an insurgency, and I think economics are the prime driver of this movement. Comparing the US economic "woes" to those in some of these other countries is comparing apples and oranges, however- we're not that bad off (not that that's good, mind you!). We simply have a robust system that can process insurgencies - IE, the elections!

As for the other posts (sorry I am behind so mass replying) - I am closer to JohnT's opinion I think.

I agree that war is politics by other means, and insurgency is warfare by and for politics more so than most other types of war.

That said, I think you ignore economic causes at your peril. Certainly they are expressed politically, but economics have been at the root of numerous revolutions/insurgencies - like our own (taxes due to the British debt) or the French Revolution (debt from numerous wars against the Brits). In many cases where this doesn't hold true I would argue that a few self-interested folks hijacked the populace's economic dissatisfaction (Lenin, Mao)...

I am not arguing that all insurgencies/revolutions are caused by economics. But I am arguing that these will become more common than ever before. Globalization means that our economic interests are more integrated than ever before. While globalization has occured before, the integration of supply chains across nations has never occured to the level we see today. Likewise, the competition in almost every area of the economy has never been as widespread as it is now. This round of globalization is different as a result- it's not trade in raw materials or finished products but technology enabled flat supply chains operating on just-in-time principles.

Due to the system of liberalized international trade and finance set up by the victors of World War II, states tend to compete in the economic realm rather than in the military one, and we haven't seen a great power war since World War II. Let's be honest - as long as your average middle class person has a job and can take care of their family and improve their life, they don't have as much to be dissatisfied about. That's why China hasn't seen massive countrywide protests- as long as the CCP can deliver reasonable growth, the folks will stay reasonably happy. In places where this is not the case, you see upheaval.

Again, I am not saying that politics or legitimacy do not matter. They most certainly do. But I am saying that economic issues will become even more important than ever before. As countries develop this will tend to be more the case, while in lesser developed countries it will be less so. Is the development the cause? It seems that you could make an arguement that people at the low end (very poor, little economic activity) tend to dislike their government, and people at the high end of development (more economic activity, developed economy) also tend to get there. South Korea is a good example - not much democracy until their economy took off - then massive protests and upheaval.

In summary, I think that economic causes are a major part of many insurgencies. Getting bogged down on semantics or trying to separate economic and political causes (It's only about the legitimacy - in four parts!) disregards important aspects of the problem. I think part of the reason for this tendency is the centrality of the military to dealing with insurgencies in the West - which is exactly why Dr. Barnett and others argue for a "department of everything else" or Goldwater Nichols for the interagency - to give the USG non-military tools to deal with these issues.

V/R,

Cliff

PS - good to see you Prof Fishel! Hoping I can be a poster and not just a lurker, at least for a few more months!

[Bob's World]

Cliff,

The Tea Party absolutely is not an insurgency for the simple reason that it is within the rule of law. The Tea party is legal politics.

However, in many, perhaps most countries around the world the Tea Party absolutely would be an insurgency because it would be illegal politics.

This is why I add "Hope" and describe it as the great off ramp from insurgency. Imagine a U.S. where the populace lost their faith and confidence in the Constitution? An America where there was no trusted, certain, and legal means to address conditions of poor governance?

Take that away from the segment of America that comprises or supports the Tea Party and option would they have besides insurgency? This is the situation the African American populace found themselves in; as they were excluded as a matter of status from inclusion in the good governance of the United States. Lyndon Johnson threw his own political future under the bus, a far more significant bus than the one "Ms Parks was on. He had the moral courage to pass three landmark laws that brought the African American populace within the circle of "good governance" and also with the voters rights act insured they had Hope.

Many Americans today are in denial over the civil rights situation that exploded post WWII in much the same way many Germans are about the Holocaust. Somethings are so horrible, so hard to imagine in the context of modern times that they are discounted as to how bad they were.

So, in Afghanistan, building equity and justice will take time, though we could get started on the laws and infrastructure required for both. Hope can come much more quickly; but begins with a new constitution. The current constitution robs virtually the entire populace of Afghanistan of hope; and discriminates against half as a matter of status. Does anyone think the Northern Alliance would stand for the current Constitution if Mullah Omar was sitting in the presidency with the power to pick a 1/3 of the senate, a new Supreme Court, every District and Provincial Governor and Police Chief; plus many more??

As to economics, I don't ignore them, they are a critical part of the equation. But people will tolerate crushing poverty if they believe that it is fair. But even the wealthy rise up in rebellion when the conditions of insurgency reach a certain point.

[slapout9]

On the subject of insurgency and its causes: Ted Robert Gurr, back in 1970, published what is still the best explanation in Why Men Revolt. In its essence, Gurr's argument was that revolutions take place when after a period of economic growth there is a sudden and sharp decline and the perception of the populace (or significant members thereof) that this is the fault of the venal and unjust government. He calls this "perceived relative deprivation." As a political scientist, I agree that this is politics, but economics is both relavant and the trigger mechanism expolited for political purposes.

Cheers

JohnT

Ding....Ding....Ding we have a winner IMO. Watch Egypt!!!! and then the world. People are getting fed up with welfare for the rich and suffering for the rest.