OK, let me try again:Originally Posted by Cliff
"... it functions so that the Sauds sell their oil reliably and often at lower prices, and recycle these [I meant the Petro-Dollars they earn that way] through massive purchases of US armament or investments in the USA, both of which keep large parts of the US economy in running condition."
Regarding "security and stability"... You say, "One of the main benefits is that the Saudis (along with the UAE and Qatar) help us deter the Iranians from dominating the region. This is one of the main reasons why we provide them with weapons, in spite of the drawbacks that you have pointed out."
I understand your standpoint and I'm ready to go as far as to say, "theoretically, it's perfectly OK". Practically, however, I often see it as "greasing mud into the eyes". Why? Well, I think this is not going to be possible to explain without going into quite some details.
I see myself as "specialized" in studying "air forces" and "ops". When I study these two topics in regards of KSA I can reach back on quite a fresh experience: the "war" against al-Houthis, in Yemen. In very short, somewhat generalizing terms, for the local military RSAF this war developed as follows: after being put on alert, the military rushed the local brigade, reinforced by certain "elite" elements (rangers, para-commandos etc.) to the scene. Driven rather by religious fevour than all the 20 years of training it received from its US instructors, this "unit" did exactly the same that led to an early demise of two "elite" armoured brigades of the Yemeni Army only a few weeks before: namely, it charged the enemy positions frontally even though having next to no clue what's going on. I hope that many here are going to agree, that it's little surprising the Saudi unit in question suffered considerable losses in the process (over 120 KIA and MIA on a single day).
This "slap on the fingers" convinced the rest of the military that this is going to be a "slightly" more serious affair than expected. Thus, even though al-Houthis surely did not bombard Riyadh or disrupted the work of the Saudi military on its home-bases in any other fashion, they required another three days to set up a joint command capable of coordinating the work of all the involved branches. Surely enough, the RSAF was airborne and flying very intensively, providing 24/7 air cover for the (mauled) brigade that was in contact with al-Houthis at the border, and the troops on the ground knew to appreciate the almost permanent presence of F-15s and Tornados above them - particularly in the light of the fact that many of them proved overweight, unfit, that their assault rifles proved too short-ranged, that they lacked even such basic equipment like binoculars etc., not to talk about their lack of any kind of training in navigation and manoeuvring in the field... But, eventually it turned out that F-15s and Tornados operating at above 15,000ft is not the best possible idea, particularly if this happens because somebody in Washington convinced al-Sauds that the Iranians supplied al-Houthis with MANPADs - while this was simply not truth... (al-Houthis actually supplied themselves from depots of some 20 various Yemeni arms-dealers, all of whom have since been arrested by the authorities; but that with "Iranians delivering arms" appeared more convenient as a PR-tool, so why change it only because it proved wrong?)...Whatever, intensive flying soon began pointing at maintenance problems related to the fact that there are jobs the RSAF ground crews simply refuse to learn doing; i.e. they order their "foreign contract personnel" to do it since in their opinion the party that sold them the equipment that's "not functioning" is responsible for making it functional again....Something like another "three days later", it turned out the RSAF is also short on PGMs, and in need of urgent resupply (I could go into some...funny...details about "whys" here too)....etc., etc., etc.. Once this all was over, the Saudis declared themselves for "victorious" - and then for "better than the Israelis", then they think they fought a "Hezbollah-type" force and won a war against it (ssshhh, please, don't tell them that the Yemeni government eventually felt forced to accept a ceasefire with al-Houthis and give them a share in power and politics), while the Israelis failed to do so in Lebanon, back in 2006....
And now imagine this "military" finding itself on the receiving end of an Iranian attack...
Thus, in summary, you say, "One of the main benefits is that the Saudis (along with the UAE and Qatar) help us deter the Iranians from dominating the region. This is one of the main reasons why we provide them with weapons, in spite of the drawbacks that you have pointed out."
I say: sure, the Saudis do not deliver as much oil to the US as certain other countries (see Canada for example), but, sure, they do buy much more US armament than the Canadians (in turn keeping large segments of the US heavy industry afloat etc., etc., etc.). The problem is that they can't really use this armament, nor does their government cares for its military to become capable of using this armament - and thus KSA remains dependable on US support should the situation become really serious.
Means: I'm sure the US means it serious with "security and stability"...But as it is, the situation is resulting in none, then as far as I know the Iranians (those between them that matter), they are not really deterred even by the US-, not to talk about the Saudi military.
I confess I'm convinced that Iran dominates the US minds already since years, and that - in the long run - I simply do not see the way the US can prevent them from dominating at least certain parts of the area.I submit that you would be hard-pressed to argue that allowing Iran to dominate the region would be a good idea.
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