Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
I'm quite pleased with what was a central argument of that manuscript: that what the Arab world needed was a "catalytic event" that would alter perceptions of authoritarian power and set in motion democratic demonstration effects... precisely of the sort we now see.
Rex Brynen,

In my view, there is too much focus on the revolution itself. Starting the revolution was the easy part. However, it's not the revolution that counts, but the day that follows it. As Mr Fukuyama rightly observed, democracy is not a kind of default condition to which societies revert after the disappearance of an autocratic regime. The only tangible result we currently have is a power vacuum. The power vacuum will soon be filled by the best available alternative. Two organizations have a head start in this race: the Army and the Muslim Brothers. Emerging democratic political parties need time to catch up. The international community has to provide that time by keeping Egypt's graneries well filled. In Egypt, "bread is everything" and the lack of it will quickly lead to riots, resulting in either a military regime or an Islamist government.

For democratic, secular parties to develop, the issue of food security has to be kept out of the debate. If necessary, international organizations have to step in to maintain food subsidies at their current level. However, even this does not guarantee a smooth transition towards democracy. What will the Egyptian political landscape look like six months from now? Three main actors will determine the outcome: secular groups, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Army. According to me, it is useful to analyze their plan A, their worst case scenario, and their plan B.

Plan A of the secular groups is to unite around a democratic project and lead Egypt towards freedom, security, and prosperity. Their worst case scenario is to be marginalized or oppressed by either a military autocrat or an Islamist regime. Their plan B is a power sharing arrangement between themselves and the Muslim Brotherhood to marginalize the regular army.

Plan A of the Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic republic. However, the Muslim Brothers are pragmatic enough to realize this is not within reach at the moment. Such a project would require a popular Islamic army (like the Pasdaran in Iran) to balance the power of the regular army. At the moment, this is simply beyond their reach. Their worst case scenario is the emergence of a military autocrat like Nasser who removes them from the political scene. Their plan B is a power sharing arrangement between themselves and secular groups to marginalize the army.

Plan A of the Army is to found a military regime. However, the generals are not blind to the fact that this is precisely what the revolution was all about. At the moment, the generals are simply unable to put the genie back in the bottle. Their worst case scenario is the loss of all their priviliges as the prime political and economic power in Egypt. Their plan B is to bide their time and foster disagreements between the Muslim Brotherhood and secular groups and within secular groups themselves. Political instability will put the army in the role of arbitrator, a steppingstone towards a monopoly on political power.

I guess that, at the moment, all actors will opt for their Plan B. This will result in a system that is much more democratic than Moubarak's regime. However, it will be very fragile. Every actor will look for the first opportunity to move to Plan A and every actor will fear the worst case scenario is just around the corner.