Egypt's Spring Revolution (2011-2013)

[slapout9]

John Lennon "Power To The People"


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y575x...eature=related

[tequila]

A split between the military and Mubarak/Suleiman?

Maj. Gen. Safwat El-Zayat, a former senior official of Egypt’s General Intelligence and member of the Egyptian Council of Foreign Affairs, asserted, in an interview with Ahram Online, that the address delivered by President Mubarak last night was formulated against the wishes of the armed forces, and away from their oversight. He claimed that Vice Preisdent Omar Suleiman’s address, which came on the heels of Mubarak’s address, was equally in defiance of the armed forces and away from its oversight.

Attributing this information to his own sources within the Egyptian military, Maj. Gen. El-Zayat said there was now a deep cleavage between the armed forces, represented in its Supreme Council, and the Presidential authority, represented in both President Mubarak and his Vice President, Omar Suleiman.

According to El-Zayat, communiqué #2 issued this morning by the Supreme Armed Forces Council was not, as many people in Egypt and elsewhere understood it, an affirmation of the addresses of Mubarak and Suleiman, but rather an attempt to avoid an open conflict, while at the same time underlining that the army will act as guarantor for the transition to full democracy. He adivced that people should listen carefully to the anticipated communique #3.

[Surferbeetle]

Crowbat,

Your post’s are interesting as always, I greatly appreciate your taking the time to provide references to further explain your points. If you don’t mind my joining in, your last post raises a couple of questions in my mind, and I am also interested in your take on how the recent events in the Arab world will be impacted by some of the latest political developments in Europe.

Let’s start off with discussion regarding business deals with the Middle East, and let’s consider three population observations for scale. My references are Wikipedia, the Economist’s Pocket World in Figures, the IMF, and the EIA. The estimates provided by my references do not exactly match nation for nation in my spot check – but the estimates appear to be close enough for this discussion. The Arab League is comprised of 22 countries, has approximately 300 million inhabitants, and has a combined GDP of approximately 2 trillion USD. The USA has 50 states (plus 5 territories + 11 small islands and the District of Columbia), has approximately 300 million inhabitants, a GDP of approximately 14 trillion USD, produces 1,665 million tons of oil equivalent, uses 2,340 million tons of oil equivalent. The EU is comprised of 27 countries, has approximately 500 million inhabitants, has a combined GDP of approximately 17 trillion USD, produces 460 million tons of oil equivalent and uses 1,229 million tons of oil equivalents.

Given these observations/baselines, and in the interest of an open minded discussion, are you able to provide an overview of EU27 foreign military sales and economic assistance during the time period you reference?

My viewpoint is that it’s not all sweetness and light, but neither is it all hatred and evil….

Perhaps this is "reality", i.e. the world is really such a nice place. In the media, it looks like this (all nicely sorted out for the first source that reported it, and in chronological order):
As first, there is a report that the U.S. [is] Set to Offer Huge Arms Deal to Saudi Arabia, $20 billion dollar deal. Then there is the usual outcry: Israel cautious on US-Saudi arms deal. This problem is then solved in following fashion: Israel hails US military aid rise, over $30 billions! - in reaction to which there is plenty of praise: Israel Says No Objections to US Gulf Arms Deal.

If you have the means, the choice between a ‘Rolls Royce’ and a ‘Yugo’ as a daily ride is not a tough one. Besides, which ‘company’ is more likely to ‘sattel die pferden, wir reiten nach…’ to make sure things work? This appears to be primarily a marketplace driven solution, oder…?

Along these lines, China’s recent advances in manufacturing and servicing high speed trains make me wonder about the effects of even more competition in the marketplace of war armaments in a few years.

Obviously, nothing happened, i.e. their call received a negative answer. But still: if they need this armament for their protection and if it is so that "if we don't sell them, they'll get it somewhere else", then why do they call the US for..."help"?

This is a good question, what do you see as the answer?

And vice-versa: if this has to do with protecting the USA, West, rest of the world, Moon, the Mars people or whatever else, then why is the extremism spreading and the situation (see Iraq and Pakistan) worsening, instead of improving?

…my guess is that you see this as the answer to the previous question?

So, we have the US that "didn't start", and the Iranians that "didn't start", and the Saudis that appear to be "initiating" but actually react to highly a successful, years-long PR-campaigns etc., i.e. they also "didn't start". (Trying to get myself back to the topic) There is also Egypt that "didn't start". Nobody started this; all is "mutual interest".
Hm... this is still prompting at least one "unpleasant question": what is the only common factor in all these cases?

So, what then is your take on Mr. David Cameron's and Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy’s recent pronouncements on the topic of multiculturalism. I note that they are both in-line with Frau Dr. Merkel’s comments…will this lead to greater understanding and world peace or are they instead acknowledging the world as it is?

[Dayuhan]

Mubarak resigns, but apparently is not leaving the country. Have to wonder if any assurance were made about possible prosecution or other issues regarding his personal fortune. Also have to wonder whether he'll continue to have influence behind the scenes, and what role, if any, Suleiman will have. Did the army get fed up and act, or has this been orchestrated to get the crowds off the street, followed by business as usual with cosmetic changes?

We'll see. Certainly not a bad way for events to go, but it ain't over by a long shot.

On points previous:

But Saddam was...OK, not "openly" but still... very friendly to the USA, back in the 1950s, again in the 1980s (see Rick Francona's "From Ally to Adversary", for example). His country was not only removed from the list of countries supporting terrorism, back in 1983, but it also received very "nice" loans, combat helicopters, and even ingredients for "senf". The ties became so close, that between 1986 and 1988, he several times requested deliveries of F-4 Phantom fighters. Indeed, even as of July 1990, he politely requested - and received - a "permission" (well, sort of it) for the "Kuwait business". And, if he would still be around to ask (not that I'm sorry he isn't), I'm sure even today he couldn't reasonably explain to himself, how come his person and his country then found itself on the receiving end of so much hatred and a major military attack by the same powers he has been said he is protecting against the Islamic extremism in Iran for an entire decade...

The 1950s were a long time ago; things change.

The idea that Saddam was a "US ally" during the Iran/Iraq war is a fairly common misconception, but it is definitely wrong. US policy then was effectively that neither side should be allowed to gain a decisive victory. There was never any illusion about Saddam being on our side or protecting anyone from Iranian imperialism; we just didn't want to see him lose, which could have left Iran in a dominant regional position. There was also no interest at all in seeing Saddam win. A cynical policy perhaps, and arguably one that extended a very destructive war, but by no means an unreasonable one.

The idea that Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks, based on wildly distorted out of context excerpts from a diplomatic meeting. It's fantasy, pure and simple. Everybody involved miscalculated: the US thought Saddam was going to negotiate with Kuwait and the troop movements were just a threat aimed at influencing the negotiations, Saddam thought the US would stop short of full-scale military action. He had no illusions about US approval, nor were there ever any bases for such illusions.

Going back into "Devil's advocate mode" (until further notice): But, they did. They have supported US operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan, in 2001 and 2002. They wholeheartedly supported the case against Saddam, even applauded Bush and Powell in the UN. It's a "public secret" that a large number of the Tomahawks, plus a good deal of F-117- and B-1-attacks against Iraq in March 2003 went through the Iranian airspace - which would be impossible (at least equal to an act of war) without an agreement with Tehran. They have written almost a dozen of letters to the White House ever since, but never got a single response (BTW, in Iran it's considered as a "very brazen act", indeed "major offense" not to answer to somebody's letter). All they've got in response are threats, sanctions and yet more threats - all of these released through the media. So, what shall they do if the US simply refuses to get along with Iran (or, worse yet: have no clue how to do that)?

Obviously Iran was not going to have any complaint about US action against Saddam Hussein, or against a regime in Afghanistan heavily influenced by Wahhabi and Deobandi theology and ISI support, none of which are terribly sympathetic to the Shi'a.

Ask yourself: what exactly does Iran as a nation, or the Iranian people, gain from Iranian support for Hezbollah, or from the Iranian nuclear program, or from the constant decades-old deluge of frantic anti-US and anti-Israeli rhetoric? Iran gains nothing, but the regime gains the kind of permanent enemies that justify its existence. Without permanent enemies the regime might find its repression, corruption, and staggering economic mismanagement subject to more attention than they already get. Obviously the Iranian regime will not complain if the US acts in their interests (as in Iraq), but they will always find reasons to keep the hate going. They need to.

But, now the US admin has a "problem": how to "explain" all of these sales to a country from which 14 out of 19 idiots from 9/11 came - plus provision of billions of US-taxpayer's money to Israel?

In what country in the world can you not find 14 idiots?

And vice-versa: if this has to do with protecting the USA, West, rest of the world, Moon, the Mars people or whatever else, then why is the extremism spreading and the situation (see Iraq and Pakistan) worsening, instead of improving?

Who says extremism is spreading and the situation is worsening? Certainly prolonged US occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan has played into the hands of the extremists, but they're not having things their own way by any means. The end of the oil glut and the rush of prosperity in the Gulf has vastly reduced the appeal of radicalism there. AQ's efforts in SE Asia have fallen completely flat. It's a mixed situation and it's not running in one direction by any means.

I'm honestly not sure what point you're trying to make re arms sales to the KSA... clarification, ideally concise, would help.

[Ken White]

The idea that Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks, based on wildly distorted out of context excerpts from a diplomatic meeting. It's fantasy, pure and simple. Everybody involved miscalculated: the US thought Saddam was going to negotiate with Kuwait and the troop movements were just a threat aimed at influencing the negotiations, Saddam thought the US would stop short of full-scale military action. He had no illusions about US approval, nor were there ever any bases for such illusions.

I don't think that is at all correct. Ta'arof (LINK) rears its lovely Persian head. He asked for Kuwait simply by saying it was historic Iraqi territory; April Glaspie -- unknowing US career diplomat from Canada and nominal Arabist-- replied, variously, that it was not a major issue to the US. See this (LINK). I know it's the Wiki but it's probably as accurate as anything on this; we cannot know for sure what either Hussein or Glaspie really said. This from that Wiki entry:

When these purported transcripts were made public, Glaspie was accused of having given tacit approval for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which took place on August 2, 1990. It was argued that Glaspie's statements that "We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts" and that "the Kuwait issue is not associated with America" were interpreted by Saddam as giving free rein to handle his disputes with Kuwait as he saw fit. It was also argued that Saddam would not have invaded Kuwait had he been given an explicit warning that such an invasion would be met with force by the United States.

To most Westerners and even most Asians, the nominal interchange would not have been viewed as permissive -- to a ME resident steeped in ta'arof , it was an invitation. While ta'arof is a Persian custom, the various Persian Empires embedded the concept firmly in all the races and peoples of the ME.

From that Glaspie Wiki entry:

Journalist Edward Mortimer wrote in the New York Review of Books in November 1990:
“ It seems far more likely that Saddam Hussein went ahead with the invasion because he believed the US would not react with anything more than verbal condemnation. That was an inference he could well have drawn from his meeting with US Ambassador April Glaspie on July 25, and from statements by State Department officials in Washington at the same time publicly disavowing any US security commitments to Kuwait, but also from the success of both the Reagan and the Bush administrations in heading off attempts by the US Senate to impose sanctions on Iraq for previous breaches of international law.

I think Mortimer was correct. So, not only Glaspie but actions of US Administration played into Saddam's perception that he had at least tacit permission if not approval to do what he did...

Thus to say that "...Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks..." is absolutely correct in Western terms. However, for a resident of the ME that statement is just as absolutely incorrect -- in their view, the US literally suggested that he invade -- as Crowbat intimates...

[jcustis]

Mass rebellions of this sort are often decided, in the end, by a simple choice made by the armed forces and police. The order to disperse the crowd, to fire on them if necessary, will eventually be given. They will obey or they will not. If they obey, we have a Tiananmen Square scenario and the government continues, albeit unsteadily and in this case possibly unsustainably.

Mubarak will not leave because the crowd wants him to leave. He certainly isn't going to leave because the US President tells him to, no matter what some believe. He will leave if his army refuses to follow his orders. He won't have any choice.

And so it seems to end.

[Dayuhan]

I don't think that is at all correct. Ta'arof (LINK) rears its lovely Persian head. He asked for Kuwait simply by saying it was historic Iraqi territory; April Glaspie -- unknowing US career diplomat from Canada and nominal Arabist-- replied, variously, that it was not a major issue to the US. See this (LINK). I know it's the Wiki but it's probably as accurate as anything on this; we cannot know for sure what either Hussein or Glaspie really said. This from that Wiki entry:To most Westerners and even most Asians, the nominal interchange would not have been viewed as permissive -- to a ME resident steeped in ta'arof , it was an invitation.

I've heard this interpretation before, and I don't quite buy it. Saddam may have been steeped in Ta'arof, but he was anything but a virgin on the diplomatic scene; he'd been through these scenarios many, many times and was absolutely aware of the niceties and conventions.

Context is all too often forgotten. Glaspie didn't initiate that meeting; she was summoned on short notice, at a time of day that precluded instructions from DC. That doesn't happen by accident; it happens because the party doing the summoning thinks that consultation might bring an unwelcome position. A diplomat in that position has very limited options. There's no way in the world that Glaspie could have threatened the use of force without explicit authorization from on high, and Saddam unquestionably knew that. All she could do was to reiterate prior authorized positions filled out with boilerplate diplospeak, and of course Saddam knew that as well.

The other half of that "no opinion" comment is also overlooked: "We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via Klibi or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly." What she said was boilerplate diplospeak for "we will not take sides on this, but we want it settled fast and we want it settled through negotiation, and these are the intermediaries that would be acceptable to us. I don't think there's any way Saddam would not have known that, and his advisers surely would have known it.

A lot of these comments sound ambiguous from the outside, but they are standard diplomatic templates that Saddam would have heard dozens or hundreds of times before: he was not some bumpkin colonel who seized power the week before. It's like the December Playmate of the Month hearing "come up to my place for a drink". Not likely that she wouldn't realize that more than a drink is being discussed.

I think the use of force was never threatened because nobody thought he would really do it. Saddam explicitly promised negotiations, and Glaspie (along with everybody else) came away thinking the troop movements were a negotiating ploy. Certainly Saddam never approached the US to find out how an invasion would be received, as has been alleged at times.

Tariq Aziz, who was present at the meeting, has stated several times that Glaspie had made nothing but routine comments that any diplomat would make, and that Saddam had no illusions about receiving permission.

[CrowBat]

The Gong for the Round 2....

11 February, 2011
Egypt army to suspend parliament, sack cabinet: report
(Reuters) - Egypt's higher military council will sack the cabinet, suspend both houses of parliament and rule with the head of the supreme constitutional court, Al Arabiya television reported Friday.
The army statement was expected to be delivered later on Friday and followed President Hosni Mubarak's dramatic resignation after 30 years in power.

It seems now that the Supreme Council of the Army removed even Soleiman from his position and is now running all affairs.

Crowbat,

Your post’s are interesting as always, I greatly appreciate your taking the time to provide references to further explain your points.

Thanks, and you're most welcome. My standpoint is that nobody should have a problem discussing any topic with anybody, and that internet forums like this one exist exactly with the purpose of exchanging opinions to topics like these. Thus, the more participate, the more interesting it is going to get.

Please keep in mind, though, that my knowledge and understanding is rather limited to politico-military affairs, than the economy.

The reason for my answer to Dayuhan's post was his explanation that the US-Saudi relations are "business only", initiated by the Saudis rather than the US, and that the US neither has nor wants to exercise any kind of influence upon the Saudi government. I find this is very much relevant for the discussion here, because - as I explained before - the US obviously had very strong influence over Mubarak too (see Mubarak slammed U.S. in phone call with Israeli MK before resignation. Another, rather "personal" reason was that the expression "conspiracy theorist" was used in my direction, which I not only consider offensive (the only "worse" step than this would be to declare me for "liberal" - in US way of using that description), but also for denying reality.

In my response, I attempted to show how these relations actually function, i.e. that there is much more going on behind the scenes than "business only, nothing personal". Otherwise nobody would need any explanations for the media. One can ridicule my standpoint as a "conspiracy theory", but there is more than "circumstantial" evidence that there are unofficial connections between certain, say, "decisive" segments of the US establishment and al-Sauds (for those interested in more information about this topic, see such publications like "In Bed with the Devil", by Robert Baer). The rest is to follow bellow.

Given these observations/baselines, and in the interest of an open minded discussion, are you able to provide an overview of EU27 foreign military sales and economic assistance during the time period you reference?

No, I'm not able to provide an overview of (all?) the EU foreign military sales. Not even to the Middle East alone. But then, I'm also not able to provide an overview of all the US, Russian etc. foreign military sales to the Middle East. The reason for this is that I never sought for publications containing such data.

What I can do is discuss specific deals/projects related to the defence (and air forces in particular) - most of which are, nevertheless, the biggest and most important deals of that kind. And, "by pure accident" (I guess?) the US deals with Saudi Arabia "happen" to be by far the largest of all the ones that are known.

But, if you're looking for some kind of "satisfaction", i.e. for examples of the EU's "aid".... Here a particularly "sweet" one: the green-painted, Italian-made Iveco "APCs" of the Egyptian CSF (the black-clad "Basiji") we've seen driving over the protesters on the streets of the Egyptian cities in the first days of the revolution, were provided within the frame of the EU-supplied aid to the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, as equipment "not intended for specifically military purposes". The project within which they were delivered is running since something like ten years, and was worth some €10 Million annually...

My viewpoint is that it’s not all sweetness and light, but neither is it all hatred and evil…

Again: I'm not trying to point with finger or accuse anybody. I consider this discussion an "exchange of opinions", not "mine is bigger than yours" fight, and I find it "normal", "self-understanding" that every state and every government has its own interests (i.e. the interests of those who are running and backing the government in question) and is primarily working on pursuing the same.

I do raise the question, though: is this pursuit of interest of "business only, nothing personal" kind, is it as "innocent", "legitimate" and as "useful" as so many appear to be convinced it is, or do all these "affairs" actually serve some other purposes, while at the same time completely and blissfully ignoring the actual problem?

If you have the means, the choice between a ‘Rolls Royce’ and a ‘Yugo’ as a daily ride is not a tough one. Besides, which ‘company’ is more likely to ‘sattel die pferden, wir reiten nach…’ to make sure things work? This appears to be primarily a marketplace driven solution, oder…?

This might appear so at the first look, but as I attempted to show with several examples, there is much more in the background.

Let me now try with help of your own example: I'm looking for an explanation for the Saudis actually buying "Rolls Royces with Yugo equipment". Namely, that's what one gets when ordering a downgraded variant of the F-15E (i.e. F-15S) in a deal including only one maintenance workshop and no PGMs (these had to be ordered separately, and then only in very limited numbers), as well as a "guarantee" they are not going to be deployed on specific bases on their own soil - and then still pays two times its usual "market" price, like the Saudis did...

This is something nobody, not even the Saudis I know, could explain so far.

This is a good question, what do you see as the answer? …my guess is that you see this as the answer to the previous question?

Sorry, but the answer is negative: my second question was no answer to the first one. That aside, the purpose of both questions was to hear answers from people like you, not to get questions in response. ;-)

So, what then is your take on Mr. David Cameron's and Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy’s recent pronouncements on the topic of multiculturalism. I note that they are both in-line with Frau Dr. Merkel’s comments…will this lead to greater understanding and world peace or are they instead acknowledging the world as it is?

I do not consider them relevant for the topic at hand, but have strong doubts they are going to lead to anything like "greater understanding and world peace".

To be continued...

[CrowBat]

The 1950s were a long time ago; things change.

Yes, they change, but then, the 1950s was just an observation for the point in time at which this friendship began. I'm sure you're going to agree that long-lasting friendships are of far higher quality than short ones (and that we're both beyond the age of enjoying one-night-stands ;-))?

The idea that Saddam was a "US ally" during the Iran/Iraq war is a fairly common misconception, but it is definitely wrong.

This "misconception" was actually disproved during the recent Reappraising the Iran-Iraq War Thirty Years Later Conference in London. Surely enough, evidence of Saddam advising the US (and receiving any sort of "blessing" from the DC) about his intention to launch an invasion on Iran, in September 1980, is still of rather circumstantial nature (well, he at least informed the Saudis and received their blessing, and there is little doubt the Saudis kept this info away from the DC). But the rest is meanwhile beyond doubt.

US policy then was effectively that neither side should be allowed to gain a decisive victory. There was never any illusion about Saddam being on our side or protecting anyone from Iranian imperialism...

We're again at discussing the official and unofficial stances. Yes, the official US stance was "it would be good if both of them could lose that war". Unofficial stance was: "Let's help Saddam keep the Iranian extremists busy" - with the repercussion of fastening exactly the same extremists in Iran in power.

The idea that Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks, based on wildly distorted out of context excerpts from a diplomatic meeting.

Ken answered this better than I ever could. Note that all the Iraqi generals that I interviewed meanwhile replied the same. Surely, everybody is free to call this "just another Iraqi conspiracy theory", but to me they seemed quite firmly convinced about this and certainly not thinking about this affair as any kind of "fantasy". (Indeed, I'll admit that "my" expression "Kuwait business" is actually exactly what I've heard from several retired Iraqi generals.)

You're right, Dayuhan (in your latest post), that Saddam was certainly no "diplomatic virgin". On the contrary. Alone from the studies of the Iran-Iraq War we can see that he knew very well how to (mis)use the diplomacy for his own purposes (a good example was when he used a member of the Qatari royal family to launch rumours that an Iranian F-14 pilot is about to defect to Iraq - in order to curb the IRIAF F-14 ops over the Khark and enable an IrAF offensive against that island, in summer 1985). But exactly that was the problem in this situation: because he was so good at this business, he understood Gilespy's statement as "no problem, go ahead".

Obviously Iran was not going to have any complaint about US action against Saddam Hussein, or against a regime in Afghanistan heavily influenced by Wahhabi and Deobandi theology and ISI support, none of which are terribly sympathetic to the Shi'a.

Agreed.

Ask yourself: what exactly does Iran as a nation, or the Iranian people, gain from Iranian support for Hezbollah, or from the Iranian nuclear program, or from the constant decades-old deluge of frantic anti-US and anti-Israeli rhetoric?

I went a step further and asked quite a number of Iranians. Their answers were as follows:
a) What does Iran gain from support for Hezbollah?
The same the US expected to gain from fighting Taliban in Afghanistan: keeping the opposition busy - and that away from its own turf.

b) What does Iran gain from its nuclear program?
B.1.) Sustainable and durable solution for providing energy for its oil/gas-export "triade", which is currently gulping immense amounts of power due to its dependence on entirely obsolete electric engines that are running its pumps (required to pump oil and gas over hundreds of kilometres of Iranian mountains and under the sea to such loading places like Khark, Sirri etc.);
B.2) Sustainable and durable solution for power supply required by its industrial and scientific development; and
B.3) Sustainable and durable solution for providing power required due to the population growth.

c) What does Iran gain from its frantic anti-US and anti-Israeli rhetoric?
Exactly the same US and Israel gain from their anti-Iranian rhetoric. Having enemies of that kind is good for the economy [well, at least the defence sector; my observation] and can be used for all possible practical purposes on the domestic as well as the international scene.

(And, please, don't blame the messenger.)

Iran gains nothing, but the regime gains the kind of permanent enemies that justify its existence. Without permanent enemies the regime might find its repression, corruption, and staggering economic mismanagement subject to more attention than they already get.

...I most sincerely hope you are aware of the fact, that from the standpoint of a great deal of the "US-enemies", this works exactly the other way too?

I.e. "Without permanent enemies, the US government might find its support for repressive and corrupt regimes in the Middle East a subject to more attention that they already get".

Obviously the Iranian regime will not complain if the US acts in their interests (as in Iraq), but they will always find reasons to keep the hate going. They need to.

And vice-versa. The problem is: we all know that the Iranians are ruled by a mercilessly brutal regime. A significant segment of the Iranian society knows this as well (and the part that doesn't, doesn't care about the regime's foreign policy the least). Correspondingly, they meanwhile need no foreign enemies to use for keeping themselves in power.

Why does the US need to demonize Iran, while at the same time are best friends and closest allies of such oppressive regimes like those in Saudi Arabia, UAE - or like Mubarak's was?

[Bob's World]

http://www.voanews.com/english/news/...115935744.html

Some of the new players. I had the privelege of serving with their 3rd Mech Division out of Alexandria during the first Gulf War. It will be interesting to see if any familiar faces emerge.

If anyone has a good link to names and bios of the senior military leadership it would be interesting to see.

[Entropy]

Ken,

There are two sides to that. First, from your wiki link there was an interview with Tariq Aziz on this topic:

Similarly, in a 2000 Frontline interview, Aziz declared, "There were no mixed signals", and further elaborated:
“ ..

.it was a routine meeting. ... She didn't say anything extraordinary beyond what any professional diplomat would say without previous instructions from his government. She did not ask for an audience with the president [Saddam]. She was summoned by the president. ... She was not prepared.... People in Washington were asleep, so she needed a half-hour to contact anybody in Washington and seek instructions. So, what she said were routine, classical comments on what the president was asking her to convey to President Bush.

Then there is the US side. DIA's warning element correctly gave warning for war and warning for the attack but they were not believed:

On 25 July, I issued a "warning of war" memorandum which stressed that Iraq had nearly achieved the capability to mount a corps-size operation capable of defeating Kuwaiti forces and of occupying much of Kuwait. This report rated the chances of a "military incursion" at better than 60 percent. It further stressed that, even with major Kuwaiti concessions, the chances of some form of Iraqi military action remained significant -- 25 percent.

The Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), after reviewing the report, stated that the warning appeared to be "OBE," -- that is, "overtaken-by-events". He cited a cable which had just been received from the US Ambassador in Iraq who recounted Saddam's assurance that he had no intention of taking military action because of forthcoming talks between Iraq and Kuwait in Jeddah and Baghdad. In response I stated that Saddam could be engaging in deception, given the massive buildup of Iraqi forces along the border and the costs the Iraqi government was incurring to complete it. The Chairman of the NIC agreed and concurred in the issuance of the warning report.

and

As a postscript, at a session of senior military and civilian officers at the Pentagon, General Butler, the J-5, stated that the NIO for Warning had provided warning of war and warning of attack, but that he was not taken seriously because senior US officials talked with, and accepted the judgment of a number of leaders in the Middle East as well as the Soviet Union, all of whom were of the opinion that Saddam did not intend to attack.

In one sense, there is a chicken-egg argument here. Glaspie perhaps didn't sufficiently warn Saddam about consequences, but then her superiors in the State Department and at the senior level consistently believed that Saddam was bluffing in order to gain concessions despite the indications otherwise. So it's understandable that Glaspie would provide the standard line and that her superiors would not subsequently tell her to reinforce the message that the US would oppose an invasion because her superiors didn't believe Saddam would actually invade. This was reinforced by assurances from Saddam that he wouldn't do anything before the upcoming talks in Jeddah and Baghdad. The Jeddah talks collapsed the same day that Iraq's forces became fully prepared (what a coincidence!) and the invasion took place the following morning. The Baghdad talks, of course, never happened.

To me Glaspie had little to do with this. Iraq conducted a quite successful deception operation - their intentions were in motion before Glaspie was summoned.

[RedRaven]

Council,

I think I am missing something very basic here... What was the proximate cause of the demonstrations, what actually kicked the whole thing off?

RedRaven

[davidbfpo]

Red Raven,

All the reports seen here indicated it was the Tunisian protests success and the heavy handed response of the state to non-violent gatherings. Hence much of the media portrayal of a 'wave of protests weeping the Arab world'.

From a BBC Q&A:

How did it all start?

Egypt has long been known as a centre of stability in a volatile region, but that masked malignant problems which erupted in popular demonstrations against the 30-year rule of Hosni Mubarak on 25 and 28 January.

His National Democratic Party (NDP) monopolised political power through a mixture of constitutional manipulation, repression and rigged elections, cronyism, and the backing of powerful foreign allies.

The main drivers of the unrest have been poverty, rising prices, social exclusion, anger over corruption and personal enrichment among the political elite, and a demographic bulge of young people unable to find work.

The catalyst was fellow Arabs in Tunisia successfully overthrowing their autocratic ruler, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, with a popular uprising on 14 January.

Popular anger was fuelled by dozens of deaths at the hands of the security forces, while protesters' voices have been heard thanks to social media and the presence of independent news broadcasters at the scene.

Their rallying cries were "The people want the fall of the regime", "Mubarak, go", and "Illegitimate, illegitimate".

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12324664

The protests that followed were unusual - the protesters chased off the riot police; there was a good BBC-TV report on this yesterday, similar to this round-up:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12418163

[Bob's World]

Council,

I think I am missing something very basic here... What was the proximate cause of the demonstrations, what actually kicked the whole thing off?

RedRaven

Raven,

To be sure, reasonable minds will differ. Much of that difference will be at how deep one chooses to look.

First, Proximate Cause is a legal term of art. "proximate cause is an event sufficiently related to a legally recognizable injury to be held the cause of that injury. There are two types of causation in the law, cause-in-fact and proximate (or legal) cause. Cause-in-fact is determined by the "but-for" test: but for the action, the result would not have happened. For example, but for running the red light, the collision would not have occurred. For an act to cause a harm, both tests must be met; proximate cause is a legal limitation on cause-in-fact."

Second, for my opinion I refer you to the article I posted here on insurgency a few months ago and the updated model and supporting graphic

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...urgency-model/

I contend that in Egypt the Conditions of Insurgency were/are out in phase II, but held below the line in a "suppressed" state by the government. Leaders of the rebellion also employed non-violent tactics keeping it below the line during the past couple of weeks as well. As to causation, I look to the four causal factors of the model. As to the catalyst that kicked this into motion, it was the example of Tunisia; just as the example of Egypt is now having a similar affect among similarly situated populaces across the region.

It will take some time for a new government to emerge and move the populace of Egypt down into phase 0, and much could go bad between now and then. A mistake would be to assume that this is over. This is merely the end of the beginning.

[Ken White]

I've heard this interpretation before, and I don't quite buy it.

Not a problem. We can disagree.

The context was not forgotten by me and at no point did I suggest that the "unknowing US career diplomat from Canada and nominal Arabist" was not manipulated. Those words of mine were deliberate. Sarcastic and deliberate.

I'll also reiterate that we do not and cannot know precisely what was said at the meeting, we have only ex post facto statements by her used in explaining that she agrees with you as well as 'corroboration' by not disinterested parties.

I don't think there's any way Saddam would not have known that, and his advisers surely would have known it.

I think you just validated my suggestion; "So, not only Glaspie but actions of US Administration played into Saddam's perception that he had at least tacit permission if not approval to do what he did..." Perception and "tacit approval" being key.

I think the use of force was never threatened because nobody thought he would really do it.

True. No one thought 19 people would fly airplanes into buildings either. No one in the West, that is.

Saddam explicitly promised negotiations, and Glaspie (along with everybody else) came away thinking the troop movements were a negotiating ploy. Certainly Saddam never approached the US to find out how an invasion would be received, as has been alleged at times.

Of course to the former, that's what would've been the western modus. Regrettably, Mr. Hussein was not a westerner...

Had not heard the latter before and IMO that would be totally out of character.

Tariq Aziz, who was present at the meeting, has stated several times that Glaspie had made nothing but routine comments that any diplomat would make, and that Saddam had no illusions about receiving permission.

Aside from the fact that Tariq had his own reasons to say things, I did not contend that Saddam thought he'd received permission -- I said he'd applied the principles of Ta'arof to what he did hear and had likely manipulated to occur. I did say that many in the ME -- and I'll upgrade that to 'most' -- had seen "...in their view, the US literally suggested that he invade."

Entropy:

I noticed the Aziz comment and had read it elsewhere years ago. He was not an uninterested party. Regardless, his comment (and others of similar vein) do not discount my statement that. Glaspie and the US Administration(s) {Plural -- understanding of the ME is not a US strong point... } were manipulated by Saddam to tell him what he wanted to hear. From your link and that Allen of the CIA article: "I might add at this point that, later, there were reports that Iraq had prepared the attack force for its eventual move into Kuwait over about a three-month period. Additionally, the initial movement of Iraqi forces was reported 12 days before the actual attack against Kuwait." That also has been long known.

What has been longer known -- and deliberately disregarded -- is also in your link and Post:

""As a postscript, at a session of senior military and civilian officers at the Pentagon, General Butler, the J-5, stated that the NIO for Warning had provided warning of war and warning of attack, but that he was not taken seriously because senior US officials talked with, and accepted the judgment of a number of leaders in the Middle East as well as the Soviet Union, all of whom were of the opinion that Saddam did not intend to attack. ""

That needs to be written in stone somewhere because it's the point of my assertion -- the West in general and the US in particular does not understand and therefor gets continually manipulated by the ME. As you said:

Glaspie perhaps didn't sufficiently warn Saddam about consequences...because her superiors didn't believe Saddam would actually invade...The Baghdad talks, of course, never happened.

To me Glaspie had little to do with this. Iraq conducted a quite successful deception operation - their intentions were in motion before Glaspie was summoned.

True dat. Glaspie was virtually irrelevant and most any westerner in her position would have done pretty much the same thing. Saddam wanted corroboration that what he was about to do would be met with little more than a hand slap, he got it. He did not get an invitation but he did get what he perceived was a "Get out of Jail free" card. He got -- and later used -- US lack of understanding, good guy attitude and dithering to point out to the broader ME that he was being picked on. You and others in the West may not believe that.

Far more importantly, most in the ME do believe it...

What Glaspie did inadvertently and what several US Administrations had done is react to Saddam as if he were a rational western head of state. A minor point is that he was in some senses irrational -- the far more important point is that he was not Western.

[carl]

I wonder if I could solicit opinions about the Egyptian national character, if there is such a thing. Is it different from the other Arabs and how so? How did it affect the events in Egypt and how might it affect things in the future?

I figure you guys might have some experience and viewpoints that are of value.

What got me thinking on this was a story that says the organizers of the Tahrir Square demonstrations are calling upon people to return to the square today and help clean it up. I don't know how important that is but it got me thinking along this line.

[Marc]

Council,

I think I am missing something very basic here... What was the proximate cause of the demonstrations, what actually kicked the whole thing off?

RedRaven

RedRaven,

In my view, there are two proximate causes of the demonstrations: population growth and rising food prices.

Like most autocracies, Moubarak's regime was founded on the passive acquiescence of the majority of the population. This acquiescence was generated by a patronage system that guaranteed survival and social security by subsidizing basic necessities like food. The problem is that economic growth in Egypt was insufficient to cover the cost of patronizing the fast-growing Egyptian population. As a result, Egyptians slowly sank into poverty. The recent rise of food prices exacerbated the situation. Egypt is the world's largest importer of wheat: 8 million tons per year. Of these 8 million tons, 6 million tons are dedicated to the subsidy program, feeding three quarters of the population. Moubarak simply did not have the cash to sustain this system.

Starting the revolution was easy. But where will Egypt find the cash to feed the Egyptians the day after the revolution? The person who can find the answer to that question will be the country's next president.

[Dayuhan]

True dat. Glaspie was virtually irrelevant and most any westerner in her position would have done pretty much the same thing. Saddam wanted corroboration that what he was about to do would be met with little more than a hand slap, he got it. He did not get an invitation but he did get what he perceived was a "Get out of Jail free" card. He got -- and later used -- US lack of understanding, good guy attitude and dithering to point out to the broader ME that he was being picked on. You and others in the West may not believe that.

I totally believe that Saddam constructed a situation that he could use to persuade others in the ME, and probably a fair number of his own generals, that he had a pass from the US. I just don't think he ever believed it himself.

Looking at the sequence it seems fairly clear to me that the decision to invade was made well before the meeting with Glaspie. The meeting seems to have been called for one reason: to pass on the disinformation (ok, outright lie) that negotiations were in progress, delaying any US response and making it easier to present a fait accomplii. Anything Glaspie said was irrelevant, as you say, because everyone present knew she had no instructions and couldn't say anything but the usual diplomatic twaddle. I can't imagine that Saddam saw that twaddle as corroboration of anything, or that he cared: the point was to pass on wrong information, not to gain information about US intentions that Glaspie could not, under the circumstances, have provided.

The idea (not coming from you but widespread) that Glaspie could have prevented the invasion by threatening force in response is of course silly: ambassadors can't make that kind of decision on their own. If there was fault it was higher up. The idea that the US deliberately baited Iraq into invading to give them an excuse to go into the region with major military force is even nuttier, though a whole lot of people still believe it. The Middle East is one of the few places in the world where reflexive acceptance of conspiracy theory is even more prevalent than it is in the US. My own reflex position is more the opposite: never attribute to conspiracy that which can be adequately explained by ####up.

Yes, they change, but then, the 1950s was just an observation for the point in time at which this friendship began. I'm sure you're going to agree that long-lasting friendships are of far higher quality than short ones (and that we're both beyond the age of enjoying one-night-stands ;-))?

There are no lasting friendships in diplomacy, only lasting interests. Not all interests last. i don't think the US ever saw Saddam as a "friend", though at various points there may have been common perceived interests. The word "friend" may have been used, but I doubt that it was ever meant. Politicians and diplomats lie a lot; it's their job.

This "misconception" was actually disproved during the recent Reappraising the Iran-Iraq War Thirty Years Later Conference in London.

Conferences don't prove or disprove anything. Lots of perspectives out there, few of them amenable to "proof" one way or the other.

We're again at discussing the official and unofficial stances. Yes, the official US stance was "it would be good if both of them could lose that war". Unofficial stance was: "Let's help Saddam keep the Iranian extremists busy" - with the repercussion of fastening exactly the same extremists in Iran in power.

Not a lot of difference there. The war probably did fasten the Iranian regime in power, but the US didn't initiate the war and couldn't have stopped it. Once it was on the policy of not letting either side gain a convincing win was probably reasonable, if cynical.

Ken answered this better than I ever could. Note that all the Iraqi generals that I interviewed meanwhile replied the same. Surely, everybody is free to call this "just another Iraqi conspiracy theory", but to me they seemed quite firmly convinced about this and certainly not thinking about this affair as any kind of "fantasy". (Indeed, I'll admit that "my" expression "Kuwait business" is actually exactly what I've heard from several retired Iraqi generals.)

I'm sure Saddam sold this idea to his generals and many others; that doesn't mean he believed it himself. Many Iraqi generals believed to the last that Saddam had WMD. Saddam didn't necessarily trust a lot of his people, and he didn't necessarily tell them the truth.

a) What does Iran gain from support for Hezbollah?
The same the US expected to gain from fighting Taliban in Afghanistan: keeping the opposition busy - and that away from its own turf.

It also keeps the opposition opposing; equally important.

b) What does Iran gain from its nuclear program?
B.1.) Sustainable and durable solution for providing energy for its oil/gas-export "triade", which is currently gulping immense amounts of power due to its dependence on entirely obsolete electric engines that are running its pumps (required to pump oil and gas over hundreds of kilometres of Iranian mountains and under the sea to such loading places like Khark, Sirri etc.);
B.2) Sustainable and durable solution for power supply required by its industrial and scientific development; and
B.3) Sustainable and durable solution for providing power required due to the population growth.

All of which could be achieved, without contention, under a number of fuel processing deals that have already been rejected.

The Iranian government could stop supporting Hezbollah, accept the fuel processing deals on offer, and drop the ridiculous anti-US and anti-Israel rhetoric without compromising its interests in any way. The advantages would be very substantial: there would no longer be any justification for sanctions, and the neighbors across the Gulf have demonstrated rather well that oil-producing countries that get on with the west do rather better than those who choose confrontation. There's no need to "tie down the opposition" if there is no opposition. The Iranian regime does not take that course because they need the permanent hostility to justify their own existence.

...I most sincerely hope you are aware of the fact, that from the standpoint of a great deal of the "US-enemies", this works exactly the other way too?

I.e. "Without permanent enemies, the US government might find its support for repressive and corrupt regimes in the Middle East a subject to more attention that they already get".

We work with governments who are willing to work with us, and governments with interests similar to ours. Alliances are made by common interests, not similar systems of government... always been that way. The extent to which the US "supports" or "props up" regimes in places like Saudi Arabia or the Gulf States is hugely overrated: we deal with what is, just as we deal with and trade with China. We may have our own beliefs but it's not our place or our job to impose them on others.

Why does the US need to demonize Iran, while at the same time are best friends and closest allies of such oppressive regimes like those in Saudi Arabia, UAE - or like Mubarak's was?

The Iranian regime is pretty much a self-demonizing system, not because of its internal repression but because of its consistently aggressive, harsh, and threatening positions toward neighbors and its deliberate isolation. They have the power to change that, and it is in no way purely a response to provocation.

[Ken White]

I totally believe that Saddam constructed a situation that he could use to persuade others in the ME, and probably a fair number of his own generals, that he had a pass from the US. I just don't think he ever believed it himself.

I don't know and, in truth the answer to that is as irrelevant as was Glaspie and what she said. The issue is not what Saddam believed, it is what the broader ME believed. More important than any of that history is the fact the US does not do a good job of spreading its beneficence in the ME. A huge part of that is failure to give ta'arof its due.

I've met as many or more Persians that hate it as I have that liked it -- but they all practice it as do most in the ME. It is a documented fact that most Arab armies have an operational problem in that subordinates do not report accurately but rather tell their Boss what they believe he'd like to hear. Ta'arof. Attacks have not been launched due to a junior person being given command. Ta'arof. Most of the ME is quite willing to believe the evils of the US because we (a) ignore the rules of ta'arof and (b) tend to tell people what we think -- an absoute no-no.

Like any cultural trait, ta'arof has it devotees and its haters -- it also is often manipulated, not least by suggesting to another that ta'arof not be practiced -- while continuing oneself to practice it thereby scoring points on he or she who took you at your word and did not follow the rules.

Looking at the sequence it seems fairly clear to me that the decision to invade was made well before the meeting with Glaspie.

No question.

I can't imagine that Saddam saw that twaddle as corroboration of anything, or that he cared: the point was to pass on wrong information, not to gain information about US intentions that Glaspie could not, under the circumstances, have provided.

He probably did not and would have done what he was going to do even if she'd been more forceful. I believe that he called the meeting not only for the purpose you cite but also for the one I cite -- he got most people in the ME to accept that the very inconsistent US polices and the rather innocuous diplomatic gabble were tacit approval of his plans -- there certainly was no disapproval expressed...

The idea (not coming from you but widespread) that Glaspie could have prevented the invasion by threatening force in response is of course silly...

It exists but I don't think it's widespread. Most people know:

ambassadors can't make that kind of decision on their own. If there was fault it was higher up.

Yes. That failure to understand all we know about what we're doing is the crux of the matter. We spend millions to train foreign area specialists and then our policy makers let their egos get in the way and refuse to listen to people who know the area. See Korea, Viet Nam, Dominican Republic, Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan (among others, not least the Philippines...).

The idea that the US deliberately baited Iraq into invading to give them an excuse to go into the region with major military force is even nuttier, though a whole lot of people still believe it. The Middle East is one of the few places in the world where reflexive acceptance of conspiracy theory is even more prevalent than it is in the US.

Again thank you for the corroboration. The "whole lot of people" who still believe it are by a large majority in the ME. They believe it because we got suckered and out-ta'arofed.

My own reflex position is more the opposite: never attribute to conspiracy that which can be adequately explained by ####up.

No conspiracy cited by me, just a pure ####up on the part of several US Administrations, Secretaries of State and Ambasssadors. Poor April just happened to be the one that got caught up in the large scam. She and dipwad Joe Wilson...

As I said earlier: "Thus to say that '...Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks...' is absolutely correct in Western terms. However, for a resident of the ME that statement is just as absolutely incorrect -- in their view, the US literally suggested that he invade."

That whole lot of people are the ones who are willing to believe Saddam got manipulated and the US is perfidious. Many there are going to believe that regardless but our pretty consistently inept diplomacy in the area is in large measure due to arrogance and an unwillingness to accept local norms into our calculations certainly exacerbates that. The invasion of Kuwait was but one small example.

[Dayuhan]

We spend millions to train foreign area specialists and then our policy makers let their egos get in the way and refuse to listen to people who know the area. See Korea, Viet Nam, Dominican Republic, Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan (among others, not least the Philippines...).

Yes, area specialists (not all trained by Government) are consistently ignored; this I know well. Possibly the most egregious example was in post WW2 China, when area specialists who told us Chiang Kai-Shek was done and like it or not Mao was going to win were not only ignored but persecuted. Much the same happened to the OSS man on the spot in Vietnam, who reported that the French were toast and Ho Chi Minh could be dealt with. Hard not to wonder what would have happened if people had listened...

Again thank you for the corroboration. The "whole lot of people" who still believe it are by a large majority in the ME. They believe it because we got suckered and out-ta'arofed.No conspiracy cited by me, just a pure ####up on the part of several US Administrations, Secretaries of State and Ambasssadors. Poor April just happened to be the one that got caught up in the large scam. She and dipwad Joe Wilson...

As I said earlier: "Thus to say that '...Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks...' is absolutely correct in Western terms. However, for a resident of the ME that statement is just as absolutely incorrect -- in their view, the US literally suggested that he invade."

That whole lot of people are the ones who are willing to believe Saddam got manipulated and the US is perfidious. Many there are going to believe that regardless but our pretty consistently inept diplomacy in the area is in large measure due to arrogance and an unwillingness to accept local norms into our calculations certainly exacerbates that. The invasion of Kuwait was but one small example.

No, you didn't cite a conspiracy... others did hint at it.

Our people typically play to our domestic audience, which wants to hear and see very specific things. That often gets us into trouble, but I'm not sure there's any way to avoid it. Our predictability in such matters also gets us into trouble, but again it's a difficult thing to change.