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  1. #8
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    "We have reminded the White House many times about the presence of the PKK in northern Iraq. We have notified the US over and over that the terrorists, which are being logistically supported there, are carrying out attacks in Turkey. We have reiterated that the administration in Baghdad is not strong enough on this subject, and we have asked the US to take precautions. But despite the passage of much time, nothing has happened on this front. Now, on top of everything else, Barzani has started making statements about how, if necessary, he will intervene in Diyarbakir. By giving a copy of the Baghdad note to America, we are saying to the US: You are directing Iraq, we are addressing you."
    Hypocrisy to the extreme. Turkish intel (MiT) and SF operatives have been working in the north to foment discord between the Kurds and the Turkmen since the fall of Saddam. Which, if it needs to be said, goes directly against coalition desires for stability in that region. We've grabbed, bagged, and handed over their operatives a few times since the highly publicized incident in '03; keeping it quiet to reduce the level of friction with what is - still and all - a valuable regional ally.

    Also to the point - the PKK would never have reached this degree of resurgence if Turkey had not failed to implement changes (thus far on paper only) toward its treatment of its Kurdish minority. After the capture of Ocalan, the PKK fragmented and became virtually incapable of conducting operations. The Turkish government failed to exploit a golden opportunity to truly bring all of its Kurdish citizens into the fold, and the re-emergence of violent Kurdish nationalism within Turkey is stark testimony to the abject failure of Turkish domestic policies.

    Having said all that, this memo is meaningless crap. We don't have the luxury of troops or time to waste running Turkish errands. As stated, if they kept their own house in order, this wouldn't be an issue.

    As a fluent TU linguist, I've had memorable times working with the soldiers of the Turkish Army in a variety of contexts. However, I do not have a single pleasant experience to relate from the years I spent working out of the MCC in northern Iraq during OPC. First off they were a constant annoyance, in that all our communications were monitored by the Turks - we knew it, and took measure to deal with it, complicating operations. Everything we needed had to come through Turkey, and everything was searched - even our mail was opened (packages and letters). Despite better relations at that time, at least publicly, they were convinced we were aiding and abetting the PKK. Our medics were always given an especially difficult time.

    The Turkish Red Crescent offices in the north served as cover for Turkish Intelligence - MiT. Through them, the regional Turkmen parties were given support and assistance. We banned them from the MCC after we caught the Turkish signal NCO with a TRC rep in the comms room - the TRC rep was switching out crypto in the Turkish military base radio. The most interesting TRC incident was at the beginning of the March '95 Turkish military incursion into Northern Iraq. We stood on the roof of the MCC and watched a clearly marked TRC ambulance drive up to the border and act as a guide vehicle for the Turkish armored column - bringing them through town to where the main road split, where it remained to provide direction to follow-on forces.

    However, for the car bomb incident the month prior, not only did the TRC not respond - but the Turks refused to permit US ambulances/medics across the border until the following day. Many died who could have been saved had doctors and equipment arrived immediately. Our two medics used up much of our store of medical supplies at the MCC that long day. And afterwards, the Turks refused to allow the US post-blast investigating team across the border for two weeks. Of course, anything that could have helped point to specific bad guys was OBE by that point.

    Many of the Americans who were assigned to the MCC were on 90 day rotations - damn near all left hating the Turks. (And most of these guys were from 10th Group - who had often worked with the Turks before under friendlier circumstances) It was obvious to everyone that our data from village assessments was being used for targeting purposes by the Turks. Their "special missions" often ended up interfering with our air cover and disrupting the humanitarian mission. What got to everyone, was that many villages that were targeted by the TAF were ones that we had recently visited and assessed - and had nothing to do with the PKK. Hell, a key element in the friendly-fire shootdown of the Blackhawk flight in '94 was the Turkish "special mission" that was in the air without knowledge of the AWACS or the fighter pilots.

    Our own Turks - the MCC co-commander, his assistant and a communications NCO were like enemies in our midst. We continually had to maintain tight security to keep them from sneaking unknown individuals into the compound at night. They were constantly trying to undermine our US trained Kurdish guard force with bribes, extortion and blackmail...I could go on, ad nauseum.

    The Kurds of Northern Iraq hate the Turks. A large number of them were held in camps in SE Turkey where they fled from the Anfal - their treatment there by Turkey only reinforced hatred and distrust. In many cases, they also suffered worse than elements of the PKK during the Turks' annual spring-time incursions. The Turks were not there just to eliminate elements of the PKK. I was there during 3 different incursions and each time they willfully destroyed Kurdish farmland, took over and trashed schools, confiscated weapons' caches that belonged to the KDP/PUK (and many of which we had lists of serial numbers for registration), while doing little against the PKK itself - which always retreated to the most inhospitable portion of the mountains along the tri-border area. The farms, schools, and houses that were destroyed were, almost all the time, those that had been established with aid and assistance from USAID and various NGO's. Well, enough of the rant.

    Permitting them to move into the area in force again would be a grave strategic error.
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 04-13-2007 at 07:52 PM.

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