Catch All OEF Philippines (till 2012)

[Dayuhan]

Looking back at that, I’l say that this:

Virtually every politician on Mindanao maintains a private armed force accountable to nobody but the boss.

…was an exaggeration. Northern and Eastern Mindanao do suffer from the same syndrome, but not to nearly the same extent. It would be more accurate to say that virtually every prominent politician and political clan in the conflict zones of Mindanao (and in some areas that are not currently conflict zones) maintains a private armed force accountable to nobody but the boss.

A few other comments:

Someday soon, someone is going to make his fortune in hardwoods from Tawi-Tawi. He will find a skilled, willing, English-speaking workforce. He will find it cheap and easy to get the goods to the shipping route that takes it to Japan or California, where he will get the best prices in the world. He will find that Sanga-Sanga is “going green,” as the Special Forces soldiers say.

Cutting down the trees seems a strange way of “going green”, but possibly there’s a meaning there that I’m not picking up.

It is very likely that someone, someday soon, will make a fortune out of Tawi-Tawi hardwood. It’s already happened on a lot of other islands. Generally the fortune is made by an influential local clan working with influential people in Manila. The only part of the money that will come to Tawi-Tawi will be the derisory wages paid to those who do the cutting, which will be spent before the last log is shipped out. The real profits will end up in Manila or abroad, and the only way anyone in Tawi Tawi will see any of it is if one of the principals is kidnapped and pays ransom.

The logging itself will be absolute. You can talk about reforestation and sustainable logging, but that’s not the way it works in the Philippines: when it’s done the island will look like the “after” picture in a Gillette ad. If you want to see what happens next, you can look at any one of hundreds of islands that serve as an example. Without the trees the topsoil washes off with the first rains, choking reefs under masses of silt. Agriculture on these islands depends on inland forest cover: without it rainfall runs off in destructive flash floods and when the rain stops the land goes dry. Without surface water retention streams stop running, and people rely on pumping more and more ground water. Without forest cover the rainfall runs off too fast to replenish the aquifers (these islands are not large), and soon groundwater pumping leads to salt water intrusion, and the wells start yielding salt water.

This is not imagination, it has happened on too many islands to count. You can make a good quick buck from cutting the trees, but the long term implications for the populace are very harsh.

And this is what’s suggested as the kind of economic development that can provide a long term solution to insurgency? Allah weeps.

[Shawn Boyer]

All of the above poster have valid points / counter-points on the failings and successes of the situation in the Philippines.

I believe that the root cause of all of these issues can be more aptly summed up to a lack of an effective legal system. While this is more evident in the rural, conflict-affected regions it is also true in the urban areas. Over the years I've heard the southern Philippines described as the "Wild West," in a reference to the US in the 1800's. While most people say this with a smile on their face, they are more accurate than they truly recognize. During the USA's time of manifest destiny there was no effective legal system to govern the land. There were no means to settle a dispute through deliberation or legal proceedings; there was only the rule of the gun. Additionally, there was widespread corruption which was facilitated through this rule of the gun. Those with the power (guns) were the ones to rise to office and the ones to reap the rewards of corruption. This model holds true most accurately in the Bangsa-Moro areas of the southern Philippines though is also applicable to the "communist" NPA areas throughout Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.

The fighting between the AFP (which is a fairly effective fighting force as shown through the last few years' operational successes) and these "insurgents" will continue until this root problem is resolved. Government legitamacy (real, not just perceived) and an effective legal system (nationalized judges and a truly nationalized police force that are not accountable to local politicians) are absolute priorities to cutting the root.

[Dayuhan]

I believe that the root cause of all of these issues can be more aptly summed up to a lack of an effective legal system.

With this I agree... I wrote about this problem in some (probably excessive) detail here:

http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journ...5.4rogers.html

While this is more evident in the rural, conflict-affected regions it is also true in the urban areas.

It's possibly even more true in the urban areas, simply because there's more at stake: the urban areas are where the power and the money are. The twisting of the law is slightly less obvious, because it's less likely to involve overt violence, but it's no less present.

Additionally, there was widespread corruption which was facilitated through this rule of the gun. Those with the power (guns) were the ones to rise to office and the ones to reap the rewards of corruption.

It works both ways: guns can get you money, but money buys guns, and the loyalty (no matter how nominal and transient) of those who carry guns. Much of the fighting in Mindanao (and elsewhere in the Philippines) has more to do with money than with ideology or political goals.

This model holds true most accurately in the Bangsa-Moro areas of the southern Philippines though is also applicable to the "communist" NPA areas throughout Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.

It's certainly most visible in Muslim Mindanao, though again I'd say the same syndrome is every bit as present, though more quietly manifested, in many other areas. I'm not sure that there's anywhere in the country right now that I'd call a "communist area", but the NPA have certainly (and unsurprisingly) been best received and established their most durable presence in areas dominated by the essentially feudal old-school political dynasties.

The fighting between the AFP (which is a fairly effective fighting force as shown through the last few years' operational successes) and these "insurgents" will continue until this root problem is resolved. Government legitamacy (real, not just perceived) and an effective legal system (nationalized judges and a truly nationalized police force that are not accountable to local politicians) are absolute priorities to cutting the root.

I would agree that real progress cannot be made in the Philippines until local politicians, the police, and the justice system are brought within the rule of law. I'd also have to add the AFP to that list, because corruption and illicit business interests among AFP personnel, often in cooperation with local politicians and businessmen, are a major part of the problem.

There's an old Manila joke that sort of sums it up...

A Berliner, a New Yorker, and a Manilan were discussing police efficiency in their cities.

The Berliner declared "in my city, when a crime is committed, the police are there within five minutes.

The New Yorker snapped back "that's nothing... in my city, when a crime is committed the police are on the scene in less than three minutes".

The Manilan just smiled: "in MY city, when a crime is committed... the police are already there."