Catch All OEF Philippines (till 2012)

**Jedburgh** · 02-26-2007

BBC, 22 Feb 07: Philippine Army Linked to Murders

...The commission's report came a day after a UN envoy accused the army of being in "denial" over the issue of extra-judicial killings.

A rights group said 830 activists had been killed since President Gloria Arroyo came to power in 2001.

Ms Arroyo said she would take the findings and allegations seriously....

Here's the actual report:

Independent Commission to Investigate Media and Activist Killings

**pinoyme** · 03-02-2007

Hi:

What the Melo report indicates is that the Philippine military is still suffering from the consequences of having Marcos once as their commander in chief.

Neither the NPA nor the Armed Forces of the Philippines holds the high moral ground in my country's COIN campaign.

I condemn these alleged political murders. I also believe they are counterproductive.

Nonetheless, the Philippine public is indifferent. There is no uproar right now.

This is due to the fact perhaps that most victims have been identified with the Maoist left. No one among the victims was ever identified with other political groups--the middle forces included.

The indifference could be interpreted as the NPA's being isolated politically.

But if the COIN campaign in the Philippines is to be brought to a successful conclusion eventually--no matter how long this takes--steps must be taken to further speed up institutional reforms in the AFP.

**Jedburgh** · 10-16-2007

The Long War Journal, 15 Oct 07:

To Raise Them Up. Part 1: The Lesser and Greater Insurgencies of the Philippines

B.A. Patty was recently embedded with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In part one of his three-part series, Patty examines the roles of organizations such as Abu Sayyaf and MNLF in the insurgency and what Filipino and US troops are doing to squelch terrorist activities.....

**Jedburgh** · 10-18-2007

The Long War Journal, 17 Oct 07:

To raise them up. Part 2: The role of the Philippines in the Long War

B.A. Patty was recently embedded with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In part two of his three-part series, Patty examines the the Philippines' role in the Long War.

Zamboanga, Philippines: Colonel David Maxwell is the commanding officer of the US Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. In a two-hour interview he spoke about counterinsurgency in the Philippines and the larger Long War.....

**B A Patty** · 10-21-2007

The last part of that series is here:

To raise them up. Part 3: Investing in people

I'm a longtime reader of SWJ. If anyone wants to discuss the series, I'll be happy to do so.

**pinoyme** · 10-22-2007

Hi:

Interesting.

Comes now the issue. Marcos politicalized what was once a relatively professional Armed Forces of the Philippines.

He also allowed--no, encouraged--AFP officers and men to help themselves to the public coffers--as long as they went along with his politics.

For any long term results, the US will also have to help address these also.

A good number of AFP officers still harbor Bonapartist tendencies. They will have to learn to respect civilian authority once more.

At the same time, their grievances will have to be addressed.

Incidentally, hazing at the Philippine Military Academy will have to be addressed. Much anecdotal evidence suggests that this hazing is what had made many of them torturers and perpetrators of human rights violations during Marcos' dicatatorship.

This helped fuel the Maoist insurgency in the 1970s and 1980s.

As one notorious torturer is reported to have said, and quoted in a book:

"What I did to them (i.e. the torture she committed on political dissidents) was only what was done to me as a plebe in the PMA."

Will the US help address this?

**B A Patty** · 10-30-2007

I think the answer to your question, "Will the US help address this?" is "Yes, within the context of its overall strategic goals."

The US strategy depends on maintaining at least, and increasing if possible, the GRP/AFP legitimacy in the eyes of the population. There are signs that is working, esp. in the case of Task Force Zamboanga (where the police and AFP work in teams, and therefore watch each other as well as cooperate). US advisors are always working to improve the professionalism of the AFP and police forces for that reason.

That said, this is and has to be a GRP-led and GRP/AFP "out front" issue. The main thing the US can't do is visibly 'push' them in one direction or another. It has to be done through offering training that they're free to accept or reject. They are accepting it, but it is a gradual process.

**CalmSeas** · 11-11-2007

Just ran acros this site & consequently this thread.

Having been in & around this country for the past 30-years & a resident for the last 10-years, I just to comment on your article (Part 3 would not open by the way).

First, the AFP has no desires whatsoever for the "War" to end in Mindanao,or for the NPA threat, to come to a conclusion. Why, you might ask? Simple... GREED. Dig deeper into the AFP/PNP brass & follow the money (USAID) & I would wager that you would be hard-pressed to find a poor retired officer...quite the contrast to the poverty that AFP/PNP enlisted live in.

Secondly, I would challenge your assumptions that the PMA is compareable with West Point, or that there is a strong AFP NCO Corps...it is just simply false. You were obviously, as with all embedded journalist, shown what they wanted you to see.

As for Mindanao...the majority of Filipinos (yes, they are considered seperate from the Bangsa Moros) could care less what happens to the Muslims in the South, or everywhere else in the PI. You must scratch the surface & discover the REAL Philippine culture in order to break down the psychological make-up of the Filipino psyche. They could care less about their country, as they are only concerned, in the following order, with Self, family, tribe (Ilocano, Bisaya, etc.). They only start shouting "Pinoy Ako" when it is in reference to some foreign perceived insult such as the "Desperate Housewives" slant. Yes, absurdly patriotic.

What is the real underlying factor that keeps this country in terminal poverty? A deeply ingrained culture of CORRUPTION! As one Filipino General (Lim, I think) wrote: "The Filipino cannot help to be corrupt...it is in his blood." When Filipinos see Gloria sitting up in malacanang doing her best to make the Marcos' look like petty thieves, you soon hear them saying "If the the President can steal from the country, then why not me?"

While the U.S.military is trying to regain some sort of foot-hold in the Southern Philippines, the DoS is blindly throwing the money at the problem, thus emboldening Philippine authorities to steal even more. All the while the Chinese must be laughing their ass off. They know how to play the game here in SE Asia. They will continue to "LOAN" the Philippines $Billions$, thus establishing a debt that the Philippines cannot even begin to pay back. This is how they will eventually regain control of the South China Sea (oil drilling rights, etc.) and continue to expand their influence over the area.

On one final note: keep an eye out for a land deal for peace coming from Gloria. She is on record as saying that ARMM (Autonomus Region of Muslim Mindanao) will be given a very huge chunk of land as part of the Malaysian (Muslim) peace brokered deal.

**Dayuhan** · 07-01-2009

The older Moro National Liberation Front fragmented into factions after the group and the Filipino government signed a peace treaty in 1996…. it disaggregated a large insurgent group into multiple factions

This is simply wrong. The MILF split from the MNLF began in 1977, in Jeddah, during negotiations between the MNLF and Philippine Government representatives. Hashim Salamat and other Maguindanao and Maranao MNLF leaders, upset at the way MNLF Chain Nur Misuari was handling the negotiations, tried to take over leadership of the organization. Misuari denounced them as traitors and expelled them. They set up their own group, the “New MNLF”, and formally initiated the MILF in 1984. The Abu Sayyaf formed in 1990-91.

This is not obscure information, it’s available to anyone with access to Google and 5 spare minutes. I find it disturbing that an article like this can be published apparently without the slightest attempt to check basic facts.

This is not a minor detail. The presumption appears to be that this process of “disaggregation” disables the insurgency. If you look at the actual track record in Mindanao since the split, the disaggregation has made the fight more difficult. “Disaggregated” groups, such as the MILF and ASG, are more radical, less susceptible to negotiation, and more inclined to associate with international terrorist groups. Recently the MILF itself has shown a tendency to splinter, with disaggregated groups proving to be less inclined to engage in a peace process, more violent, and more inclined to harbor JI terrorists. They are also not necessarily easier to defeat, either militarily or politically. The failure of the MILF Central Committee to bring back any results from its negotiations and generally more moderate stance has enhanced the prestige of the breakaway radicals and raised the possibility that the entire organization may shift in that direction.

Abu Sayyaf is an international terrorist organization with ties to al Qaeda and part of the global insurgency being waged from New York to Iran, from Iraq to Afghanistan, from Pakistan and Thailand to Indonesia and the Philippines. Two other networks – for they are that more than armies – are Moro separatists…

This is a glib oversimplification that has been reappearing in many of the more superficial articles published on Mindanao. The MILF’s ties to JI and AQ are deeper and more continuous than ASG’s. The MILF often disowns ASG and publicly announces withdrawals from areas where operations against ASG are ongoing, but at the same time the MILF or some of its constituent parts will be cooperating with ASG, and with groups like the Pentagon and Al Khobar gangs, which do exactly the same things as ASG but are generally referred to as criminal syndicates, rather than terrorist groups.

ASG has been through a series of discontinuities in both leadership and agenda, wandering across a continuum between Islamist terrorism and outright banditry. ASG has reached its peak in manpower and influence in its purest bandit incarnation: ASG’s expansion in 2000-2002 was a consequence of large ransom payments, not a sudden burst of enthusiasm for jihad. ASG has been most effective as a terrorist group when its manpower resources and territorial control have been severely constrained, and at one point military success against the bandit incarnation of the ASG generated greater connections to foreign terrorist groups and a return to a terrorist agenda.

This article does not seem to have been supported by much real research into the backgrounds and histories of these organizations – bearing in mind of course that much of the secondary source material on these issues is highly questionable and based on information from individuals and institutions with vested interests in a particular presentation of events.

The battles between the AFP and Abu Sayyaf and MNLF make the papers, but they miss the real story of the counterinsurgency in the Philippines. The real story is the movement of the populace away from support for conflict and toward a support for the peace processes. This has followed “a shift in strategy since April,” according to Raphael, to focus on what are called civil military operations, which focus on dealing with problems afflicting the people. “A lot of the villages have insufficient water,” the general said. “They have no schools. We are doing massive infrastructure projects.” Acting in cooperation with the JSOTF-P, the AFP have held numerous meetings at which medical treatment is provided to anyone who showed up, with any problem that could be handle in the field. The AFP has built schools and community centers…

Meanwhile, the villagers – deciding whether to support the guerrilla – examine the situation based on their self-interest. If the government defends their interests and does not oppress, the villagers often choose prosperity over conflict. If the government is corrupt and suppresses the things they care about, the people often support an insurgency.

The problem with this formulation is that the government IS corrupt. Corruption is institutionalized and embedded, and has been for generations. Why do you think there are no schools, water systems, or health care; why do you think these projects are necessary? Corruption is not just a matter of appropriating money, imposing huge kickbacks, etc. Virtually every politician on Mindanao maintains a private armed force accountable to nobody but the boss. These forces are used to ruthlessly suppress dissent and political or economic competition.

This corruption cannot be fought by training or education of civilian and military officials. Corruption exists not because leaders aren’t aware of its adverse affects, but because it is extremely profitable, and because an entrenched culture of immunity has virtually eliminated risk associated with corruption.

Corrupt officials do not have horns and tails. The articulate, sophisticated politician who parrots back all the rhetoric of international development for beaming American visitors is likely to be the same one who’s been raiding the treasury, collaborating with bandits, and maintaining a squad of goons to make sure nobody interferes with personal interests. The officer who recites COIN dogma and speaks earnestly of hearts and minds may be the same one who has sold arms to the ASG, taken cuts of ransom payments, and participated in a list of human rights violations as long as your arm – if you’re Yao Ming. The guy sitting next to him in the same uniform may be completely straight, but he will never rat out the guy sitting beside him, partly because the culture of institutional loyalty forbids it, partly because talking too loudly can endanger a career, and at times a life.

The US has an advantage here that it lacks in many GWOT theaters. Aside from a tiny cadre of ideologues, the anti-US rhetoric of the Islamic fundamentalists has very little traction in Mindanao. Philippine Muslims generally don’t care about Israel and the Palestinians, American influence in Saudi Arabia, or American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan: their concerns are a lot closer to home. They do appreciate the projects, though they know quite well that the money isn’t coming from the Philippine government. More than that, they appreciate the impact that the US presence has had on the Philippine military: a Muslim cleric related by marriage to a senior ASG leader once told me that the human rights performance of Philippine troops is “1000 times better” when Americans are around.

The US has won some hearts and minds. The problem with that is that the US is not a party to the conflict. If this change is to mean anything, the respect earned by the US has to be transferred to the Philippine government, and that is not happening. People will tell us whatever we want to hear as long as we’re the big dog on the block, but everyone down there knows that the Americans will leave, and when they do the same people who have been ripping them off and kicking them in the teeth for the last 40 years will still be in control.

You cannot measure progress in Mindanao by Commanders killed or captured, or by transient territorial gains, or by forced rearrangements of the alphabet soup of insurgent acronyms: all this has been done before, with little to show for it in the long term. A better measure of progress would be evidence that the culture of impunity that lies at the core of Mindanao’s institutionalized crisis is finally being addressed. A real indication of progress would be a few Congressman, Governors, Mayors, Generals successfully prosecuted for corruption and collusion with terrorists and criminals, private armed forces disbanded and their members called to account for their crimes, members of Christian militias prosecuted for killing Muslim civilians. The first challenge faced by the Philippine Government is not to defeat insurgents, but to bring its own representatives within the rule of law.

US forces cannot “win” the fight in Mindanao. All they can be expected to do is to create a secure space for the Philippine Government to step in, not with cosmetic projects but with real reforms in governance. Unfortunately there is little to suggest that the Philippine government has the will or the capacity to do this.

**Dayuhan** · 07-01-2009

Looking back at that, I’l say that this:

Virtually every politician on Mindanao maintains a private armed force accountable to nobody but the boss.

…was an exaggeration. Northern and Eastern Mindanao do suffer from the same syndrome, but not to nearly the same extent. It would be more accurate to say that virtually every prominent politician and political clan in the conflict zones of Mindanao (and in some areas that are not currently conflict zones) maintains a private armed force accountable to nobody but the boss.

A few other comments:

Someday soon, someone is going to make his fortune in hardwoods from Tawi-Tawi. He will find a skilled, willing, English-speaking workforce. He will find it cheap and easy to get the goods to the shipping route that takes it to Japan or California, where he will get the best prices in the world. He will find that Sanga-Sanga is “going green,” as the Special Forces soldiers say.

Cutting down the trees seems a strange way of “going green”, but possibly there’s a meaning there that I’m not picking up.

It is very likely that someone, someday soon, will make a fortune out of Tawi-Tawi hardwood. It’s already happened on a lot of other islands. Generally the fortune is made by an influential local clan working with influential people in Manila. The only part of the money that will come to Tawi-Tawi will be the derisory wages paid to those who do the cutting, which will be spent before the last log is shipped out. The real profits will end up in Manila or abroad, and the only way anyone in Tawi Tawi will see any of it is if one of the principals is kidnapped and pays ransom.

The logging itself will be absolute. You can talk about reforestation and sustainable logging, but that’s not the way it works in the Philippines: when it’s done the island will look like the “after” picture in a Gillette ad. If you want to see what happens next, you can look at any one of hundreds of islands that serve as an example. Without the trees the topsoil washes off with the first rains, choking reefs under masses of silt. Agriculture on these islands depends on inland forest cover: without it rainfall runs off in destructive flash floods and when the rain stops the land goes dry. Without surface water retention streams stop running, and people rely on pumping more and more ground water. Without forest cover the rainfall runs off too fast to replenish the aquifers (these islands are not large), and soon groundwater pumping leads to salt water intrusion, and the wells start yielding salt water.

This is not imagination, it has happened on too many islands to count. You can make a good quick buck from cutting the trees, but the long term implications for the populace are very harsh.

And this is what’s suggested as the kind of economic development that can provide a long term solution to insurgency? Allah weeps.

**Shawn Boyer** · 07-23-2009

All of the above poster have valid points / counter-points on the failings and successes of the situation in the Philippines.

I believe that the root cause of all of these issues can be more aptly summed up to a lack of an effective legal system. While this is more evident in the rural, conflict-affected regions it is also true in the urban areas. Over the years I've heard the southern Philippines described as the "Wild West," in a reference to the US in the 1800's. While most people say this with a smile on their face, they are more accurate than they truly recognize. During the USA's time of manifest destiny there was no effective legal system to govern the land. There were no means to settle a dispute through deliberation or legal proceedings; there was only the rule of the gun. Additionally, there was widespread corruption which was facilitated through this rule of the gun. Those with the power (guns) were the ones to rise to office and the ones to reap the rewards of corruption. This model holds true most accurately in the Bangsa-Moro areas of the southern Philippines though is also applicable to the "communist" NPA areas throughout Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.

The fighting between the AFP (which is a fairly effective fighting force as shown through the last few years' operational successes) and these "insurgents" will continue until this root problem is resolved. Government legitamacy (real, not just perceived) and an effective legal system (nationalized judges and a truly nationalized police force that are not accountable to local politicians) are absolute priorities to cutting the root.

**Dayuhan** · 07-26-2009