The Philippine press isn't always accurate, but I suspect there is some truth to this, and if it happened as described then the locals in the area were very likely pro Abu Sayyaf and anti-government/military. This once again calls into question the efficacy of our approach to countering insurgencies through development efforts, since we have spent tens of thousands of dollars in that area on civil affairs activities, etc., and of course conducted MISO for years, and yet the ASG still maintains considerable support from the populace. This ties into another discussion we had on the blog about the importance of honesty when addressing problems, and not creating false perceptions of success by cherry picking happy stories to present to the public. There are deep structural problems within the Phlippine Goverment and its military, and U.S. assistance is only effective at the superficial level (tactically, and then only when the military is willing to listen and apply the lessons). Building a school, building a road, building a clinic are all humanitarian acts that have obvious humanitarian value, but they do not represent real change in the relationship between the populace and the government. The Filipinos need to honestly seek out why the populace supports the ASG and develop a more effective approach than the standard fare of random COIN tactics that have been applied again and again year after year with the same effect.