Catch All OEF Philippines (till 2012)

[SWJED]

22 February VOA - Southern Philippine Island Plays Out Drama in War on Terror by Douglas Bakshian. Posted in full per USG guidelines.

Far from the headlines and the rest of the world a drama in the global war on terror is playing out on Jolo island in the southern Philippines. A Muslim guerrilla group called Abu Sayyaf is on the run from the Philippine military while U.S. water, road, and health projects are making life better for the people. But is it yet time to declare victory? Douglas Bakshian recently traveled to Jolo for a look at things.

There is much talk these days in Philippine and U.S. military circles about winning the war on terror on Jolo island, and ending a long struggle against the Abu Sayyaf Islamic terrorist group.

Years of fighting the guerrillas failed to produce peace. So the Philippine military, with the help of U.S. advisers, began addressing civilian needs - roads, schools, water systems and medical care.

By alleviating some of the desperate poverty on Jolo, the military defused some of the anger and frustration that fuels violent movements.

General Juancho Sabban, commander of the Philippines Marines who are in the forefront of the operation, says this is all about winning public support.

"The secret of all these operations should be the people," he said. "If you win the people, you win the war."

The Abu Sayyaf is one of several groups that over the past 30 years have fought to create a Muslim homeland in the southern Philippines, a predominately Christian country. The government has negotiated peace deals or ceasefires with the two dominant militant forces.

Unlike other separatist groups, the Abu Sayyaf has become best known for a series of deadly bombings and brutal kidnappings and murders.

Since 2002, American special forces have provided training, analysis and intelligence to the Philippine military in the fight against the Abu Sayyaf. U.S. Navy Commander James Marvin helps lead the joint task force for the operation. He says the goal is to build confidence in the people that the military is a good thing and to drive a wedge between the terrorists and the people.

"Basically, you take the bullies that are on the playground and you get all the kids on the playground to stick up for themselves, and tell the bullies, 'we don't want you here anymore.' And they are no longer bullies, they cannot function in that capacity and they move," he said.

At the same time, the Philippine military focused its combat effort on smaller patrols conducting intelligence-driven operations that target terrorist leaders. It also adopted guerrilla tactics to fight in the dense jungles of Jolo.

As a result, in recent months, several Abu Sayyaf leaders have been killed, and their followers driven into the hills.

But will this mixture of the missionary approach and the iron fist be enough to eradicate a problem that was decades in the making?

General Sabban says he thinks the Abu Sayyaf leaders will fight to the death.

Radullan Sahiron, in his 70's is the main senior leader left. Sahiron's son, Ismin, was killed in a clash with the military last year. But before he died the general spoke with him by cell phone.

"And I was trying to convince him to come down and live a normal life, go back to the mainstream," he said. "But he said 'we have an ideology that we are fighting for. I'm sorry, we really want to establish an Islamic state.' And then I told him, 'How about your father?' He said, 'my father will die here in Patikul [a Jolo area], fighting. It's either you get out of Sulu, or my father dies here.'"

Some political analysts say the Abu Sayyaf can be wiped out, but that is not enough to bring lasting peace to Jolo. Ramon Casiple, head of Manila's Institute of Political and Electoral Reforms, says the problems that fostered the group's rise must be addressed.

"But if you are asking me if the factors that give rise to Abu Sayyaf have been eliminated, and therefore in the future will there be more Abu Sayyaf? I think these factors have not been eradicated even with all the civic action that has been done already," he said.

Sulu province, which includes Jolo, is one of the poorest regions in the Philippines. It has suffered neglect by the central government and long-standing grievances have powered successive rebellions.

It also has a rigid hierarchical social structure with a few wealthy families at the top and dozens of clans. Casiple says previous development programs in the region have failed because only certain families or groups benefited.

"There are certain sections that have been getting wealthier from all the aid. But the farmer at the bottom level has not improved," he said. "That is the breeding ground of rebellion. I mean you can have a road, but if the family doesn't have a car or a vehicle to use it, it is nothing for them."

For all this to be untangled after so many decades of neglect will require a lot of work, and a fundamental and sustained change in Jolo's economic, social and political structures. More importantly, analysts say, Manila must shift from a policy of neglect to a serious commitment to better the lives of all Jolo's people.

[Global Scout]

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39462815...ws-asiapacific

“The safe havens are getting smaller on the islands,” said Master Sgt. Wade Christensen, a U.S. Army Special Forces instructor who came to Mindanao in 2003 on his first tour. He’s now on his second as part of JSOTF-P. “Since we’ve been here, there have been no attacks on the U.S. from terrorist organizations that originated here or terrorists that were trained in the Philippines.”

So if the mission to defeat terrorist networks and to eradicate safe havens has been successful, why are U.S. Special Forces still operating in the southern Philippines?

“The simple answer is that the Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist groups are still here,” said U.S. Navy Captain Robert Gusentine, the JSOTF-P Commander. “They’re still active. They still aspire to violence. They still aspire to be a regional threat.”

I have high confidence that MSG Christensen is an educated, level headed, and very dedicated warrior, so I suspect the media took the liberty of taking his statement out of context; however, since there are those who believe this is a success metric I would like to offer a counter view. There has been no terrorist attacks on the U.S. from a number of countries where we both have troops and don't have troops. The metric in itself is completely irrelevant.

The reality is that the JI (and they're continually morphing, but done the less they retain their core ideology) and to a lesser extent the criminal/terrorist group ASG still pose a regional threat. I think the U.S. is getting a good return on its investment. If pressure is removed the problem will most likely get much worse, instead of slowly decreasing in scale. Ultimately the solution in the S. Philippines is a political solution, but JSOTF-P was immensely successful in reducing the level of violence in the region. It is time (has been time) for the diplomats to take advantage of the reduced violence and implement a sustainable political agreement.

As for the claims that JSOTF-P is there to counter China, I have a hard time buying that is the reason they're there, but if it is a collateral benefit from being there so much the better. Based on comments by a few Philippine leaders, they're as worried about China's claims to hegemony over the South China Sea as much as we are, so instead of questioning our altruism for being in the S. Philippines, I think this is just another issue that the Philippines and U.S. will agree to partner on.

[Dayuhan]

The originally cited article is riddled with inaccuracy and omission. Just a few from page 1: the ASG was not involved in the plot to kill the Pope in Manila, they did not provide sanctuary to Ramzi Youssef, and the American missionary couple kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf were collateral damage in a move aimed at a specific non-American target, not a target in themselves. This is so typical of reportage on the Abu Sayyaf, especially from the big-name parachute journalists who occasionally deign to grace us with their presence, that it no longer raises an eyebrow. When I got to this bit, though:

It struck me that the most pressing problem in today's Philippines isn't terrorism or even government corruption but poverty and a lack of social mobility.

I have to admit that I had a rather severe encounter with the "thank you for that astonishingly perceptive observation, now excuse me while I gag" moment. What is it that possesses Americans and persuades them that they can walk into environments of which they are clearly ignorant, look around in a full circle, and gravely pronounce to the world what "the most pressing problem" is... through the good offices of The Smithsonian, who really ought to know better? The superficiality is almost blinding.

Looking at the pieces cited on this thread, I have to say I don't for a minute believe that our people on the ground here are as ignorant and naive as they come across, and I suspect that this theater is simple being used, as so often before, as a source for a few feelgood stories.

There has been no terrorist attacks on the U.S. from a number of countries where we both have troops and don't have troops. The metric in itself is completely irrelevant.

If this is the metric of choice we'd have to wonder why we're in the Philippines in the first place. Some people who have attacked the US have gone to ground here, and the explosives acquisition for the Bali bombing was done here, but have any of the groups here directly attacked the US?

Ultimately the solution in the S. Philippines is a political solution, but JSOTF-P was immensely successful in reducing the level of violence in the region. It is time (has been time) for the diplomats to take advantage of the reduced violence and implement a sustainable political agreement.

A sustainable political agreement is extremely unlikely, and there's very little that diplomats can do to produce one, let alone implement one. We tried once before, with support and pressure for the MOA/AD with the MILF, and managed to make matters worse. Possibly unwise to repeat.

So if the mission to defeat terrorist networks and to eradicate safe havens has been successful, why are U.S. Special Forces still operating in the southern Philippines?

I suspect that we've accomplished all we're likely to accomplish, and it wouldn't surprise me at all to hear that we're maneuvering toward extrication. Of course that would mean a return to business as usual (and the word "business" is not there by accident) but that was always going to be the case.

This is fantastic. When I was part of OEF-P in 2002 we weren't allowed to even think about staging operations on Jolo.

In 1982 I spent a fair bit of time on Jolo and Basilan, among other places we don't go now... alone. Things were different then; couldn't have done that in '72, '92, or '02. Still, it was... interesting, for want of a better word. Also interesting, the editors with whom I discussed plans to write about the situation all told me that the Muslim conflict was over and done, and the issue was Marcos vs the NPA. Tides ebb and flow; it is their nature. Fundamental change... maybe someday, but I suspect not in my lifetime.