Catch All OEF Philippines (till 2012)

[Dayuhan]

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakin...ew-armed-group

Ex-MILF leader forms new armed group

COTABATO CITY, Philippines—A senior Moro rebel commander blamed for the attacks that left 60 civilians dead in several central Mindanao towns in 2008 has admitted forming a new armed group.

Ameril Ombra Kato also blamed members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s (MILF) central committee for his decision to split from the MILF and form the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)...

This has actually been coming on for a while. Umbra Kato's 105th base command and a couple of the Lanao base commands have been effectively outside MILF control for some time, though this is as far as I know the first time one of them has declared itself as an independent organization.

A number of things could happen...

There's a fair possibility it will go nowhere, and that Umbra Kato can be brought back into the fold with a greater role in the MILF Central Committee and a few other concessions. Personal issues are, as always, very much a factor.

There could be a bifurcation in the MILF, with more radical members that are less amenable to negotiation coalescing behind Umbra Kato and the demand that the "peace agreement" trashed by the Philippine Supreme Court be reinstated, which of course the government cannot do.

There could be a general splintering, with local commanders who are already largely autonomous formally going their own way.

The government response will also be interesting to watch. There will be pressure from Mindanao's Christian politicians and some quarters of the military to declare Umbra Kato (who was heavily involved in the outbreak of violence after the Supreme Court decision) outside the ceasefire with the MILF and come down on him hard before he draws any more support. There will also be calls to wait and see: if he fails to draw support it would do more to affirm the leadership of the negotiation-minded Murad faction (also called the Central Committee, though it seems less and less central), which would be placed in a very awkward spot if the AFP mounts a major attack on Umbra Kato. Umbra Kato is also well up in years, and won't be around forever. I don't know enough about his second tier at this point to speculate on succession.

This all traces back to the proposed MOA/AD and it's rejection by the Supreme Court, which hugely weakened Murad's pro-negotiation faction and left much of the Muslim populace doubting that there's any real point in negotiation. Less reported, but equally a concern, the Government's initial support for the agreement was seen as absolute betrayal by the Christian population, whose already weak trust in Manila took a further hit. There are reports of independent militias quietly reorganizing, and it should be remembered that the war in the early 70s began not with secessionists fighting the government, but with fighting between Christian and Muslim militias (though in truth they spent more time attacking each others unarmed supporters than attacking each other).

Proponents of "disaggregation" might see this as a step forward; I have doubts. It's difficult to negotiate with a fractured organization, and having a mass of independent commanders, all needing to feed and pay their soldiers, seems a recipe for all kinds of trouble.

It seems to me overall that in both the Maguindanao/Maranao mainland and the Tausug/Yakan islands there's less coherent leadership than there has been for some time (much more so in the islands of course). That shouldn't be confused with progress. Dislike and distrust of both Manila governance has been if anything increased in much of the area, and tension between indigenous Muslims and Christian settlers is as strong as ever. The number of armed men is as large as ever. Makes one wonder what emerges next.

Of course it all may come to nothing, and they may shake hands and get back together tomorrow....

[jmm99]

in Beyond the Abu Sayyaf, by Steven Rogers (January/February 2004 Foreign Affairs).

Perhaps a trustworthy bundoks source.



Mike

[Dayuhan]

in Beyond the Abu Sayyaf, by Steven Rogers (January/February 2004 Foreign Affairs).

Perhaps a trustworthy bundoks source.



Mike

If I was going to write that again I'd change a few things. Not all that much, but some... clarity with hindsight, I guess. Of course that dealt more with the islands to the west... a quite different situation from Central Mindanao, though with similarities.

There is actually a window of opportunity at this point (driven by both the MILF's uncertain control and the overreach and subsequent divorce from government of the Ampatuan dynasty) for the Philippine Government to step in with a strategy that is both within its legal capacity and capable of real progress toward reducing, if not fully resolving, the tension in Central Mindanao, and for that matter in the islands. Might almost be worth another article... but nobody would read it, the strategy would never be adopted in any event, it would be a hell of a lot of work, and I wouldn't get paid for it, all of which induce a certain lethargy.

Meanwhile, back at the ranch, Umbra Kato's boys are allegedly up to some nasty work...

http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx...CategoryId=200

COTABATO CITY, Philippines (Xinhua) - Suspected followers of a former Muslim rebel field commander blamed for the attacks that left 60 civilians dead in several southern Philippine towns in 2008 torched houses as they raided a Christian community in the southern Philippines yesterday, military said today.

Seven houses of civilians in a remote village in the township of Mlang in North Cotabato province were set on fire by suspected followers of Ameril Umbra Kato during the raid, the military said, adding the rebels also took away farm crops and animals as they fled.

Emphasis on "allegedly" and "suspected" here... Umbra Kato and Co. are certainly capable of this sort of thing and may very well be responsible, but others are equally capable, and there are a number of groups who would have an interest in provoking military action against the breakaway faction. Never wise to assume that things are as they seem, or as they are reported.

[Dayuhan]

There's a major corruption scandal unfolding in Manila. Started with investigation of a retired general who served as military comptroller and who had allegedly accumulated a personal fortune of roughly 300 million pesos; a plea bargain was hit and the usual sweep-under-the-rug was in progress, but a bunch of witnesses have emerged from the closet, including retired officers and a retired auditor, and the beans are spilling faster than anyone can count. Allegations include massive diversions of troop pay, the modernization budget, UN funds paying for peacekeepers, US exercise budgets, and almost everything else imaginable. Numerous instances of huge purchases from unknown suppliers, multiple accounts being billed for the same expenses. Large payments to legislators are being openly discussed. Lots of names on the table. Various hearings going on and a great deal of amnesia being expressed on the witness stand.

It all escalated today, former defense Secretary and General Angelo Reyes apparently committed suicide. Doubts are being expressed. He knew a lot of stuff about a lot of people, to put it mildly, and was coming under intense pressure.

There's undoubtedly a great deal to reveal, and it runs from top to bottom: these guys don't have skeletons in their closets, they have cemeteries. Hard to know how far it will go or what will come of it, but well worth watching. Long term it's undoubtedly a good thing; short term there could be significant operational disruption.

[Rachamim]

Although it is certainly true that Kato is NOW off the reservation that has only taken place within the last 8 months. The belief that he, Abdurahman Macapaar, aka"Kumander Bravo" (102 Base Command) and Aleem Sulaiman Pangalian, aka "Kumander Pagnalian" (103 Base Command) have been "outside of MILF control" isn't rooted in fact. Two of the last three MILF "wars" ("Estrada's All Out War" in 2000 and "MoA" in 2008 and 2009 were calculated gambits on the part of the MILF Central Committee to try and force the government's hand in the Peace Process. The third, "Bundiok Complex" in 2003 was reactionary but entirely condoned by the leadership since the AFP's stated objectives (Policing of KFR on the edges of Liguasan Marsh, primarily against the "Pentagon" organisation) was merely a ruse to force the MILF's hand after GMA found herself neck deep in a failed Peace Process that was very quickly spinning out of control.

GMA, like all Filipino Presidents was incredibly insecure on her status vis a vis the AFP (the actual seat of power in the Philippines). Coming to power in a coup less than 2 years before she had immediately and literally begged Malaysia to assume the role of Facilitator in the Peace Process. Having internationalised what should have been solely a domestic issue, and having done so with a nation who until the early 1990s had largley been responsible for the existence of the MILF she was terrified of having the MILF gain the upper hand. Of course the moment GMA appealed to Malaysia in 2001 the MILF had gotten that and a whole lot more.

Estrada's war was a war of opportunity and though it turned out very well for the government alot of factors have been overlooked; As they say, "timing is everything." On the very same day Kumander Bravo stormed Kauswagan a very large contingent of the Marines 1st Brigade re-deployed to Camp Evangelista (Cagayan del Oro, Misamis Oriental Province in Northcentral Mindanao) Kumander Bravo's 102 Base Command (rather, what would soon become the 102 Base Command since the BIAF, the MILF military wing only converted its conventional structure into more mobile "Base Commands" following this very war. At the time of the attack the 102 Base Command was still the 303rd Brigade) decided to push the Estrada Government back to the table by invading and occupying the largely non-Muslim town of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte Province. The Marines were in the very next province and hadn't even unpacked their kitbags.

I won't go off onto a long tangent about that conflict. Sufficient to say that the 102 Base Commandzg303rd Brigade was operating with full knowledge AND agreement of the MILF central commamd structure. Here is a unit commander (Kumander Bravo) who, if we buy into media accounts (dictated by the Philippine Government), single handedly decides that for an unstated reason he simply wants to take over a large non-Muslim town, terrorise, pillage and kill. This act then leads to the near destruction of the MILF at the height of its power. Its 11 main camps functioned completely independently of the government, with hundreds of thousands of peasants living as quasi-citizens of the MILF's parallel government. Kumander Bravo's actions led to the loss of every single one of those camps, near total destruction of that parallel government and the deaths of what is generally believed to be 1,200 guerillas, a huge loss. So what does the MILF do to Kumander Bravo for causing all this? Not a thing. He isn't even publicly censured.

Of course, you cannot blame a commander when you yourself were the one who ordered the attack on Kauswagan.

Fast forward to the summer of 2008. After nearly 2 decades of Talks, public and private, the Philippine Government goes for broke and takes a gigantic gamble by agreeing to the Memorandum on Ancestral Domain, aka"MoA." This is done in secrecy so as not to have to circumnavigate what would be years of political and judicial opposition (and to a lesser degree the threat of military coup). The MILF Central (and Executive) Committee sit with baited breath knowing that the very next day both sides will ink the document. That afternoon though the Supreme Court issues a Restraining Order barring the signing as it deliberates on the legality of the document. Imagine the feeling on the MILF Central Committee. Then Kumander Kato launches his attack on the non-Islamic portion of North Cotabato Province.

Again, the traditional narrative, courtesy of the Philippine Government, is that Kato undertook this wide scale attack on his own, despite his AOR intersecting with that of 5 other Base Commands. MILF Base Commands operate independently of one another and view encroachment, without full coordination (usually affected via the Central Committee), as Casus Belli. Despite this huge operation that encroached upon 3 of those other Base Commands not one case of in-fighting took place. The attack was extremely well coordinated. When Kumanders Bravo and Pangalian jumped into the fray the MILF STILL refused to condemn their actions which if we buy into that traditional narrative, effectively constitute mutiny. In fact, the MILF did everything it could to stymie AFP interdiction.

There was actually 1 renegade Base Command in that war, the 107. It had recently relocated its AOR to Sarangani Province where it launched a large opportunistic attack on the municipality of Ma'asim. Unlike the other 3 Base Commands the 107 was dissected by the AFP who rapidly captured its main camp in the hills above Ma'asim. In fact, MILF Central Committee provided valuable intel that played a central part in the 72 IB's attack on that camp.

Back to Kato...Despite his having done no worse than Kumander Bravo it was Kumander Kato who became the central villain in the Govenment's narrative. Pressuring the MILF for a huge concession the Government was handed a Goodwill Gesture when the MILF Central Committee replaced Kato with his Executive Officer, sub-Kumander Goma, in early 2010. Kato was laterally transferred into the political echelon and given a paper position as an Ustadz (Islamic Scholar, in this case acting as a consultant) for the MILF Shari'a Court (Islamic Court). This gesture was given because Kato's star was in ascendance. Ironically the Philippine Government's concentrating on Kato had turned him into an icon in Central Mindanao. A huge cult of personality has developed around him. Having commanded he BIAF's largest and best armed Base Command (the 105) he was clearly a force to be reckoned with. In addition he had been quite blunt in his disdain for the Central Committee's abandonment of its most valued objective, full independence for the "Bangsamoro." He saw the evolution of independence into a "state:sub-state solution" as tantamount to sacrilege. Finally, al Haj Murad (Murad Ebrahim, Chairman of the MILF) had a debilitating stroke in the autumn of 2010. Transported to Sabah (in Malaysia) for hospitalisarion the MILF was sinking into chaos. Knowing that IF he were to cleave from the MILF/BIAF he ought to do it BE0fORE Murad died because of the lack of suitable replacement (the probable successor, Vice Chairman Jafa'ar lacks charisma and support amongst the BIAF Command).

So, in October Kato set out his shingle and created BIFF (Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters). As yet he's playing it close. The organisation has less than 800 Regulars but there are a great many MILF/BIAF that are almost ready to join him (just as in the 104 and 111Base Commands many guerillas are jumping to the 2 MNLF factions in their respective AORs). To date BIFF has 2 engagements though the Midsayap KFR they were accused of was not connected to the group.

[Rachamim]

Re "militias have been quietly forming"; Paramilitaries have existed here since the post-WWII Era and have never gone away. The poster is correct to note that the Islamic Insurgencies began with Muslim and non-Muslim (not "Christian" per se) paramilitaries fighting in the late 1960s. It actually began in Lanao del Norte Province with the Dimaporo Clan and its paramilitary, the "Barakudas." The Barakudas merely existed to exert control on the Dimaporo lumber concessions, at first. To the south. In North Cotabato Province the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM, later re-named Muslim Independence Movement) spawned a militant faction known as the "Black Shirts." It was these Black Shirts who actually spawned the communal fighting still ravaging the island today.

As the Black Shirts were first forming, a non-Muslim group began taking shape in what is now the municipality of North Upi, in Maguindanao Province. At the time Maguindanao was part of North Cotabato. The town of Upi (now split into Upi and North Upi) was home to very poor Ilonggo whose forbears settled there in government re-settlement schemes from 1904 until the late 1950s. At the same time the area was largely populated with a Lumad ("Lumad" is a Cebuano word meaning "Born of the Soil," synonymous with "Hill Tribes"and denotes the non-Negrito Animists of Mindanao, analogous to the "Igorot" of Luzon) group, the Teduray. Both the Lumad and the Ilonggo co-existed perfectly, respecting each others different life styles. The 3rd facet of the dynamic in Upi/N.Upi was the Maguindanowan Tribe. They are a Moro (Muslim) group inhabiting the lowlands and flood plains in that area.

Since shortly after Islamisation in the late 16th Century the Maguindanowan had exploited the upland Teduray and this included laying claim to all Teduray lands which they then deigned to "permit" Teduray" to work as sharecroppers. Since the 3 Moro Sultunates (actually 2 Sultunates and a confederation of principalities constituting the 3rd "sultunate": Maguindanao, Buayan and Maranao in respective order) refused to recognise American Law and Civil System the sultunates' lands largely remained unregistered until late in the Modern Era. In Upi/N.Upi this led to Ilonggo peasants being given lands claimed by the Manguindanowans. In one particular case a poor Ilonggo family moved to Upi/N.Upi in the 1940s and was settled on a tract of uncultivated land on a steep mountainside. After this family, surnamed "Luces," had cleared and terraced their small plot the chief of a Maguindanowan Clan surnamed "Ampatuan" (people familiar with the Philippines will probably know that name well) claimed it. Having been cleared and made arable it was now worth a decent amount of money.

The Luces were told to pay a very high price for land they already owned and so naturally they refused the Ampatuan's offer. Before too long Ampatuan Clansmen came and murdered the entire family, an event all too common in that era and in fact not unusual now. The family's son Felipe escaped death because he had been at the town's main market on an errand. Hearing what had happened he turned to Teduray friends who introduced him to a group of extended families who had refused to bow to the Maguindanowans, and who were periodically doing battle, mostly over land related issues. Felipe then lived among them and eventually rose to leadership of the small group. Adopting the moniker, "Kumander Toothpick" his victories attracted more Teduray, and eventually fellow Illongos as well as ( to a lesser degree) Cebuanos as well (Cebuanos and Ilonggos are culturally similar, both rooted in the Visayan Islands).

As the Black Shirts began launching attacks against Ilonggo and Cebuano villages in North Cotabato Province low level local politicians appealed to the PC (Philippine Constulbary, a COIN force organised by the Americans in 1901 and disbanded by the Philippine Government in 1991) for succor. Soon recognising that it would be advantageous to have an allied group not constrained by protocol and Standard Operating Procedure the PC encouraged Kumander Toothpick to work with the afore mentioned politicians.

Toothpick's group, still loosely organised, were referred to as "Ilaga," a Cebuano/Ilonggo word meaning "Rats." Moro propaganda claims that the word is actually an acronym standing for, "Ilonggo Land Grabbing Association." Forgetting that the group wasn't known for its English speaking skills, what organisation would define itself as "Land Grabbing"? For those not familiar with the nuance. In the Southern Philippines "Land Grabbing" is a euphanism for "Land Stealing." As the Ilaga expanded, and it expanded rapidly, it became more cohesive and received formal training AND weaponry from the PC (all the more so after 1971 when the Ilaga joined the fray against the NPA, the Communist Insurgency).

By 1969 the Barakuda to the north had taken on an ideological sheen and converted themselves into "Mujahadin" ( Islamic Warriors fighting in defence of the faith). Spreading from Lanao del Norte into the Zamboanga Peninsula and to a lesser extent into Misamis And Lanao del Sur Provinces they were far out numbering the Black Shirts who along with their parent organisation MIM fell by the wayside. Thus the Ilaga followed the outbreaks of violence by the Barakuda with neither group gaining the upper hand.

By the time of Martial Law in late 1972 the Ilaga had primarily become a tool for the anti-Communist push. It was in this vein that the Ilaga would become infamous as it absorbed Tad Tad elements. "Tad Tad" is Cebuano for "Chop Chop" and is applied to synchrestic Christian faiths that engage in canibbalism. Probably the case that defined, and tainted, the Ilaga was the case of Father Tullio Favali and Ilaga "officer" Norberto Manero Jr. In Tulunan, North Cotabato Province. Fr. Favali was an Italian priest and communist sympathiser who was killed and partially eaten in broad daylight un the spring of 1985. After its hey day in the mid 1980s the Ilaga faded into obscurity...until its re-emergence in response to the MILF/BIAF "MoA War" in 2008 and 2009.

The Ilaga are merely 1 group however, with literally every province on the island having several pro-Government paramilitaries. Whether as part of the CAA Program (CAFGU,CVO and SCAA) or as part of the Force Multiplication facet of the current and preceding ISPs, particularly the ISP-IPs (Internal Security Plan-Indigineous Peoples). Code named "Oplan Alsa Lumad" (Operational Plan Lumad Arise) it has created extremely well armed pro-Government paramilitaries like BULIF/bLA (Bungkatol Liberation Force/Army) amongst the Higaon-on Lumad in Agusan del Sur, Agusan del Norte and Bukidnon Provinces, BLPs (Bagani Longrang Platoons) amongst Manobos in the Davao Region and so on.

[Dayuhan]

It was these Black Shirts who actually spawned the communal fighting still ravaging the island today.

That depends on who you listen to. As discussed elsewhere, both sides in that conflict have adopted self-serving historical narratives casting themselves as victims and their opponents as aggressors. Neither narrative is particularly credible. There were acts of outright aggression and atrocity on both sides, and the militias on both sides preferred to target the other side's unarmed civilian base.

In one particular case a poor Ilonggo family moved to Upi/N.Upi in the 1940s and was settled on a tract of uncultivated land on a steep mountainside. After this family, surnamed "Luces," had cleared and terraced their small plot the chief of a Maguindanowan Clan surnamed "Ampatuan" (people familiar with the Philippines will probably know that name well) claimed it. Having been cleared and made arable it was now worth a decent amount of money.

The Luces were told to pay a very high price for land they already owned and so naturally they refused the Ampatuan's offer. Before too long Ampatuan Clansmen came and murdered the entire family, an event all too common in that era and in fact not unusual now. The family's son Felipe escaped death because he had been at the town's main market on an errand. Hearing what had happened he turned to Teduray friends who introduced him to a group of extended families who had refused to bow to the Maguindanowans, and who were periodically doing battle, mostly over land related issues. Felipe then lived among them and eventually rose to leadership of the small group. Adopting the moniker, "Kumander Toothpick" his victories attracted more Teduray, and eventually fellow Illongos as well as ( to a lesser degree) Cebuanos as well (Cebuanos and Ilonggos are culturally similar, both rooted in the Visayan Islands).

That would be Feliciano Luces, no?

Again, I've heard that version of the story... spent a lot of time with Mindanao Ilonggos in the late 70s and early 80s and emerged well steeped in their mythology. I then spent some time in Cotabato listening to their mythology. The two are very different, and obviously incompatible, yet both sides accept them as absolute truth.

The refrain about settlement on "unused land" only goes so far. Anywhere that you still have indigenous control in the Philippines, tribal units have extensive tracts of "unused land" within their ancestral domain claims... these may be disputed by different tribal groups, but none of the disputing parties would generally be amenable to outside settlement. In my area forest, hunting grounds, watersheds, and simple buffer zones between groups are all considered an integral part of the tribe's territory, even though those areas might seem "unused" to an outsider. Certainly if someone tried to settle there and claim the land (none of which has government-recognized titles) an immediate and probably violent reaction would ensue. Looking back at the history the surprise is really that settlement went on so long before it produced a violent backlash.

Toothpick's group, still loosely organised, were referred to as "Ilaga," a Cebuano/Ilonggo word meaning "Rats." Moro propaganda claims that the word is actually an acronym standing for, "Ilonggo Land Grabbing Association." Forgetting that the group wasn't known for its English speaking skills, what organisation would define itself as "Land Grabbing"?

I never heard anyone claim that "Ilaga" was actually intended to stand for "Ilonggo Landgrabbers Association", and I've listened to some extreme propagandists on both sides. It was an assigned meaning, bit of black humor. Lang grabbing did go on, and lots of it, often with the cooperation and in some cases participation of the military.

You could go on forever trying to decipher who started the actual violence, and never come up with a really satisfactory answer. Certainly you'd have no chance of coming up with an answer accepted by both sides. Ultimately, though, the cause of the conflict was clearly the sponsored large-scale migration into Cotabato and Lanao. That had been going on a long time, but it accelerated dramatically in the 50s and 60s, to the point that areas where settlers achieved a numerical majority and political control in areas where indigenous groups once had both. There's no way a government can impose that sort of demographic change without producing violence.

It's useful to see the Moro propaganda for what it is, but the propaganda from the other side is no less distorted. It's a bit like listening to Israeli and Palestinian narratives: it's useful (if depressing) to know what both sides think, but one wouldn't want to confuse either version with truth.

[Rachamim]

The answer is both yes AND no. When the AFP issued its SOMO in July of 2009, and the MILF/BIAF reciprocated a couple of days later, they did so without consulting Kato. For 3 months prior to the SOMO Kato had been effectively sidelined from the chain of command. A sub-Kumander by the name of Zacarias Goma had been made de facto Kumander of the 105 Base Command (Kato-s unit). Goma was issuing orders to Kato's #2, sub-Kumander Alo Binago on behalf of the BIAF General Staff (BIAF being Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, the armed wing of the MILF). So then the SOMO, and Kato feels he was being excised from the unit he himself created (the 105 existed before Kato transferred from the 109 but was ineffective).

At that point Kato admits he began sending out feelers to allies within the BIAF about possibly branching out on his own. Then, when the Peace Process resumed, the BIAF General Staff had been in regular communication with Kumander Bravo, CO of the 102 Base Command, and had even promoted Kumander Mars (Pangalian) of the 103 Base Command, the other 2 being the Base Commands who with Kato, formed the so called "Lawless" faction of the MILF/BIAF. They ignored Kato, they didn't try to resolve the warrants issued against him for the 2008 War, they continued to refer to him as "Lawless" so that in effect they condoned the AFP/PNP campaign being waged against his Base Command without considering it a violation of the SOMO, or previous Ceasefire mechanisms.

Kato says that this caused him, in the early months of 2010 to resign his commission as Kumander of the 105 while simultaneously having both underlings AND the MILF political machine within his AOR submit petitions to both the BIAF General Staff and MILF Central Committee NOT to accept Kato's tendered resignation. Instead, the BIAF stayed silent and the MILF CenCom accepted the resignation and offered him a position as a teacher's aide, knowing he would reject it (he is a distinguished theologian in addition to his military experience which only began in middle age).

In December of 2010 he firmly separated from the MILF/BIAF and publicly outted his new organisation BIFF. However, this outting caused unexpected problems for the MILF in that it offered the Government a way in which to hedge in the Peace Process, to avoid substantiative progress while placing the onus on the MILF. Since then both Kato and the MILF Central Committee have played both sides of the fence, refusing to burn that final brisge. It is all rhetoric.

Even when Kumander Bravo deployed 4 senior officers to try and cajole Kato into renouncing this new group Kato has remained steadfast. Moreover, the MILF CenCom has co-operated with the AFP in framing BIFF (Kato's group) for every hiccup in Central Mindanao. CenCom did avert a meltdown when it created the new Base Command, the 118, to sap the 105 and 106 of disaffected personnel so as to circumvent a jumping of ship to BIFF but that is neither here nor there.