Bob,

I certainly share the frustration, but I think you're missing a few points.

if the MILF of Mindanao and the MNLF of the Sulu Archepeligo wanted the ASG and JI (our two targets of OEF-P, and the reason for US engagement) out of the Philippines, those guys would be gone within a week.

First, minor point: getting ASG "out of the Philippines" really isn't an option. They didn't come from out of the Philippines, they are indigenous, and sure as hell nobody else wants 'em.

More important, I think you're overlooking the reality that the only effective chain of command in Mindanao belongs to the US Armed Forces - and I very much include the Philippine civilian and military authority structure in that estimation.

Does the MILF Central Committee have the capacity to stop its base commands from dealing with JI? Realistically, no. Maybe under Hashim Salamat that kind of centralized authority existed, but Al Haj Murad simply doesn't have it. Look at the problem he has with les rogues du jour, Umbra Kato and Commander Bravo. Murad can't confront Kato because Kato belongs to the Maguindanao aristocracy that forms Murad's key support base, and if push came to shove they might well support Kato. Bravo is just a thug, but he's a Maranao thug and the other Maranao base commands will stick with him; if Murad confronts him he risks losing the entire Maranao contingent.

Don't assume that power and internal legitimacy flows from the Central Committee to the base commands. It's more the other way around. Murad is "in charge" because the field commanders let him be "in charge". He's more spokesman than commander.

Ironically, the shaky position of the MILF central leadership stems at least partly from the reality that the MILF has never had a consistent source of external funding. If they had money flowing from the outside, the ability to allocate or withhold resources would give Murad some leverage. At this point, he has very little. The money flows from internal taxation/extortion and other business/criminal ("/" = "blurred distinction") activities, and the base commands, which actually hold territory, are in a better position to collect revenue than the center.

If the MILF has weak leadership, the MNLF has none. Nur Misuari is a spent force and no credible successor has emerged. Field commanders are making whatever deals and whatever alliances suit their immediate personal needs, with all manner of strange bedfellows involved.

The situation of the Philippine Government is in many ways similar to that of the MILF. For the last 5 years or so the Macapagal administration has been mainly preoccupied with keeping power, which it has done by shoving candy down the throats of various support blocs and trying to keep everyone on board. Arroyo cannot take charge of the military and she cannot take charge of the powerful Mindanao politicians/feudal lords, neither of which really wants a peace deal: she needs their support too badly. Once again, the puppets are pulling the strings.

Nothing productive will happen until the 2010 election is done. Best case scenario there would be a clear winner with unquestioned legitimacy, but the probability of that is low. In the meantime, the AFP will play whack-a-mole with the ASG, the Americans will pat each other on the back and call it all a great success, the MILF and the AFP will avoid both war and peace... in short, things will carry on much as they are.

We should offer the Philippines aid and support contingent on them working seriously to do this (carrots); and tell them quite seriously that if they won't help the populace of the south, then we will

I'm curious: how exactly do you propose to help anyone outside the framework of the Philippine Government? For all the mess, it remains an allied sovereign state.

Second order effect would likely be a push by the communist insurgency in the north and a toppling of the ever-fragile national government by either them or by the military.

The communist insurgency is not in a position to topple anything, except possibly itself. I would not anticipate a successful military coup either, and if that happened it would be close to a worst-case scenario for US objectives.

Regardless, we would be able to work with whichever group took power and continue to work toward accomplishment of all of our national objectives in the region if this did occur. The Fils know this; and I am sure they often wonder why don't do the obvious.

Most unlikely: neither a communist government nor a military one would be likely to give priority to US objectives. Has it occurred to you that "the Fils", individually and collectively, may have objectives of their own, and that they may not be inclined to prioritize US objectives over their own?

When you find yourself wondering why somebody doesn't "do the obvious", there's usually something in the picture that you don't see.