Bahrain's Unrest

[Jedburgh]

ISN Security Watch, 12 Feb 09: Bahrain's fraught sectarian divide

Sectarian violence has again flared in Bahrain following a wave of arrests associated with an alleged plot to attack national day celebrations.

Described as a fraud by government opponents - who allege the strengthening of repressive mechanisms and measures and moves to promote discrimination in recent years - the alleged terrorist conspiracy and rioting in predominantly Shia areas underlines the fraught nature of sectarian relations in the Gulf kingdom......

Detailed ICG backgrounder, Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge, dated 6 May 05.

[jcustis]

Seems the Bahraini security forces "aren't screwing around," as one journalist on the streets put it.

Hmmm, this has interesting implications. It is HQ 5th Fleet after all.

I am curious about a particular fact though, and that is what strata of society the protesters are from. Ruling families, TCN residents, or disenfranchised Arabs who claim Bahrain home but do not have any ties to ruling class?

This quote from the current article on the CNN site left me curious about the notion of the right to assemble that she highlights. Do Bahraini's have the right to assemble peacefully? It would seem that the security forces have cracked down under the guise of public safety for all, considering the protesters had occupied a traffic circle, presumably causing traffic problems throughout Manama.

"Catherine Ashton, the European Union foreign policy chief, deplored the violence and loss of life. "She also calls on the Bahraini authorities to fully respect and protect the fundamental rights of their citizens, including the right to assemble peacefully. The peaceful expression of people's concerns should be met through dialogue," according to a statement from her office."

I suspect that this thread, the Egypt thread, and the few others that will be spawned, will be merged together down the road in a larger thread with a different title, noting the discord throughout many Muslim countries.

[Rex Brynen]

I am curious about a particular fact though, and that is what strata of society the protesters are from. Ruling families, TCN residents, or disenfranchised Arabs who claim Bahrain home but do not have any ties to ruling class?

Approximately 70-80% of the citizen population are Shiites. The ruling Al Khalifa family are Sunni, and the political and parliamentary system has been designed to limit Shiite political influence. Consequently, the protesters have been largely (although not exclusively) Shiite.

Historically, both the Bahraini military and the security services have relied of significant numbers of foreign personnel. I'm not sure what the current situation is (although certainly one hears complaints--true or not--from Bahrain protesters that many of the riot police are non-nationals).

[Bob's World]

Official exclusion of 70-80% of the populace of any nation is a recipe for disaster. When you add economic disparity along a religious faultline, eventual revolt is inevitable.

Hopefully the Department of State is scurrying to get in front of all such inevitiable (and entirely predictable) uprising to work with these governments to identify, announce, and begin implementation of reasonable reforms. These are not new issues, it is only that they have never had to address them before.

The Having the 5th Fleet headquartered there is primarily a problem in that it is a bold strategic communication to that populace and the world that "we approve this government."

[jcustis]

Hopefully the Department of State is scurrying to get in front of all such inevitiable (and entirely predictable) uprising to work with these governments to identify, announce, and begin implementation of reasonable reforms.

Sir, is that really State's responsibility, and isn't that the sort of meddling that many of us seem to advocate we should step further away from?

How can DoS does this without approaching the appearance of being the infidel intruder who is absolutely meddling?

In your experience in the PI, how much do back channel efforts even resonate with the host nation?

[Rex Brynen]

Official exclusion of 70-80% of the populace of any nation is a recipe for disaster.

Really? The US effectively excluded 70% of the population (the poor, women, non-whites) and from effective political participation until 1920 or so. While you did have that nasty civil war over slavery, I'm not sure that the history of the United States between 1776 and 1920 could be described as a "disaster."

China has effectively excluded 95% of the population from political participation since 1949, and has been stunningly successful over the past 20 years.

I'm being provocative, of course--we academics get paid to be argumentative. I certainly think democracy is, in the long run, a good thing. I'm also with you on the overall merits of a stronger US stance in favour of political reform in the Arab world.

However, I am suggesting that the relationship between political exclusion, revolt, and national "success" is far murkier than we might wish.

[jcustis]

Really? The US effectively excluded 70% of the population (the poor, women, non-whites) and from effective political participation until 1920 or so. While you did have that nasty civil war over slavery, I'm not sure that the history of the United States between 1776 and 1920 could be described as a "disaster."

China has effectively excluded 95% of the population from political participation since 1949, and has been stunningly successful over the past 20 years.

These seem to me to be exceptionally apples and oranges comparisons.

It's easy to oppress a minority and keep the lid on things, for a long time at that. Different with majorities, whether they be the poor, or a different sect.

And I think we (US) had a civil war in the 60's and 70's as well, but it just didn't bubble up to the level of conflict that we would identify as a civil war from traditional perspectives. It was also localized to geographic areas. My parents never felt quite the effects that Blacks in the deep South did.

China's a rather homogeneous state, and could probably be stratified mostly by the classic Marxist means of looking at the problem from a proletariat and bourgeois perspective. I haven't touched those old Communism in modernity texts in a long time though, so the analysis there could be off.

I would say, however, that the cases you mentioned are outliers because of these facts.

[Bob's World]

Really? The US effectively excluded 70% of the population (the poor, women, non-whites) and from effective political participation until 1920 or so. While you did have that nasty civil war over slavery, I'm not sure that the history of the United States between 1776 and 1920 could be described as a "disaster."

China has effectively excluded 95% of the population from political participation since 1949, and has been stunningly successful over the past 20 years.

I'm being provocative, of course--we academics get paid to be argumentative. I certainly think democracy is, in the long run, a good thing. I'm also with you on the overall merits of a stronger US stance in favor of political reform in the Arab world.

However, I am suggesting that the relationship between political exclusion, revolt, and national "success" is far murkier than we might wish.

Rex,

Come now, the American example you give list segments of the populace with no historic expectation of inclusion in politics directly. As our society continued to evolve under this new model of governance it created such expectations over time and had to adjust to bring these new stakeholders into the fold.

It is a far different matter to exclude, or discount the inclusion of some segment of the populace that has such a historic expectation of inclusion or degree of influence. For the influence of landed gentry such as the American founding fathers to be discounted by half merely because they lived in the colonies rather than in England. Or in Afghanistan, to strip influence and participation from one segment of society and vest it all in another every time the tide of war shifts the balance of power under the hand of some external power or another.

How many of that 95% of the Chinese populace has a historic expectation of inclusion? This is not a game of simple math, but one which requires taking into account (as my Contracts professor used to say) "all the surrounding facts and circumstances," and not just what is written within the four corners of the contract document itself.

The issue in the Middle East today, and I suspect in China tomorrow, is a change in expectation fueled by the modern information age. Just and changes in American society created an expectation in Women that had to be addressed; just as WWII created changes in expectations of the African American society that had to be addressed.

The world is changing, expectations are changing. Governments, however, have been held static. Many don't want to change. It's good to be King. Many we don't want to change. It's good to have a King monitor ones financial and security interests. But Kings who cling too long to too much in eras of such social change end up with their heads in a bucket or their necks in a noose. Sponsors of such kings who cling too long in the face of such change find themselves beset by "Anarchists" or "Terrorists"; or mired in "COIN" campaigns dedicated to preserving the status quo.

I stand by my argument, but you have made me have to flesh it out a bit with your challenge, and for that I thank you.

Bob

[Dayuhan]

Hopefully the Department of State is scurrying to get in front of all such inevitiable (and entirely predictable) uprising to work with these governments to identify, announce, and begin implementation of reasonable reforms.

Who exactly are "these governments", and why would they want to work with the US State Dept on internal reforms or other matters of domestic policy? To put it very simply, they will not "work with" the US on these issues, which they consider none of our business, and we haven't the power to compel them to do so. They aren't client states, and we aren't an empire.

If the Chinese came round suggesting that we "work with" them on matter of domestic fiscal reform (which arguably they have a right to suggest, as a major creditor) how do you think we'd react? Why would other governments react any differently to the suggestion (or dictation) that they "work with" the State Dept on domestic policy issues?

[Steve the Planner]

Dayuhan:

Your trying to separate reality from delusion. There are no people in the State Department doing any of this, nor is it their role.

There was a high-level meeting with Ambassador Crocker/Gen. Petreaus in 2008, where they went to Bahrain to thank the leaders for their support on Iraq matters (Wikileaks source).

I doubt any delegation from the US would really accomplish much other than what they did. Absent curtailing US funding (not likely), this is just one of those duck and cover events.

Rex:

Really? The US effectively excluded 70% of the population (the poor, women, non-whites) and from effective political participation until 1920 or so. While you did have that nasty civil war over slavery, I'm not sure that the history of the United States between 1776 and 1920 could be described as a "disaster."

China has effectively excluded 95% of the population from political participation since 1949, and has been stunningly successful over the past 20 years.

I'm being provocative, of course--we academics get paid to be argumentative. I certainly think democracy is, in the long run, a good thing. I'm also with you on the overall merits of a stronger US stance in favour of political reform in the Arab world.

However, I am suggesting that the relationship between political exclusion, revolt, and national "success" is far murkier than we might wish.

This dumbass question of a government which operates with the "consent of the people" seldom seems to mean active, participation or universal sufferage. There are many ways and means where "consent of the people" can actually be interpreted as many are pissed off and disenfranchised but not enough to either do something about it, or change the status quo.

JCustis's point about the 60's and 70's is a case in point where many things in the US reached a Billy Jack moment (Civil Rights, Viet nam, etc...) which led to notable changes, but did not rise to wide-spread conflict.

Certainly, the level of violence and destruction in many urban areas did reach catastrophic levels, but limited to urban neighborhoods. Nonetheless, it was part and parcel of a successful shift in civil rights.

Vietnam protests, without dispute, marked the end of universal conscription, and the shift to a volunteer army, the results of which are still playing out in US History. Can we trace elective wars to that shift? Would we have ever considered Iraq with universal conscription still in operation? (I think Afghanistan would have been different as to a limited incursion/occupation).

I'm constantly aware of Bob's arguments for an Afghan constitutional change, but wary that it is all too easy to forget that power politics in a capital does not always equate to "consent of the people," nor that "consent of a majority" might not mean oppression of substantial minorities.

This government stuff sure seems to be complicated!!!!

[AdamG]

MANAMA, Bahrain — A day after Saudi Arabia’s military rolled into Bahrain, the Iranian government branded the move “unacceptable” on Tuesday, threatening to escalate a local political conflict into a regional showdown with Iran.

On Monday, about 2,000 troops — 1,200 from Saudi Arabia and 800 from the United Arab Emirates — entered Bahrain as part of a force operating under the aegis of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a six-nation regional coalition of Sunni rulers that has grown increasingly anxious over the sustained challenge to Bahrain’s king, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa. “This is the initial phase,” a Saudi official said. “Bahrain will get whatever assistance it needs. It’s open-ended.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/16/wo...er=rss&emc=rss

[joelb]

i was wondering what a match up like this would look like could be a good pretext war remember the Maine Saudi's could win its a missile air war even if paratroopers could be sent from iran any one have any thoughts

[RTK]

i was wondering what a match up like this would look like could be a good pretext war remember the Maine Saudi's could win its a missile air war even if paratroopers could be sent from iran any one have any thoughts

My only thoughts have to do with punctuation and protocol.....

[Pete]

The last time when I was in Bahrain in April 1995 there was an episode of Shiite protesting that occasionally led to incidents of violence. Helicopters were flying over Manama, there were a couple of pillars of smoke rising in the air, and from a distance of about 400 meters away I saw a traffic control point with an APC or two. I wasn't particularly concerned about my personal safety and just went about my business as usual -- it wasn't as though it was Normandy or anything like that.

I was there because the heaviest rainfall in Bahrain since 1945 had caused flooding in a warehouse next to the U.S. Navy base there that contained U.S. Army war reserve medical stuff. (Over there they don't build stormwater drainage systems like we do because they rarely need them.) The damage to the medical supplies was negligible but I found holes torn in the roof of the warehouse that had been caused by high winds during the storm. I told the Navy about it because their contracting office was the organization leasing the facility.

During the period of '94-'95 when I went back and forth to Bahrain I saw occasional news stories about Saudi crackdowns on Shiites living on the east coast of Saudi Arabia by the Persian Gulf. The stories invariably said the troubles were caused by Iranian provocation. I don't know whether that was actually true or just something the Saudis were saying. I'd like to see a map of the region that shows the percentages of Shiites living in the coastal areas of eastern Saudi Arabia, vis-a-vis the Sunnis. It would also be interesting to see the same thing about the other smaller Gulf nations.

[RTK]

I'd like to see a map of the region that shows the percentages of Shiites living in the coastal areas of eastern Saudi Arabia, vis-a-vis the Sunnis. It would also be interesting to see the same thing about the other smaller Gulf nations.

It doesn't show percentages, but it shows majority in various areas.

http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/...ionCore_lg.jpg

[Bob's World]

Shiites have long been an oppressed minority on the Arabian Peninsula; though a disproportionately large portion of the known oil deposits is drawn from their land. The northern Saudi oil, Bahrain are notable, and it looks like the oil producing part of Yemen as well.

Knowing that the Brits had Iranian oil cornered when the US made a move on Arab oil; I would not be surprised if this influenced our perspectives as to who to throw our lot in with. To elevate Shiite leadership may have been seen as too likely to fall under Britiish influence.

This is a division we could play to our advantage today, both to help stabilize and reduce the strategic significance of the Saudis; and also to open better lines of communication with the Iranians. Both of those are vital US interests.

The Gulf States sending security forces understand this very well, and those leaders are acting far more to sustain their own status quo than they are to ensure there are no temporary disruptions of oil flow. Temporary they can live with; but the creation of 1-2 Shiite states on the AP? I suspect that makes them very nervous indeed.

Next thing you know the Hashemites will re-exert their claim on leadership of the region...