Bahrain's Unrest

[Bob's World]

Ken, you know I promote the example of the US experience as a model for government structure in principle rather than as some cure that must be taken on face value. I advocate for the COIN value of ensuring no single element of government can become too effective or powerful, and for ensuring the populace is always armed, informed, and allowed to peaceably assemble as a additional check on government; also that in protecting some core collection individual and collective rights and in identifying clear mechanisms for affecting governance one can keep a populace from drifting in to insurgency.

What type of government, what rights, what procedures? It is the logic behind the framework that is important, not the specific framework or what is hung upon it.

No one will ever hear me promote 6 years as the perfect term length for a senator, or 25 as the model for eligibility for congress, or that two houses is the only way to go, etc, etc, etc.

Only that this document was written with a keen eye to preventing insurgency, and has several mechanisms designed for that purpose that have proven quite effective. But until one is willing to swallow the hard fact that the vast majority of insurgent causation radiates out from government, rather than in toward government from some "malign actor" employing "radical ideology" it may well be hard to appreciate the importance of such a governing document in the prevention of insurgency.

Similarly, until one is prepared to swallow the even harder fact that the vast majority of causation for international terrorism radiates outward as well in the form of foreign policy and engagement it may well be hard to appreciate the importance of reframing our approach to the world to better suit the one we live in today, rather than the one that existed some 60 years ago.

These uprisings in the Middle East are fueled by the same popular discontent that fuels those who bring terror to Western countries. Each of these countries will have to work out a solution to their distinct situation. I would encourage them to consider their role in causation and to make smart changes in how they govern. Yes, I would say "see what the US did, now understand why, and see if you can achieve similar functions that make sense for your country and your culture. I would also point out what Afghanistan did, and say, "don't do this, they created a constitution as rough on the Pashtuns as the Treaty of Versailles was on the Germans. Such vengeful, power hungry controlling documents sound good at the time, but they never seem to play out well in the long run.."

As for the US? This is our best opportunity yet to finally turn the corner on the GWOT, yet for that everyone is focused on what GEN Petraeus has to report from Afghanistan; and Libya and Bahrain are seen as largely unrelated to the war on terrorism. This is the sad irony. It is Iraq and Afghanistan (post the first 6 months) that have been largely unrelated to the GWOT; and our foreign policies in these places that are now on fire that should have been the main effort.

[Ken White]

However, it can give the appearance of that inconsistency of which I wrote:

What type of government, what rights, what procedures? It is the logic behind the framework that is important, not the specific framework or what is hung upon it.

That's true and you usually write words to that effect -- but then things like this appear:

No one will ever hear me promote 6 years as the perfect term length for a senator, or 25 as the model for eligibility for congress, or that two houses is the only way to go, etc, etc, etc.

Only that this document was written with a keen eye to preventing insurgency, and has several mechanisms designed for that purpose that have proven quite effective. But until one is willing to swallow the hard fact that the vast majority of insurgent causation radiates out from government, rather than in toward government from some "malign actor" employing "radical ideology" it may well be hard to appreciate the importance of such a governing document in the prevention of insurgency.

I'll agree that you are not pushing the US Model -- but I have to say it sure reads as though you are -- and frequently, you more assertive along that line...

Note the incongruity. First para offers unlikely and throwaway possibilities in one short pithy sentence, a one liner in essence. The second para pushes the 'US Model' of excellence in quite a few more words...

It's not the detail, it's the overall impression. I offer that not to be a picker of gnits but just as a casual observer and for your consideration, no more. I will now go get more coffee...

[Dayuhan]

[QUOTE=Bob's World;117605]

So now, I submit, the terms of the contract have changed. If these governments want US support to sustain them in power they are going to have to deal with some invasive new terms.

Who wants or needs US support to sustain them in power? Not Bahrain, or Saudi Arabia, or Libya, or Qatar or the UAE. None of these countries receive US support or rely on it to sustain them in power. When those who rule Bahrain wanted help, did they ask us?

I can't for the life of me grasp why you keep talking about these governments as client states, dependent entities that we sponsor and support and protect against their enraged populaces. This is an illusion, and a dangerous one, because it assumes influence that we cannot actually wield. If these governments did in fact rely on our support or sustenance, we could influence their behaviour by threatening to unilaterally rewrite the "terms of the contract" and impose "invasive new terms". They do not rely on our support, and we are not in a position to impose terms on them. If they tell us to insert our invasive terms in an awkward and uncomfortable place, what exactly do we propose to do?

The only US principle in play, and the one we have the greatest conflict with, is our express commitment that these people, and people everywhere, have a god given right to fight for such things. If we help these governments suppress their people in this desire, then there will be consequences paid in increased acts of terrorism for our actions.

We aren't "helping these governments suppress their people". They are doing that all by themselves.

Which brings us to my recommendation that now is the time for hard, smart diplomacy. To renegotiate the contracts of our relationships with these governments based upon new and emerging conditions; and to do so in a manner that is as consistent with our stated principles as possible.

You're basing your proposal for "hard, smart diplomacy" on assumed influence that we don't actually have. That's not likely to turn out well. What's your carrot? What's your stick?

Similarly, until one is prepared to swallow the even harder fact that the vast majority of causation for international terrorism radiates outward as well in the form of foreign policy and engagement it may well be hard to appreciate the importance of reframing our approach to the world to better suit the one we live in today, rather than the one that existed some 60 years ago.

That's your opinion. It remains largely unsupported and highly debatable.

Each of these countries will have to work out a solution to their distinct situation. I would encourage them to consider their role in causation and to make smart changes in how they govern. Yes, I would say "see what the US did, now understand why, and see if you can achieve similar functions that make sense for your country and your culture.

Go ahead and encourage, go ahead and say it. You and I and Barack Obama can say this 50 times a day, or 100, and it won't make any difference. Nobody cares what we say. These governments are not going to make changes in the way they govern, smart or otherwise, because of anything we say.

As for the US? This is our best opportunity yet to finally turn the corner on the GWOT

How?

I asked this simple question of you and JMA, and received no answer:

What exactly would you want us to do in Bahrain?

Emphasis on "do", because "say" without "do" means nothing.

If we speak of American principles, I commend to you the item quoted earlier by Granite State:

America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. - John Quincy Adams

It may seem to you that I argue with everything you say. American principles, of course, suggest that I've a right to an opinion, but I'd also point out that it seems to me that you keep making the same points over and over again without acknowledging or incorporating the reasonable counterpoints made by quite a number here.. This does impose a somewhat cyclic nature on the conversation, which I suspect will be broken only when boating season is back and I haven't time to continue it. But then there's Ken, and others...

[Ken White]

from my Wife, thank you berry much...

Ah, the benefits of retardation coupled with retirement.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan.

"But for" the US those countries would all be the colonies of some European country, or would be provinces of some combination of Iraq and Iran. This is not lost on the leaders of these countries, and yes, it does give us influence in the region. Just as the fact that if we were so inclined we could put them under a US flag in short order as well. This is real leverage, counter threats to not sell oil are a false leverage that relies upon our good will to play along with such coercion, and even if we did play along are not sustainable options for any of these countries.

You discount that, I realize, but it is the elephant in the room that others cannot ignore.

So, with that elephant standing quietly behind us, I do think we should sit down and talk with these guys about how to best regain stability in their respective countries. Their instinct is likely to simply ratchet up the oppression until the people finally return to a state of well suppressed insurgency. This is the forced stability that has been gradually weakening over the past 20 years, and that has been targeted by bin Laden and his AQ organization to grow his own influence in the region.

By employing our influence to convince these gentlemen to engage their people in conversation rather than with cluster bombs and chainguns we have our best chance at a stability that actually begins to reduce the conditions of insurgency in these populaces; and thereby reduces the likelihood of acts of terrorism against the US. and the West. Small, reasonable reforms, on their terms and IAW their culture and values, will vent the pressure that is threatening to burst these countries wide open.

And yes, the US constitution was designed to do just that, and provides keen insights as to what type of procedures and rights are most important in such an endeavor of tailoring governance so as to not inflame a populace. It is not the only answer, but it is a good one. A point of departure.

[Dayuhan]

"But for" the US those countries would all be the colonies of some European country, or would be provinces of some combination of Iraq and Iran. This is not lost on the leaders of these countries, and yes, it does give us influence in the region.

That's the past. This is the present. There is no longer any threat of European colonial occupation. There is no longer any threat from Iraq. There is a hypothetical threat from Iran, but Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States no perfectly well that we will resist any Iranian attempt to take the Gulf no matter how they govern. That's not about defending them, just as Iraq wasn't about defending them. It's about defending ourselves: the US is not going to let a hostile or potentially hostile power take full control of the Gulf oil reserves. They and we know it, so threatening to withdraw defense against external aggression is not a viable stick.

Again: we cannot pretend that these countries are clients or dependencies that have to jump at our request. They aren't. We aren't helping or enabling them to oppress their populaces either. They don't need or want our help to do that.

Just as the fact that if we were so inclined we could put them under a US flag in short order as well. This is real leverage

It is no leverage at all: they know very well that we are not going to conquer and colonize the Gulf. We know it too, so there's not much point in talking about it.

So, with that elephant standing quietly behind us, I do think we should sit down and talk with these guys about how to best regain stability in their respective countries.

That elephant is still standing squarely in the middle of the room. "These guys" are not going to talk to us, or listen to our lectures, about the internal politics of their countries. They don't have to, and they won't.

Realistically, what are your carrots, and what are your sticks? Why should they listen to us, especially if we come off with some high-handed "daddy white man knows best, and you benighted slobs need to re-organize your country as we see fit" routine? That may not be what you intend to say, but that's how it comes across, and people on the receiving end won't like it. The governments won't like it, and neither will the populaces: they won't see us standing up for them, they'll see us treating their leaders and their countries like backward children. It comes off as arrogance and contempt, and that doesn't make good relationships.

And again:

What exactly would you want us to do in Bahrain?

Emphasis on "do", because "say" without "do" means nothing.

[Bob's World]

That's the past. This is the present. There is no longer any threat of European colonial occupation. There is no longer any threat from Iraq. There is a hypothetical threat from Iran, but Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States no perfectly well that we will resist any Iranian attempt to take the Gulf no matter how they govern. That's not about defending them, just as Iraq wasn't about defending them. It's about defending ourselves: the US is not going to let a hostile or potentially hostile power take full control of the Gulf oil reserves. They and we know it, so threatening to withdraw defense against external aggression is not a viable stick.

Again: we cannot pretend that these countries are clients or dependencies that have to jump at our request. They aren't. We aren't helping or enabling them to oppress their populaces either. They don't need or want our help to do that.



It is no leverage at all: they know very well that we are not going to conquer and colonize the Gulf. We know it too, so there's not much point in talking about it.



That elephant is still standing squarely in the middle of the room. "These guys" are not going to talk to us, or listen to our lectures, about the internal politics of their countries. They don't have to, and they won't.

Realistically, what are your carrots, and what are your sticks? Why should they listen to us, especially if we come off with some high-handed "daddy white man knows best, and you benighted slobs need to re-organize your country as we see fit" routine? That may not be what you intend to say, but that's how it comes across, and people on the receiving end won't like it. The governments won't like it, and neither will the populaces: they won't see us standing up for them, they'll see us treating their leaders and their countries like backward children. It comes off as arrogance and contempt, and that doesn't make good relationships.

And again:

What exactly would you want us to do in Bahrain?

Emphasis on "do", because "say" without "do" means nothing.

I told you. You just disagree so cannot hear. But now you are suddenly the "do something there" guy? Pick one.

As to the Past, if you really think that we live in some conflictless age, where nations no longer are willing to use power to achieve gain, I find hard to believe. It is the US presence in the region and commitment to preserving governments in power that makes Iraq not a threat, likewise for iran. and Russia and quite possibly Turkey, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, China or any of another number of countries who would like to own that stretech of oil soaked beachfront property.

As to what the US will certainly never do, that is one bet I would never put much money on. We would never liberate Kuwait. We would never invade Iraq. There is no such thing as "we would never." That all depends on the assessment of our national interests at a given time by a relatively small number of leaders. We don't like to be pushed, and tend to overreact when we are. People understand that about America if nothing else. We may be a "Christian Nation" as some like to say, but that has never prevented us from "getting Biblical" with those who cross us.

But none of that needs to be in the conversation. It is implied. The conversation needs to focus on what these leaders do to best stabilize their own countries.

[Dayuhan]

I told you. You just disagree so cannot hear. But now you are suddenly the "do something there" guy? Pick one.

You're telling me about broad generalities that offer no practical support for the diplomatic pressure you want to exert.

You're the one who wants us to do something. You want us to change how these governments govern. I'm asking what you propose to do to achieve that goal. Sermons and suggestions are not going to do it: there have to be immediate, meaningful, practical carrots and sticks on the table if we want to change anyone's behaviour. What are they?

Lecturing these governments on how we think they ought to govern is meaningless. It will be ignored. It has already been ignored: we told the Bahrainis what we thought they should do, and they went to the Saudis instead.

But none of that needs to be in the conversation. It is implied. The conversation needs to focus on what these leaders do to best stabilize their own countries.

Unless we have some way to persuade or compel them to do what we think they need to do, discussion of what we think they need to do is abstract to the point of meaninglessness.

Sure, we can lecture them on democracy and human rights, in public and private. That makes us sound noble to ourselves, and preachy and obnoxious to others, but it's tradition. Just don't expect it to produce change.

Here's what I'm hearing from you:

I do think we should sit down and talk with these guys about how to best regain stability in their respective countries....

By employing our influence to convince these gentlemen to engage their people in conversation rather than with cluster bombs and chainguns

I would encourage them to consider their role in causation and to make smart changes in how they govern. Yes, I would say "see what the US did, now understand why, and see if you can achieve similar functions that make sense for your country and your culture.

convince these leaders that the best way to stay in power is to make smart, reasonable, moderate concessions to their people. To trend toward a parliamentary system with a more ceremonial role for the Royals seems logical to me; while granting greater justice in the judicial systems, and a greater voice in governance to the populace.

So now, I submit, the terms of the contract have changed. If these governments want US support to sustain them in power they are going to have to deal with some invasive new terms.

How does this not come down to lectures and sermons? If they are ignored - which they will be - what do you propose to do? How do you propose to impose "invasive new terms" on these countries? You say we have "influence", but how specifically are we going to deploy that supposed influence to achieve the result you want to achieve?

Take it a step forward. You've given your lecture on how we think they should govern. It's something we've done before. They've nodded gravely, promised to take your opinions under consideration, and ignored you, which is what they've always done before. What's the next move?

Granting that our self-image requires us to lecture a bit, what's the point, in this case, in spouting words that we aren't prepared to back up with action?

[Bob's World]

When I was a platoon leader a few years ago I had these two E-4s who always thought whatever leadership came up with was lame.

One day at a MOUT site at Graf while we were doing an AAR after a platoon attack on the site these two were in the back row, as usual, offering criticisms of the past operation, but not offering any more viable alternatives.

So I told the platoon that we were going to form a new plan and attack again in an hour. Spc X would be the Platoon leader, and Spc Y would be the Platoon Sergeant for the coming attack. Dead silence in the back row.

SFC Bowen and I worked with the two new leaders and helped them as they struggled to formulate a plan. We conducted the attack, had problems, but more importantly the entire platoon realized that it was far easier to follow and criticize than it was to lead.

So, fine, I know I have opinions and I offer them up here knowing that there will be keen eye and minds upon them. It helps me to refine my ideas and make them better.

Help me out. So far your criticisms tend to fall in the category of "that sucks." Ok, fine. Personally, I do think the US has tremendous influence and that negotiations from a US leader is far more than some "lecture."

But I'm open Spc Dayuhan, you're in charge. What is your plan?

[Pete]

Apples and oranges. American foreign policy in general and small-unit leadership techniques in the U.S. Army are separate subjects, though the two may occasionally overlap a bit.

[Dayuhan]

Personally, I do think the US has tremendous influence and that negotiations from a US leader is far more than some "lecture."

I don't think we're discussing negotiations here. Negotiations take place between two parties on matters of mutual interest. We're not in a position to tell the Saudis or the Bahrainis that we want to "negotiate" over their domestic policies. They don't have to negotiate with us over those matters, which they do not see as legitimate subjects of interest for us. We cannot compel them to negotiate, or to do as we think they should.

How would we feel if the Chinese told us they wanted to negotiate with us over our domestic economic policies, and impose intrusive conditions on our fiscal policies? Arguably they've a right, as a major creditor, but I doubt we'd take it too kindly.

It's all very well to speak of generic "influence", but using that influence to achieve any specific goal is a bit more complicated. Changing the behavior of people who don't want to change requires specific, immediately applicable carrots and sticks. If we want others to do as we say they should, we have to offer immediate tangible reward or penalty... and what have we go to offer in this case?

As a general rule, making statements we aren't willing to back up with specific action makes us look like ineffectual windbags, and is to be avoided.

But I'm open Spc Dayuhan, you're in charge. What is your plan?

For Bahrain? I don't have a plan. I don't think we need a plan. We'll state that we think the Government should pursue political reform and move toward democracy, but acknowledge that as a sovereign nation they've no obligation to do as we say. This we have, essentially, already done. They will, of course, ignore us. Then we wait and let things sort out as they will. We are not in a position to direct or manage events. We can state that we won't assist the Bahraini government against domestic insurrection, but that's a non-issue because they already know that and they won't ask for our assistance. There's really no need for us to be any more involved than that.

We do not want to be seen preaching sermons to Muslim governments, because people don't pay attention to the substance of what we preach. They just see us preaching our gospel to Muslim governments, and it comes off as intrusive, arrogant and contemptuous behaviour.

I realize that I get pissy and obnoxious and repetitive on the subject, but it's frustrating to see the repeated advocacy of solutions that we haven't the capacity to implement. Good governance is a wonderful and admirable solution. I've no doubt that it would be an effective solution. Unfortunately we cannot govern Bahrain or Afghanistan, Libya or Saudi Arabia, ourselves. Neither can we persuade or compel those who rule to govern the way we think they should. It's a great solution, but it's not a solution we can impose.

In a broad sense, I think we need to recalibrate our foreign policy ends to match our means and our capacities. Too often in the recent past we've pursued goals that we haven't the capacity to achieve, and it hasn't worked out well for us. People who bite off more than they can chew tend to choke: we've a limited chewing capacity at the moment, and we need to choose our bites very carefully.

[Pete]

Oh well, I was in Bahrain a few times many years ago but I hardly consider myself to be an expert on the place. The thing about learning is realizing how much you don't know.

If folks would let me digress a bit I'd like to introduce an analogy. A British forum about the First World War has an off-topic subforum for members who have a certain number of posts. By and large people in Britain are very well informed about events taking place in the U.S.

However, when the mass-shooting happened at Virginia Tech a few years ago there was a long thread in the off-topic forum about what madmen we are to have the gun laws that let it happen. These are people who speak our language and know a lot about our country, but most of the nuances of the gun control/Second Amendment debate in the U.S. escape them. What I'm talking about are cultural nuances, and if British people can't read them in regard to gun control in America than I doubt Americans can see them in regard to certain issues the Middle East or Central Asia, where the people speak other languages.

My point is that we ought to be careful about lecturing people overseas about how they ought to lead their lives. If American and British people could have such a collision of opinions when we speak the same language and share a common heritage it means we ought to be a bit careful about hectoring foreign countries.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

Would anybody care to identify what unit(s) of Saudi Arabian National Guard or Royal Saudi Army or KSA Ministry Of Interior or whoever are in Bahrain?

Specifically seeking to confirm or deny presence of SANG Military Police Battalion.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 6 Apr 11: The Bahrain Revolt

Manama’s crackdown and Saudi Arabia’s military intervention are dangerous moves that could stamp out hopes for peaceful transition in Bahrain and turn a mass movement for democratic reform into an armed conflict, while regionalising an internal political struggle. They could also exacerbate sectarian tensions not only in Bahrain or the Gulf but across the region. Along with other member states of the GCC, Saudi Arabia purportedly is responding to dual fears: that the popular uprising could lead to a Shiite takeover, and a Shiite takeover would be tantamount to an Iranian one. Both are largely unfounded. It also is concerned protests might inspire similar movements among its own Eastern Province Shiites, oblivious that its involvement is likelier to provoke than deter them. Bahrain’s brutal crackdown and Saudi interference fan flames both want to extinguish. The most effective response to the radical regime change threat or greater Iranian influence is not violent suppression of peaceful protests but political reform. Time is running short and trends are in the wrong direction....

[Pete]

Jedburgh, this situation has been latent with the possibility of happening for several decades now. On one of my trips there in the 1990s during a period of Sunni-Shiite strife the Navy contracting office at our Naval base in Bahrain forbade the hiring of Shiites for construction projects at a contingency-use U.S. Air Force base on the southern desert end of the main island.

The facility consisted of runways, temporary buildings, maintenance bays and fuel tanks that remained vacant and unused but were being improved for contingency use later should the need arise. The Air Force had Red Horse teams (combat engineers) there in TDY status improving the facility and they occasionally wanted contracted labor. The woman at the Navy contracting office in Bahrain who ran the contracts for work at the airbase was Japanese-American from San Francisco and was probably the daughter of parents who had been incarcerated during WW II. Thus she felt pretty strange about banning an ethnic/religious category of people.

The concern about having Shiites on the job site was because it was believed that official U.S. support for the Sunni ruling dynasty of Bahrain might motivate blue collar Shiite day laborers on the job site to blame their plight on the U.S. and take some sort of revenge while they were there.

[davidbfpo]

Has anyone noticed - within or in parallel - with the Saudi Arabian role a Pakistani military involvement?

I am aware that historically some Gulf states have employed large numbers of Baluchi soldiers, notably Oman and a couple of decades ago Pakistan deployed both active duty troops (division equivalent) and enabled others to serve.

[Pete]

Bahrain has a state security force that recruits heavily in Pakistan.

[davidbfpo]

Distracted by chores and once again watching a wedding.

A quick search found a large number of references and there is a comment on a Pakistani military blogsite. So as an example only:http://www.news24.pk/detail.php?nid=1642

Which has:

A foundation affiliated to the Pakistani army is recruiting retired military personnel from the Pakistan Army, Navy and the Air Force who will be deployed in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain at exorbitant salaries....Over 1,000 Pakistanis have so far been recruited in March 2011 alone, while 1,500 more would be hired in the next few weeks, reports say.

The Pakistani Newsweek has:

Pakistan already has a presence in Bahrain: a battalion of the Azad Kashmir Regiment was deployed there over a year ago to train local troops, and retired officers from our Navy and Army are part of their security forces. Media estimates put the number of Pakistanis serving in Bahrain’s security establishment at about 10,000. Their removal has been a key demand of protesters in the kingdom.

Link:http://www.newsweekpakistan.com/the-take/287

There are other, shorter suggestions of recent and current recruiting in Balochistan for the army and in Lahore for the national guard.

[blueblood]

Saudi forces attacked Hazrat Zainab Masjid in Hamad town and set it on fire and burned all holy objects including holy Quran.

The masked men threw Molotov cocktails in to the Masjid and burned it.

http://english.irib.ir/radioislam/ne...y-saudi-forces

http://babulilmlibrary.com/news/anti...-in-the-mosque

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ACKsk...layer_embedded

[davidbfpo]

Bahrain continues to "bubble" along and catching up my reading of the RUSI website I found this review of the Pakistani role:http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth...048574888.html

Nothing startling.