Bahrain's Unrest

[Bob's World]

I watch our government with no confidence. However, I have tremendous confidence in our constitution, and what it was designed to do: create trust trust within and between diverse segments of a complex populace necessary to allow them to work and grow together as a nation; and to prevent government from ever becoming so efficient as to someday grow to where it might seek to exercise inappropriate degrees of control over that same complex populace, or any segment of it.

We are fortunate, and when I watch the fiasco of recent monetary debates between our national "leaders" I can at least take solace that such inept buffoonery is a clear metric that the Constitution is still performing its primary function.

But, like all nations, the US has interests. Some are indeed vital, and where we have to power (not just military, but economic, influential, etc) to act to guard those interests we should have both the moral and physical courage to act, and the wisdom to act in a manner best designed to produce the best effects for us in a manner with the least possible negative effects onto others.

We enter a new era though. Historically while some have always held in high regard considerations as to the impact on the people, the fact was that even if the people were ruthlessly screwed over there was not much they could do about it. Locally, sure, but not across vast oceans to take their grievances to our heartland. As we all know, today that is no longer the case. The old playbook is obsolete, yet we still use it all the same.

In cases like Bahrain there is great opportunity, as well as great risk, but first we must assess if indeed vital interests exist there, and then we must have a new playbook to operate from.

In recent days new national strategies for dealing with both violent extremism and transnational crime have hit the airwaves. Both, sadly, are still based on the old playbook. Words like "hope and change" are easy to say, and easy to hear; but they prove perhaps to be the most "wicked problem" of all to actually implement.

"How" belongs to the executor. That is tactical and there are many ways up any mountain. What I offer attempts to provide some strategic insights for the leadership who may have to make those tactical choices or provide guidance to those who will craft or implement efforts to address such problems.

Until the massive investment our President made with the bail out funds in the development of new sciences and new effective energy come on line (oh, wait, that's right, he didn't invest that money in the future as promised, but instead applied it to double down on failing flagships of the past, such as GM and the efforts in Afghanistan), we will be vitally interested in what happens in places such as Bahrain. To not act would perhaps be the most tragic action of all.

[Dayuhan]

I watch our government with no confidence. However, I have tremendous confidence in our constitution, and what it was designed to do: create trust trust within and between diverse segments of a complex populace necessary to allow them to work and grow together as a nation; and to prevent government from ever becoming so efficient as to someday grow to where it might seek to exercise inappropriate degrees of control over that same complex populace, or any segment of it.

Our Constitution works well, for us. I wouldn't want to assume that it, or its principles, are going to work for anyone else. Even if we make that assumption, it's not our place to be telling others how to run their governments. Easy for us to believe that our solution is best for everyone, but if we choose to act on that belief we're skating on very thin ice.

like all nations, the US has interests. Some are indeed vital, and where we have to power (not just military, but economic, influential, etc) to act to guard those interests we should have both the moral and physical courage to act, and the wisdom to act in a manner best designed to produce the best effects for us in a manner with the least possible negative effects onto others.

Yes, we have interests, though our assessment of those interests may change from day to day, and what's seems at any point to be in our immediate interest may not turn out so well in the long run. Again, before we decide to act on any momentary perception of interest - especially when the action involves meddling in other countries - we really need to remember that all our meddling in the past was also done in accordance with our perception of our interests at that time. It didn't always turn out well. It may not turn out well this time either.

"Where we have the power to act" is an important question. We should recall that "influence" is a function of tangible carrots and sticks. If we can't define and quantify exactly what our influence comes form and we propose to do to wield that influence, we probably don't have any.

Thus, questions, in any given case...

Are we really sure that any given proposed action is really going to be in our long-term interest? Have we adequately assessed the potential for unintended adverse consequences?

Do we really have the power to act? What influence will we bring to bear, and on what bases does it rest?

I donm't sdee much good in acting until those questions are answered.

Look at these two quotes...

Words like "hope and change" are easy to say, and easy to hear; but they prove perhaps to be the most "wicked problem" of all to actually implement.

"How" belongs to the executor. That is tactical and there are many ways up any mountain. What I offer attempts to provide some strategic insights for the leadership who may have to make those tactical choices or provide guidance to those who will craft or implement efforts to address such problems.

So "how" is the "wicked problem"... but that's what you're not telling us. Adopting a strategic goal that we have no viable tactics to achieve is not a good recipe for success, and I have a feeling that "change the way Saudi Arabia is governed" is a goal that fits into that category, not unlike "install democracy in Afghanistan".

Isn't bailing on "how" a bit of a cop-out? Seems to me that one of the major reasons for our deficiencies in execution lately is that our executors have been handed goals that are not practical, achievable, and specific. Do we want to repeat that?

we will be vitally interested in what happens in places such as Bahrain. To not act would perhaps be the most tragic action of all.

That brings back the same old question... what action do you propose? All very well to say not acting would be tragic and thus we must act, but it doesn't say much unless there's a proposed course of action to go with it.

[Bob's World]

This clip from an article on al jazeera rings true to me, and is an important perspective to appreciate:

The Gulf states' reaction, mainly the sending of Saudi Arabian and United Arab Emirates security forces to help quell the protests, underscored that the official Gulf order would not hesitate to do anything to maintain the status quo of the rule of the few.

The demands of the Bahraini protesters for elected officials accountable to freely elected parliaments, even under the umbrella of the monarchy, were intolerable to Gulf leaders. Such ideas challenged the notion of absolute control practiced in these countries and went far beyond the parliamentary system allowed in Kuwait.

The implicit and even explicit message that was sent from the Gulf to the rest of the Arab world, is that what happened in Bahrain was different than the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Monarchs framed Bahrain's protests as an Iranian-backed sectarian Shia "conspiracy" to destabilise the Gulf and dominate the Arab World.

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth...473301296.html

[Dayuhan]

In much of the Gulf there's a perception that the hereditary aristocracies are fundamentally different from, say, a Saddam Hussein, a Gadhafi, or a Mubarak. The perception is based on a traditional, conservative respect for tribal institutions and the tribal system - strange though it may seem to an American, hereditary rule is seen in some places as an inherently legitimate - and on the belief that a ruler earns legitimacy by delivering security and prosperity. Of course these beliefs prevail among the aristocracy, but - again, surprising as it may be to n American - they are shared by a larger portion of the populaces in question than many of us would think likely.

Obviously the Shi'a of Bahrain don't think their rulers are legitimate, but many in Qatar or Saudi Arabia would see no inconsistency in supporting the rulers of Bahrain against a rebellion and supporting rebellion against the rulers of Syria or Libya. In our view there may be no difference, but our view isn't universal.

We don't approve, of course, but the Saudis, Qataris, etc really don't care whether we approve or not. They'll do what they think is in their interest.

[Bob's World]

Actually, while I agree with your assessment of Middle Eastern governance in general, I suspect (and the rise of AQ, where those who support them come from, expressions of discontent captured in the media, the massive up-tick in internal security arrests, etc all being metrics) that there are far more who feel it is time for such an evolution as described in this Bahrain example within SA and other Sunni dominated states than you are willing to recognize. Perhaps less than I believe as well, but as those of us who study and deal with insurgency well know, it does not take a large minority to fuel a successful insurgency.

Europe was little different, Asia as well. The people of the Middle East must find a solution that works for them, and we must not attempt to create those solutions for them. That would be illegitimate from the outset. Similarly we must not ignore what is going on for what it is and discount it as the actions of a few "terrorists" who have employed an evil twisted form of Islam to ideologically brainwash otherwise satisfied members of these populaces to join their cause or to act out against blameless governments at home or abroad.

Saudi Arabia has their Oliver Cromwell, and he is probably already born, and possibly already an adult (and likely taking sanctuary in Yemen or perhaps Pakistan, or is a student in the US or Europe). It is not if, it is when these changes will occur. Encouraging and supporting evolution on the important issues (popular perceptions of legitimacy, justice, respect, and the creation of legal options to influence government) is far wiser than to simply amp up security efforts until the revolution finally explodes.

If the Saudi Royals do not take heed, the recent escalation of beheadings employed to control a dissident populace will one day shift to them being on the receiving end of the sword. That would be an unfortunate, and wholly avoidable situation. But it will happen if they do not take current events serious and shift from their tactics of increased internal security and social bribes to one of exploring and adopting true social change that makes sense for them and their people and that gets at those critical popular perceptions described above.

[Dayuhan]

Actually, while I agree with your assessment of Middle Eastern governance in general, I suspect (and the rise of AQ, where those who support them come from, expressions of discontent captured in the media, the massive up-tick in internal security arrests, etc all being metrics) that there are far more who feel it is time for such an evolution as described in this Bahrain example within SA and other Sunni dominated states than you are willing to recognize. Perhaps less than I believe as well, but as those of us who study and deal with insurgency well know, it does not take a large minority to fuel a successful insurgency.

Has AQ been rising in the Gulf lately? Not to any great extent I would think... and while Gulf populaces have been generally supportive of jihad against the West, and against foreign intervention in Muslim lands, the response to AQ's calls for jihad against Gulf governments has been tepid at best.

I wouldn't want to predict what will happen in the Gulf or when, and I doubt that anyone could with any accuracy. Bahrain is of course somewhat unique in the area, owing to the "Sunni minority ruling Shia majority" dynamic.

I'd agree that there's a lot of desire for evolution in the Gulf. I don't think there's any great consensus on what direction that evolution should take, though. I think the desire for evolution is also tempered by a very real fear of the possible consequences. The possibility that political liberalization, let alone democracy, would lead to chaos, and subsequently foreign domination, a takeover by a military strongman, or domination by radical Islamists - all of which are deeply feared by much of the populace - is on a lot of minds, and drives an acceptance of the status quo that might not otherwise be present. Populaces in the Gulf are generally much more comfortable and have much more to lose than those in, say, Egypt or Tunisia.

Similarly we must not ignore what is going on for what it is and discount it as the actions of a few "terrorists" who have employed an evil twisted form of Islam to ideologically brainwash otherwise satisfied members of these populaces to join their cause or to act out against blameless governments at home or abroad.

"What is going on" meaning exactly what? Obvious of course in Bahrain, less so in the rest of the Gulf.

Saudi Arabia has their Oliver Cromwell, and he is probably already born, and possibly already an adult (and likely taking sanctuary in Yemen or perhaps Pakistan, or is a student in the US or Europe).

They may not need an Oliver Cromwell. One of the interesting (and to me appealing) aspects of the Arab Spring movements is that they do not seem leader-driven or personality-driven at all. That may complicate succession of course, as there's no visible "leader of the revolution" to step in, but leaders of revolutions have generally not done terribly well as leaders of nations.

I think it unlikely that whatever political change eventually occurs in the Gulf will be driven by anyone from the AQ "sanctuary in Yemen or perhaps Pakistan" world. The Saudi populace has already been offered that option, and showed little interest, even in the 90s, an environment very conducive to success for that kind of movement. Very hard to predict how the current dissatisfaction will coalesce and express itself... we should not assume that people want the type of change that we would want in their place.

It is not if, it is when these changes will occur. Encouraging and supporting evolution on the important issues (popular perceptions of legitimacy, justice, respect, and the creation of legal options to influence government) is far wiser than to simply amp up security efforts until the revolution finally explodes.

The degree to which any outside power can effectively "encourage and support evolution" in the Gulf is going to be very limited IMO, and our assessment of "important issues" may be very different from local assessments. We are not in a position to choose between reform and amped-up security... not our country. If a movement for reform emerges with real popular support it might under some circumstances be a good idea to support it... whether that's the case and what type of support would be appropriate can't be assessed until that happens. Trying to initiate change would be a most inappropriate role for us, and would not be appreciated at all by the populaces in question.

If the Saudi Royals do not take heed, the recent escalation of beheadings employed to control a dissident populace will one day shift to them being on the receiving end of the sword. That would be an unfortunate, and wholly avoidable situation. But it will happen if they do not take current events serious and shift from their tactics of increased internal security and social bribes to one of exploring and adopting true social change that makes sense for them and their people and that gets at those critical popular perceptions described above.

Possibly so... but our opinions on this matter not at all. They will do as they will and reap the consequences. We will watch and respond to circumstances as they emerge.

[Bob's World]

Do not misunderstand unconventional warfare. An outside party cannot "create" insurgency. It's kind of like starting a fire, AQ may bring spark and a desire to create a fire; but unless the conditions for fire are present all one will get is frustration. A "wet" populace will not burn. Good governance is really just another term for such a wet populace, a populace that is generally satisfied with their situation under their current governance. They feel they are treated with respect, they feel they have justice under the law, they recognize the right of this government to govern them, and they feel that they have legal venues available to express their concerns and to affect change when necessary.

AQ does not "create" insurgency anywhere. AQ does not really "radicalize" populaces anywhere either. AQ goes to places and populaces where conditions of insurgency already exist, to populaces and individuals who have already been "radicalized" by the actions and policies of their own government, and provides a focus, a vision, an offer of support. AQ is not the problem, AQ is a small, opportunistic organization that without the highly flammable conditions of poor governance that are so prevalent across the entire greater Middle East would be little more than noise.

AQ is a symptom, they are not the problem. But when the actual problems are not recognized and addressed such symptoms can grow in influence and power and become problems. There is a tremendous state-level parallel in Adolf Hitler. Without the conditions that existed in post WWI Germany he would have been just another wing-nut spouting off down at the beer hall. He was a spark. But a single spark can destroy a forest, and must be taken seriously. But true prevention is not in fighting sparks, but rather in understanding and addressing those factors that make a conflagration likely.

We tend to overly fixate on the Insurgent or the UW actor, but both are symptoms. Alternatively we overly fixate on the populace, but they are simply the matrix all of this occurs within. The government has full onus as both the cause and the cure of such illegal, often violent, political unrest. Few governments accept that proposition. They blame the populace, they blame the insurgent, they blame the external UW actor. They blame the tools of ideology that such actors employ. Governments don't take responsibility for the negative effects of their actions, because governments are made up of politicians and princes.

So no, I do not think AQ is "causing" insurgency anywhere, but I do appreciate that they are waging UW across the Middle East. I do appreciate that they had no real target audience in the AFPAK region until we acted to elevate the Northern Alliance to power and then helped them to form and then protect the type of government that exists there now. Prior to that AFPAK was just a safe place to operate from, now it is less safe to be sure, but it is a place they actually operate. We created that change.

But most nationalist insurgents do not want to go off to help someone else with their problems, they want to resolve their own problems at home. So AQ started building outlets in the sanctuaries closest to where these populaces existed. Most notably in Yemen to service the populaces of the Arabian Peninsula, and in the Maghreb to service the populaces of North Africa.

But all of this is nothing new to what I was pointing out long before Arab Spring began to erupt. Those movements had and have little to do with AQ, but certainly they (AQ) will seek to influence events and outcomes, and seek credit where little is due. Those events were caused by the governments of those respective countries and the nature of their relationships with their respective populaces. Factors like hard economic times and the presence of ideological actors such as AQ certainly make action more likely, but such factors do not cause action.

These are populaces who could use a champion. Someone to engage with their governments to help them to see that it is well within their power to turn these conditions around. But there are two huge obstacles to this. First is that our own leadership does not understand this very well and sees the symptoms as being the problems; we also tend to focus on aspects of governance that WE don't like, rather on the aspects of governance that are the true drivers of poor governance based on the perceptions of the populaces that are actually involved. Interventions shaped by such perspectives are not likely to be very helpful, nor to produce enduring, legitimate results. Second is that the affected governments have no desire to change, and certainly do not take responsibility for the conditions of unrest they face. They blame outside factors, they blame the populace, they blame the economy, they blame ideology, etc. As I have said before, the best COIN begins with a governmental 12-step program.

Hello, I am the government of country X, and I have a problem... Poor governance, like addiction cannot be cured so long as the affected party continues to rationalize their behavior and place blame anywhere but upon themselves. An outsider cannot "fix" an addict, but very rarely will an addict take the first steps on their own to fix themselves. Our interventions need to be in the role of that friend who has a hard conversation. that friend who recognizes that his own behavior is enabling the problem and changes that enabling behavior (yes, security force capacity building is often enabling behavior).

We must change much or our own understanding and approaches; but we also must have hard conversations with our troubled friends, even if it means losing some friendships in the process. Any that end are dysfunctional relationships that needed to change or end long ago anyway.

(a bit of a meandering post, but that is what happens when one wakes up at 0330 and logs into SWJ...)

[M-A Lagrange]

Do not misunderstand unconventional warfare. An outside party cannot "create" insurgency. It's kind of like starting a fire, AQ may bring spark and a desire to create a fire; but unless the conditions for fire are present all one will get is frustration. A "wet" populace will not burn. Good governance is really just another term for such a wet populace, a populace that is generally satisfied with their situation under their current governance. They feel they are treated with respect, they feel they have justice under the law, they recognize the right of this government to govern them, and they feel that they have legal venues available to express their concerns and to affect change when necessary.

Bob,

With all respect, this is not completly exact. South America insurgencies/rebellion have proven this to be only partially true.
What you describe here are the perfect conditions for an insurgency to not find ground to be rooted.
The other option for an insurgency to not be able to develop is a strong and extremely well targetted repression. (Cf issurgencies started by Che Gevara after Cuba or other small insurgencies in South America.)

You may argue that it just delay the insurgency growth (which is true) but staying in power and maintaining the status quo isn't the goal of a partly legitimate power? Especially in such a case.

[Dayuhan]

Do not misunderstand unconventional warfare. An outside party cannot "create" insurgency. It's kind of like starting a fire, AQ may bring spark and a desire to create a fire; but unless the conditions for fire are present all one will get is frustration. A "wet" populace will not burn.

AQ's attempt to light a fire in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s went flat, despite very conducive conditions. Is that because the populace was "wet", or because the spark didn't appeal to them? It's not enough to have discontent; the spark has to offer something the populace, or at least a substantial part of it, thinks could be an improvement. AQ didn't achieve that.

Good governance is really just another term for such a wet populace, a populace that is generally satisfied with their situation under their current governance. They feel they are treated with respect, they feel they have justice under the law, they recognize the right of this government to govern them, and they feel that they have legal venues available to express their concerns and to affect change when necessary.

I think you underestimate the extent to which a government's ability to provide security and prosperity contributes to popular acceptance. Maybe it shouldn't be that way, to an American, but it still is that way in much of the world.

AQ does not "create" insurgency anywhere. AQ does not really "radicalize" populaces anywhere either. AQ goes to places and populaces where conditions of insurgency already exist, to populaces and individuals who have already been "radicalized" by the actions and policies of their own government, and provides a focus, a vision, an offer of support. AQ is not the problem, AQ is a small, opportunistic organization that without the highly flammable conditions of poor governance that are so prevalent across the entire greater Middle East would be little more than noise.

I agree, AQ does not create insurgency. AQ has only really succeeded, though, when they oppose foreign intervention in Muslim lands, not when they oppose bad governance in Muslim lands. The narrative that AQ has used successfully is not about bad governance, it's about resistance to infidel intrusion.

AQ is a symptom, they are not the problem... a single spark can destroy a forest, and must be taken seriously. But true prevention is not in fighting sparks, but rather in understanding and addressing those factors that make a conflagration likely.

Possibly so... but our capacity to address these factors in other countries is limited at best. We haven't the duty, the right, or the ability to go about fixing what we see as flaws in other governments.

These are populaces who could use a champion. Someone to engage with their governments to help them to see that it is well within their power to turn these conditions around.

Possibly so, but who says these populaces want us to be their champion, still less to appoint ourselves as their champion? Do we really know what these populaces want? Do they trust us, or believe that we would ever act on their behalf? Do they want us mucking about in the internal affairs of their countries?

The idea of Americans leaping on the white horse and appointing themselves as champions of Muslim populaces, uninvited and unilaterally, fills me with horror. I suspect it would fill AQ with delight. Foreign intervention, after all, is what they thrive on.

We can claim to be acting as champion of a populace. We may even believe it... but nobody in the Muslim world will believe it. Most Americans wouldn't believe it. I'm not sure I'd believe it. The assumption will be, not unreasonably, that we are intervening to advance our interests.

Our interventions need to be in the role of that friend who has a hard conversation. that friend who recognizes that his own behavior is enabling the problem and changes that enabling behavior (yes, security force capacity building is often enabling behavior).

What makes you think that any of the GCC governments would listen to us... or that any GCC government or populace wants us meddling in their internal affairs?

We must change much or our own understanding and approaches; but we also must have hard conversations with our troubled friends, even if it means losing some friendships in the process. Any that end are dysfunctional relationships that needed to change or end long ago anyway.

None of these relationships have anything to do with friendship. They're about interests.

I don't see any leverage the US has that would put us in a position to persuade or compel these governments to change, nor do I think the US should be in the business of appointing itself as anyone's saviour, or trying to change the way other countries are governed.

They may need to change; that doesn't mean it's our job to change them, or that we can change them, or that any of the populaces involved want us involved.

[Bob's World]

Bob,

With all respect, this is not completly exact. South America insurgencies/rebellion have proven this to be only partially true.
What you describe here are the perfect conditions for an insurgency to not find ground to be rooted.
The other option for an insurgency to not be able to develop is a strong and extremely well targetted repression. (Cf issurgencies started by Che Gevara after Cuba or other small insurgencies in South America.)

You may argue that it just delay the insurgency growth (which is true) but staying in power and maintaining the status quo isn't the goal of a partly legitimate power? Especially in such a case.

As I understand your post, you wish to make the point that a government that is failing its populace (creating in effect a dry, highly flammable forest of a populace through its poor governance) may well prevent insurgency through aggressive programs of "fire" prevention and suppression? This is very true. Certainly the Saudis currently, Saddam, Mubarak, The Shah of Iran, Qaddafi, etc, etc, etc all did this in their respective day and situation. Karzai does this with our tremendous assistance at this very moment.

This is well within the legal right of government to do. Such legal governments are also "legitimate" in the sense of that word that they are legally recognized as the official government of some place and populace. Insurgency, however, is by definition illegal; and the type of legitimacy that matters in insurgency is not that of black letter law, but more that of the equitable principles of the common law. It is a form of legitimacy based in perceptions of the populace and their acceptance and recognition of the right of some government to govern over them.

Certainly a government that is merely legally and officially legitimate may remain in power through dilligent efforts to suppress illegal challenges from a populace that finds them to be illegitimate in the sense that they no longer (or never did) recognize their right to govern.

But insurgency is not about the rule of law, it is not about the facts, it is not about what those outside the populace or inside the government know. It is about what some distinct and significant (though often quite small) segment of the populace believes.

Many find this too fuzzy of a concept to work with, and persist in wheeling out arguments based in fact and law and officalness. Such arguments are interesting, but they have little to do with insurgency. The fact that the vast bulk of our COIN doctrine and material are based upon the facts as understood by official governments in their efforts to enforce the rule of law creates a tremendous bias in our understanding of this human dynamic of insurgency. The fact that most of those same writings are derived from second party experiences in efforts to sustain Colonial or Containment controlling relationship executed through some "legal" (though typically higly illegitimate in the eyes of the populace) local government, further clouds our vision.

[ganulv]

Cf issurgencies started by Che Gevara after Cuba

If you mean Guevara’s foray into Bolivia then you’re dead wrong. It has been a few years since I dug into that history, but IIRC from reading his Bolivian Diary Guevara became increasingly frustrated the longer he spent in Bolivia with his failure to start anytihng.

or other small insurgencies in South America.

As regards the Sendero Luminoso, I will say that every anthropologist I have known who had done work in Peru described the life of a Quechua peasant at the height of the internal conflict there as a nightmare of being caught between a brutal state security apparatus and the at least as brutal Senderistas.

The FARC de facto controls a large enough area that I don’t know that I would call it a small insurgency at this point. I’m no expert, but my impression is that can hardly be called a bottom-up movement at this point.

[M-A Lagrange]

Gav :
I can be wrong but I am not talking of Guevara experiene in Bolivia but other small insurgencies initiated in the 70th in South America. Unfortunately, I cannot remember where. There is an excellent exemple in that book: Les guerres irrégulières : XXe-XXIe siècle, Guérillas et terrorismes, Gérard Chaliand; most probably the original version of this book: Revolution in the Third World.
The question is not what did the peasants do today or during the presence of insurgent groups but rather what/how did they feel before such groups come. Once the groups are there: too bad for the peasants and what they tink of the insurgents and the government.

Bob:

You got me right but I think there is a need to make a distinction between faith and identity based insurgencies and ideologically protracted ones. My point being that in the case of several communist insurrections there was a “need” to educate the populations to make them realize the ones who were ruling them were illegitimate. While in your understanding of insurgencies (that I mostly sopport and agree with), it is assumed that there is already a level of frustration which creates the necessary conditions for insurgencies to grow.
But I agree with the distinction you do about understanding mechanisms which lead to insurgencies and response mechanisms (mainly security ones)which are based on RoL.

[Dayuhan]

My point being that in the case of several communist insurrections there was a “need” to educate the populations to make them realize the ones who were ruling them were illegitimate. While in your understanding of insurgencies (that I mostly sopport and agree with), it is assumed that there is already a level of frustration which creates the necessary conditions for insurgencies to grow.

The two aren't necessarily incompatible. Formal insurgent groups have to turn generic popular discontent into directed opposition toward governance and support for them. Sometimes they succeed, sometimes they fail. Even where they fail, it doesn't necessarily mean the populace is content, it can mean that the populace didn't see that particular insurgent group as worthy of support.

On a general level I largely agree with Bob's assessment of where insurgency comes from, though I think it's a bit more varied and less absolute than he sometimes seems to suggest. Where we disagree is on our assessment of the American capacity to insert ourselves into the governance/populace dynamics and political competitions of another country and produce positive results.

[Bob's World]

The communists often worked in vulnerable populaces where the government held strong control over the media/message, and where means for self-education that allows one to compare their own situation to others elsewhere were difficult at best.

"Prophets" like Che carried the message to the people to create awareness that they did not have to live under those conditions and that others elsewhere had risen up and created change. A generation ago with the information technology that leveraged widespread popular movement for change in Eastern Europe to throw off the Soviets and their puppets at the end of their side of the Cold War control system; and now with the even greater information technology that is empowering populaces of the greater Middle East to challenge and throw off Containment driven controls established by Western Governments and their puppets (in large part) are largely self-educated.

The prophets of illegal political change are not necessary, but they are still out there targeting these vulnerable populaces.

Look how we employ security force capacity building to help governments that are challenged by their own populace to exercise control over the same. This is a very symptomatic approach that sees the threat as the problem and sustainment of the status quo as success. This is a perspective that is based on legal legitimacy as recognized by outsiders trumping popular legitimacy as assessed by the governed populace. One must deal with the treat, one must deal with the populace, but one must either FIX or REPLACE the government in such situations if one wants to ever get to an enduring result.

Populaces do not fail governments, it is governments that fail populaces. Often not the entire populace, look at the Northern Alliance-based government of Afghanistan. They are completely dedicated to the support of the Northern Alliance populace; but equally dedicated to the exclusion and suppression of those segments of the populace that are outside that circle of trust. In such political conditions insurgency is inevitable. One can not grasp this if they see insurgency as being caused by insurgents or ideology.

I agree with Dayuhan that there are no absolutes, but one must have a core start point for analysis. I shift that core, and I believe we become far more successful in our approaches when we shift that core.

Similar problems that lack that core are not insurgency. If one is facing a profit or power driven challenge to government, such as in Mexico today with the cartels, or in Sierra Leone with the grab of the diamond industry; we call it insurgency, but it really isn't as it is of a very different causal genus, and therefor demands and will respond to very different solution sets. Pure CT would work much better on such situations. (Particularly if coupled with major changes to the market to legalize and legitimize what is generating so much illicit income and power).

Seek first to understand, then to be understood. We wonder why others do not appreciate and understand what we are doing for them. It is because we first do not understand them or the problem we are genuinely attempting to "help" them with.

[Dayuhan]

One must deal with the treat, one must deal with the populace, but one must either FIX or REPLACE the government in such situations if one wants to ever get to an enduring result.

That raises a rather glaring question... who in that bold-type statement is "one"?

look at the Northern Alliance-based government of Afghanistan. They are completely dedicated to the support of the Northern Alliance populace; but equally dedicated to the exclusion and suppression of those segments of the populace that are outside that circle of trust. In such political conditions insurgency is inevitable.

Straying a fair distance from Bahrain here, but if we attribute the Afghan insurgency solely to the governance of the Karrzai regime, don't we risk overlooking the herd of elephants in the drawing room that is our presence? Occupying armies also have a tendency to stimulate insurgency, do they not?

[Bob's World]

"One" is whoever; but your implied point is a critical one. Any solution that is even perceived to be created by some external, and therefor inherently illegitimate, or lacking standing, party is not likely to endure. This is why I encourage shifting from those approaches derived from Western Colonial heritage of interventions that are aimed at creating a governmental vehicle to represent Western interests in some land/populace, and then working to reduce threats and control the populace to sustain those governmental systems. We must shift to less controlling, less intrusive, far more diplomatic approaches that focus on encouraging governments to make reasonable accommodations with their populaces, but not to protect them from the same. Insurgency in governance, like wildfire in nature, is a natural process for cleansing unhealthy situations. The urge is to suppress both due to their uncontrollable violence and destruction, but one should never do so without understanding the essential benefit and necessity of such natural cleansing events.

We made the controversial decision to let Yellowstone burn a couple decades ago; such things as wildfire are ugly and inconvenient, and often economically disruptive in the short-term, but inherently good and beneficial in the long-term. The Native Americans employed fire as a regular tool to manage the "wilderness." Europeans arriving in the New World had no idea that what they found was not truly "wild" but actually a sophisticated, man-managed ecosystem. They did not appreciate that fire did not destroy the magnificent wilderness, it created it. So too with insurgency. We fear the destructive violence and the temporary disruption of such political cleansing events, but they occur for a reason, and when they are artificially suppressed, the reason goes unaddressed and typically worsens. Insurgency does not destroy good governance, it too creates it (in time...)

As to insurgency in Afghanistan or in Bahrain; both are unique, yet both are the same at their core. One big difference is that we dedicate ourselves to suppress the Afghan populace, while stand back and condom government in Bahrain for doing much the same thing. Such is the nature of politics and policy. But to your specific question, yes, as I often point out the insurgency in Afghanistan has a clear dichotomy to it. There is the Revolutionary insurgency, that is the much more politically driven aspect centered in the grievances of the populace that supported the Taliban originally and that were systematically dis-empowered and disenfranchised by the Northern Alliance when we elevated the latter into power. The second aspect is the resistance insurgency that has been building yearly since 2005 in response to the very presence of ISAF and the efforts of ISAF to support the sustainment of the Northern Alliance government we created.

Sadly this dichotomy is not recognized officially by us. If it was we could then design much more effective engagement (and disengagement) that would address each aspect uniquely based on the unique factors of revolution vs resistance. We have our Colonial derived doctrine, we have our threat-centric military-led perspective, and while everyone knows it really isn't working, we have yet to really develop an appetite to evolve.

Meanwhile US causalities for August set a new record. Such is the nature of resistance, the harder one pushes against it, the harder it pushes back. Such is the nature of revolution, so long as the core political issues go ignored and unaddressed, the insurgency will always regenerate.

[Dayuhan]

"One" is whoever

As long as it ain't us...

We must shift to less controlling, less intrusive, far more diplomatic approaches that focus on encouraging governments to make reasonable accommodations with their populaces, but not to protect them from the same.

Reasonable enough, as long as we realize that our encouragement will generally be ignored.

We also have to realize that our understanding of these situations is often very incomplete, and our assessment of "reasonable accommodations" may be dangerously inadequate. For one thing, what one segment of a populace might consider a "reasonable accommodation" might be highly inflammatory to another... if mutually agreeable solutions were easily available there wouldn't be violence in the first place. If we see what we think is an easy and obvious solution, there's a good chance we're missing some kinks in the picture. We often do, even when out intentions are good.

As to insurgency in Afghanistan or in Bahrain; both are unique, yet both are the same at their core.

The presence of an occupying army and a government placed in power by an occupying army might in some circles be considered a difference.

One big difference is that we dedicate ourselves to suppress the Afghan populace

We suppress a portion of the Afghan populace, which is trying to get back into a position to suppress the portion that we are supporting. Let's not kid ourselves, this isn't about disenfrachisement, it's about power. At the end of the day somebody's going to have it, and that somebody is going to suppress whoever doesn't have it. If we decide that our way out of Afghanistan is a functioning democracy, we'd better prepare to be there for a long and messy time.

while stand back and condom government in Bahrain for doing much the same thing.

I refrain, with prodigious effort, from comment

[Jedburgh]

IMS, 24 Jan 12: Justice Denied in Bahrain: Freedom of Expression and Assembly Curtailed

Following the fall of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, hundreds of thousands of Bahraini protesters took to the streets of Manama, the capital city, on 14 February, 2011, to peacefully call for democratic reform. Officials were quick to crack down on protests, and the access of the international media was limited2 almost immediately after the start of the protests. Unlike other citizens demonstrating across the Arab World in 2011, the protests in Bahrain have received very little coverage, particularly considering the disproportionate number of people jailed and killed in the tiny country of 1.2 million people. Furthermore, the messages of the protesters – calling for reform, equal rights and opportunities and greater democracy – have largely been distorted by both the government and the international community which have instead focused on sectarian interpretations and regional geopolitical issues.

CRS, 29 Dec 11: Bahrain: Reform, Security and US Policy

...US officials are concerned that the instability in Bahrain could render US use of the naval headquarters facilities untenable, but there are no evident moves to relocate it. Beyond the naval facility, the US signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain as a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated US weapons systems. Bahrain also receives small amounts of US security assistance. New US sales and aid are coming under criticism from human rights and other groups and, in response, the Administration put on hold a major new proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. Factoring into the US position is a perception that Iran might seek to take advantage of Shiite unrest in Bahrain to reduce US influence and the US military presence in the Persian Gulf. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers in GCC initiatives to resolve regional issues such as uprisings in Libya, Syria, and Yemen....

[davidbfpo]

Gone, but not overlooked. A small, strategic island still protesting:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17002308

Bahrain Sunni-Shia split manifests itself in mistrust. Supporters of Bahrain's Sunni government fear the influence of Shia Iran. Anti-government protests in Bahrain were suppressed last year with the help of Saudi Arabia, but the tensions between the Sunni leadership and the Shia majority population are never far below the surface. The BBC's Bill Law has been to a mosque in the Bahraini capital Manama to get behind the continuing sectarian split.

A reminder this UK-based website continues to report on the protests in Bahrain and beyond:http://www.enduringamerica.com/

[KingJaja]

These are rhetorical questions, the purpose is to get us thinking about the impact of fifty years of US Middle East policy on the perception of the US in that area.

What is the difference between Bahrain and Syria or Yemen and Syria?

What is the difference between Homs and Fallujah?

Americans tend to assume that when they speak, all the World listens because their words carry moral authority and their cause is right. That could have been true in the past, but I am not sure it is true today.