Getting Strategy Right

[jmm99]

LTC Melton spells out generally what he wants, but does not provide much guidance for the "re-writer" (emphasis added):

from Melton
Wars must be won first at the strategic level, then at the operational level, and then at the tactical level. Our strategic-level lodestones—the National Security Act of 1947 and Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986—have created cross-purposes at the strategic level of war and have proven inadequate in producing victory in war. These laws must be rewritten to ensure strategic unity of command.

If Melton were my client, I'd have to say: I need an outline of what you want in a re-written statute. No need to draft a statute, but give me a list of points that can be turned into a statute. BTW: Title 10 is one big statute.

And, since I like graphics, let's start with the current chart per JP 0-2 (also attached as a pdf so you can put it in Photoshop and work with the original):

JP 0-2 Chart.jpg

and you change it to meet the Getting Strategy Right concept. At some point, you have to get lawyers involved; but, if you don't spell out what you want, you'll get what the lawyers dream up.

Regards

Mike

[Pete]

However, I'm inclined to doubt that he had an "Impeach Earl Warren" sticker on his car.

[Bill Moore]

Mike,

Step one you move the CJCS directly under the SECDEF and the COCOMS and Services report to the CJCS who is responsible for "military strategy" and ensuring it is nested with the National Security Staff. The National Security Advisor needs in fact, not theory, directive authority over the interagency, so unity of effort can be compelled instead of requested. We're all tools designed to conduct operations or activities to achieve our nation's strategic objectives. It isn't our role as non-elected officials to determine what those objectives are, and right now each GCC and each government agency has a fair amount of autonomy to do just that.

Bill

[Bill Moore]

Mike,

There is more to it than this involving CYBERCOM, the interagency, etc., so I'll try to put something on paper. First we need a suprastructure that the Title 10 structure falls under. What is that officially called? What mandates it?

[jmm99]

in answer to this:

from Bill
First we need a suprastructure that the Title 10 structure falls under. What is that officially called? What mandates it?

I'd have to answer: the Constitution (to both questions).

Title 10 is an integrated statutory authority for DoD, the Service Departments and the Armed Services (except for Coast Guard):

TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES

Subtitle, Sec.
A. General Military Law - 101
B. Army - 3001
C. Navy and Marine Corps - 5001
D. Air Force - 8001
E. Reserve Components - 10001

Last year, to answer an obscure question from Brother Fishel via PM (who is great at brain twisters !!), I downloaded the entire frigging title. It is an 18.7mb txt or rtf file !

The Office of the Law Revision Counsel prepares and publishes the United States Code, which is a consolidation and codification by subject matter of the general and permanent laws of the United States.

See, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, for various downloads and data.

A more useable format is at Cornell Law, TITLE 10—ARMED FORCES:

Subtitle A—General Military Law (§§ 101—2925)
Subtitle B—Army (§§ 3001—4842)
Subtitle C—Navy and Marine Corps (§§ 5001—7913)
Subtitle D—Air Force (§§ 8010—9842)
Subtitle E—Reserve Components (§§ 10001—18506)

What we want to look at with primacy is Subtitle A—General Military Law:

PART I—ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS (§§ 101—490)
PART II—PERSONNEL (§§ 501—1801_to_1805)
PART III—TRAINING AND EDUCATION (§§ 2001—2200f)
PART IV—SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT (§§ 2201—2925)

and most particularly at, PART I—ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS (§§ 101—490):

CHAPTER 1—DEFINITIONS (§ 101)

CHAPTER 2—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (§§ 111—119)

CHAPTER 3—GENERAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS (§§ 121—130d)

CHAPTER 4—OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (§§ 131—144)

CHAPTER 5—JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (§§ 151—156)

CHAPTER 6—COMBATANT COMMANDS (§§ 161—168)

CHAPTER 7—BOARDS, COUNCILS, AND COMMITTEES (§§ 171—187)

CHAPTER 8—DEFENSE AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FIELD ACTIVITIES (§§ 191—203)

CHAPTER 9—DEFENSE BUDGET MATTERS (§§ 221—235)

CHAPTER 11—RESERVE COMPONENTS (§ 261)

CHAPTER 13—THE MILITIA (§§ 311—312)

CHAPTER 15—INSURRECTION (§§ 331—336)

CHAPTER 17—ARMING OF AMERICAN VESSELS (§ 351)

CHAPTER 18—MILITARY SUPPORT FOR CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT GENCIES (§§ 371—382)

CHAPTER 20—HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE (§§ 401—410)

CHAPTER 21—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS (§§ 421—437)

CHAPTER 22—NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (§§ 441—467)

CHAPTER 23—MISCELLANEOUS STUDIES AND REPORTS (§§ 480—490)

All of this is just the tip of a very large iceberg (inter-agency gets much wilder); but Chaps. 1-6 are the guts of the matter.

Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10 July 2001, in Appendix I, lays out the controlling legal references (which also include regs and other non-statutory governing documents):

The development of JP 0-2 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Federal Statutory Laws
a. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
b. Titles 10 and 32, US Code, as amended.
c. Title 14, US Code, sections 1, 2, and 141.

2. NCA Guidance
a. Unified Command Plan.
b. Forces for Unified Commands.
c. Presidential Decision Directive-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations.
d. Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, United States Intelligence Activities.
e. SecDef Memorandum, Assignment of Force, 6 September 1996.
f. Nuclear Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

3. Memoranda of Agreement and Understanding
a. DOD and Department of Transportation Memorandum of Agreement, 3 October 1995, The Use of U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy.
b. DOD and DOS Memorandum of Understanding, 16 December 1997, Security of DOD Elements and Personnel in Foreign Areas.

4. DOD Directives
a. DOD 1348.33-M, Manual of Military Decorations & Awards.
b. DODD 2000.12, 13 April 1999, DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program.
c. DODD 3020.26, 26 May 1995, Continuity of Operations (COOP) Policy and Planning.
d. DODD 5100.1, 25 September 1987, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components.
e. DODD 5100.20, 23 December 1971, The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service.
f. DODD 5105.19, 25 June 1991, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).
g. DODD 5105.21, 18 February 1997, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
h. DODD 5105.60, 11 October 1996, National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
i. DODD 5105.62, 30 September 1998, Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
j. DODD 5106.4, 7 January 1993, Inspectors General (IGs) of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.
k. The integrated policies and procedures established by the Secretary of Defense for the coordination of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives
a. CJCSI 6120.05, Manual for Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance for Joint Operations, Joint Interface Operational Procedures for Message Text Formats.
b. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).
c. CJCSM 3410.01, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Continuity of Operations Plan.
d. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Emergency Action Procedures.

And, also in Appendix I, the subsidiary doctrinal manuals - which include refs to their own legal bases:

6. Joint Publications
a. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.
b. JP 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations.
c. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
d. JP 1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support to Military Operations.
e. JP 1-05, Religious Ministry Support to Joint Operations.
f. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.
g. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I.
h. JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, and JP 3-12 series.
i. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.
j. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.
k. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.
l. JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations.
m. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.
n. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.
o. JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.
p. JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations.

Re-writing this pack of wildcats would be no trivial task.

Hope this helps to define the scope of the answer needed to solve the problem presented. Am I being a wet blanket ?

Cheers (and beers)

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Am I being a wet blanket ?

Mike the answer to this question is obvious , but it is good to keep at least one foot grounded in reality. However, I don't think I am challenging the Constitution if I'm recommending a return to a former C2 arrangement/structure for military forces. Bill

[Ken White]

Not a wet blanket but you have done one thing -- illustrated how the sclerotic bureaucracy has taken charge of DoD. Good job.

To address with full specificity is beyond my capability right now but quickly, I for one would not advise doing away with DoD or even trying to do so. It was IMO misguided but it's probably irreversible. That does not mean the organization and structure cannot be tweaked and significantly reduced in bureaucratic reach. Specifically, it needs to butt out of service personnel matters (that will offend Congress, who likes the nominal but really delusional linearity and uniformity -- 'fairness.') That will be difficult due to Congressional interest but a good case can be made for some special concern and disregard of 'American values.'

Any reorganization of DoD will be admittedly difficult as it will trample on several Congressional Rice Bowls -- as they are a significant part of the problem, I believe those Bowls should be smashed...

Difficult is not impossible.

The only problem with G-N is adjusting the duties and responsibilities, a relatively minor tweak to the Statute and job security for the OLRC. Most significant would be giving the CJCS a new title -- say, Director of Military Operations -- and real command authority UNDER the SecDef and the CinC of Cincs. It would mean tabbing strategic planning responsibility to the JCS with a diktat to do broad plans and policy while leaving the details not to the GCCs but to the actual, not supposed warfighting commands. The GCCs are really political and are going to stay that way...

Consider the fact that two CentCom Commanders got involved in warfighting, the first successfully (with a lot of help...) the second not so much -- but that both were while so involved NOT watching their 'theaters.' The GCCs need the ability to form large JTFs to do the actual fighting -- and they need to be able to get specific competencies for the Commanders of those Forces. The recent history of Iraq might have been quite different had Dan McNeill been in charge in Baghdad instead of Rick Sanchez...

As for the DoD Policies and the Joint Pubs, those get routinely revised in all cases; we could just do substantive modifications instead of cosmetic changes of "glad" to "happy."

The current structures were designed to ameliorate responsibility and decentralize planning and execution. The first part is successful beyond anyone's dreams, the second has not been really even marginally, much less successfully achieved...