Getting Strategy Right

[Bill Moore]

Ken White has mentioned this several times, and I think this author provides accurate supporting fires that our current structure for developing effective strategies is deeply flawed. More later, but wanted to post the article so the community of interest could start thinking about it.

http://www.ndu.edu/press/war-and-its-aftermath.html#

Wars must be won first at the strategic level, then at the operational level, and then at the tactical level. Our strategic-level lodestones—the National Security Act of 1947 and Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986—have created cross-purposes at the strategic level of war and have proven inadequate in producing victory in war. These laws must be rewritten to ensure strategic unity of command.

[jmm99]

in other threads. Cavguy started a thread on Melton's book,The Clausewitz Delusion, titled Wilf Bait: The Clausewitz Delusion (10-11-2009).

The last Melton mention seems to have been by one JMM99, LTC Melton - Cavguy comments, where I cited but did not discuss the 2011 article:

Here is not the place for me to comment on LTC Melton's article, Conceptualizing Victory Anew (2011), which is subtitled "Revisiting U.S. Law, Doctrine, and Policy for War and Its Aftermath" - thus, entering my ballpark.

The article looks like a good takeoff point for discussion.

Bill: thanks for the post - I'd forgotten about this one.

Regards

Mike

[Pete]

In what was more a matter of semantics instead of substance, during Rumsfeld's recent tenure as SecDef the regional combatant commanders stopped being called CINCs.

[Ken White]

As Bill M. notes, I have long decried both the !947 amalgamation of War and Navy to form DoD and Goldwater-Nichols, contending both are deeply flawed and have harmed national defense and the conduct of foreign affairs. I'll have to read the article tomorrow but in the process of saving it, saw this picture, long a favorite. Note the posture and gaze of Admirals King and Leahy, General Marshall and the USAAF guy whose name escapes me now.

None of them are gazing at their illustrious leader much less each other. Note the gaze of all three Russians has a target. A picture is indeed worth a thousand words...

[Pete]

I wasn't born yet in 1947 so the National Defense Act can't be blamed on me. However, in regard to the other act of Congress I'm nearly positive that in 1964 one of our members had a bumpersticker on his car that said "In Your Heart You Know He's Right."

[jmm99]

How did you know that ?

But, you missed the plastic dashboard Curt LeMay cigar holder:





Mike

[Ken White]

People that mention them may not be but the stickers are...

Whoops -- caught again with two finger typing. Mike's bumper stickers would never have been tacky. Never...

[Pete]

Well, I admit to maybe having been wrong, the bumpersticker may have been "AuH20."

[Ken White]

Zilverwasser?

[jmm99]

tacky:





Definitely not tacky:

Natalie Wood.jpg

From Bob Hope - what we are fighting for .....



Mike

[Pete]

Something like that. In his defense I'll say he always had a kind of unique and idiosyncratic integrity about him, even if you didn't want him to be the guy in charge. Certainly my parents didn't in '64 but I was 14 at the time.

[Bill Moore]

Ken,

I didn't catch the symbolism, but I thought the author's use of Sun Tzu for this article was spot on:

The victorious strategist seeks battle only after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

—Sun Tzu

It appears to me that we repeatedly throw together military plans in support of often poorly articulated policy, and then after the plan is formed we "socialize" it with the interagency and then start the tweaking process, and really end up with something that is sub standard.

I definitely think our strategy and planning process "would" work better if the Pentagon developed the strategy at their level with the National Security Staff (informed by the GCCs and Services), and THEN and only THEN would it be pushed down to the GCCs to develop and execute operational level plans. GCCs have a large strategy role down (some of it is appropriate), but this approach fails to explore how problems can be solved indirectly or if war is a necessity how to wage it "most effectively", because the strategy is largely confined by defined boundries.

It may be even more important to return to pre 1947 now based on greater global integration. For example, assume we're planning a defensive war against country Y in name your theater. If you leave it to the theater the strategy will be focused within that geographical space, yet country Y as financial, military, diplomatic and other vulnerabilities that we could pressure in three different theaters with a whole of government approach. Having participated in GCC level planning you may see this discussed, but rarely is it pursued because there isn't a mechanism compel others to act outside your theater. If the Pentagon was empowered once again to perform this role (there would be painful growing pains) then they could compel the global force to act, and work more effectively with the interagency through the National Security Staff to get the various agencies to support the strategy (USG strategy, not just a military strategy).

We have seen global plans, and we have seen various tasks given to various agencies to execute, but the ability to compel action (operationalize the plans) is clearly missing, and actual execution of these plans is spotty at best.

There are other shortfalls with our current methodology, but just wanted to try to get the conversation back on track.

[Marc]

It appears to me that we repeatedly throw together military plans in support of often poorly articulated policy, and then after the plan is formed we "socialize" it with the interagency and then start the tweaking process, and really end up with something that is sub standard.

Bill,

I think you're right. Contrary to our adversaries, we do not understand the importance of the interagency. In my view, one of the most important insights in Melton's article is the following:

Having the military responsible for winning the kinetic war . . . but not responsible for winning the peace in phase four . . . creates a counterproductive schism in command authority and accountability at the all-important moment when populations assess their new occupiers and form lasting impressions. The precedents established in that critical transition, for better or worse, will color all the efforts that follow.

Our opponents do it the other way round. They understand that modern war is political in nature and that the people's welfare in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations is key to success in the low intensity conflict that follows.

A recent book, "Stalemate", analyzes this in detail. The author, Erik A. Claessen, points to the importance of the population's welfare at the all-important moment when populations assess their new occupiers and form lasting impressions:

By far the simplest way to win the essential services battle is to get a head start. The effect of relief efforts is greatest when people’s need is most dire, when they are at the bottom of Maslow’s pyramid. People never forget who arrived first at the scene of a disaster and distributed a hot drink or a plastic sheet for shelter. We have already noted Al-Sadr’s early actions to build an essential services infrastructure and Hezbollah’s haste to start reconstruction after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2006 . . .
The conflict’s nature is determined to a large degree by the way visions on conflict mesh with each other. More often than not, these visions differ fundamentally. Sometimes they differ so much that the hostile character of one belligerent’s actions is not immediately recognized as such by his opponent. For instance, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, small, armed groups of young clerics dashed to seize control of mosques, soup kitchens, schools, and welfare centers while U.S. tanks rushed to Baghdad. As early as April 11, 2003—only weeks after the start of the war—the clerics’ leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, “asked Shiites to express their piety by undertaking a pilgrimage to Karbala on foot.” Hundreds of thousands answered his call, offering “Shiites a first opportunity to see and measure their new, colossal force.” The significance of these seemingly harmless, but obviously well-prepared actions only became clear a couple of months later. Moqtada al-Sadr’s social initiatives had created a popular base that marginalized moderate Iraqi elites. This laid the foundation for his ability to influence military and political events in Iraq. Failing to recognize his actions as part and parcel of a particular vision on conflict, Coalition Forces had done nothing to stop his rise to prominence.

Unless we get this right, we will continue to be overtaken by events.

[Ken White]

I didn't catch the symbolism...

The symbolism in the picture was sort of on track. It showed the then CNO, CJCS, CosA and a senior US Air person deliberately not looking at their civilian boss or each other -- jointness it was not. Far from it -- and that was my point.

Yet those guys won a global war...

It appears to me that we repeatedly throw together military plans in support of often poorly articulated policy...

That is the major flaw. Instead of insisting on a viable policy, we say 'Yessir, Yessir, three bags full...' Civilian control is vital but common sense should not be precluded.

I definitely think our strategy and planning process "would" work better if the Pentagon developed the strategy at their level with the National Security Staff (informed by the GCCs and Services), and THEN and only THEN would it be pushed down to the GCCs to develop and execute operational level plans. GCCs have a large strategy role down (some of it is appropriate)...Having participated in GCC level planning you may see this discussed, but rarely is it pursued because there isn't a mechanism compel others to act outside your theater.

Exactly, that and the theater specific parochialism are a large part of the problem.

If the Pentagon was empowered once again to perform this role (there would be painful growing pains) then they could compel the global force to act, and work more effectively with the interagency through the National Security Staff to get the various agencies to support the strategy (USG strategy, not just a military strategy).

True. G-N meant well but unintended consequences took over. Ever notice that most "unintended consequences" involve people not doing what the 'law' thought they would or should do...

I'm firmly convinced that most unintended consequences --and, militarily speaking, most failure to comply -- result from excessive specificity. We talk Mission Orders but we really cannot dredge up enough trust in our subordinates to let them loose. That is partly a result of inadequate training, partly normal human response and, in our case, partly a result of excessive civilian political micromanaging that gets adapted by our seniors.

The establishment of DoD and and G-N / Nunn-Cohen were the effective generators of the first and last of those three items; human nature has always been with us -- but its pernicious effects can be and were enhanced by excessively detailed military organizational decisions made by civilians on a civilian basis.

We have seen global plans, and we have seen various tasks given to various agencies to execute, but the ability to compel action (operationalize the plans) is clearly missing, and actual execution of these plans is spotty at best.

There are two distinct problems in this arena.

G-N was a band aid applied to existing US C2 systems and processes and accordingly, it does not give the CJCS command authority. Yet he is nominally senior to (or at least more equal than) the GCCs. The Chain of SecDef (who may or may not have the true respect of his direct subordinate GCCs) directed by a President (probably strongly influenced by his NSA / NSC, de facto competitors to both Defense and State) is convoluted and an invitation for non-compliance -- so that's what it gets. There's more to it than that like the Specified Command intrusions / exceptions, the proliferation of Flag Officers but suffice to say, the system is not clean and unity of command is violated (in the rape sense of the word... ).

That translates to a loss of unity of effort and not only an opportunity but an invitation to disobey or at least significantly modify plans from on high.

The plans themselves are a problem; the policies are unclear so the plans all too often provide excruciating detail in an effort to compensate and result in providing excess specificity (also an invitation for modification...) and inadequate flexibility for the Commanders (and / or Diplomats) on the ground.

My take on the issue is that:

- The establishment of DoD was a mistake and was unneccessary. Yes, that means I do not believe in the necessity or desirability of a separate Air Force. However, far more importantly, it allowed DoD to become a monopoly instead of the prior effect of two services competing for budget dollars and attention. Monopolies always stagnate due to lack of competition. IOW, If we wanted an AF, we could've created one and been a little better off. However, three way competition is not healthy as two will tend to gang up on one...

- G-N and Nunn-Cohen combined to force the services to be more 'joint.' What it effectively did was emasculate the Service headquarters -- but left them in being, to be a parochial thorn in the side of 'jointness;' empower the GCCs -- to the point of making them diplomatic pro consuls and thus a stake in the heart of State (causing them to often resist on principle even if they agreed with a position); remove the national planning capability (as you note) and 'decentralize' it -- while requiring all Plans to be approved by DoD and the NCA thus insuring that plans would be tailored to gain approval and not necessarily reflect reality or changing circumstances.

- The real issue is that the establishment of DoD created a centralized bureaucracy that would by the nature of our budgeting process seek to aggrandize itself so it was an invitation to problems. That was followed by two laws that had the intent of enhanced decentralized planning and execution -- but which failed to rein in the monster created by the 1947 Act. The Bureaucracy ate the homework. The two actions effectively worked at cross purposes, DoD wins in the budget battle, the GCCs win in the 'who's in charge here, now...' battle and the poor Troops / Squids / Airdales end up being tied in knots due to conflicts between the two...

Sadly, this could all be fixed fairly easily but that is unlikely to occur because we have, as a nation, lost our way, spent more than we took in and have a host of minor domestic problems that will consume the attention of the political classes for a while and national defense is, at this time, not a pressing issue..

[Ken White]

He's a smart guy. Since I've been saying pretty much all of that since 1966 or thereabouts and he agrees with me, he must be smart...

With respect to his Reframing ideas:

Reframe 1 -- Agree. Note that he also rightly criticizes the rapid rotation of senior personnel as severely exacerbating the problem of poor design.

Reframe 2 -- Agree. However, while 'full spectrum operations' as a term does have the unfortunate connotation he describes, if we do away with it, we'll need to invent a new term to describe the capability to engage in all types of warfare and military operations which is a strategic, operational and tactical imperative and an achievable goal with improved training and education and a less risk averse attitude. Such capability is a likely necessity in the future. It was in the past, we just didn't bother after Viet Nam and we can see where that got us...

Reframe 3 -- Agree. He also notes the propensity to produce erudite, wordy and voluminous Field Manuals that say nothing and do even that poorly. While I believe that State and a reinvigorated USAid should have primacy in nation building efforts short of GPF commitment, there is no question that in conventional operations resulting in Occupation or anything that might resemble it and no matter how brief, the US Army has the responsibility to perform in lieu of the government it just displaced or defeated. That would include stopping local looters and precluding US Field Grades and senior NCOs from looting Free Port Stores along with Joe and the odd local denizen, a noted shortfall after the seizure of Baghdad and its International Airport...

Reframe 4 -- Agree. There are two critical points in this section:

"Strategically, we must determine the art of the possible regarding our relationship with Beijing and develop an achievable endstate for the emerging new world -- emphasis is mine:"

As well as this even more important item:

"The American citizenry needs to establish higher expectations for military competence—a new standard that the Pentagon must get the war right before it even begins, not blunder through years of painful and costly heuristic learning as the prospect of victory diminishes. Modern kinetic wars are measured in a handful of days. Golden hours in occupation are ephemeral. The opportunity for military success is often presented only once. Miss that precious moment, and we will ultimately fail, even though we may labor many more years before we come to that realization. We have simply got to wage the war right the first time.

[jmm99]

LTC Melton spells out generally what he wants, but does not provide much guidance for the "re-writer" (emphasis added):

from Melton
Wars must be won first at the strategic level, then at the operational level, and then at the tactical level. Our strategic-level lodestones—the National Security Act of 1947 and Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986—have created cross-purposes at the strategic level of war and have proven inadequate in producing victory in war. These laws must be rewritten to ensure strategic unity of command.

If Melton were my client, I'd have to say: I need an outline of what you want in a re-written statute. No need to draft a statute, but give me a list of points that can be turned into a statute. BTW: Title 10 is one big statute.

And, since I like graphics, let's start with the current chart per JP 0-2 (also attached as a pdf so you can put it in Photoshop and work with the original):

JP 0-2 Chart.jpg

and you change it to meet the Getting Strategy Right concept. At some point, you have to get lawyers involved; but, if you don't spell out what you want, you'll get what the lawyers dream up.

Regards

Mike

[Pete]

However, I'm inclined to doubt that he had an "Impeach Earl Warren" sticker on his car.

[Bill Moore]

Mike,

Step one you move the CJCS directly under the SECDEF and the COCOMS and Services report to the CJCS who is responsible for "military strategy" and ensuring it is nested with the National Security Staff. The National Security Advisor needs in fact, not theory, directive authority over the interagency, so unity of effort can be compelled instead of requested. We're all tools designed to conduct operations or activities to achieve our nation's strategic objectives. It isn't our role as non-elected officials to determine what those objectives are, and right now each GCC and each government agency has a fair amount of autonomy to do just that.

Bill

[Bill Moore]

Mike,

There is more to it than this involving CYBERCOM, the interagency, etc., so I'll try to put something on paper. First we need a suprastructure that the Title 10 structure falls under. What is that officially called? What mandates it?

[jmm99]

in answer to this:

from Bill
First we need a suprastructure that the Title 10 structure falls under. What is that officially called? What mandates it?

I'd have to answer: the Constitution (to both questions).

Title 10 is an integrated statutory authority for DoD, the Service Departments and the Armed Services (except for Coast Guard):

TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES

Subtitle, Sec.
A. General Military Law - 101
B. Army - 3001
C. Navy and Marine Corps - 5001
D. Air Force - 8001
E. Reserve Components - 10001

Last year, to answer an obscure question from Brother Fishel via PM (who is great at brain twisters !!), I downloaded the entire frigging title. It is an 18.7mb txt or rtf file !

The Office of the Law Revision Counsel prepares and publishes the United States Code, which is a consolidation and codification by subject matter of the general and permanent laws of the United States.

See, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, for various downloads and data.

A more useable format is at Cornell Law, TITLE 10—ARMED FORCES:

Subtitle A—General Military Law (§§ 101—2925)
Subtitle B—Army (§§ 3001—4842)
Subtitle C—Navy and Marine Corps (§§ 5001—7913)
Subtitle D—Air Force (§§ 8010—9842)
Subtitle E—Reserve Components (§§ 10001—18506)

What we want to look at with primacy is Subtitle A—General Military Law:

PART I—ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS (§§ 101—490)
PART II—PERSONNEL (§§ 501—1801_to_1805)
PART III—TRAINING AND EDUCATION (§§ 2001—2200f)
PART IV—SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT (§§ 2201—2925)

and most particularly at, PART I—ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS (§§ 101—490):

CHAPTER 1—DEFINITIONS (§ 101)

CHAPTER 2—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (§§ 111—119)

CHAPTER 3—GENERAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS (§§ 121—130d)

CHAPTER 4—OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (§§ 131—144)

CHAPTER 5—JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (§§ 151—156)

CHAPTER 6—COMBATANT COMMANDS (§§ 161—168)

CHAPTER 7—BOARDS, COUNCILS, AND COMMITTEES (§§ 171—187)

CHAPTER 8—DEFENSE AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FIELD ACTIVITIES (§§ 191—203)

CHAPTER 9—DEFENSE BUDGET MATTERS (§§ 221—235)

CHAPTER 11—RESERVE COMPONENTS (§ 261)

CHAPTER 13—THE MILITIA (§§ 311—312)

CHAPTER 15—INSURRECTION (§§ 331—336)

CHAPTER 17—ARMING OF AMERICAN VESSELS (§ 351)

CHAPTER 18—MILITARY SUPPORT FOR CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT GENCIES (§§ 371—382)

CHAPTER 20—HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE (§§ 401—410)

CHAPTER 21—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS (§§ 421—437)

CHAPTER 22—NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (§§ 441—467)

CHAPTER 23—MISCELLANEOUS STUDIES AND REPORTS (§§ 480—490)

All of this is just the tip of a very large iceberg (inter-agency gets much wilder); but Chaps. 1-6 are the guts of the matter.

Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10 July 2001, in Appendix I, lays out the controlling legal references (which also include regs and other non-statutory governing documents):

The development of JP 0-2 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Federal Statutory Laws
a. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
b. Titles 10 and 32, US Code, as amended.
c. Title 14, US Code, sections 1, 2, and 141.

2. NCA Guidance
a. Unified Command Plan.
b. Forces for Unified Commands.
c. Presidential Decision Directive-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations.
d. Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, United States Intelligence Activities.
e. SecDef Memorandum, Assignment of Force, 6 September 1996.
f. Nuclear Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

3. Memoranda of Agreement and Understanding
a. DOD and Department of Transportation Memorandum of Agreement, 3 October 1995, The Use of U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy.
b. DOD and DOS Memorandum of Understanding, 16 December 1997, Security of DOD Elements and Personnel in Foreign Areas.

4. DOD Directives
a. DOD 1348.33-M, Manual of Military Decorations & Awards.
b. DODD 2000.12, 13 April 1999, DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program.
c. DODD 3020.26, 26 May 1995, Continuity of Operations (COOP) Policy and Planning.
d. DODD 5100.1, 25 September 1987, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components.
e. DODD 5100.20, 23 December 1971, The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service.
f. DODD 5105.19, 25 June 1991, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).
g. DODD 5105.21, 18 February 1997, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
h. DODD 5105.60, 11 October 1996, National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
i. DODD 5105.62, 30 September 1998, Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
j. DODD 5106.4, 7 January 1993, Inspectors General (IGs) of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.
k. The integrated policies and procedures established by the Secretary of Defense for the coordination of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives
a. CJCSI 6120.05, Manual for Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance for Joint Operations, Joint Interface Operational Procedures for Message Text Formats.
b. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).
c. CJCSM 3410.01, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Continuity of Operations Plan.
d. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Emergency Action Procedures.

And, also in Appendix I, the subsidiary doctrinal manuals - which include refs to their own legal bases:

6. Joint Publications
a. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.
b. JP 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations.
c. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
d. JP 1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support to Military Operations.
e. JP 1-05, Religious Ministry Support to Joint Operations.
f. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.
g. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I.
h. JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, and JP 3-12 series.
i. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.
j. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.
k. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.
l. JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations.
m. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.
n. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.
o. JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.
p. JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations.

Re-writing this pack of wildcats would be no trivial task.

Hope this helps to define the scope of the answer needed to solve the problem presented. Am I being a wet blanket ?

Cheers (and beers)

Mike