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Thread: Getting Strategy Right

  1. #41
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    Default NCA Guidance

    The 2002 Iraq AUMF.pdf (attached) is long on "Whereases" and short on guidance for the use of military force:

    SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

    (a) AUTHORIZATION.—The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to—

    (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and

    (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
    This is the controlling policy statement for Operation Iraqi Freedom (passed by Congress and approved by Pres. Bush).

    Of Bush Admin members, John Bolton is the only one I've seen on record (from March 2007) who asserts he espoused an "invade and leave" policy - see my post, Backgrounder.

    3/25[/2007]
    BBC Newsnight's Jeremy Paxman
    .....
    Iraq 4 Years On: A Neo-con Rethink?
    ....
    Q. Is there not an American responsibility, having invaded a country, dismantled all the apparatus of government, to ensure the citizens of that country are not murdered?

    A. I think it's the responsibility which we've tried to fulfill to turn it back over to the Iraqis... We made a mistake in hindsight not turning it over to them earlier.
    ....
    But we don't have a responsibility to make the government of Iraq succeed, that's their responsibility.

    Q. Do you have a responsibility to keep the peace or not?

    A. I think that's their responsibility too. I think we're all agreed the sooner the Iraqis can decide whether they're gonna do that or not the the better off everyone is.

    Q. You sound as if you're washing your hands of the whole affair?
    ...
    A. What I would have done differently is much earlier, much sooner after the overthrow, given it back to the Iraqis, and I'll exaggerate for effect here, but given them a copy of the Federalist Papers and said good luck.
    Any others known to our readers, please advise.

    My earlier question, Question on "invade & leave", was generated in part by a comment from one Bill Moore in his post, This will stir debate:

    Perhaps I'm bias[ed], but I sensed we could have won this war rather quickly if we were more realistic. The Iraqi people I talked to were expecting the invasion for years, and they wondered what took us so long. They wanted us to replace Saddam and then leave.
    So, in the case of Iraq, unrealistric (actually non-existent) policy guidance - other than reference to enforcement of the UN Resolutions.

    These posts are from Iraq: Pre-War Planning, a thread started in 2006 by Jedburgh. The first reference was to the New State Department Releases on the "Future of Iraq" Project:

    Less than one month after the September 11 attacks, the State Department in October 2001 began planning the post-Saddam Hussein transition in Iraq. Under the direction of former State official Thomas S. Warrick, the Department organized over 200 Iraqi engineers, lawyers, businesspeople, doctors and other experts into 17 working groups to strategize on topics including the following: public health and humanitarian needs, transparency and anti-corruption, oil and energy, defense policy and institutions, transitional justice, democratic principles and procedures, local government, civil society capacity building, education, free media, water, agriculture and environment and economy and infrastructure.

    Thirty-three total meetings were held primarily in Washington from July 2002 through early April 2003. As part of the internal bureaucratic battle for control over Iraq policy within the Bush administration, the Department of Defense's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), itself replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in May 2003, would ultimately assume responsibility for post-war planning in accordance with National Security Presidential Directive 24 signed on January 20, 2003. According to some press accounts, the Defense Department largely ignored the report, although DOD officials deny that.

    The result of the project was a 1,200-page 13-volume report that contains a multitude of facts, strategies, predictions and warnings about a diverse range of complex and potentially explosive issues, some of which have since developed as the report's authors anticipated...
    Of course, you can have contingency studies and plans up the DoS and DoD kazoos; but those ain't one iota of policy guidance from the NCA.

    Regards

    Mike
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  2. #42
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    Default You are making my point

    Mike,

    Thirty-three total meetings were held primarily in Washington from July 2002 through early April 2003. As part of the internal bureaucratic battle for control over Iraq policy within the Bush administration, the Department of Defense's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), itself replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
    in May 2003, would ultimately assume responsibility for post-war planning in accordance with National Security Presidential Directive 24 signed on January 20, 2003.
    According to some press accounts, the Defense Department largely ignored the report, although DOD officials deny that.
    Adhocery at its best, and real planning didn't start until May 03? 2-3 months after we invaded....outstanding strategy process we have. Also reinforces my point that CENTCOM probably wasn't given this mission, it was a tug a war between State and DOD for ownership, but then when it turned bad neither one of them wanted it.

    We all know we can do better than this.

  3. #43
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    Default Which point of yours ...

    am I making. Seriously.

    Cheers

    Mike

  4. #44
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    Two points:

    There was no over arching strategic planning body with directive power, both DOD and State had "separate" plans and efforts.

    CENTCOM was given this planning mission apparently, since there were numerous adhoc planning efforts in the beltway, so if DOD civilians and State were doing the plannng for this, CENTCOM was probably just focused on the immediate fight and not the transition.

    That is still wrong on CENTCOM's part, you have to plan the transition with whoever you think is taking over, and ensure you agree on appropriate conditions to be set by the military before it is handed off.

    The COCOM's should not be the strategic planning body, it doesn't work, nor do adhoc planning efforts in the beltway.

  5. #45
    Council Member Polarbear1605's Avatar
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    Default Now you’re talking brothers!

    One problem we actually had was the critical issues with Turkey, which falls under EUCOM. CENTCOM and EUCOM had different views on how to proceed. Who is the final arbitrator in the current system?

    I also want to propose a future scenario where we have another Axis like coalition that we go to war with that has allies in multiple COCOM AORs (kind of like Al Qaeda, but I'm now talking about States now, much more serious threat). We need a global strategy to deal with it, who prepares it? Who leads it? What COCOM in the current structure is responsible? Of course that is just DOD, so who compels the other interagency members to row with us? We talk whole of government approach, but that doesn't happen much above the PRTs in combat zones.
    It will stop five and a half plus one geographically distantly located and focused Commands from doing it their way. As I said, the idea of decentralization was great. As you say, we do not have the FlagO quality to make it work.
    Now you’re talking brothers! (But I still don’t like Melton’s article) I am now beginning to understanding where you want to go. I think giving national command responsibility to the chairman is too simplistic a solution and would result in a step back to undue service influence. Sorry, not trying to upset anyone …just being honest. Frankly, I was waiting for the old general staff argument, thanks for not bringing that up. BTW which one of you two is in charge of the other? JMM are you in charge of these two? IMHO you both need supervision but I need some help as I scroll past your replies, consequently, getting you mixed up with one another…j/k …and another apology.

    We have agreed that the national command authority needs a good, consistent, method, apparatus, leadership, etc., to generate timely and effective national strategy. We have also agreed that the current unified command structure has it flaws. (I also feel some but not all of those flaws could be corrected if the generals followed its procedures instead of looking for work arounds.) I feel the solution to the national strategy issue is good leadership (generalship) and yes the resolution will take years; why not start now. I cannot accept the too long argument when we have been in Afghanistan since 2001. I feel you agree there is a leadership issue and I understand we are trying to solve the strategy issue quicker with a command structure change.

    What I am concerned about is, if we change it, we do not recreate the same past problems; specifically, what I have been calling service optimization. The chairman has a historical tendency to play to the service chiefs…after all, they live together in the Pentagon. Yes G-N cut the chairman’s command authority privates off but I feel you can’t sow them back on, nor should we want to …after all; they cauterized the wound with Teflon. It was part of the same process they used when they covered his butt with that non-stick substance.

    Here is my structural solution. Take US Joint Forces Command (the old USLANTCOM) and give that command strategic operational authority over the COCOMs (the old regional CINCs or whatever they are called lately). Require that super COCOM general to not only generate adequate strategy but also coordinate the strategic seams between COCOMs (now that’s motivation for strategy). As part of this command structure change, require this headquarters to move out of Norfolk and into the old Navy Annex that overlooks the Pentagon (actually, I am not sure if it is still standing). This guy will need to be close to the president and the symbolism will not be lost on the existing Chairman nor the Pentagon Staff. If you want to see a great strategy, promises this guy a fifth star upon deliver and acceptance of the national strategy. Personally, I think a better solution here would be to subtract one star from every existing general except this new guy. (BTW, Ordierno ain’t the guy.) You still have some issues here… SOCOM is one (should be a force provider) and the command relations with the functional support CINCS another. Yes, you need to bring in the CIA, State Department, etc. but start that with the strategic planning process, if the opportunity is available. Those government agencies are huge rice bowls that will not break easily.

    Bill, Ken and JMM..would really like to shake your hand over a beer someday..if your ever in Raleigh, NC…look me up 
    Last edited by Polarbear1605; 02-21-2011 at 07:16 PM.

  6. #46
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    Default A picture instead of a 1000 words

    For the present, we are just looking at the top of the C2 chart - correct ?

    C2 Top.jpg

    Re-arranging the military chairs does not solve the civilian side problem, which involves questions of substance as well as of process.

    Possibly think Churchill, Pug Ismay, Sea, Air and Land, Foreign Affairs - note that Winston was very much into the political scene as well as the military. FDR, on the other hand, thought that, if we won the war, the politics of peace would take care of themselves. Wrong.

    Who's in charge ?
    Willard: Who's in charge here?
    Soldier: In charge? I don't know, man. I'm just doing what I'm told - I'm just a working girl.
    But, better, Who's on first:

    Abbott: Well Costello, I’m going to New York with you. You know, Bucky Harris, the Yank’s manager gave me a job as coach for as long as you’re on the team.

    Costello: Look Abbott, if you’re the coach, you must know all the players.

    Abbott: Right, certainly do.

    Costello: Well, I never met the guys, so you’ll have to tell me their names, and then I’ll know who’s playing on the team.

    Abbott: Oh, I’ll tell you their names, but you know strange as it may seem, they give these ball players now a days, very peculiar names.

    Costello: You mean funny names?

    Abbott: Strange names, pet names. Like, Dizzy Dean, and…

    Costello: His brother Daffy?

    Abbott: Daffy Dean.

    Costello: And their French cousin.

    Abbott: French?

    Costello: Goofe’.

    Abbott: Goofe’ Dean, oh I see! Well let’s see, we have on the bags, we have Who’s on first, What’s on second, and I Don’t Know is on third.

    Costello: That’s what I want to find out.

    Abbott: I say, Who’s on first, What’s on second, and I Don’t Know’s on third.

    Costello: Are you the manager?

    Abbott: Yes.

    Costello: You going to be the coach too?

    Abbott: Yes.

    Costello: And you don’t know the fellow’s names?

    Abbott: Well I should.

    Costello: Well then who is on first?

    Abbott: Yes.

    Costello: I mean the fellow’s name.

    Abbott: Who.

    Costello: The guy on first.

    Abbott: Who.

    Costello: The first baseman.

    Abbott: Who!

    Costello: The guy playing first base.

    Abbott: Who is on first.

    Costello: I’m asking you who’s on first!

    Abbott: That’s the man’s name. .... (and on and on)
    Cheers and beers somewheres

    Mike

  7. #47
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Bare facts...

    Quote Originally Posted by Polarbear1605 View Post
    I think giving national command responsibility to the chairman is too simplistic a solution and would result in a step back to undue service influence.
    Can't speak for others but that is not my intent or idea. NCA is the Prez, period. However, the current 5th wheel status of the CJCS is not conducive to good order and discipline, he has been removed from the chain (never was in it, really) and should be in the chain or removed. They emasculated the position and that was a political, not a military decision. Part of the rationale was military. A Navy CJCS might be ill suited to be directive in a major land operation. Myers as CJCS suffered from that problem, I'm sure he was a great Airman but the land war threw him.

    That, BTW, is one of the problems I have with excessive emphasis on 'jointness' -- we end up with jacks of all trades and master of none. Even within the Army and Marines, I can make a case for lack of expertise when great Artillerists are given maneuver command as GOs -- in the Army, a great Mech Infantry guy is quite likely to be a very poor Light Infantry commander and vice versa.

    The current solution is to have six competing delegates of the NCA and, as you note, not all FlagOs do that job well. Giving the CJCS authority will not fix that problem but it will establish a chain of responsibility that is currently lacking. It also, more importantly, provides an Umpire to sort competing Fuedal Earls...

    Far more important than authority, the real issue is to centralize NATIONAL strategy (and its selling or discard) in DC and that also fixes responsibility as opposed to the current excessive diffusion. Decentralization is good if you have competent subordinates, it will be eschewed if they are not (also yet another thread with broader application), diffusion is not good -- no one is in charge...
    We have agreed that the national command authority needs a good, consistent, method, apparatus, leadership, etc., to generate timely and effective national strategy. We have also agreed that the current unified command structure has it flaws. (I also feel some but not all of those flaws could be corrected if the generals followed its procedures instead of looking for work arounds.)
    Probably true but unlikely to occur -- the Flag Superego factor will get in the way.
    I feel the solution to the national strategy issue is good leadership (generalship) and yes the resolution will take years; why not start now. I cannot accept the too long argument when we have been in Afghanistan since 2001. I feel you agree there is a leadership issue and I understand we are trying to solve the strategy issue quicker with a command structure change.
    In reverse order, yes; yes; adjust your "too long argument" to encompass 200 plus years. That is not a recent phenomenon, we've had poor Generals for years (Lee, Gates, Wilkinson, Pierce, Bragg, Sickles, Fredendall, Millikin, Almond, Barsanti) Many like Joe Wheeler excelled in combat at lower levels but were past their prime or worn out as major commanders. So yes it's a leadership issue, a training and management issue -- and a human foible issue. No matter how you tweak the selection process, 50% will always be good, 50% less so...
    The chairman has a historical tendency to play to the service chiefs…after all, they live together in the Pentagon. Yes G-N cut the chairman’s command authority privates off but I feel you can’t sow them back on, nor should we want to …after all; they cauterized the wound with Teflon. It was part of the same process they used when they covered his butt with that non-stick substance.
    While true, the problems you cite are partly organizational, partly historical baggage and partly personal. The bigger problem with the CJCS is the rotation of services and concomitant lack of knowledge that causes that deference to the Service Chiefs -- any one of whom can destroy a Chairman if they become so inclined simply by doing exactly what he tells them to do. Neither organizational changes nor more 'jointness' will fix that -- personnel selection NOT based on political appeasement wil help but even that is no guarantee.
    Here is my structural solution. Take US Joint Forces Command (the old USLANTCOM) and give that command strategic...into the old Navy Annex that overlooks the Pentagon (actually, I am not sure if it is still standing).
    It is not. And you've already got a first among equals, the CJCS. I'm uncertain yet another command is wise.
    ...SOCOM is one (should be a force provider)
    Very much agree...

    Good lick on the beer -- though back in the day I tended to get in minor trouble every time I was in Wake County.

  8. #48
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    I think this captures the problem with GCCs thinking that they do "strategy" as well as anything:

    SUMMARY:Editorial cartoon showing Douglas MacArthur, seated on the left with a cubed globe that focuses on the far eastern countries of China, Japan, Korea, Manchuria, and Formosa, and George Marshall, seated on the right with a spherical globe and a more global view of foreign policy. Published May 7, 1951 in the Washington Post.

    "We've been using more of a roundish one"
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    Last edited by Bob's World; 02-21-2011 at 08:15 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  9. #49
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    That is not a recent phenomenon, we've had poor Generals for years (Lee, Gates, Wilkinson, Pierce, Bragg, Sickles, Fredendall, Millikin, Almond, Barsanti).
    Is that Light Horse Harry Lee?

  10. #50
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    Default Nah, Henery Lee III was a Colonel at the end of the Revolution.

    He was made a MG (Miliitia) after helping take care of the Whiskey Rebellion and doing a good job at that. Then he resigned and went into politics He was a gifted amateur. One of the good guys even if he couldn't manage his money...

    I was referring to the very professional Major General Charles Lee, he who got outfoxed -- and relieved -- by George Washington. Bad Generals abound here and elsewhere and they run all the way from the Revolution through Viet Nam and until today for us...

  11. #51
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    To some it's a major thing of pride to have a Revolutionary War ancestor. The first of my German surname to come to California in 1850 married a woman from Wetzlar who was the daughter of a Hessian army officer. Imagine my surprise when I read that among the Hessian units fighting on the British side was a guy with her maiden nane, one Leutnant Dietrich von Gottschall, Infanterie Regiment von Mirbach.

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