Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
It appears to me that we repeatedly throw together military plans in support of often poorly articulated policy, and then after the plan is formed we "socialize" it with the interagency and then start the tweaking process, and really end up with something that is sub standard.
Bill,

I think you're right. Contrary to our adversaries, we do not understand the importance of the interagency. In my view, one of the most important insights in Melton's article is the following:

Having the military responsible for winning the kinetic war . . . but not responsible for winning the peace in phase four . . . creates a counterproductive schism in command authority and accountability at the all-important moment when populations assess their new occupiers and form lasting impressions. The precedents established in that critical transition, for better or worse, will color all the efforts that follow.
Our opponents do it the other way round. They understand that modern war is political in nature and that the people's welfare in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations is key to success in the low intensity conflict that follows.

A recent book, "Stalemate", analyzes this in detail. The author, Erik A. Claessen, points to the importance of the population's welfare at the all-important moment when populations assess their new occupiers and form lasting impressions:

By far the simplest way to win the essential services battle is to get a head start. The effect of relief efforts is greatest when people’s need is most dire, when they are at the bottom of Maslow’s pyramid. People never forget who arrived first at the scene of a disaster and distributed a hot drink or a plastic sheet for shelter. We have already noted Al-Sadr’s early actions to build an essential services infrastructure and Hezbollah’s haste to start reconstruction after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2006 . . .
The conflict’s nature is determined to a large degree by the way visions on conflict mesh with each other. More often than not, these visions differ fundamentally. Sometimes they differ so much that the hostile character of one belligerent’s actions is not immediately recognized as such by his opponent. For instance, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, small, armed groups of young clerics dashed to seize control of mosques, soup kitchens, schools, and welfare centers while U.S. tanks rushed to Baghdad. As early as April 11, 2003—only weeks after the start of the war—the clerics’ leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, “asked Shiites to express their piety by undertaking a pilgrimage to Karbala on foot.” Hundreds of thousands answered his call, offering “Shiites a first opportunity to see and measure their new, colossal force.” The significance of these seemingly harmless, but obviously well-prepared actions only became clear a couple of months later. Moqtada al-Sadr’s social initiatives had created a popular base that marginalized moderate Iraqi elites. This laid the foundation for his ability to influence military and political events in Iraq. Failing to recognize his actions as part and parcel of a particular vision on conflict, Coalition Forces had done nothing to stop his rise to prominence.
Unless we get this right, we will continue to be overtaken by events.