Threat or Opportunity: non-violent protest?

[Ken White]

Actually, he didn't run because of the heat he was taking for his stance in support of civil rights.

That's a myth with little grounding in reality. He knew he'd lost a lot of voters in the South over the Bill but he didn't lose all of them and he could have carried an election had it not been for the fact that he lost Cronkite.

Had Johnson run, he would have beaten Nixon were it not for Viet Nam. His loss of 'democrats' in the south didn't hurt nearly as much as his loss of Democrats in the rest of the nation who supported him on the Bill but not on Viet Nam...

[Bob's World]

We'll never know for sure what might have happened. I personally subscribe to civil rights role as being what cost him the most. Clearly the friction at home between growing race-based insurgency and the perspective that Vietnam was yet one more example of African Americans bearing an unfair brunt of the fight there merged in the protests at home. Between the two he was finished, and from what I have seen and read it was the blowback to his work on civil rights that drove his rapid decline after leaving office.

[Ken White]

We'll never know for sure what might have happened.

Obviously. However as one who'd been voting for about 20 years at the time and thus was paying attention, Nixon was distrusted as was Johnson he was the less distrusted until mid 1967 when too many rumors of dumb things related to Viet Nam and his personal pecadilloes were circulating and he became the 'untrust' front runner. He was a sitting President, yet he drew two challengers for his own party's nomination?

McCarthy had the student and academic vote, Kennedy had the working Democrat vote -- both campaigned using war errors as fodder -- and Johnson had less than 20% support among Democrats in the polls. Viet Nam sunk him -- as it should have. It also killed him, a good part of his decision was based on his belief that another term would kill him. He died two days after it would have ended.

I personally subscribe to civil rights role as being what cost him the most...and from what I have seen and read it was the blowback to his work on civil rights that drove his rapid decline after leaving office.

We can disagree on that.

Addendum: Started this, stopped, went to dinner came back an posted without looking. Mike had posted in the interim and I didn't see it until this post had arrived on the Board. Good catches, Mike. All makes sense, and with due respect to Clark Clifford, et.al. (very little, I'm not a Clifford fan -- nor a Vance fan...) Lyndon left due to Viet Nam. James R. Jones not withstanding, I'm not at all sure that Lyndon would've trumped Nixon. The press had long disliked Nixon; they had come to dislike Lyndon even more...

[jmm99]

Minutes of 2 Nov 1967 "Wise Men" meeting - as to which, that group believed that all was going well:

2 Nov 1967 Snip 01.jpg

Mr Dean (Wiki, Korea, Geneva, NYT Obit) suggested that:

2 Nov 1967 Snip 02.jpg

Over the next 4 months, he delved into his own questions. His answer on 25 March 1968 was disengagement.

The problem that the Johnson Admin had is that it had propagated a gospel that we would win - "light at end of tunnel", etc. When that became doubtful, the Admin's competence (in the public's eye and in the Wise Mens' eyes) went through the floor.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Disappointing that the advice given to the President on Vietnam in many ways sounds too similiar to the advice given to the President on Afghanistan. Once again we dived in with no clear and achievable end in mind, and love to point out the numerous tactical successes we're having.

I did a lot of reading on this topic, and actually watched it unfold as a kid. I remember witnessing the war protests and racial riots quite vividly during those days and there should be no doubt both these issues were key national issues that touched most of America to some extent. The difference is the President did the right thing concerning the Civil Rights Movement and he mishandled the Vietnam War. Those who knew him best said it was Vietnam that convinced him not to run again, so I'm not sure why we would challenge that assessment.

Posted by Marc,

Let's not glorify non-violence. It relies on the enthusiasm of the people, but is not necessarily democratic. Non-violence is a defeat mechanism in its own right. The Iranian revolution of 1979 was largely non-violent. For many a movement, the art of non-violence is to arouse the masses, start a revolution and take control the day after the revolution.

I think this comment most accurately addresses the question of whether these movements are an opportunity or a threat. We shouldn't automatically equate these movements as being democratic or even necessarily representing a significant percentage of the population. We sure as heck can't automatically confuse them as democracy breaking out (but we can still hope until proven otherwise). In short it is a tactic that be employed for both good and evil ends, and its success demends on a number of variables in each circumstance.

Non violence led by Ghandi didn't work in India, yet it is still a myth perpetuated by those who "want to believe". Non violence didn't work in China and won't work in China in the current environment. Non violent movements in most countries can be violently suppressed "if" the government still maintains control of the security forces and decides to employ harsh methods, so like any tactic it can only be employed in certain situations to attain specific ends (for better or worse).

What I do find interesting is the ability to use social media to facilitate these movements in unique ways. However, as we all know popular movements have been facilitated in the past without this technology.

[davidbfpo]

LBJ and Gandhi aside I do wonder as autocratic states look around the scene what are the lessons learnt?

First and foremost electronic communication is so dangerous. If you are a developing autocratic state, would you want to allow this to develop? I understand it is easy to switch off mobile phone networks, the UK has a preferential system in place for emergencies, so state mobiles work and for example others can only get calls in. Isolating international links, which are via a few nodes, unless you have a sat phone, appears to be easy.

Limited or slow communications would be attractive for an autocrat. In another thread on Burma I have commented that without imagery 24/7 news has a much reduced impact. Large chunks of the world are not on the 24/7 editors list.

Reducing international exposure is possible, although even the PRC has learnt not easy after rioting in Tibet was filmed by tourists and a BBC reporter on a holiday. Plus the ethnic rioting and state response in Urumchi.

Tourists are a mixed blessing, in Egypt the vast majority were miles away from the focal point, the cities, on beaches in Sinai and above all usually have little interaction with the locals. More problematic are the resident expats, especially if widely dispersed like preachers, NGO etc.

[davidbfpo]

From Open Democracy:

An audio interview in which Nabila Ramdani describes the role of the social networks in the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions – to what extent are Morozov's and Gladwell's arguments proved wrong by events?

Closing sentences:

There will be numerous attempts to re-impose autocracies dominated self-styled leaders of the people. However, the biggest historical change highlighted by revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia is that these people are nowadays hugely well informed, questioning and technologically savvy.

This should be our greatest cause for optimism as we consider the future of the Arab world.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/tony-cu...-02-19%2005:30

[Fuchs]

LBJ and Gandhi aside I do wonder as autocratic states look around the scene what are the lessons learnt?

First and foremost electronic communication is so dangerous. If you are a developing autocratic state, would you want to allow this to develop?

related:
Trajan on the revolts in Tunisia (?)

It's not the communications, but the organising.

[jmm99]

not Robert Jones, but James Jones in 1988:

Behind L.B.J.'s Decision Not to Run in '68

By James R. Jones; James R. Jones, President Lyndon B. Johnson's chief of staff in 1968, was a Democratic Representative from Oklahoma from 1973 to 1987

Published: April 16, 1988

WASHINGTON — It's now just a shade over 20 years since Lyndon B. Johnson's speech to the nation that closed with this surprise: ''I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President.''

Most Americans couldn't believe that this larger-than-life figure could voluntarily relinquish the reins of power. Scholars and politicians still argue over what really motivated his decision to step down.

My perspective was that of the President's administrative chief of staff. My office was next to his. I can state categorically that fear of losing the 1968 election was not the reason he retired. Several days before the speech, Mr. Johnson commissioned a poll, which indicated that he would be re-elected over all possible candidates. I always have felt that he took that poll to satisfy himself that he wasn't being run out of office.

The real reason for Mr. Johnson's withdrawal was Vietnam. It was an involvement he had questioned as a Senator and about which he brooded as President. But his sense of Presidential continuity compelled him to pursue the commitments made by Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy.

As our casualties grew, the abstract agony caused by the daily situation reports became a personal pain for the President when his own son-in-law, Charles Robb, a Marine captain, entered combat.

In addition, Mr. Johnson had begun to doubt our ability to prosecute the war to any clear-cut victory. He worried about the discrepancy between Government reports and news stories in The New York Times written from Vietnam. The President mused aloud on more than one occasion that either The Times's reporter, R. W. Apple Jr., was working for the enemy or that our Government's intelligence apparatus was misleading him. ... (much more background in story)

During March 1968, LBJ was advised by his "Wise Men" that he was not going to achieve a clear-cut victory:

Johnson meets with 'The Wise Men,' March 25, 1968

On this day in 1968, as pessimism over U.S. prospects in Vietnam deepened, President Lyndon B. Johnson met with 14 informal advisers. In 1945, some of them had forged a bipartisan foreign policy based on containing the Soviet Union. They went on to craft key institutions like NATO, the World Bank and the Marshall Plan. They were known, collectively, as “The Wise Men.”

They met with LBJ after being briefed by officials at the State Department, the Pentagon and the CIA. They had been informed of a request from Gen. William Westmoreland, the top U.S. commander in Vietnam, for additional troops in the wake of perceived U.S. setbacks in the Tet Offensive.

Present at the White House meeting were Dean Acheson, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Clark Clifford, Arthur Dean, Douglas Dillon, Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas, Averell Harriman, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., Robert Murphy, Cyrus Vance and Gens. Omar Bradley, Matthew Ridgway and Maxwell Taylor.

In the words of Acheson, who summed up the recommendations from 11 of the men, “we can no longer do the job we set out to do in the time we have left, and we must begin to take steps to disengage.” Murphy, Taylor and Fortas dissented.

and from a PBS Transcript - first re: the Nov 1967 "Wise Men" meeting with LBJ:

McCullough: [voice-over] By the end of 1967, a grim sense of siege was settling over the White House. The President dug in. He had spent a lifetime climbing to the pinnacle of power; his whole political life now hung on only one issue -- Vietnam.

Clark Clifford: He decided to call in the men whom he respected most. They became known as "the Wise Men." There were about ten of them. If you put the total service, those men must have had two hundred and fifty to three hundred years of government service.

McCullough: [voice-over] These were the architects of American foreign policy -- Dean Acheson, John McCloy, Averell Harriman. "Contain Communism, don't let it spread" had been their advice to every President since Truman.

William P. Bundy: The picture that was given to them was that we are making slow, grinding progress and we thought we could see, at some point, a break, with the other side really starting to really weaken and go downhill.

McCullough: [voice-over] Dean Acheson said later, "I told him he was wholly right on Vietnam, that he had no choice except to press on."

Clark Clifford: They voted unanimously for him to go on with his course. He was greatly comforted by that.

William P. Bundy: The advice they gave was, "Look, the country doesn't see it the way you're describing it. You've got to develop a way to make your assessments of the situation more credible."

George Ball: Well, they gave him perfectly silly advice. They were sensible people, and why they were so silly, I don't know. Their main advice was, "Well, you ought to improve your public relations." Well, after the meeting, I spoke to Dean Acheson and John Coles and Arthur Dean, and I said, "You old bastards, you ought to be ashamed of yourselves. You're like a lot of vultures sitting on the fence and sending the young men out to die." And I walked out of the room.

but, the consensus disappeared in March 1968:

McCullough: [voice-over] By the middle of March, Clark Clifford despaired of ever changing the President's mind. Only one group of Americans might be able to influence him -- those foreign-policy experts called "the Wise Men". Five months before, the Wise Men had cheered Johnson with their support. Now, Clifford encouraged the President to meet with them one more time.

Clark Clifford: Although it might sound somewhat conspirational, I thought it wise to contact a good many of them first, so I did. I knew them all, I'd known them all for years, and I got a feeling from them. I made four, five or six contacts and found that in each instance, Tet had changed their minds. They all came back; we went through the same process -- reading cables, getting briefed; then we met with the President. They had all turned around. The impact was profound -- so profound that he thought something had gone wrong, and he used the expression "I think somebody has poisoned the well."

Richard Goodwin: He had picked these old Cold Warriors that were still fighting the battle of containment, and he listened to their advice, and as long as they stayed with him, he felt that he must be doing the right thing. Then, finally, at the end, they left him. They all said, "It's not working," and they walked out of the room, and there was Lyndon Johnson all alone with his war, the last believer.

So, that sums the evidence - although much more could be easily added (e.g., see Dean Rusk Transcript & George Ball Transcript).

Regards

Mike