Thanks, good stuff
He blends morality with tacticsOriginally Posted by Tom Odom
Thanks, good stuff
He blends morality with tacticsOriginally Posted by Tom Odom
Last edited by GorTex6; 11-09-2005 at 07:07 PM.
yes Mr Grau has written plenty of interesting articles and books. Two on Afghanistan one from the Russian the other from the Guerilla point of view. He wrote an interesting article on the Russian Armor experience in Chechnya which bears alot of relevance for American Armor in Iraq. A shame no one really paid attention before.http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/rusav.htm
Folks,
I said I would order this book, read it, and offer some thoughts so here goes:
Is it worth reading?
absolutely in that it offers an interesting perspective on counter-insurgency set in the context of today's operations.
Weaknesses:
a. Style of writing. The book suffers much from poor editing. it reads in may cases like a power point slide show run rampant. While it is a legitimate technique to repeat key ideas, Poole at times takes repetition to extreme. That also comes across in poor organization; chapters, sections, and paragraphs do not flow. Given the repetition of ideas, I felt like a hamster on a mental ferris wheel going round and round with no progress.
b. Exaggeration of certain key ideas. On this I would point to the role of Hizballah and its sponsor, Iran, especially the Iranian Sepah. Poole states that Hizballah is the main threat to the West and goes to great length to support that contention. Unfortunately his sourcing is poor and not--at least to me and I served in Lebanon and lost friends to Hizballah--convincing. I agree the Hizballah model and method are dangerous and difficult to counter; I don't see them as a universal model. A related issue is his insistence that Asian military culture permeated into the Middle East over the ages. Again it is an interesting idea but one hindered by poor sourcing and superficial analysis.
Strengths:
a. Poole focuses on the root elements of any counter-insurgency, the insurgents and the security forces who fight them. What I really liked about the book was his call for a more capable, more highly trained infantry with offensive infantry maneuver capabilities versus fires dominated thinking.
b. Related to a. is Poole's other key point, that tactical victories based on such a firepower dominated military modely are NOT victories for the forces engaged in COIN. His key point--at least to me--was that civilian collateral casualties in COIN must be given equal or even more weight that friendly casualties. Now this is not something new; the same point has been debated many times. But it is still a point worth considering.
c. Finally I liked the linkages Poole makes between culture and military operations. Some as I have already said were overstated to me. Still he does apply a logic that makes sense in understanding how a diffent culture with a different model for success can develop tactics to achieve that success--and how another culture may foolishly discount that success.
Using an Amazon rating of 1-5 stars, I would give it a 3.
Tom
Tom, thanks for the review. Though I am a big "Gunny" Poole fan, I think I agree with you - overall very good on content but at times the writing style seems a bit choppy.
I suspect you already have Militant Tricks (ISBN: 0963869582) on your to-read list. Its on mine. I look forward to your review of that one.
Mark
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"The true soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him, but because he loves what is behind him." - G. K. Chesterton
Man, I couldnt agree more. Mr. Poole always puts out a vast ammount of great info. I still think "The Last 100 Yards" is his best yet. But I gotta say it: the guy is an awful writer. Usually an author needs to cut down on the fluff. Mr. Poole needs to do the opposite and flesh out his writing so it flows smoothly.Originally Posted by Tom Odom
"The Infantry’s primary role is close combat, which may occur in any type of mission, in any theater, or environment. Characterized by extreme violence and physiological shock, close combat is callous and unforgiving. Its dimensions are measured in minutes and meters, and its consequences are final." - Paragraph 1-1, FM 3-21.8: Infantry Rifle PLT and SQD.
- M.A. Holzbach
CPT H - I see your "location" has changed - welcome home...
One reason Poole's writing tends to be sloppy is that he's often "cutting and pasting" stuff from other sources and not really making an attempt to have smooth transitions. I agree he has some great stuff to say, and his books often give you a synthesis of stuff you'd have to go to literally hundreds of other sources to get, but he'd get his message across more effectively if he'd put a little more effort into combining the sources and maybe adding his own analysis.Originally Posted by CPT Holzbach
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