And Libya goes on...

[CWOT]

My assumption is that AQ will try to take credit and take advantage of the Libyan uprising. I think AQ-LIFG linkages with the rebels have been overstated thus far. But, I don't think we should be naive about AQ types trying to influence key jihadi leaders in Darnah.

Here's six things I think we (US) should begin doing now to offset AQ ambitions. Would enjoy any further thoughts on what the U.S. should be considering. What else should we be doing?

1. End the Gaddafi regime immediately- Opposition to Gaddafi links rebels generally amenable to the West with jihadi's affiliated with LIFG-AQ types. The longer LIFG-AQ types remain embedded with other Libyan opposition groups, the stronger the bonds will be between them. Eliminating the Gaddafi regime will allow for more moderate rebel groups to emerge and repel AQ aggression.

2. Push moderate rebel leaders to the forefront- The West should move to place a face on the Libyan opposition. Strategic communications should be implemented quickly to demonstrate to the world that the Libyan opposition is clearly not the result of AQ inspiration. This could be accomplished through publicized communication with select opposition leaders and widely broadcast television interviews with key rebel partners allied against Gaddafi and LIFG-AQ linked groups. Current amorphous descriptions of the Libyan opposition create ambiguity allowing for biased interpretation; ambiguity easily capitalized on by AQ elements taking credit for a revolution they missed.

3. Don’t waste an opportunity-The U.S. wanted to counter jihadi elements in Darnah three years ago. The NFZ and the vacuum created by the crumbling Gaddafi regime should not be wasted. If AQ moves to bolster their position in Libya, the West should be prepared early to use soft and hard power options directly and through surrogates.

4. Isolate Darnah if necessary- LIFG-AQ support and presence in Darnah has existed for a long time. The West should move aggressively to monitor and isolate Darnah if it goes the way of AQ. Own the border crossing from Egypt. Monitor desert crossings with aerial surveillance. Control the coast through the Navy. Darnah is one of the few places AQ might reside where the West retains distinct capabilities to monitor the region from land, sea and air.

5. Engage the EU reference an AQ Libyan safe haven - Should AQ gain a safe haven in Libya, the greatest threat will initially be to Europe. The U.S. has proceeded responsibly by letting NATO take the reins of the NFZ. EU countries need to step up in the CT effort in Libya. Italy, France and the UK all have reason to get engaged.

6. Prepare for something other than democracy in Libya - I hope lessons learned from trying to institute democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan reasonably moderate the West’s vision of Libya’s political future. Freedom comes in many forms and often time incrementally. Libya remains a tribal, oil dependent country. Constructing a unified democracy without occupation is likely impossible. Libya may find renewed political stability and economic vitality quicker if it pursued an emirate type structure; a form closer to the original Barbary states or similar to the UAE. Can the West accept this? Can they help this happen? This will be tough. Bottom line: a weak democracy is more beneficial to AQ while stronger sub-states can be a useful counter against AQ aggression.

From:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=187

[Bob's World]

In a slightly different take, I don't think we need to counter AQ in Libya. I think we need to out compete AQ in Libya for the trust of the populace (I almost wrote "support," but we don't need the support of the Libyan populace, their reforming/emerging government does, we "merely" need to earn their trust.

Part of earning that trust will be in how we treat those who have affiliated with the LIFG. While this has been the most active, most closely tied with AQ, tip of the iceberg of the dissatisfied populace of Libya, they are part of that populace. Instead of isolating, I would move now to take them off of the terror list and ensure that they have an appropriate voice in what happens next.

To ignore those who have committed their lives to staying and fighting for freedom for years because we disagree with the ideologies they have adopted, or who they had to turn to for assistance now that they are on the cusp of achieving their Ends is the classic mistake we always make. We overlook the rough, dirty fighters and become enamored with some smooth expat opportunist who is less offensive to our sensibilities and throw our lot in with such, and elevate them into power as the new dictator that now owes allegiance to the US and our interests. It's time to break that model. It sure as hell isn't working for us in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan we elevated such "moderates" and attempted to "isolate" those who we felt were too close to AQ. In so doing we crafted a situation that ensured the current insurgency there and us being stuck once again (as in Vietnam, as in Iraq, etc) battling to sustain what we have created against resistance from the populace we have foisted such governance upon.

Less is more. I think we need to beware the Johnny come lately "moderates," and we need to keep an open mind in regard to those who we have struggled with in the past. To exclude the LIFG is to ensure that most active segment stays in the AQ camp and continues to wage international terror on their behalf. We need to let Libyans decide what the fate of the LIFG is, and also allow them to decide who they think should lead them.

[davidbfpo]

My assumption is that AQ will try to take credit and take advantage of the Libyan uprising.

I find it difficult today from my armchair to see how AQ, more particularly LIFG & AQIM, can claim 'credit' when it is a local rebellion that has survived and made gains to date due to Western air power. A rebellion in which the Jihadists are a minority, yes, I know so were the Bolsheviks in 1917 Russia. Plus the reported acclaim by those in eastern Libya for the Western action and responses of civilians to the downed US pilots.

If anything AQ has been singularly quiet on its contribution in Tunisia, Egypt and now Libya.

[CWOT]

Instead of isolating, I would move now to take them off of the terror list and ensure that they have an appropriate voice in what happens next.

Yes, I'm all for engagement, I was focusing more on isolating if they begin to pursue the jihadi route and start talking caliphate. It would be excellent if we aligned and engaged with LIFG remnants before AQ attempts to reinforce.

We overlook the rough, dirty fighters and become enamored with some smooth expat opportunist who is less offensive to our sensibilities and throw our lot in with such, and elevate them into power as the new dictator that now owes allegiance to the US and our interests.

Yes, I wrote about this reference Egypt and AlBaradei. It felt really Chalabi like, and I hope we don't try that in Libya.

To exclude the LIFG is to ensure that most active segment stays in the AQ camp and continues to wage international terror on their behalf. We need to let Libyans decide what the fate of the LIFG is, and also allow them to decide who they think should lead them.

The U.S. needs to reevaluate all its so called enemies in North Africa and the Middle East. I'm waiting to see how the Muslim Brotherhood turns out in Egypt. They are in the driver's seat for the government's future in Egypt. The U.S. has to engage with them, and the Muslim Brotherhood is too big in Egypt not to have a seat at the table.

[CWOT]

AQ completely missed out on these uprisings and it really hurts their credibility. That's why I think AQ has to get active in the next few months. If they can't begin meddling in these revolutions then their era is over. It's been ten years, they've missed the fall of all their so called "Apostate regimes" they have argued against. That's why I'm interested in Libya. I think there are only a handful actively aligned with AQ currently residing in Libya. But, there are another handful waiting in other AQ campaigns that I imagine will want to relocate back home.