And Libya goes on...

[Pete]

Up to a point the alternate specialty concept makes sense for Army officers who aren't selected for battalion command. Non-selection pretty much means the end of being considered for positions in the command and operations tracks. Those left behind can do useful things that need to be done for the institution and still be on hand if there's ever a need to vastly increase the size of the Army. However, this issue is way off-topic to Libya and is probably best left for another thread.

[Surferbeetle]

The newspaper article on personnel management in the Foreign Service mentioned facilities management as one of the alternate specialties, the idea being that basic housekeeping tasks at embassies and consulates be carried out on a more standardized basis. That part sounded reasonable to me.

Pete,

The website for the US Embassy in Tripoli has listings for the Consular Section, Commercial Section, Educational Advising Office, Political and Economic Section, and Public Affairs Section.

DoS has Foreign Service Officers (5 specialties), Foreign Service Specialists (7 specialties), Diplomatic Security (6 specialties), and Civil Servants. Depending upon the size of the location and who is on vacation folks are expected to cover down/help out depending upon classification i.e. FSO's all have consular experience in addition to their specialty/'cone'.

Ken,

I am aware that I am very much preaching to the choir on this topic but indulge me if you would...

On the reserve-side of things; In Civil Affairs-land officers have the basic 38 training/classification plus Additional Skills Indicators can be assigned based upon civilian education and experience in order to capture and help manage folks who are specialists (i.e. 6G - public works/utilities - engineering degree + real world work experience). In Foreign Area Officer-land officers have the basic 48 training/classification plus a designator (C -Western Europe for example) which reflect a graduate degree, capabilities in at least one foreign language (tested annually and exceeding a minimum ability level), plus time spent living/working in the designated area of the world. The Army is recently starting to think about ASI's again...but it's still very much a work in progress.

[Pete]

Oh well, I never claimed that spending five minutes reading a newspaper story 20 years ago about the subject made me an expert on it. There are a lot of smart people on this forum so I hesitate to express strong opinions about things I don't know much about.

[Surferbeetle]

...even with all of those qualifications a twenty something year old Captain/Company Commander is running more people, responsible for more CERP money, and actually holding ground...

...life goes on....

[Ken White]

DoS has Foreign Service Officers (5 specialties), Foreign Service Specialists (7 specialties), Diplomatic Security (6 specialties), and Civil Servants. Depending upon the size of the location and who is on vacation folks are expected to cover down/help out depending upon classification i.e. FSO's all have consular experience in addition to their specialty/'cone'.

Then in the late 40s they adopted many USN personnel rules -- including up or out -- and reduced the number of specialties and created the Specialist and Security subsets but Pete was referring to the 1980 Act that tried to produce 'generalists.' FSOs used to have more specialties IIRC but that changed with the 80 act -- which, if you'll recall is about the time the Army started playing with MOSC, ASIs and specialties in general.

On the reserve-side of things; In Civil Affairs-land officers have the basic 38 training/classification plus Additional Skills Indicators...The Army is recently starting to think about ASI's again...but it's still very much a work in progress.

Agreed. I have noticed the recent addition of a slew of ASIs...

The effort to reduce the number MOSs and such, the number of specialties and specialists starts anew after every war and the resultant post war drawdown in end strength. It happened after WWII, after Korea, After Viet Nam, after DS/DS. As I see no attempt to improve our 1917 system, I suspect such a reduction will again occur in the not too distant future...

Anyway, postwar the number of variations is reduced and what then happens is another war with concomitant expansion occurs and the specialties naturally proliferate (but slightly different -- new watch in charge...). So the cycle -- and it is a cyclical thing -- repeats...

The CA field MOS / ASI aren't messed with by the Hoffman Building because the (quite necessary ) number of specialties doesn't impact their workload -- the USARC worries about them and doesn't trifle with 'em.

The brilliant 41s (or whatever they are today...) in that building do smart things to lessen their AC oriented daily workload. Like eliminate the 11M MOSC for enlisted people because in their view, all Infantrymen are illiterate, grubby and marginally useful -- so as it's easier to 'manage' just 11Bs instead of all those 11Fs, 11Hs and 11Ms. I'm sure the same thing occurred with Officer specialties but I haven't tracked 'em.

They produce a system that allows them to place small square pegs in large round and triangular holes. Then we wonder why some marginally competent people get some jobs -- people who'd be ideal in other jobs but are, regrettably, 'here.'

In the case of some issues, I'll tepidly defend the Per folks because many of their inane and non-supportive of the force rules are foisted on them by a Congress who values apparent 'fairness' above pure merit and competence. In the case of the skill numbers drawdowns, that barely applies -- that's pretty much a workload reducer. Well rationalized by claiming 'good personnel management practices, of course...'

[Surferbeetle]

The immediate concern is that one or more major producers could suffer major production impairments at the same time due to sustained domestic conflict, and not be able to sell oil to anyone. That would result in a major price spike that would negatively impact us, and the Chinese, and the Europeans, and the Koreans, Japanese, Taiwanese, Indians, etc. It wouldn't be US-specific and it wouldn't be caused by hostile governments refusing to sell to us, it would be a matter of conflict reducing available supply and forcing prices up.

OIL FUTURES:Nymex Crude Tumbles As Massive Quake Hits Japan, By Jerry A. DiColo and Sarah Kent Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, MARCH 11, 2011, 9:24 A.M. ET, at WSJ

Crude futures fell sharply Friday after a massive earthquake in Japan, the world's third-largest oil consumer, though traders kept watch for any news of spreading unrest in the Middle East and North Africa.

Light, sweet crude for April delivery recently traded $2.92, or 2.8%, lower at $99.78 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Brent crude on the ICE futures exchange traded $2.40 lower at $113.03 a barrel.

Oil prices weakened as markets assessed the damage to Japan's refinery capacity and the impact on overall crude demand, as aftershocks from an 8.9-magnitude earthquake that hit earlier this morning continued to rock the country.

Japan does the most with least oil, By James Brooke, Published: Monday, June 6, 2005, NY Times

But Japan is where energy consciousness probably reaches the highest levels. The second-largest economy produces virtually no fossil fuels, importing 96 percent of its energy needs - a dependence that has led to tremendous achievements in improved efficiency. France and Germany, where governments crusade against global warming, expend almost 50 percent more energy to produce the equivalent of $1 in economic activity. Britain's energy use, by the same measure, is nearly double; that of the United States, nearly triple; and China's almost eight times as high.

Tokyo Electric Tries to Cool Unstable Reactors, Avert `Three Mile Island', By Yuji Okada, Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yuriy Humber - Mar 12, 2011 6:51 PM MT, Bloomberg

The utility began injecting sea water and boric acid to cool its Fukushima Dai-Ichi No. 1 reactor, according to a statement today. The plant’s No. 3 reactor has been vented to release pressurized gas after its cooling system failed, said spokesman Akitsuka Kobayashi. The station lost power needed to keep the reactor core cool after an earthquake two days ago, the largest ever recorded in Japan.

Radioactive cesium, a product of atomic fission, was detected near the site yesterday, indicating a meltdown may have begun, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency spokesman Yuji Kakizaki said yesterday.

There are six reactors at the Dai-Ichi site. The unit being flooded, No. 1, is a General Electric Co. boiling-water reactor model that is capable of generating 439 megawatts of power and began commercial operation in 1971, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

[anonamatic]

The `you break it, you bought it' observation also applies to anyone rushing in with a tube of glue... I'm somewhat wary of NFZs after watching Saddam play escalation games with the one in Iraq. The people may not have liked him any, but during the time it was in place he got to control the local narrative to build resentment towards his enemies. The defecting Libyans are not completely rag-tag either, many of them were in the Libyan military before this began.

Presuming for a minute that there was some sort of military intervention, unless it's designed to be limited in such a way as to not require an exit strategy, it seems to me that more than a single exit strategy would be required. Having a primary best case plan is fine, but not having a number of good alternate strategies seems like an unwise move. One of the things I've thought was a mistake in Iraq was not having credible strategies to address the situation if things didn't go the way everyone wanted. Worse, without being able to articulate those openly to both allies & opponents, they were able to form their own mangled narratives. Would it have helped if the people of Iraq knew at the outset that the price for supporting Al-Qaeda in Iraq was going to be awful, and that this would prolong the war unnecessarily? Perhaps... It's one thing to say 'this is our preferred outcome' quite another not to be able to articulate how we would act if things don't go according to script. Not doing that seems to me to be a mistake that's easily made.

I think providing the rebels with humanitarian support would be a good idea. I do think that we're on something of a death watch for Quaddafi, about all anyone is going to miss is his sartorial entertainment.

We don't know the calculus the forces under his control are making either, and that's difficult. They obviously think that rolling with Q is their best choice as long as they're not forced into some other option. A lot of history says as much too. Are they waiting on events with a leaden sense of duty until a reason they've been waiting for to flip sides comes along? We don't know, but I'm sure they're thinking about it.

I think there are a lot of potential things that could be done, but as long as there are huge piles of foreign nationals there & they're able to leave at varying rates, well everyone is going to be somewhat stuck. In essence that safe passage is already buying him a lot of time he might not otherwise enjoy. That only works until he starts to play nasty, but what then? It's not something that anyone wants to provoke him into doing.

It might be possible to make strategic strikes of various types, the idea of taking out his communications capacity is a good one. So is taking out his offensive air capacity. A NFZ wouldn't be so much needed if he's got nothing to fly that's weaponized. The idea of using some combination of sea / air power to degrade his capacity to inflict harm seems good, and it might well be one of the pushes some of his ostensibly loyal forces are looking for. We don't know that for sure though.

We aren't seeing the rebels plead for arms & ammunition yet, and from reading what people have written here about their internal supply situation it's easy to see why.

It may well be that the best strategy will be to help with humanitarian aid, and go all-in to make sure democracy succeeds in Tunisia and Egypt. Success for the people of those countries that outstrips the story of Iraq could go a very long way towards changing peoples ideas in the region. I find it interesting that in some of the countries where there's some discontent, but not complete discontent, the people have been agitating for solutions that disempower their various leaders in ways that don't create a lot of strife for everyone.

While there are varying amounts of pseudo-imperialist views driving some of the calls for the US to intervene, there's an awful lot to be said for not doing it too. The thing that comes to my mind the most is that it's empowering for people to understand better that their fate really is in their own hands. That was never not true, but far too much of the time people have grown used to the mistaken notion that somehow the US is the worlds police force. To go with that in circumstances that are less than ideal, like people everywhere, they get pissy when the police don't show up and do what they want them to do. The calls we hear for the US to "do something" are not calls to "do this", instead they're very similar to what people say when the cops show up in a conflict. They aren't sure what is to be done, but they want the conflict to end, and don't feel like they can end it themselves.

Also, at least personally, I'd like to see the US stay focused on Afghanistan. It's still a bigger mess with bigger stakes.

[Surferbeetle]

...not that it matters, the job is still the same, and we still have our issues.

Then in the late 40s they adopted many USN personnel rules -- including up or out -- and reduced the number of specialties and created the Specialist and Security subsets

This was well before my time and I have no reason to doubt you.

...but Pete was referring to the 1980 Act that tried to produce 'generalists.' FSOs used to have more specialties IIRC but that changed with the 80 act -- which, if you'll recall is about the time the Army started playing with MOSC...

My observations from on the ground are that FSO cones are for the most part staffed by folks highly skilled in their particular specialty. 'Observe and report', analysis, negotiation, and communication skills as well as a certain gravitas appear to be highly valued across the board.

The effort to reduce the number MOSs and such, the number of specialties and specialists starts anew after every war and the resultant post war drawdown in end strength. It happened after WWII, after Korea, After Viet Nam, after DS/DS. As I see no attempt to improve our 1917 system, I suspect such a reduction will again occur in the not too distant future...

Agreed. Saw it after DS/DS-Fall of the Berlin Wall and am also seeing it now.

.... all Infantrymen are illiterate, grubby and marginally useful -- so as it's easier to 'manage' just 11Bs instead of all those 11Fs, 11Hs and 11Ms. I'm sure the same thing occurred with Officer specialties but I haven't tracked 'em.

Agree with your implied point that out in most parts of the world brains, common sense, and capabilities are not limited to rank or 'specialties' and Commanders have say for a multitude of good reasons....

They produce a system that allows them to place small square pegs in large round and triangular holes. Then we wonder why some marginally competent people get some jobs -- people who'd be ideal in other jobs but are, regrettably, 'here.'

So Ken,...how do we fix this given that soldiering is a young man's job and DoD has a very bad case of mission creep when it comes to DoS and USAID personnel functions?

Should the specialties formerly known as CS and CSS be completely contracted out?

On the DoS and USAID side of things the exclusive pale, male, and Yale (DoS) and earth muffin (USAID) staffing pattern stereotypes who are afforded limited management/leadership training opportunities are not the answer that America needs either.

In the case of some issues, I'll tepidly defend the Per folks because many of their inane and non-supportive of the force rules are foisted on them by a Congress who values apparent 'fairness' above pure merit and competence....

...out in the field we are always open to ideas.

Formal study, self study, coaching, and the encouragement of other career paths are the TTP's that I am familiar with and use...

All things that apply to Libya (potentially) and any other place we may have to operate...

[Pete]

There are a lot of smart people on this forum ...

In addition to them are the old NCOs, and they'll cut you no slack if they think you're up to something ...

[JMA]

It might be possible to make strategic strikes of various types, the idea of taking out his communications capacity is a good one. So is taking out his offensive air capacity. A NFZ wouldn't be so much needed if he's got nothing to fly that's weaponized. The idea of using some combination of sea / air power to degrade his capacity to inflict harm seems good, and it might well be one of the pushes some of his ostensibly loyal forces are looking for. We don't know that for sure though.

This should have been done... unilaterally some time ago... crater the runways or if the intel is good enough take out the jets on the ground. The helicopters are slightly more complex but could be sorted very quickly by the demonstration (note not a mere threat) of taking out a military target with the promise (again not a mere threat) that if just the sound of a helo flying somewhere is reported then another military base gets it. And so on.

As to the tanks. Put the word out that tanks are a no-no. The rebels must be told that any tank anywhere is a target. The RoE would be "You see a tank, you kill it." Let the pilots have some fun.

It is quite possibly too late already as the opportunity to put in a personal strike on Gaddafi may have passed. Then the question must be asked why is his TV and radio stations still working? I could go on.

The US and the EU have blown it... now it is just a matter of counting the bodies of the Libyans killed by Gaddafi to see just how incompetent the UN Security Council in particular is. There has to be a better way.

[carl]

Why would they "rely on the US" in the first place? How is it the business of the US to come to the rescue of the Libyans, Ivorians, Zimbabweans, Rwandans etc? The Iraqi Shi'a have a legitimate complaint, to the extent that the US actively encouraged them to rebel, but I can't see how any of the others ever had any reason to expect to be rescued by Americans. As far as I know the US has never been appointed saviour of the world.

I don't know if we have any duty to act, or if we can be legitimately criticized for not acting, but it the case of Rwanda at least, we could have, and it would not have taken much. If we had at least those 800,000 people would be alive. We were the only ones who could have, and we should have.

[Dayuhan]

This should have been done... unilaterally some time ago...

Unilaterally by who?

[Dayuhan]

I don't know if we have any duty to act, or if we can be legitimately criticized for not acting, but it the case of Rwanda at least, we could have, and it would not have taken much. If we had at least those 800,000 people would be alive. We were the only ones who could have, and we should have.

If it would not have taken much, why are we the only ones who could have? Are we the only ones on the planet who have deployable military forces?

[rant]
It's easy to look at any given case and wish the US would do something, or had done something. Add all those cases together and you quickly see how impossible it is. The attitude that the US is the only one who can and therefore the one who must un-f&ck every f&cked-up situation on the planet has got to stop, unless of course the planet wants to tax itself to underwrite the expense involved.

Maybe the UN needs to hire a bunch of Gurkhas and set up its own capacity to intervene in places where it doesn't take much to make a difference. Maybe Europe and a bunch of others need to step up and seriously work on developing a rapid response intervention capacity. I don't know what the answer is, but I know the answer is not "let's all point to America and bleat".

A lot of people didn't want the US as sole superpower. Well, fine, they got their way: we aren't. We haven't the economic capacity, our forces are far too expensive to deploy, there are far too many places that need help, and we've overcommitted in places we never should have stayed in (or in some cases been in) in the first place.

Time to start working on a better way, certainly. The US can and should be involved in that better way, but it cannot and should not be America's responsibility to go about the world playing caped crusader.
[/rant]

[JMA]

It's a bit more complex than that. The political problems are quite significant but there's also a purely military reluctance to do some things on two counts; marginal training has reduced trust and confidence making commanders, in some cases, reluctant to push out; there is a sensing that the political constraint will bring this to no good end therefor commanders are reluctant to risk people on adequately aggressive patrolling and missions. Add in the societally induced risk aversion inherent most everywhere in today's world and you have a recipe for unwillingness. That unwillingness, BTW is not so much a decision, unconscious or otherwise, to avoid casualties as it is a desire to avoid waste -- not precisely the same thing.

Yes, I guess that over time the "disease" has spread to the military as well.

How has it been lost (as soldiers learned long, long ago) that fortune favours the bold? That skilfully planned bold military actions/strikes yield the best results in terms of results and low (own force) casualties. If this has been lost then the officer corps may well have become a liability.

I am still confused about the supposed concern over casualties in Afghanistan. If that concern was genuine then why are patrols being forced to walk through "medium minefields" on a daily basis? So what exactly is going on?

This is an excellent summary:

""The Boer Wars are a reminder of how a relatively small force with solid local support were able to run circles around a large conventional army which was too slow to adapt to the conditions on the ground and the tactics of the enemy. It took a policy of scorched earth to finally break the back of the rebellion (a policy which the Brits would rather not talk about even today).""

Insurgents and the like will always be more flexible and innovative while displaying more decentralized initiative than any big Army -- size is an impediment all its own...

My point was that by attempting these incursions, we are playing to the opponents strengths and while some such interventions may be inevitable, most can be avoided by producing far better trained forces that do not have to undergo a learning curve in each new endeavor; by having better (just halfway decent... intel and more competent diplomacy. Militarily, we need to be more competent in the basics and to add the capability to conduct strategic raids with flexible forces as opposed to relying on mass and opponent attrition. The Pentagon has constrained the Politicians by having a too limited menu of capabilities. It also needs to get out of the diplomatic business and force State to do their job. We can't cure the domestic focus or electoral cycle problem but can fix those Pentagon related things...

The "incursions" only play into the hands of the enemy - IMHO - if we go in there swinging like a drunken bar brawler and taking out more civvies than gooks. How to avoid this?

Well I have commented a few times on how ridiculous it is to drop kids from London, New York and Vancouver into Afghanistan and expect them to acclimatise and fight an established enemy on his home ground... just like that. To make matters worse we rotate the troops out just when they are possibly beginning to get an inkling of what it is all about in Afghanistan. After ten years there no excuse exists for the manner in which the war in Afghanistan is being prosecuted. Whether Petraeus is part of that problem only time will tell.

The key to good intel is continuity (... and can you trust the local Afghan police and military intel?). Again there is virtually none of quality in ISAF down where it matters (as I understand it).

Yes the basics are critical in the Commander's Plan is to work. But these basics must be the basis on which to build. Adapt or die is a pretty apt description of what needs to happen on the ground. But with inflexible RoE how do you release the skill of your troops on the enemy to maximum effect? What is the point of training up troops to a high level if they are restricted to the point of being ineffective on operations? You go figure.

Yes, you have to hit their bases. With air strikes or raids or both. But they will always mix in with civilians for sex, food and shelter so will be ready to claim all kills are civilian and it was another US war crime. This is why you need smart ops planners and first rate recce. It is not as difficult as it seems.

Just imagine what could have been achieved by now if the whole Afghanistan exercise had been taken seriously from the beginning. We would see one time Lts now as Maj/LtCols and troopies as sergeants - with that time in theatre and experience ISAF would be unstoppable.

Soldiers must be soldiers. If you look at the French example from Algeria there is a cross-over with Civic Action teams where some military input will be required ... but that input would (I would say never but will settle for) rarely if ever involve infantry officers (who were involved in the clear phase of the operation). - read more from McCuen page 152-166. I remember when the special forces were trained to do this sort of work... that was before they threw that all away and settled on forming assassination squads. Are there any Green Berets left who will move in and live in the villages with the people?

Regrettably true -- also true is the fact that some stick around in spite of political tribulations to attempt to alleviate some of the damage as they know the Pols will always be able to keep digging down until they reach someone who will do even more harm...

This is why I am hopeful that what Woodward wrote in his book - Obama's Wars - about the military not rolling over as they have done before is true. It is the only thing what will save the military.

[JMA]

I don't know if we have any duty to act, or if we can be legitimately criticized for not acting, but it the case of Rwanda at least, we could have, and it would not have taken much. If we had at least those 800,000 people would be alive. We were the only ones who could have, and we should have.

Yes the US should have... but in fact contributed towards it all happening - through:

In reality the United States did much more than fail to send troops. It led a successful effort to remove most of the UN peacekeepers who were already in Rwanda. It aggressively worked to block the subsequent authorization of UN reinforcements. It refused to use its technology to jam radio broadcasts that were a crucial instrument in the coordination and perpetuation of the genocide. And even as, on average, 8,000 Rwandans were being butchered each day, U.S. officials shunned the term "genocide," for fear of being obliged to act. The United States in fact did virtually nothing "to try to limit what occurred." Indeed, staying out of Rwanda was an explicit U.S. policy objective.

It was rank incompetence from a man unfit to be the most powerful man in the world who had surrounded himself (as they mostly do) with idiots (the main one being in this case the wimp Warren Christopher).

The story of U.S. policy during the genocide in Rwanda is not a story of willful complicity with evil. U.S. officials did not sit around and conspire to allow genocide to happen. But whatever their convictions about "never again," many of them did sit around, and they most certainly did allow genocide to happen. In examining how and why the United States failed Rwanda, we see that without strong leadership the system will incline toward risk-averse policy choices. We also see that with the possibility of deploying U.S. troops to Rwanda taken off the table early on—and with crises elsewhere in the world unfolding—the slaughter never received the top-level attention it deserved. Domestic political forces that might have pressed for action were absent. And most U.S. officials opposed to American involvement in Rwanda were firmly convinced that they were doing all they could—and, most important, all they should—in light of competing American interests and a highly circumscribed understanding of what was "possible" for the United States to do.

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/...genocide/4571/

In 1998, President Bill Clinton traveled to Rwanda and apologized for Washington's failure to act. Analysts say that after the U.S. military humiliation in Somalia in 1992, the Clinton administration was hesitant to intervene again in an African conflict.

In Rwanda on Tuesday, Rwandan President Paul Kagame accused the international communityfor failing to stop the killings of being "cowards" who "abandoned" the Rwandan people.

U.S. says it failed to stop Rwanda Genocide

In her memoirs, Living History, Hillary Clinton, the current secretary of state, does not write about what went on in the White House during those god-awful weeks in the spring of 1994, when human rights activists were begging the Clinton administration to do something--anything--to stop or slow the mass-murder frenzy underway, and the Clintonites steadfastly refused their entreaties. Clinton does note that later on she came to "regret deeply the failure of the world, including my husband's Administration, to act to end the genocide."

Remembering Rwanda--and the Clinton Failure

All the above and what about Bosnia?

For outsiders looking in at the US it is a constant source of amazement that such a great nation can continually elect such gross incompetents to the highest office in the land and allow a system where this person surrounds himself with even greater idiots. There is a massive gap between the good the US could have achieved in the world and what it in fact has. Such a great pity.

[jmm99]

from Dayuhan
Maybe the UN needs to hire a bunch of Gurkhas and set up its own capacity to intervene in places where it doesn't take much to make a difference.

was the idea of UN Charter, Chapter VII - more specifically:

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible [JMM: Never done] on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
.....
Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43 [JMM: Never done], by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Now, John Bolton and I are not great lovers of these provisions ; but they do exist. In truth, I don't expect to see a permanent UN Security Force in my lifetime (I don't know about brother Bolton).

Each of us here at SWC has different ideas (constraints and restraints) of where and when our own countries (recognizing that about 15-20% of SWC is non-USAian) should or should not engage. I know that "pure interventionists" and "pure non-interventionists" may exist (if any are here, let him or her come forward).

My own views are fairly basic (not unlike those of GWB is his 2000 Presidential Campaign) - subject to the "... but" proviso ( ):

World Map US Limits.jpg

and, in a sense (because they've existed in my head for so long), they are carved in stone (though "only somewhat"; remember the "but" in "Never Again, but ..." - and re: current armed conflicts, e.g., the executive agreements, both GWB & BHO, re: our "continuing partnership" with Astan).

That being said, a different or even opposing view (while I am not likely to accept it) is not perceived by me to be "vile", etc. So, we here at SWC will have different views on what are really very basic policy questions ("Politik" in CvC terms). Like Ken, I have great doubts as to whether most of our politicians have the slightest idea about what we speak.

They ain't read the manuals, much less had the experience.

We can ask, however, that they and we be realistic in these matters - and that those inspired by idealism realize that others may not not share in it. I happened to run into this comment while reading a real (hardcover) book tonite - which inspired this post to some extent:

There is a difference between us French [Colonial Troops] and Don Quixote. Don Quixote rode against windmills believing they were giants, but we ride against windmills knowing that they are windmills - but doing it all the same because we think that there ought to be someone in this materialistic world who rides against windmills.

HT to COL Wainwright (yup; he was French - commandant de Groupement Blindé[*] ) - Marc Lagrange might appreciate the TdM sentiment.

The point is that each of us has his or her own ideals, perceptions, etc., etc. re: his or her country's role in the World (each of us has an individual Worldview). That individual Worldview very much influences each of us.

Regards to all

Mike

---------------------------
[*] The TdM also had an LTC MacCarthy in Indochina ca. 1952-1954 (commandant de 10e Moroccan Tabor), who was probably a very distant relative - most of these "Wild Geese" MacCarthys went and stayed in France or its colonies before 1700.

There also was a Vigny (de Vigny) who was (supposedly) a general in the "French Indochina War" (per Jack McCuen, but with no refs in his book beyond the name; and that Michigander - RIP - is no longer available to ask). The "general de Vigny" was probably a cousin. If someone has more info on him, I'd appreciate it.

[Dayuhan]

The point is that each of us has his or her own ideals, perceptions, etc., etc. re: his or her country's role in the World (each of us has an individual Worldview). That individual Worldview very much influences each of us.

Ideals and perceptions of roles in the world must compete with the harsh realities of interests and capacities. The US in particular needs to make it absolutely clear that we are not going to be policeman to the world: if it's true that "something must be done", others are going to have to pitch in and do their share.

I'd have no objection to US forces intervening in Libya as part of a coalition, provided that it was a real coalition with meaningful participation from everyone involved, not 90% US, 5% Britain, 5% token forces from 20 different countries. Unilateral action is just not appropriate: for one thing, it encourages others, particularly in Europe, to continue the habit of moaning, rending their garments, waiting for the Americans to do something, and then whining about American bellicosity. People who think something needs to be done have to be ready to stand up and do it, not wait for someone else.

[davidbfpo]

So the Arab League have called for a NFZ, IIRC described by the BBC yesterday a 'notoriously reluctant organisation'. Having checked the IISS Military Balance, Egypt alone has a reasonable air force (F16s mainly, some F4 & Mirages) and a small AEW capability. So why is the focus on the USA?

If Egypt and smaller contributions from other Arab League members can be assembled, surely the USA & NATO could provide non-lethal support only? Lethal action by Arabs only would be IMHO a massive gain.

Turning to the ground fighting. It struck me that the loyal to Gaddafi forces are a mixture of militia, volunteers, army and the "corset" of mercenaries. Might there be a danger in over-extending themselves in pushing eastwards?

[davidbfpo]

The military balance of Libya’s domestic conflict is raising debate about external intervention. But the strategy of the Gaddafi regime is also crucial to what happens next.

The article has some good background on the strategic geography.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-ro...rospect-of-war

[Bob's World]

So the Arab League have called for a NFZ, IIRC described by the BBC yesterday a 'notoriously reluctant organisation'. Having checked the IISS Military Balance, Egypt alone has a reasonable air force (F16s mainly, some F4 & Mirages) and a small AEW capability. So why is the focus on the USA?

If Egypt and smaller contributions from other Arab League members can be assembled, surely the USA & NATO could provide non-lethal support only? Lethal action by Arabs only would be IMHO a massive gain.

Turning to the ground fighting. It struck me that the loyal to Gaddafi forces are a mixture of militia, volunteers, army and the "corset" of mercenaries. Might there be a danger in over-extending themselves in pushing eastwards?

It is not in the interest of any Arab leader to contribute to a no fly zone; after all, there but for the grace of Allah (and a robust internal security network) goes their own country. They will likely let this play out as a lesson to their own respective populaces what they will have to face if they decide to act out in pursuit of liberty as the Libyans have.

It is really up to the West to decide where we stand on this issue of populaces faced with unendurable despotism. I know the U.S. is on record on this matter, and that position is a bold one that may make many in and out of government uncomfortable today:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security. — Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world."


The tyranny in the Middle East is far greater than that suffered by American colonists, but a populace feels the way they feel, and those outside that populace are in no position to judge the veracity and extent of those feelings.

What happened in America was quite natural. What is happening in the Middle East is quite natural as well. A right is a powerful thing in the law, it is something that cannot be denied. A duty also is a powerful thing in the law, as it imposes a necessity to act. These few words in this single paragraph are all very intentional.

In short, the US recognizes the duty and the right of the Libyan people to act out in insurgency. We recognize this right in all people. Just as we recognize the duty of all governments to "... to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed..."

That is some powerful stuff, it is the cornerstone of my heritage as an American citizen, and I embrace it.