And Libya goes on...

[SWJ Blog]

The Battle for Libya

Entry Excerpt:

Over at the The New York Review of Books, Nicolas Pelham offers another look into defining and describing the motivations and interest of those rebelling in Libya in his article "The Battle for Libya."

BLUF Tucked between the Mediterranean and the Sahara, the Libyan town of Brega was a rather somnolent back-of-the-beyond place on the Gulf of Sidra in the north of the country. Oil workers went there for its high wages and decent schools—an engineer at the Sirte Oil Company earned ten times more than his counterpart in the armed forces.

No longer. Brega, which sits on an oil lake, has become a battlefield in the fight against the government of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. Bombs drop among oil depots filled with hundreds of thousands of barrels, and in the past two weeks, the company managers have had to deal with four changes of regime. To hedge bets they keep in touch with both the rebels in Benghazi, to the east, and the Qaddafi regime in Tripoli, to the west.

The battle for Brega and a nearby but larger terminal, Ras Lanuf, has significantly upped the stakes in Libya’s conflict. It is being fought halfway between Colonel Qaddafi’s tribal heartland of Sirte and the rebel base in Benghazi, a city of 800,000, and has drawn traditional desert tribes into the revolution, including the large Maghraba and Zawiya clans, on whose coastal scrubland Brega lies. It also threatens to draw in an outside world jittery that southern Europe’s nearest oil supplies are now jeopardized.

Much more at The New York Review of Books



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[Bob's World]

http://articles.janes.com/articles/J...IFG-Libya.html

This short summary from Jane's is as good as any.

BLUF is that the LIFG has been running a nationalist insurgency for years, and they do employ an Islamist ideology (smart, given their target audience and the nature of the government they seek to take down); and they do affiliate with AQ and provided foreign fighters to go to Iraq to help AQ there.

It's not all about the US, there are many Western countries that are perceived as contributing to the current batch of despots that hold sway across the Middle East. One has to get past the rhetoric and brands and focus on the basic dynamics at work.

LIFG has not been mentioned much in reporting on recent events in Libya. I would assume that is more intentional than accidental given their past affiliations, espoused ideologies, and the fact that we have been carrying them as a Terrorist organization on our books for several years now, and since 2007 have been working with Qaddafi to help suppress them in the name of GWOT. This is a second order problem from us letting the Intel bubbas slap big "Terrorist" and "Al Qaeda" labels on every group that is forced to resort to illegal means to affect change of government, or every such group that is engaged by AQ. LIFG is both. It traps us into not being able to work with the people who can help us most. This was true with the Nazis in post WWII Germany, that Baathists in Iraq, the Taliban currently in Afghanistan, and now likely the LIFG in Libya. When one gets too focused on the "threat" or "enemy" they limit themselves in their ability to deal with the "problem"

It is safe to assume that LIFG is perhaps the most organized aspect of the current movement and that AQ is doing their best to strengthen their ties and spin current events as something that they have brought about.

Once liberty is attained though, often the ideologies employed to motivate the masses, and the leaders and organizations that carried much of the fight fade away, as their sole purpose for existing is no longer there. If one slapped a bell curve on the Libyan populace one would probably find hardcore Qaddafi people on one tail, and hard core Islamists on the other. The vast center is that moderate majority that just wants reasonable liberty, rights, and the ability to live their lives to the best of their abilities in freedom and peace. The evil, the greedy, and those who lust for power will all show up to exploit to their ends.

From Chaos comes opportunity. From great Chaos come great Opportunity. Our challenge is to shape and mitigate the chaos. Effects in Libya must be secondary to how we employ this operation as a Stratcom to the Arabian Peninsula.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

Cannoneer,

Easy big guy, not calling you racist, rather just pointing out that your observation is one that is commonly made of certain groups based upon the perceptions those outside the group in question. While a satisfactory brand of "liberty" for an average Libyan is likely quite different than for the average American the critical issue is that there is a universal quest in alll mankind for whatever it is they see as meeting that mark.

It is the unsatisfactory brand of liberty they have a nasty habit of taking that concerns me.

It is no less arrogant and condescending to assume that an Arab doesn't understand what liberty is today than it was for some southerner to assume that African Americans wouldn't know what to do if they were freed from slavery.

Not going there. Google "Reconstruction"

But yeah, I do want to "kill you message" if your message is that Libyans wouldn't know what to do with liberty if they had it. One has to assume that the current rebels come from a cross-section of the populace. Some are looking for loot, some for power, most simply to achieve what they have no legal peaceful means the achieve. One should also assume that there are agents representing Islamist groups seeking to gain an advantage. I would assume there are a variety of national agents at work as well. All seeking to advance the interests of their respective organizations..

My message is that the anti-KaDaffy forces are not necessarily Good Guys. One does NOT have to assume that the current rebels come from a cross-section of the populace. Didn't they tell you what happens when you assume? The rebels are more deeply aggrieved, more actively hostile, more violent than the fence-sitters. Some of them were trying to kill me in Iraq four years ago.

Have we identified those factions that we would prefer did not gain the greatest influence, or do we provide close air support for whoever is fixing to get whipped? Does the whole coalition support and blacklist the same factions? How does a faction get off the excrement list and become eligible for CAS & air drops & all the material benefits of being a valued tool of the Great Satan?

[Dayuhan]

LIFG has not been mentioned much in reporting on recent events in Libya. I would assume that is more intentional than accidental given their past affiliations, espoused ideologies, and the fact that we have been carrying them as a Terrorist organization on our books for several years now, and since 2007 have been working with Qaddafi to help suppress them in the name of GWOT.

Exactly how have we been "working with Qaddafi to suppress them"? That seems a quite dramatic overstatement.

Do we have any real evidence that LIFG is a significant player in the current rebel movement?

It is safe to assume that LIFG is perhaps the most organized aspect of the current movement and that AQ is doing their best to strengthen their ties and spin current events as something that they have brought about.

I'm not sure it's ever safe to assume. Unless there's tangible evidence, best to leave such questions open. "We don't know yet" is a lot more honest and a lot less dangerous than "it is safe to assume". Once we assume that it's safe to assume we get committed to our assumption, and that can make it more difficult to adapt down the line if our assumptions prove invalid.

I'm not sure the model of nationalist insurgencies accepting help from AQ because they need help from anywhere they can get it is necessarily valid. What has AQ actually done to help these insurgencies? In many cases (not necessarily in Libya) the affiliated movements are the ones supporting AQ, not the other way round.

Once liberty is attained though, often the ideologies employed to motivate the masses, and the leaders and organizations that carried much of the fight fade away, as their sole purpose for existing is no longer there.

Are you assuming that LIFG is essentially a nationalist insurgency that is simply using Islamist ideology as a tool? If so, on what evidence is that assumption based?

How are you defining "liberty" when you say "once liberty is attained"? It's a relevant question, because the fall of a despot often does not mark the arrival of "liberty".

Why would you assume that the ideology will fade away once the despot falls and the revolutionaries take over (let's not pretend that this has any intrinsic relationship to "liberty")? Did the Taliban's ideology fade when they gained power? We've a limited data set for Islamist revolutionaries, but if we look at communist revolutions, the ideology didn't necessarily fade when the revolutionaries won. Did the ideology fade in Cuba or North Korea? Sometimes it faded down the line, or was overthrown, but there was often a wee mess in the interval. Ask a Cambodian about that... or a Russian, or a Chinese.

If one slapped a bell curve on the Libyan populace one would probably find hardcore Qaddafi people on one tail, and hard core Islamists on the other. The vast center is that moderate majority that just wants reasonable liberty, rights, and the ability to live their lives to the best of their abilities in freedom and peace. The evil, the greedy, and those who lust for power will all show up to exploit to their ends.

Is that assumption based on specific evidence emerging from Libya, or is it based on an abstract model?

From Chaos comes opportunity. From great Chaos come great Opportunity. Our challenge is to shape and mitigate the chaos. Effects in Libya must be secondary to how we employ this operation as a Stratcom to the Arabian Peninsula.

How exactly do you propose to "employ this operation as a Stratcom to the Arabian Peninsula"? What exactly do you propose that we do in Libya, and how do you propose to leverage that action as "Stratcom to the Arabian Peninsula".

My concern in Libya is that there are major limits to the end-state goals that we can realistically hope to achieve with the level of force we are willing (and, realistically, able) to commit. We prevented the sack of Benghazi; that's done. We might be able to remove MG or enable the rebels to remove him. We absolutely cannot assure liberty or good governance, and it would be folly to establish those as goals when we know we cannot achieve them.

Our folly in Iraq and Afghanistan was that once we'd done what we had the capacity to do (remove governments) we attempted what we did not have the capacity to do (replace them with governments that would govern the way we would like to see these countries governed). Gotta hope we don't fall into that trap in Libya.

[jmm99]

on one hand, U.S. finds no organized Al Qaeda presence in Libya opposition, officials say (on p.1):

Eastern Libya, the rebels' base, has a history as a breeding ground for Islamic militants, but an intelligence-gathering effort has not uncovered a significant number of extremists, officials say.

March 23, 2011
By Ken Dilanian, Los Angeles Times

Despite fears that Islamic extremists may be playing a hidden role in the rebellion against Moammar Kadafi, the U.S. intelligence community has found no organized presence of Al Qaeda or its allies among the Libyan opposition, American officials say.

A U.S. intelligence-gathering effort that began shortly after anti-Kadafi forces started seizing towns in eastern Libya last month has not uncovered a significant presence of Islamic militants among the insurgents.

"We're keeping an eye out for extremist activity in Libya, but we haven't seen much, if any, to date," said a U.S. counter-terrorism official. A Defense official added that the U.S. had not seen a direct link between the opposition and extremists. ...

But, on the other hand (on p.2):

Charles Faddis, who led a CIA team in northern Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and who retired in 2008, questioned whether the U.S. intelligence community really understands who the rebels are.

"Everyone wants to believe the opposition consists of individuals dedicated to a democratic revolution," Faddis said. "Is that true?"

"Is this a political movement or a tribal one? What we need is solid intelligence on the nature of the opposition, who the key figures are, who is going to emerge on top. I suspect we do not have that, because our collection inside Libya, a denied area, has probably been very weak for a very long time."

Since his retirement, Faddis has written several interesting books: Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War Inside Iraq; Willful Neglect: The Dangerous Illusion of Homeland Security; and Beyond Repair: The Decline and Fall of the CIA.

If you search SWC for "Faddis", you will find about a dozen posts that mention him: military background, legal background (as a death penalty prosecutor) and CIA Operations.

All in all, the verdict is far from definitive as to what the Libyan rebels actually are, now - much less as to what their revolt will become if a "success".

"Regime removal" is different from "regime change" - as Steve correctly points out:

from Dayuhan
My concern in Libya is that there are major limits to the end-state goals that we can realistically hope to achieve with the level of force we are willing (and, realistically, able) to commit. We prevented the sack of Benghazi; that's done. We might be able to remove MG or enable the rebels to remove him. We absolutely cannot assure liberty or good governance, and it would be folly to establish those as goals when we know we cannot achieve them.

Our folly in Iraq and Afghanistan was that once we'd done what we had the capacity to do (remove governments) we attempted what we did not have the capacity to do (replace them with governments that would govern the way we would like to see these countries governed). Gotta hope we don't fall into that trap in Libya.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

This makes sense:

Charles Faddis, who led a CIA team in northern Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and who retired in 2008, questioned whether the U.S. intelligence community really understands who the rebels are.

"Everyone wants to believe the opposition consists of individuals dedicated to a democratic revolution," Faddis said. "Is that true?"

"Is this a political movement or a tribal one? What we need is solid intelligence on the nature of the opposition, who the key figures are, who is going to emerge on top. I suspect we do not have that, because our collection inside Libya, a denied area, has probably been very weak for a very long time."

I would add, though, that just because the Libyan rebels are not necessarily a united movement for democracy and/or liberty does not necessarily mean that they are influenced or dominated by AQ. There are lots of other things they could be, and given the sudden nature of the outburst it's likely that they haven't even figured it out yet. They know they don't want MG, but what they do want remains unclear and probably varies a great deal among those who constitute the rebellion.

I think it's unwise to assume a unitary Libyan populace and impose a bell-shaped curve ranging between political extremes, with a moderate majority in the center. Populaces don't necessarily fracture that way, and it this case you have the historic Tripolitania/Cyrenaica divide and a wide range of tribal lines as well. Each of these sub-populaces is likely to have its own distribution of opinion and desired end state, with the end state of "us over them" likely to be a consistent factor.

[jmm99]

State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh gave this Statement Regarding Use of Force in Libya:

Remarks
Harold Hongju Koh
Legal Advisor U.S. Department of State
American Society of International Law Annual Meeting
Washington, DC
March 26, 2011

The crux of the statement on I Law is contained in this paragraph:

These United States military actions rest on ample international legal authority. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter grants authority to the Security Council to decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security where it determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression (Article 39). Articles 41 and 42 further specify that the Security Council may take such action by air, sea and land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Acting under Chapter VII, in Resolution 1973, the Security Council determined that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes a threat to international peace and security (PP21), and : (1) in operative paragraphs 6 to 8 of the resolution imposed a No-Fly Zone in the air space of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians, and authorized states to take “all necessary measures” to enforce that No-Fly Zone in accordance with the Resolution, (2) in operative paragraph 4 authorized Member States to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory; and (3) in operative paragraph 13 authorized Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out inspections aimed at the enforcement of the arms embargo. Under the Security Council authorizations, Member States may also work through regional organizations or arrangements and with local partners who share the goal of preventing attacks on civilians or civilian populated areas.

So far as I Law is concerned, this statement is unexceptionable. According to its Charter, the UN had and has very broad authority to mandate "peace enforcement". Whether that mandate was or was not wise in this case - e.g., how far do "all necessary measures" go ? - is another question (not of law, but of policy). Whether the US should or should not belong to the UN, NATO or any other multi-national organization are also political questions.

As to US domestic (constitutional) law, I find L.A. Koh's statement problematic:

The President directed these actions, which are in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, pursuant to his constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. The President has well-recognized authority to authorize a mission of this kind, which as he explained, will be time-limited, well-defined, discrete, and aimed at preventing an imminent humanitarian catastrophe that directly implicates the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. The Administration has been closely consulting Congress regarding the situation in Libya, including in a session with the bipartisan leadership that the President conducted before his announcement. Before Resolution 1973 was adopted, on March 1, 2011 the Senate adopted its own resolution by unanimous consent (S. Res. 85) calling for a No-Fly zone. The President has acted consistently with the reporting requirements in the War Powers Resolution, and has furthermore indicated that he is committed to ongoing, close consultations with Congress as the situation develops.

What was and what was not done here by Pres. Obama parallels that done by Presidents Truman (Korea) and Clinton (Kosovo), which I felt and still feel were unconstitutional - and also unwise because they failed to enlist the affirmative support of the other elected branch of government.

But, the sin of unconstitutionality in this type of case is a "political question" (not one to be decided by the courts). And, the remedy under the Constitution would be impeachment of the President by Congress - which is not about to happen. It is up to Congress to declare the President's actions illegal. In the absence of such congressional action, the President's actions stand legally.

I find it interesting that Mr Koh's position is not that far removed from Mr Yoo's.

Regards

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

The rebels just announced they took Syrthe. If proven true, this would be a major shift.

Personnaly, I need explanation on the declarations of Mr Gate who said operation could take months. Must be motivated by domestic politic but does not reflect, even partialy, reality on the ground.

About the rebels:as in all civilian uprising or rebellion, the ones who have military/weaponery knowledge are not Mr and Mrs smith. For the recall, during WW2, allied forces used italian and corsica mafia (not really good guys). The question is rather can the west establish strong enough contacts with guys who are muslims, nationalist and also shaped by their cultural environment to become the next government? You cannot blame people because they did fight the US in Irak. You can blame them if they intend to set a fascist calliphat in Libya.

[slapout9]

Link to interview of F.W.Engdahl on "The Coalition Of The Unwilling"


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jagot...mbedded#at=141

[CWOT]

My assumption is that AQ will try to take credit and take advantage of the Libyan uprising. I think AQ-LIFG linkages with the rebels have been overstated thus far. But, I don't think we should be naive about AQ types trying to influence key jihadi leaders in Darnah.

Here's six things I think we (US) should begin doing now to offset AQ ambitions. Would enjoy any further thoughts on what the U.S. should be considering. What else should we be doing?

1. End the Gaddafi regime immediately- Opposition to Gaddafi links rebels generally amenable to the West with jihadi's affiliated with LIFG-AQ types. The longer LIFG-AQ types remain embedded with other Libyan opposition groups, the stronger the bonds will be between them. Eliminating the Gaddafi regime will allow for more moderate rebel groups to emerge and repel AQ aggression.

2. Push moderate rebel leaders to the forefront- The West should move to place a face on the Libyan opposition. Strategic communications should be implemented quickly to demonstrate to the world that the Libyan opposition is clearly not the result of AQ inspiration. This could be accomplished through publicized communication with select opposition leaders and widely broadcast television interviews with key rebel partners allied against Gaddafi and LIFG-AQ linked groups. Current amorphous descriptions of the Libyan opposition create ambiguity allowing for biased interpretation; ambiguity easily capitalized on by AQ elements taking credit for a revolution they missed.

3. Don’t waste an opportunity-The U.S. wanted to counter jihadi elements in Darnah three years ago. The NFZ and the vacuum created by the crumbling Gaddafi regime should not be wasted. If AQ moves to bolster their position in Libya, the West should be prepared early to use soft and hard power options directly and through surrogates.

4. Isolate Darnah if necessary- LIFG-AQ support and presence in Darnah has existed for a long time. The West should move aggressively to monitor and isolate Darnah if it goes the way of AQ. Own the border crossing from Egypt. Monitor desert crossings with aerial surveillance. Control the coast through the Navy. Darnah is one of the few places AQ might reside where the West retains distinct capabilities to monitor the region from land, sea and air.

5. Engage the EU reference an AQ Libyan safe haven - Should AQ gain a safe haven in Libya, the greatest threat will initially be to Europe. The U.S. has proceeded responsibly by letting NATO take the reins of the NFZ. EU countries need to step up in the CT effort in Libya. Italy, France and the UK all have reason to get engaged.

6. Prepare for something other than democracy in Libya - I hope lessons learned from trying to institute democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan reasonably moderate the West’s vision of Libya’s political future. Freedom comes in many forms and often time incrementally. Libya remains a tribal, oil dependent country. Constructing a unified democracy without occupation is likely impossible. Libya may find renewed political stability and economic vitality quicker if it pursued an emirate type structure; a form closer to the original Barbary states or similar to the UAE. Can the West accept this? Can they help this happen? This will be tough. Bottom line: a weak democracy is more beneficial to AQ while stronger sub-states can be a useful counter against AQ aggression.

From:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=187

[SWJ Blog]

Lessons for Libya?

Entry Excerpt:

Lessons for Libya?
Flawed Policy and the Inevitability of Military Failure: The Anglo-French Suez Expedition of 1956
by Brian C. Collins

Download The Full Article: Lessons for Libya?

Thesis: The disastrous outcome of the Anglo-French expedition of 1956 was not the result of tactical incompetence, but rather a consequence of flawed policy.

Discussion: It is critical for policy-makers to not only understand the difficulties of armed intervention, but also the commitment of will required. If policy limitations preclude waging the type of war necessary to achieve strategic objectives, the pursuit of other options becomes imperative. Professional military members expend a great deal of energy to understand the relationship between politics and war. It would be wise for policy-makers to do the same so as to avoid the pitfalls experienced by the British and French in 1956. Tactically, the British and French - in concert with the Israelis - mobilized, deployed, and employed a diverse military force to compel the fall of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egyptian government. Operationally, the campaign required a degree of coordination between not only national entities, but branches within the armed forces as well which had yet to be exhibited in an operation of such limited size and scope in the twentieth century. Strategically, geo-political influences and factors forced the withdrawal of British and French forces before ever achieving the purpose for which the military campaign was intended – the removal of the Nasser. This paper examines the Anglo-French expedition to identify the root causes which lead to this tremendous failure in order to provide lessons for the national leadership of today.

Conclusion: The failure of the Anglo-French expedition of 1956 was clearly the result of flawed policy, not tactical incompetence. The political establishment’s failure to anticipate reaction in the context of Cold War balance of power politics, their discount of options other than military action, and insistence upon planning to obtain limited objectives, all contributed directly to the ignominy which would follow.

Download The Full Article: Lessons for Libya?

Lieutenant Colonel Brian C. Collins, USMC is the Deputy Foreign Policy Advisor at Headquarters, US Special Operations Command. The views expressed herein are his own.



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[Cannoneer No. 4]

You cannot blame people because they did fight the US in Irak. You can blame them if they intend to set a fascist calliphat in Libya.

I can withhold my support for this war of choice that SECDEF himself doesn’t think is a vital interest for the United States and I can persuade, change and influence as many American voters as I can to do the same.

Whoever is in charge of strategically communicating to me and managing my perception that the consumers of Libyan oil, the Libyan people, and the anti-Kadaffy rebels are worthy of the American treasure (and, inevitably, blood) expended on their behalf has his work cut out for him.

[Bob's World]

In a slightly different take, I don't think we need to counter AQ in Libya. I think we need to out compete AQ in Libya for the trust of the populace (I almost wrote "support," but we don't need the support of the Libyan populace, their reforming/emerging government does, we "merely" need to earn their trust.

Part of earning that trust will be in how we treat those who have affiliated with the LIFG. While this has been the most active, most closely tied with AQ, tip of the iceberg of the dissatisfied populace of Libya, they are part of that populace. Instead of isolating, I would move now to take them off of the terror list and ensure that they have an appropriate voice in what happens next.

To ignore those who have committed their lives to staying and fighting for freedom for years because we disagree with the ideologies they have adopted, or who they had to turn to for assistance now that they are on the cusp of achieving their Ends is the classic mistake we always make. We overlook the rough, dirty fighters and become enamored with some smooth expat opportunist who is less offensive to our sensibilities and throw our lot in with such, and elevate them into power as the new dictator that now owes allegiance to the US and our interests. It's time to break that model. It sure as hell isn't working for us in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan we elevated such "moderates" and attempted to "isolate" those who we felt were too close to AQ. In so doing we crafted a situation that ensured the current insurgency there and us being stuck once again (as in Vietnam, as in Iraq, etc) battling to sustain what we have created against resistance from the populace we have foisted such governance upon.

Less is more. I think we need to beware the Johnny come lately "moderates," and we need to keep an open mind in regard to those who we have struggled with in the past. To exclude the LIFG is to ensure that most active segment stays in the AQ camp and continues to wage international terror on their behalf. We need to let Libyans decide what the fate of the LIFG is, and also allow them to decide who they think should lead them.

[M-A Lagrange]

I can withhold my support for this war of choice that SECDEF himself doesn’t think is a vital interest for the United States and I can persuade, change and influence as many American voters as I can to do the same.

Whoever is in charge of strategically communicating to me and managing my perception that the consumers of Libyan oil, the Libyan people, and the anti-Kadaffy rebels are worthy of the American treasure (and, inevitably, blood) expended on their behalf has his work cut out for him.

Then you better change your mind as the US flotte in the Mediterrane buys oil from the Italian who bouht it from the Libyans. Then it's quite in your interrest to get involved and make sure that you have friends in Libya rather than ennemies.

[SWJ Blog]

Forging a Libya Strategy

Entry Excerpt:

Forging a Libya Strategy: Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration by Andrew Exum and Zachary Hosford, Center for a New American Security Policy Brief.

While the situation in Libya continues to change rapidly, the most prudent course of action for the United States is to execute a strategy that would minimize the U.S. commitment to Libya and protect the United States from a potentially protracted and resource-intensive conflict, according to this policy brief by Center for a New American Security (CNAS) experts Andrew Exum and Zachary Hosford.

In Forging a Libya Strategy: Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration, authors Exum and Hosford argue that U.S. interests in Libya, which include the protection of civilians and providing momentum to the revolutionary fervor sweeping the region, come at a potentially high cost to the United States. In addition, continued engagement may detract focus and resources away from other critical issues in the region and globally. Exum and Hosford offer four policy recommendations for the United States that limit the U.S. expenditure of blood or treasure:

Use Positive and Negative Incentives to Force Moammar Gadhafi from Power. The United States and its allies should continue to use international financial sanctions to help force Gadhafi from power. The United States should also press an African or Arab nation to accept Moammar Gadhafi and his family into exile. While that means Gadhafi could depart Libya as a free man, it would help end what promises to be a protracted and bloody civil war.

Halt Direct Military Operations. Now that the U.S.-led naval attacks and air strikes have prevented a humanitarian crisis, the United States should refrain from further direct military operations in Libya and only contribute military assets that fill capability gaps in coalition forces conducting operations related to the enforcement of the no-fly zone or arms embargo.

Help Build a Coalition To Provide Non-Military Support. The administration should work to build support among the nations of Africa, Europe and the Arabic-speaking world to provide aid to the people of Libya – to include police trainers, rule-of-law specialists and all the other means necessary for successful stabilization operations.

Be Willing to Accept the Status Quo Ante Bellum. Should the allied intervention end with Gadhafi still in power, and he again threatens military action against anti-government rebels and civilians, the United States should not re-engage militarily. The Obama Administration, meanwhile, will have plenty of other opportunities – in Syria, Egypt, Bahrain and elsewhere – to support the popular revolutions and demonstrations in the Arabic-speaking world.

Forging a Libya Strategy: Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration



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[davidbfpo]

My assumption is that AQ will try to take credit and take advantage of the Libyan uprising.

I find it difficult today from my armchair to see how AQ, more particularly LIFG & AQIM, can claim 'credit' when it is a local rebellion that has survived and made gains to date due to Western air power. A rebellion in which the Jihadists are a minority, yes, I know so were the Bolsheviks in 1917 Russia. Plus the reported acclaim by those in eastern Libya for the Western action and responses of civilians to the downed US pilots.

If anything AQ has been singularly quiet on its contribution in Tunisia, Egypt and now Libya.

[davidbfpo]

Full of adjectives and I've no idea who the author is, but it is ......

THE grotesque competition between Britain, France and the US to see who can fire the most missiles at Libya confirms the emergence of a new form of Western militarism.

Link:http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news...-1226026968542

[Ken White]

LINK.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...s=rss_homepage

Not surprised. FMCNL told me when they left England.

The C-in-C could use some dramatic gun camera video of kinetically disassembling Kadaffy's tanks to sell this war. Love watching Air Force gun bunnies feed that 105mm.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

http://www.wsbradio.com/weblogs/jami...-libya-speech/