And Libya goes on...

[Cliff]

What do we do if Libya continues internal civilian air flights? Shoot them down? Qaddafi is certainly capable of putting up civilian aircraft for the purpose of luring NATO into an embarrassing incident.

Rex, this is not a showstopper tactically. Iraq had airliners flying fairly routinely, and as I pointed out we've been enforcing NFZs over the US for 10 years with lots of civilian traffic. Yes we could use the NFZ as cover for other bombing, but as Entropy points out, why - the strategy for the NFZ is the biggest issue.

Crowbat-

I agree, Libya is a pretty big country. Still, only slightly larger than Iraq, it's do-able. All the significant infrastructure and the entire IADS is on the coast as has been pointed out, so that helps. You don't really need to patrol to the southern border even if you're trying to interdict the flow of folks/supplies from the south - open desert most of the way so you could hit them downstream.

Entropy-

I agree, the why is the big question... what would our strategy be? The objective would mostly seem to be to try and help in some way or another... But what is our desired outcome?

Finally a point for all-

I disagree strongly that the NFZs in Iraq were a failure. The NFZs not only prevented Saddam's air force from gassing more civilians, but it also let us monitor his army and deterred ground action. The northern NFZ in particular basically kept Saddam from attacking the Kurds, and the result is that Kurdistan is the most stable and functional part of Iraq. The objective was to contain Saddam- and it worked. I may be partial due to having played a part, but I think the results were positive.

V/R,

Cliff

[carl]

If it were decided that a no fly zone were a good thing, could we approximate it with some Aegis destroyers stationed just offshore? Those missiles are fairly long ranged, the radars are very good and the main road runs along the coast. How close though I don't know.

The idea would be to give the rebels some visible support, destroyers are easy to see. But at the same time not put any troops ashore and avoiding complications that would come with that. Politically we could be seen as actually doing something concrete to help, which might help us if the rebels win. But by not putting troops ashore, it would still be their victory if they can manage it.

Strategically, the goal would be to topple the dictator, but we would only be willing to put so much into achieving that goal. It would be a limited effort for a big goal. If the dictator won he wouldn't be any more mad at us than he is now.

I don't know much about naval operations but it might be easier logistically than a no fly zone enforced by aircraft flying over the country.

This is just an idea by a forever civilian so please eviscerate it if it has no merit.

[M-A Lagrange]

Now that US and EU decided to stand by the rebels: it's time for action.
The only advantage, part from military experience, that G and his troops have is the control of the air.

Sure a NFZ is not that easy to set. But the rebels are running out of time! A Kosovo like operation (Air and only air op) to support the rebels would defenitively weight the balance in the right direction.

[Rex Brynen]

Rex, this is not a showstopper tactically. Iraq had airliners flying fairly routinely, and as I pointed out we've been enforcing NFZs over the US for 10 years with lots of civilian traffic. Yes we could use the NFZ as cover for other bombing, but as Entropy points out, why - the strategy for the NFZ is the biggest issue.

in this case, however, I'm talking about military traffic in civilian aircraft (unlike Saddam, there is some value to Qaddafi in moving troops and supplies by air), or possibly civilian traffic in military aircraft (intended to provoke a shoot-down).

[Entropy]

Now that US and EU decided to stand by the rebels: it's time for action.
The only advantage, part from military experience, that G and his troops have is the control of the air.

If we're going to do this, then we shouldn't be half-assed about it. A NFZ is not enough in my judgment - if we're going to help the rebels, we should embed small teams with combat controllers to provide fire support to rebel formations and make this civil war as short as possible.

Also, I think the Europeans need to take the lead on this.

[CMSbelt]

NFZ is a tactic. Very doable, relatively low-risk although not risk-free, but still a tactic. To what purpose? What further expectations will this raise?

As far as the strategic message to the extremists, what happens if the NFZ doesn't change anything on the ground? Does this make the US look like a "weak horse" once again? Conversely, even if effective, might it support the Al Qaeda narrative of "Crusaders killing Muslims to steal their oil"?

As to using a NFZ as an excuse for wider ground attack missions, what would be the second and third order effects? Just because a lot of Libyans want to get rid of Qaddafi by force doesn't mean they want someone else bombing their country. The historical record is that such interventions are more likely to unify the population under the current regime than cause them to rise up against it.

Overthrowing Qaddafi might be a desirable objective, but then what? Why do we think the near-term outcome of deposing Qaddafi in Libya would be more favorable to US interests than at least the first 5 years after we got rid of Saddam turned out to be?

If Qaddafi is defeated, with or without external intervention, the odds of political chaos and a humanitarian disaster ensuing are pretty high. Further slaughter as the winners take revenge and/or continue the fighting to decide who amongst them will replace Qadaffi is also rather likely.

Merely deposing Qaddafi isn't going to make Libya suddenly look like Switzerland (or even Jordan, to use a less sarcastic metaphor).

The Colin Powell warning about "You break it, you buy it" is well worth keeping in mind here.

"Just do SOMETHING" rarely turns out to be good policy.

[Entropy]

Yeah, what CMSBelt said. George will also has some good questions that need answering in today's WAPO:

* The world would be better without Gaddafi. But is that a vital U.S. national interest? If it is, when did it become so? A month ago, no one thought it was.

* How much of Gaddafi's violence is coming from the air? Even if his aircraft are swept from his skies, would that be decisive?

* What lesson should be learned from the fact that Europe's worst atrocity since the Second World War - the massacre by Serbs of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica - occurred beneath a no-fly zone?

* Sen. John Kerry says: "The last thing we want to think about is any kind of military intervention. And I don't consider the fly zone stepping over that line." But how is imposing a no-fly zone - the use of military force to further military and political objectives - not military intervention?

* U.S. forces might ground Gaddafi's fixed-wing aircraft by destroying runways at his 13 air bases, but to keep helicopter gunships grounded would require continuing air patrols, which would require the destruction of Libya's radar and anti-aircraft installations. If collateral damage from such destruction included civilian deaths - remember those nine Afghan boys recently killed by mistake when they were gathering firewood - are we prepared for the televised pictures?

* The Economist reports Gaddafi has "a huge arsenal of Russian surface-to-air missiles" and that some experts think Libya has SAMs that could threaten U.S. or allies' aircraft. If a pilot is downed and captured, are we ready for the hostage drama?

* If we decide to give war supplies to the anti-Gaddafi fighters, how do we get them there?

* Presumably we would coordinate aid with the leaders of the anti-Gaddafi forces. Who are they?

* Libya is a tribal society. What concerning our Iraq and Afghanistan experiences justifies confidence that we understand Libyan dynamics?

* Because of what seems to have been the controlling goal of avoiding U.S. and NATO casualties, the humanitarian intervention - 79 days of bombing - against Serbia in Kosovo was conducted from 15,000 feet. This marked the intervention as a project worth killing for but not worth dying for. Would intervention in Libya be similar? Are such interventions morally dubious?

* Could intervention avoid "mission creep"? If grounding Gaddafi's aircraft is a humanitarian imperative, why isn't protecting his enemies from ground attacks?

* In Tunisia and then in Egypt, regimes were toppled by protests. Libya is convulsed not by protests but by war. Not a war of aggression, not a war with armies violating national borders and thereby implicating the basic tenets of agreed-upon elements of international law, but a civil war. How often has intervention by nation A in nation B's civil war enlarged the welfare of nation A?

* Before we intervene in Libya, do we ask the United Nations for permission? If it is refused, do we proceed anyway? If so, why ask? If we are refused permission and recede from intervention, have we not made U.S. foreign policy hostage to a hostile institution?

* Secretary of State Hilary Clinton fears Libya becoming a failed state - "a giant Somalia." Speaking of which, have we not seen a cautionary movie - "Black Hawk Down" - about how humanitarian military interventions can take nasty turns?

* The Egyptian crowds watched and learned from the Tunisian crowds. But the Libyan government watched and learned from the fate of the Tunisian and Egyptian governments. It has decided to fight. Would not U.S. intervention in Libya encourage other restive peoples to expect U.S. military assistance?

* Would it be wise for U.S. military force to be engaged simultaneously in three Muslim nations?

[Bob's World]

Actually Qaddafi staying and seriously opening talks and embracing reforms with his populace is superior to him running off into exile.

But the problem the US has is that we do a lot of lecturing on values and human rights; then when a populace dares to act out we look away.

The question for the US is if we have vital interests at stake in how this plays out. Not in if Qaddafi stays or goes, but in how it plays out in deciding that and how our role is perceived. The entire Arabian Peninsula is teetering as we type, and our actions could well affect whether that stabilizes, or which way it tips.

It is the pent up rage of these populaces that AQ has fed upon, this is the festering boil of oppression that has fed the war on terrorism for 15 odd years. Now it is rupturing, and that pressure will either finally be relieved, or it will be reasserted by either the current or new management. How ever it plays, the West will be judged by these populaces, and if we play this wrong, terrorism continues and may get worse. If we play it right things begin to heal.

This is far more important than Afghanistan is for getting to resolution in the war on terror. Afghanistan is just where AQ planted the flag, but North Africa and the AP are where the people who support their movement live in varying states of oppression.

For Libya, this is all about Libya. But for the US this is far, far larger.

[Entropy]

Bob,

That's all well and good, but what, specifically, would you have the US do?

[Bob's World]

That, my friend, is the Billion dollar a day question.

The first thing is to understand why these populaces have been supportive of AQ, why they are dissatisfied with their current governance, and why they tend to act out against the West in a effort to create change.

Next is to not fixate on Libya for Libya's sake, other than as one of many target audiences for whatever it is we do. It should by helpful for the Libyan people, but it must be shaped to the much larger strategic effect desired.

Next is to engage all of the dozen or so nations involved privately and diplomatically to lay out where we stand and what we are going to do in Libya, and what we are prepared to do with each of them depending on which way they self-determine to go. That is the thing about self-determination and free will, it opens the door to make some bad decisions with bad consequences. We should have learned by now that there is a communication gap between the west in general, the US in particular, and this region (like Saddam thinking he had a formal green light to take Kuwait). We must be clear.

As to Libya specifically, I lean toward making a deal with Qaddafi to allow him to stay in power for some set term to shape a way forward with heavy Arab/UN involvement in exchange for a truce with his people. If he refuses, up the ante a bit. Figure out what his pressure points are and apply pressure. To simply call for him to step down is probably the wrong thing. To just fly in and start blasting is also probably the wrong thing. (At least at first)

This is all so incredibly foreseeable that State should have a big play book that they are walking the President through with the Joint Chiefs right now. Not holding my breath, but we can catch up if they don't have that homework done.

Part of this play would absolutely to squeeze the Saudis to ramp up production for some surge time to keep the global economy stable.

Just some quick thoughts. But we need to open the aperture, step back, and get strategic if we want to maximize this opportunity.