And Libya goes on...

[Bob's World]

Fuchs, I suspect your "oil math" is the direct costs and only the tip of the iceberg; with the majority of the true costs to the US, and in turn, the global economy looming beneath the surface in the indirect effects.

A better point to support your argument is that it is a global market and all of these countries must sell oil to survive. For the even the Saudis to threaten to not sell us oil is like a small child threatening to hold its breath until it gets its way. Either it must soon gasp for air or collapse; or you just turn the impetuous brat over your knee and remind him of his true place in the big scheme of things. Bottom line, is that such disruptions are minor.

For Germany, the better example is probably your relationship with Russia than your relationship with Libya when we discuss the US and the Middle East as a whole.

All of this could be solved in short order if the US were a good colonial empire like our similarly situated predecessors. We would have simply colonized all of these places, or carved off the parts that we wanted (ala the Brits all along the gulf coast, Hong Kong, Singapore, etc) and exerted our dominion over the same, taken the resources at cost, and emplaced puppet regimes to guard our interests under the Stars and Stripes.

But we are in this moral middle-ground. An "Empire without Colonies" is how I see it. We get into all the same messes, but with half the benefit and far less ability to easily smack unruly leaders and populaces back into line when they try to exert some independence as well. We'll just chalk that up as a phase we had to go through.

Now it is time to move on to the next phase, perhaps a "World Power without Empire"? Who knows, but events such as are unfolding now across the middle east are shaping that transition right now. We miss all of that if all we do is stare into the flames.

We live in dynamic times, and an new era is emerging. I personally think it will be an era marked my much more conventional warfare, though with new non-state players in the mix in new ways, than this transitionary period has been. We would be foolish indeed if we confuse transition for the new reality and prepare for it rather than what comes next.

[Entropy]

Don't cuss at anyone unless you're prepared to be cussed in return. Do not ever pull a gun on anyone unless you're prepared to use it. Do not employ military force unless you're prepared for the escalation that will almost certainly occur.

I doubt that truer words have been written.

[Ken White]

We live in dynamic times, and an new era is emerging. I personally think it will be an era marked my much more conventional warfare, though with new non-state players in the mix in new ways, than this transitionary period has been. We would be foolish indeed if we confuse transition for the new reality and prepare for it rather than what comes next.

And thus far I see little evidence that we are doing so...

[Bob's World]

And thus far I see little evidence that we are doing so...

We'll see when we attempt to use mortars, MRAPs and Strykers to fight a conventional foe that is more force or terrain oriented than the current internal conflicts we have gotten into the middle of.

There are still plenty of unresolved and evolving issues in that huge fault line of Eastern European States; coupled with a mix of geo-political realities that could boil up into conventional state on state conflicts in the near future. The US has a habit of getting sucked into these things. Alliances will shift, muscles will flex. It is inevitable.

In the east the Japan/China dynamic will continue to grind along as well. Hard to say how that could play out, but undoubtedly it will affect the US. We fixate on North Korea and Taiwan, but those are probably low on our list of real worries in that region.

Don't have a crystal ball, but do think it is best to remain postured for maximum flexibility, and being capable of deterring or dealing with threats that can actually hurt us; rather than getting over fixated and fixed to problems that in the big scheme of things are fairly minor irritants.

[Ken White]

We'll see when we attempt to use mortars, MRAPs and Strykers to fight a conventional foe that is more force or terrain oriented than the current internal conflicts we have gotten into the middle of.

Yep. Trying to be something one is not always causes one to buy things that are not only not needed but a drain on other things...

The US has a habit of getting sucked into these things. Alliances will shift, muscles will flex. It is inevitable.

The US does have a terrible penchant for trying to 'fix' things that aren't ours to fix...

Don't have a crystal ball, but do think it is best to remain postured for maximum flexibility, and being capable of deterring or dealing with threats that can actually hurt us; rather than getting over fixated and fixed to problems that in the big scheme of things are fairly minor irritants.

Heh. True -- and some don't even really rise to the minor irritant level...

[carl]

The objections to helping the rebels in a small way are mostly to the effect of "all or nothing"; we land the Marines or we do nothing at all. The logic motivating this is that if there is an immediate critical national interest at stake, we do all and if there is not, we do nothing. A corollary of that position is that if we do anything, we will inevitably do all; all or nothing again.

This puts us at a huge disadvantage when dealing with a situation that is a national interest, as I believe the Libyan rebels prevailing is, but is not an immediate vital national interest. In those cases we have to stand by and watch. However it may be a national interest that we be able to do something (there's that phrase, go ahead and run with it) in these kinds of situations rather than nothing. There is no reason we can't limit our efforts. We did it in the early part of the 20th century and we are doing it now in the Philippines.

The nature of the things I suggested might help limit involvement. Ships offshore (probably 25 miles) manned by professional sailors, shoulder fired anti-aircraft missile teams composed people employed by an OGA, A-teams composed of professional warriors. It seems to me that a situation like this is exactly why we have those types of forces, so they can be used in unconventional ways in order to limit the depth of our involvement. The ships are on the ocean, the OGA isn't readily visible and the A-teams would stay back in order to help coordinate a disorganized effort, not be up front leading. All are of great value but none are "all" nor are they "nothing".

An effort like that may not work out. But that is not a reason to try. If we have the self-discipline required to limit the effort we may gain much while risking little. The ability to do that is a valuable thing. If it doesn't work, we will have lost little. Ken made the point that they may be worse off for us having helped if they fail. That may be true, it is never wise to provoke the god of "it can't be any worse"; but I suspect, suspect mind you, that given the nature of the dictator, the rebels only options are to win or....

Surferbeetle: It is true the Euros have lots of advanced, well maintained ships, aircraft and well trained soldiers. But it is also true they don't do anything but maintain and train. If anything is to be done, we will be the ones to do it. Because we do. They don't.

[Entropy]

The objections to helping the rebels in a small way are mostly to the effect of "all or nothing"; we land the Marines or we do nothing at all. The logic motivating this is that if there is an immediate critical national interest at stake, we do all and if there is not, we do nothing. A corollary of that position is that if we do anything, we will inevitably do all; all or nothing again.

I wouldn't characterize it that way at all. First, what is the objective? Do you know? I sure don't. The use of military force must have a purpose - what is that purpose? "Doing something" without a goal is worse than stupid. The level of force required completely depends on what we're trying to do.

[Bob's World]

It is probably worth noting that the best Qaddafi can likely hope for with his current tact is to restore a state of forced suppression over the insurgency. To reset the conditions of failure. The conditions of insurgency will remain quite high, and having had a whiff of liberty this is not a populace that will quit their pursuit of liberty after a "whiff of grape."

The people may re-engage violently, or as is often the case, become more organized and pursue more effective non-violent means to better leverage popular support with international legal organizations.

Qaddafi will likely offer up some lame, inadequate concessions, much as the Saudis are currently doing. My advice to all of these nervous despots is that now is not the time to be tight-fisted. Either have the balls to totally and ruthlessly crush your own populace so that they dare not complain; or in the alternative concede that the royal party is over and that it is finally time to give the people some means to legally affect government, listen to their concerns, and make reasonable concessions on important issues. There is little tolerance in today's information age for option one, so best to go with option two. Most will be able to retain power if this is how they go.

For American leaders, stop staring at Libya and wringing your hands. Step back, look at the big picture, and act. This is far bigger than Libya, and in that context the US absolutely has interests at stake. But remember that what we do here sets a precedent for when similar events unfold in Yemen or Saudi, etc. As Jim Rome says on his sports radio show "Have a take, and don't suck!"

[carl]

I wouldn't characterize it that way at all. First, what is the objective? Do you know? I sure don't. The use of military force must have a purpose - what is that purpose? "Doing something" without a goal is worse than stupid. The level of force required completely depends on what we're trying to do.

I stated the purpose in the first sentence of the second paragraph of the post you quoted from, the rebels prevail. The level of force that I outlined, all just ideas from an interested civilian, is I believe comensurate (sic) with that limited goal.

I think the removal of the dictator will benefit the Libyan people in the short run, us in the short run, stabilizing the oil market, and us and the world in the long run, one less dictator.

There will be no certainty of course. In a situation this dynamic there never will be a certainty. If a certainty is a pre-requisite for limited action, then that is, I think, just another way of saying "all or nothing."

[Ken White]

Consider also:

A corollary of that position is that if we do anything, we will inevitably do all; all or nothing again.

Two issues there. First, the "inevitably do all" isn't exactly right, it is not inevitable -- however, it it is historically what seems to occur. IOW, the precedents are that a commitment of military force, no matter how small tends to escalate, not necessarily to an "all" situation but certainly to be bigger and messier than anticipated (LINK). Often far messier...

Secondly, one is constrained by the capabilities one actually has -- not that one would like or is working on but that exist at the time of commitment. What you propose is viable -- what we have to actually do that with in the way of trained, competent and sustainable forces (and supporting elements) is not much. That is sad, given the amount of money we spend and the talent that is available but it is a fact and must be considered. We should be able to do things along the lines you suggest, we have not provided ourselves with the capabilities, civilian and military, to do that without committing standard military units and elements that are not really competent to do what's needed; IOW we need a scalpel with a 15c blade and all we have is a Panga. Thus your statement:

This puts us at a huge disadvantage when dealing with a situation that is a national interest.

is absolutely correct, need not and should not be -- but it is.

If we have the self-discipline required to limit the effort we may gain much while risking little.

That's true -- and we do not seem to have that self discipline. Part of that is engendered by our political system which is clumsy and constantly interferes with itself by design. That gets to be annoying at times -- like on this issue -- but on balance, I wouldn't change it. What it has produced is worth the annoyances.

... but I suspect, suspect mind you, that given the nature of the dictator, the rebels only options are to win or....

Regrettably true. Been that way for thousands of years. It gets a little better each year, there are fewer and fewer of those problems about but I doubt it'll ever go away totally. People...

[JMA]

I personally think it will be an era marked my much more conventional warfare, though with new non-state players in the mix in new ways, than this transitionary period has been. We would be foolish indeed if we confuse transition for the new reality and prepare for it rather than what comes next.

Between who and who?

The problem the US is experiencing in Afghanistan is their inability to fix the enemy. If the US are able to fix the enemy they will kill it with the overwhelming force available to them.

The Boer Wars are a reminder of how a relatively small force with solid local support were able to run circles around a large conventional army which was too slow to adapt to the conditions on the ground and the tactics of the enemy. It took a policy of scorched earth to finally break the back of the rebellion (a policy which the Brits would rather not talk about even today).

So maybe your forecast expresses the hope that some bunch of idiots will try to take on a major power in a conventional war rather than any real likelihood.

[Bob's World]

Between who and who?

The problem the US is experiencing in Afghanistan is their inability to fix the enemy. If the US are able to fix the enemy they will kill it with the overwhelming force available to them.

The Boer Wars are a reminder of how a relatively small force with solid local support were able to run circles around a large conventional army which was too slow to adapt to the conditions on the ground and the tactics of the enemy. It took a policy of scorched earth to finally break the back of the rebellion (a policy which the Brits would rather not talk about even today).

So maybe your forecast expresses the hope that some bunch of idiots will try to take on a major power in a conventional war rather than any real likelihood.

JMA,

I think you are getting your apples mixed in with my oranges a bit here. Rather than agonizing over the tactual inability to "fix" the enemy, it may be more instructive to step back and ask what exactly the Brits were doing in South Africa and what exactly the US is doing in Afghanistan and what they hoped to gain from their respective operations.

Neither were on their home turf, but my understanding is that the British intent was to stay, setup shop, and establish dominion and governance over the region and all who lived there. Killing off all who opposed such an arrangement works, as was well demonstrated in North and South America.

The US goals in Afghanistan are quite different. "All" (in quotes, because even this is infeasible) the President has asked us to do is “to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.” I believe that would make the "enemy" AQ rather than the Taliban, and any earth that gets "scorched" in the process is not going to belong to either the US or AQ, now is it?

If asked, I would advise the President to back his guidance back a notch or two to something more along the lines of “to disrupt al Qaeda in South Asia without destabilizing either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”

After all, I believe we can achieve disruption of AQ in concert with Pakistan and Afghanistan in a manner that is acceptable to the Pashtun populace they take their sanctuary among; but that we certainly will not be able contain AQ in the FATA, nor "dismantle/defeat" them by operations that only take place in that one little corner of their global playground.

No, our problem is not a tactical one, our problem is that we have mischaracterized the nature of AQ in general, and then allowed ourselves to get into a supporting operation of helping the Northern Alliance gain power in Afghanistan and then defending them against the other half of the society that was represented by the Taliban.

Kind of like cops in hot pursuit chasing a murderer into someone's home, and then getting caught up in a domestic dispute there while the murderer hides out in the house next door, where he ran to with the abusive head of the first household to hide out with his relatives. Here we are attempting to force a resolution of our own making onto someone else's domestic drama, and totally losing sight of why we even ran into this madhouse in the first place. Meanwhile the murderer is still at work, running his global operation, enjoying the support of the abusive husband we threw out into the street, while we are stuck with the crazy wife and her kids back in the house. Probably time to just say our good byes, and get back to the business that brought us here.

[JMA]

JMA,

I think you are getting your apples mixed in with my oranges a bit here. Rather than agonizing over the tactual inability to "fix" the enemy, it may be more instructive to step back and ask what exactly the Brits were doing in South Africa and what exactly the US is doing in Afghanistan and what they hoped to gain from their respective operations.

Not sure I am Bob. Who would be crazy enough to want to take any of the larger/major powers with "much more conventional warfare"? Take look back at the South Ossetia war where Georgia made a miscalculation over Russian willingness to resort to military action (and the unwillingness of the US to support them in the face of and at the risk of some real war).

So in this and the previous response I am addressing the likelihood of "much more conventional warfare" in the future.

Yes, I guess one could step back and find a few small points about any different action/war which will render the lessons learned tenuous (in some peoples minds). I say that one (certainly the US) should learn (or better should have studied and learned from) from the British experience of fighting wars all over their empire and the world against disparate enemies. Most often arriving in a new land to face a new enemy with an arrogance in the officer corps (who knew it all from past campaigns) to ensure early reverses against any but the most inept enemy.

To excuse their history of more losses than victories the Brits will tell you that in a war all you need to do is win the last battle.

Like the Brits in the Boer wars who threw "numbers" rather than brain power at the problem so have the US begun to use "surges" as their means of overwhelming their enemies (as a variation on that theme). May have worked in South Africa circa 1900 and in Iraq but maybe not so good in Afghanistan (time will tell).

Neither were on their home turf, but my understanding is that the British intent was to stay, setup shop, and establish dominion and governance over the region and all who lived there. Killing off all who opposed such an arrangement works, as was well demonstrated in North and South America.

May I suggest you need to improve upon your understanding of the events around the two Boer wars

The US goals in Afghanistan are quite different. "All" (in quotes, because even this is infeasible) the President has asked us to do is “to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.” I believe that would make the "enemy" AQ rather than the Taliban, and any earth that gets "scorched" in the process is not going to belong to either the US or AQ, now is it?

Is that what is happening on the ground?

But that does not matter. The fact remains that the US and Brit forces in Afghanistan has no chance of winning any war there against the Taliban, the heroin producers and dealers, or anyone else. Bad strategy, tactical restrictions and in too many cases just plain poor soldiering give a prognosis of no hope in hell.

[snip]

No, our problem is not a tactical one, our problem is that we have mischaracterized the nature of AQ in general, and then allowed ourselves to get into a supporting operation of helping the Northern Alliance gain power in Afghanistan and then defending them against the other half of the society that was represented by the Taliban.

The problem is a tactical one in that without tactical competence the goals (of the US president, what ever they may be at any given moment) cannot be realised.

[snip]

[Ken White]

Between who and who?

Lots of little guys -- think the 1930s, once removed...

The problem the US is experiencing in Afghanistan is their inability to fix the enemy.

That's the "Not really" -- it's not an inability, it is unwillingness, two very different things.

Unfortunately, the problems thus generated are that unwillingness creates excessive own casualties and sends a bad message on ability and / or capability that can lead some to misjudge.

Alas, we've had that problem for many years and that's why the US should not play an active or overt part in these sorts of wars.

The Boer Wars are a reminder of how a relatively small force with solid local support were able to run circles around a large conventional army which was too slow to adapt to the conditions on the ground and the tactics of the enemy.

As Bob's World pointed out the British had reason to stay and do that -- or believed they did. We have no such impetus and we do not need to do these things. There is absolutely no reason for us to play to the strengths of others and hopefully, that will finally dawn on the power structure. My sensing is that it's finally starting to penetrate though there are of course the few odd, old Cold War fighters Bob properly denigrates...

The point being the British were forced to play to their adversary's strengths. We do not have to do that, yet we continue to try to do so and it's stupid. You'd think the Politicians would learn but they don't seem to do so...

So maybe your forecast expresses the hope that some bunch of idiots will try to take on a major power in a conventional war rather than any real likelihood.

Or expresses just the thought that some bunch of idiots may try to take on another bunch and we can either join them or, far better, just watch and be prepared to reject idiocy if it approaches.

[JMA]

Lots of little guys -- think the 1930s, once removed...That's the "Not really" -- it's not an inability, it is unwillingness, two very different things.

A political unwillingness translates into a military inability IMHO. How are soldiers supposed to do they job if they are not given the tools or not allowed to use them to maximum effect?

Unfortunately, the problems thus generated are that unwillingness creates excessive own casualties and sends a bad message on ability and / or capability that can lead some to misjudge.

Yes, if you mean that a politically induced military failure leads an observer to question the military rather than the politicians.

Alas, we've had that problem for many years and that's why the US should not play an active or overt part in these sorts of wars.As Bob's World pointed out the British had reason to stay and do that -- or believed they did. We have no such impetus and we do not need to do these things. There is absolutely no reason for us to play to the strengths of others and hopefully, that will finally dawn on the power structure. My sensing is that it's finally starting to penetrate though there are of course the few odd, old Cold War fighters Bob properly denigrates...

Sorry, but I believe my analogy (using the Boer wars and Afghanistan) holds good. In both cases it took too long to figure out how to conduct those wars. The bad news in Afghanistan is that there will be no final battle or peace treaty to decide the end of the war, only another ignoble withdrawal which will go down in history as another war loss for the US.

The point being the British were forced to play to their adversary's strengths. We do not have to do that, yet we continue to try to do so and it's stupid.

Tell me more... what did the Brits do?

You'd think the Politicians would learn but they don't seem to do so...Or expresses just the thought that some bunch of idiots may try to take on another bunch and we can either join them or, far better, just watch and be prepared to reject idiocy if it approaches.

Not enough soldiers reject the politicians strategy while still serving (which is sad but pensions are important and al that).

Yes as long as some precocious kid from some Ivy League university believes that when he is appointed to some position in government as a thank you for helping with a campaign he immediately is an expert in that field then the slope is still steep and the way down is still potentially far. Add to that the "smart guy" presidents and veeps (yes Obama and Biden) who don't don't know it from Shinola yet are framing military policy. The mind boggles. Its all very sad.

[Ken White]

A political unwillingness translates into a military inability IMHO. How are soldiers supposed to do they job if they are not given the tools or not allowed to use them to maximum effect?

It's a bit more complex than that. The political problems are quite significant but there's also a purely military reluctance to do some things on two counts; marginal training has reduced trust and confidence making commanders, in some cases, reluctant to push out; there is a sensing that the political constraint will bring this to no good end therefor commanders are reluctant to risk people on adequately aggressive patrolling and missions. Add in the societally induced risk aversion inherent most everywhere in today's world and you have a recipe for unwillingness.

That unwillingness, BTW is not so much a decision, unconscious or otherwise, to avoid casualties as it is a desire to avoid waste -- not precisely the same thing.

Yes, if you mean that a politically induced military failure leads an observer to question the military rather than the politicians.

Yes.

Sorry, but I believe my analogy (using the Boer wars and Afghanistan) holds good. In both cases it took too long to figure out how to conduct those wars.

That's true as we both have said with respect to Afghanistan, I assume based on what I've read that it is also true for the British - Boer wars.

The bad news in Afghanistan is that there will be no final battle or peace treaty to decide the end of the war, only another ignoble withdrawal which will go down in history as another war loss for the US.

Possibly true. We'll see.

Tell me more... what did the Brits do?

This is an excellent summary:

""The Boer Wars are a reminder of how a relatively small force with solid local support were able to run circles around a large conventional army which was too slow to adapt to the conditions on the ground and the tactics of the enemy. It took a policy of scorched earth to finally break the back of the rebellion (a policy which the Brits would rather not talk about even today).""

Insurgents and the like will always be more flexible and innovative while displaying more decentralized initiative than any big Army -- size is an impediment all its own...

My point was that by attempting these incursions, we are playing to the opponents strengths and while some such interventions may be inevitable, most can be avoided by producing far better trained forces that do not have to undergo a learning curve in each new endeavor; by having better (just halfway decent... ) intel and more competent diplomacy. Militarily, we need to be more competent in the basics and to add the capability to conduct strategic raids with flexible forces as opposed to relying on mass and opponent attrition. The Pentagon has constrained the Politicians by having a too limited menu of capabilities. It also needs to get out of the diplomatic business and force State to do their job. We can't cure the domestic focus or electoral cycle problem but can fix those Pentagon related things...

Not enough soldiers reject the politicians strategy while still serving (which is sad but pensions are important and al that).

Regrettably true -- also true is the fact that some stick around in spite of political tribulations to attempt to alleviate some of the damage as they know the Pols will always be able to keep digging down until they reach someone who will do even more harm...

Life, as they say, is just not fair...

Yes as long as some precocious kid from some Ivy League university believes that when he is appointed to some position in government as a thank you for helping with a campaign he immediately is an expert in that field then the slope is still steep and the way down is still potentially far. Add to that the "smart guy" presidents and veeps (yes Obama and Biden) who don't don't know it from Shinola yet are framing military policy. The mind boggles. Its all very sad.

Cheer up, things could be worse.

So I cheered up and sure enough things got worse...

[Pete]

About 20 years ago I read a news story that said the State Department Foreign Service revamped its personnel system using the U.S. Army's officer personnel policy as a model. The idea was that alternate specialties be introduced so people would be "well rounded" as opposed to specializing in only one specific area. Hence a jack-of-all-trades element may have been introduced. The news story said the big losers in the reform were those who built careers upon being experts on specific nations and regions -- I suspect they had come to be regarded by many in Washington as nay-sayers prone to stating all the reasons why a proposed policy that sounded good in Washington wouldn't work when applied to a particular nation overseas.

[Ken White]

About 20 years ago I read a news story that said the State Department Foreign Service revamped its personnel system using the U.S. Army's officer personnel policy as a model. The idea was that alternate specialties be introduced so people would be "well rounded" as opposed to specializing in only one specific area. Hence a jack-of-all-trades element may have been introduced...

That 'generalist' idea screwed up the Army so State -- and others in the USG copied it. Not because it's better for the agency, organization or mission -- it is not and most understood that at the time. However, it really makes the job of the Personnel weenies a whole lot easier...

Now that they're pretty much through screwing up the Oficer Corps, to compound the felony, the Army is revamping the WO program and is trying to 'generalize' them.

And the NCOs and many civilians. Soon all the folks in and with the Army will know nothing about everything...

We're nuts...

[JMA]

It's a bit more complex than that. The political problems are quite significant but there's also a purely military reluctance to do some things on two counts; marginal training has reduced trust and confidence making commanders, in some cases, reluctant to push out; there is a sensing that the political constraint will bring this to no good end therefor commanders are reluctant to risk people on adequately aggressive patrolling and missions. Add in the societally induced risk aversion inherent most everywhere in today's world and you have a recipe for unwillingness. That unwillingness, BTW is not so much a decision, unconscious or otherwise, to avoid casualties as it is a desire to avoid waste -- not precisely the same thing.

Yes, I guess that over time the "disease" has spread to the military as well.

How has it been lost (as soldiers learned long, long ago) that fortune favours the bold? That skilfully planned bold military actions/strikes yield the best results in terms of results and low (own force) casualties. If this has been lost then the officer corps may well have become a liability.

I am still confused about the supposed concern over casualties in Afghanistan. If that concern was genuine then why are patrols being forced to walk through "medium minefields" on a daily basis? So what exactly is going on?

This is an excellent summary:

""The Boer Wars are a reminder of how a relatively small force with solid local support were able to run circles around a large conventional army which was too slow to adapt to the conditions on the ground and the tactics of the enemy. It took a policy of scorched earth to finally break the back of the rebellion (a policy which the Brits would rather not talk about even today).""

Insurgents and the like will always be more flexible and innovative while displaying more decentralized initiative than any big Army -- size is an impediment all its own...

My point was that by attempting these incursions, we are playing to the opponents strengths and while some such interventions may be inevitable, most can be avoided by producing far better trained forces that do not have to undergo a learning curve in each new endeavor; by having better (just halfway decent... intel and more competent diplomacy. Militarily, we need to be more competent in the basics and to add the capability to conduct strategic raids with flexible forces as opposed to relying on mass and opponent attrition. The Pentagon has constrained the Politicians by having a too limited menu of capabilities. It also needs to get out of the diplomatic business and force State to do their job. We can't cure the domestic focus or electoral cycle problem but can fix those Pentagon related things...

The "incursions" only play into the hands of the enemy - IMHO - if we go in there swinging like a drunken bar brawler and taking out more civvies than gooks. How to avoid this?

Well I have commented a few times on how ridiculous it is to drop kids from London, New York and Vancouver into Afghanistan and expect them to acclimatise and fight an established enemy on his home ground... just like that. To make matters worse we rotate the troops out just when they are possibly beginning to get an inkling of what it is all about in Afghanistan. After ten years there no excuse exists for the manner in which the war in Afghanistan is being prosecuted. Whether Petraeus is part of that problem only time will tell.

The key to good intel is continuity (... and can you trust the local Afghan police and military intel?). Again there is virtually none of quality in ISAF down where it matters (as I understand it).

Yes the basics are critical in the Commander's Plan is to work. But these basics must be the basis on which to build. Adapt or die is a pretty apt description of what needs to happen on the ground. But with inflexible RoE how do you release the skill of your troops on the enemy to maximum effect? What is the point of training up troops to a high level if they are restricted to the point of being ineffective on operations? You go figure.

Yes, you have to hit their bases. With air strikes or raids or both. But they will always mix in with civilians for sex, food and shelter so will be ready to claim all kills are civilian and it was another US war crime. This is why you need smart ops planners and first rate recce. It is not as difficult as it seems.

Just imagine what could have been achieved by now if the whole Afghanistan exercise had been taken seriously from the beginning. We would see one time Lts now as Maj/LtCols and troopies as sergeants - with that time in theatre and experience ISAF would be unstoppable.

Soldiers must be soldiers. If you look at the French example from Algeria there is a cross-over with Civic Action teams where some military input will be required ... but that input would (I would say never but will settle for) rarely if ever involve infantry officers (who were involved in the clear phase of the operation). - read more from McCuen page 152-166. I remember when the special forces were trained to do this sort of work... that was before they threw that all away and settled on forming assassination squads. Are there any Green Berets left who will move in and live in the villages with the people?

Regrettably true -- also true is the fact that some stick around in spite of political tribulations to attempt to alleviate some of the damage as they know the Pols will always be able to keep digging down until they reach someone who will do even more harm...

This is why I am hopeful that what Woodward wrote in his book - Obama's Wars - about the military not rolling over as they have done before is true. It is the only thing what will save the military.

[JMA]

Now it is time to move on to the next phase, perhaps a "World Power without Empire"? Who knows, but events such as are unfolding now across the middle east are shaping that transition right now. We miss all of that if all we do is stare into the flames.

As much as some would prefer to ignore the fact the US needs oil and access to natural resources and world trade it is clearly obvious that intervention will be needed from time to time to ensure the above.

Looking at the US as an outsider it is obvious and understandable that the US needs to secure its access to oil, resources and trade and will do what it needs to do to ensure that. Sometimes not pretty but necessary.

(As an aside probably the only thing of value that the worst world leader in the last 50-60 years (Carter) attempted was to promote alternative sources of energy. Had this and drilling in the Arctic been actively promoted and pursued then maybe, just maybe, that together with tying up oil supplies from South America and West coast Africa then the issues in the middle east would be somewhat less of a problem today. What were the idiots in State doing all this time?)

It doesn't help (as I have stated before) that US policy radically changes every eight years.

That Gbagbo (in the Mickey Mouse country - Ivory Coast) can refuse to take a call from the US president means that he has seen around a million killed in the Rwandan genocide while the US saw no need to "get involved". It has seen brutal dictators like Mugabe all across Africa thumb their noses at the US and other western powers and get away with it. So what has he (and others like him) got to fear?

Then just like the Hungarians, still waiting (from 1956) for the US to come to their aid... as are the Iraqi Shias from 1991 and now the Libyans in 2011. The Shias can be forgiven (as they took the example of Kuwait) but the Libyans are obviously slow learners. The message is simple... you can't rely on the US.

The problem for the US is that it cannot go home and sit in the corner and suck its thumb unless it finds oil and a bunch of natural resources at home and can trade to a satisfactory internally or at most locally.

A great nation badly governed the US needs to start to take foreign affairs a little more seriously, I humbly suggest.