And Libya goes on...

[Dayuhan]

I do know that short of the EU and other UNSC members deploying mind control laser satellites over Washington, the notion that it was "impossible" for the US, the UK and/or France to act in absence of unspecified diplomatic preconditions is bunk.

I didn't say "impossible, and wouldn't have. I'd have said "very unwise", or maybe just "dumb".

The only two powers lifting a finger are the two nations that led the US in pushing for intervention. Precisely what does "g[etting] off their asses" mean? While you're at it, which countries actually "got off their asses," and why was it necessary to wait for them to do so?

Would those two powers have pushed if the US had thumped its chest and rushed to the front of the intervention line? We don't know, but i suspect not. It would not have been necessary for the US to wait, but it was certainly desirable.

The decision to act or not to act is the President's alone. Is this office now and forever beyond being held accountable for the decisions issued from it, or does this particular President get a get out of jail free card?

Certainly the President is and should be accountable for his decisions, and excellent reason for not making decisions to seize leadership we don't want or need and charge into intervention without suitable international sanction with ambitious goals that we haven't the resources to accomplish. No sane President would want to be accountable for the consequences of that decision.

Then what's the point of the intervention? Why not let the belligerents sort it out amongst themselves?

If control of the end state is the goal of intervention, intervention in this case would be a very bad idea, because we don't want to be responsible for the end state, and any effort to control it would require resources we are not prepared to commit.

They can't know their own objectives? That's new.

They know their objectives. they are very limited objectives and they do not involve long-term control of Libya or any effort to dictate an end state.

How is not planning at all even remotely better than planning to achieve a risky objective?

Who says they aren't planning at all?

You miss the point: limited objectives, limited participation. Sure, that opens up the possibility of mission creep... but it ain't our mission. We're in a supporting role with limited objectives. If the mission creeps to a place we don't like, or if we no longer have the means or inclination to participate, we can scale back without compromising any grand plan or vast objective that we've unwisely committed to... just as many others have done when they played support in missions we led.

Silly to commit yourself to an ambitious end-state plan when the whole point is to minimize involvement. People get attached to plans. Sometimes they get married to them. People expect you to follow them. Much better to pursue a limited objective, then reassess and determine whether it makes sense to go further.

This whole idea of supporting roles and limited objectives is admittedly an odd feeling for Americans, but I for one fond it refreshing and invigorating. We should have done it sooner, and we should do it more often.

[Presley Cannady]

I didn't say "impossible, and wouldn't have. I'd have said "very unwise", or maybe just "dumb".

Forgive me. "Impossible" was Rex's point.

Would those two powers have pushed if the US had thumped its chest and rushed to the front of the intervention line?

Would it have mattered?

Certainly the President is and should be accountable for his decisions, and excellent reason for not making decisions to seize leadership we don't want or need and charge into intervention without suitable international sanction with ambitious goals that we haven't the resources to accomplish. No sane President would want to be accountable for the consequences of that decision.

And the capability of the US + the UK and France suddenly sum to "enough?" More to the point, if the interests at stake do not justify the single most capable member of the Coalition exerting leadership, then precisely what reason is there for that member to even participate?

If control of the end state is the goal of intervention, intervention in this case would be a very bad idea, because we don't want to be responsible for the end state, and any effort to control it would require resources we are not prepared to commit.

Same question as above. If we do not have any interest in the end state, why intervene in the first place?

They know their objectives. they are very limited objectives and they do not involve long-term control of Libya or any effort to dictate an end state.

You've been very clear on what the White House does not count amongst its "limited objectives," but not so much on what those objectives actually are. At some point, you're going to have to say "Obama committed force to achieve X." That "X," as far as the White House is saying, is at the very least to halt Qaddafi's offensive against the rebels. If you're arguing that either the UK and France have sufficient capacity to achieve such an end state or that Americans have no interest one way or the other, then why are Americans intervening at all? If not, then why did the US wait to act?

Who says they aren't planning at all?

No one. You articulated a principle that foregoing planning was better than accepting the risk that planning may fail.

You miss the point: limited objectives, limited participation. Sure, that opens up the possibility of mission creep... but it ain't our mission.

If it ain't our mission, then once again...why bother?

[Rex Brynen]

Forgive me. "Impossible" was Rex's point.

Indeed it was. And the comment was made not with the suggestion that it was "impossible" to have done anything at all, but rather that positioning the US as a reluctant, non-hegemonic intervenor acting in the framework of international law couldn't have happened much faster than it did.

It certainly couldn't have occurred before the Arab League decision, since I don't see how the Russians and Chinese could have been moved off a UN veto.

Could the US have done it without the UNSC? Yes, but only at a very heavy and enduring political cost. It is doubtful that anyone beyond Britain and France would have joined--and even Britain and France were reluctant to act without a UNSCR, which is why they had been pushing a NFZ resolution.

Given that everyone knows this might not be over quickly, and could get messy, political sustainability is essential. Building the basis for that requires jumping through some diplomatic hoops.

[Entropy]

I normally don't post on current combat operations due to OPSEC concerns, but since I have absolutely no knowledge on this operation other than what I see in the media I'll offer a couple of thoughts.

Bill,

Those are all good points, but they rest on the assumptions that Gaddafi will go (one way or another) and that the rebels will win, unite the country and determine their own future.

David notes one of the underlying assumptions:

When Gaddafi's army commanders in the field realise that, like the Wehrmacht in north west Europe in early 1945, they could move nowhere without deadly air attacks upon them, they will think quickly about their loyalty.

Will they want to continue to show loyalty to their manifestly eccentric leader, or will they think about their loyalty to their country, their families, their tribes, their homes and themselves?

As they experience, or hear stories, of what modern combat aircraft can do to their Soviet-era fighting vehicles, the realisation will grow that there is a better way – and the implied task of regime change may well be on the way to being achieved.

This argument is, it seems to me, an article of faith. It may be true that MG is as weak as some suggest and that a demonstration of political will and a little air power is all that's needed to ensure his exit, but as a tautology, it's not very convincing.

So my question is this: What if this assumption is wrong? What if air power isn't enough? How will we escalate when we've already drawn a big red line limiting our actions? And that's really the problem with this "strategy." If the goal is to remove MG, then remove MG. Half measures (air power) along with wishful thinking is very risky. I say this as a strong air power advocate, but I think I understand the limitations of what air power can do when it's divorced from the ground element.

Secondly, assuming MG is overthrown or otherwise killed, what then? Advocates for this intervention are saying that what happens next is up to the Libyans. Well, easier said than done, particularly since we are supposedly there for humanitarian reasons. I find it hard to believe that we would intervene to "protect civilians" against MG and then stand by when/if the country descends into civil war or a retribution by the rebels. How generously will the region's population view our involvement in this case? History suggests there will be a strong pull to increase the intervention into nation-building. The argument that it's all "up to the Libyans" is, IMO, a flimsy mask which attempts to parry questions on the risks inherent in a post-MG Libya. Everything might work out, but then again it might not. What is our plan if things don't work out, if the wishful thinking and rosy assumptions don't materialize? Again, as a tautology, the idea that we will simply leave once MG is gone no matter the circumstances is not convincing.

[tequila]

In a Field of Flowers, the Wreckage of War in Libya - NYTIMES

BENGHAZI, Libya — The attack seemed to have come out of clear skies onto a field of wildflowers.

Littered across the landscape, some 30 miles south of Benghazi, the detritus of the allied airstrikes on Saturday and Sunday morning offered a panorama of destruction: tanks, charred and battered, their turrets blasted clean off, one with a body still caught in its remnants; a small Toyota truck with its roof torn away; a tank transporter still on fire. But it did not end there.

For miles leading south, the roadsides were littered with burned trucks and burned civilian cars. In some places battle tanks had simply been abandoned, intact, as their crews fled. One thing, though, seemed evident: the units closest to Benghazi seemed to have been hit with their cannons and machine guns still pointing towards the rebel capital.

To the south, though, many had been hit as they headed away from the city in a headlong dash for escape on the long road leading to a distant Tripoli.

“They were retreating,” said Col. Abdullah al-Shafi, an officer in the rebel forces which had clamored desperately for the help that arrived on Saturday. “Soldiers had taken civilians cars and fled. They were ditching their fatigues.”

Superb pictures up at the NYTIMES website. Looks like the allies are using the UNSC resolution to the fullest.

[Ken White]

I note this face saving spin on the actions of the US politicians is becoming standard now.

Your superbly orchestrated and certain to be highly effective and important counterspin operation will take care of that!

As Carl said, this we won't know until Woodward or (I would add) Wikileaks clues the world in.

Or until all the pro-intervention folks who wish to save the world -- at no cost to themselves, of course -- go north, investigate or get involved and report...

So I really don't blame you for applying this spin. The truth is a little too unpalatable to face it seems.

Oh, the truth -- as much as is known, as you say -- is not unpalatable. The fact that a few do not like it doesn't affect most who wonder what is the point of all the acrimony. Dignation, perhaps...

Like the old Yorkshireman said, "There's nowt strange as folk..."

[Fuchs]

...this begs the question whether this is still "protecting the civilian population" or something bigger, beyond the UNSC resolution. It reminds me of what once was begun with a simple resolution for the liberation of Kuwait only.


The employment of air power against easy open field targets with no capable battlefield air defences in place will furthermore once again distort the perception of tactical air power. Kosovo had cured some of the desert warfare tactical air power perceptions, now we're going back and see the effect of air power in best case scenarios again.
This is not good news for NATO doctrines and force balance in the future.

[Presley Cannady]

Indeed it was. And the comment was made not with the suggestion that it was "impossible" to have done anything at all, but rather that positioning the US as a reluctant, non-hegemonic intervenor acting in the framework of international law couldn't have happened much faster than it did. It certainly couldn't have occurred before the Arab League decision, since I don't see how the Russians and Chinese could have been moved off a UN veto.

If "positioning" the country as a "reluctant, non-hegemonic intervenor"--if that's even possible or even relevant--is a precondition for action, then why did the White House call for the regime's ouster almost three weeks ago?

Could the US have done it without the UNSC? Yes, but only at a very heavy and enduring political cost.

The worst case you're even alluding to is the abstention of France and Britain--over a bit of process--from a fairly small role in the narrow set of operations the US has presently agreed to take on. Are our interests in Libya are so aloofly humanitarian--and unimportant--atrocity underway is inconsequential compared to the time it takes to dither in embassy? If so, then why intervene? If not, and if there's no deficit in capability, why wait?

It is doubtful that anyone beyond Britain and France would have joined and even Britain and France were reluctant to act without a UNSCR, which is why they had been pushing a NFZ resolution.

Given that everyone knows this might not be over quickly, and could get messy, political sustainability is essential. Building the basis for that requires jumping through some diplomatic hoops.

The aftermath of the Gulf War and a slew of resolutions preceded a messy decade culminating in the 2003 invasion. Sustainability is a pretty word, but I'd love to know what it if anything concrete emerges from it.

[Presley Cannady]

The employment of air power against easy open field targets with no capable battlefield air defences in place will furthermore once again distort the perception of tactical air power.

Academically, the paucity of cover should cripple movement of the enemy's heavy weapons. But Gaddafhi's Gaddafhi, and absent evidence to the contrary his people we should assume he's got a whole cadre of dead-enders as ballsy as he is. If he wants to move an armored column east what's stopping him from rounding up a bunch of hostages, throwing them into civilian vehicles interspersed with his formations, and daring the Coalition to strike? If he pushes close enough to his targets, he can resupply himself with hostages from the displaced outflow.

Definitely wouldn't put it past him to try.

[carl]

In a Field of Flowers, the Wreckage of War in Libya - NYTIMES

Superb pictures up at the NYTIMES website. Looks like the allies are using the UNSC resolution to the fullest.

Well at least in this place my fretting about being able or not able to destroy the dictator's heavy equipment was for naught. The French don't fool around.

[carl]

The employment of air power against easy open field targets with no capable battlefield air defences in place will furthermore once again distort the perception of tactical air power. Kosovo had cured some of the desert warfare tactical air power perceptions, now we're going back and see the effect of air power in best case scenarios again.
This is not good news for NATO doctrines and force balance in the future.

Why? Ground forces caught in the open with no defense have been sitting ducks for airplanes since World War I. If NATO draws the wrong conclusions from this I'd say there is something seriously wrong with the officers responsible for doctrine and force balance. That would be the grave problem, not that airplanes can still do what they have been able to do for the last 93 years.

[Ken White]

If "positioning" the country as a "reluctant, non-hegemonic intervenor"--if that's even possible or even relevant--is a precondition for action, then why did the White House call for the regime's ouster almost three weeks ago?

Because the occupant of the WH is a politician -- they say things. Dumb things. All of 'em...

There are several dimensions to reluctance and to that reluctance in particular. They have to do with, in no particular order, getting others to do things without calling for US involvement (not everyone in Washington agrees with that...), Not further antagonizing unnecessarily Muslims worldwide (previous parenthetical applies); getting the Arab nations physically -- and fiscally -- involved, however reluctantly (again...); breaking old habits of willy nilly intervention just because we think we can (ditto). The parenthetical also played -- as designed -- a significant part.

I can understand some -- many, particularly those from elsewhere --not knowing how the system works, have trouble understanding why so many here do not know. Maybe they know but are unwilling to allow the time that it takes to get enough (never everyone) on board with big decisions that can affect millions of people. Unless you're T. Friedman, perhaps, who thinks -- wrongly -- that Hu Jintao doesn't have the same problem.

If so, then why intervene? If not, and if there's no deficit in capability, why wait?

That first is really the question, is it not? As for the second, ponder the 'if.'

The aftermath of the Gulf War and a slew of resolutions preceded a messy decade culminating in the 2003 invasion. Sustainability is a pretty word, but I'd love to know what it if anything concrete emerges from it.

Sustainability isn't pretty. Whether anything concrete emerges from it depends on whether you're doing the sustaining or are just talking about it.

Oh, and on that 2003 invasion -- we're still there and it still costs.

[Fuchs]

Why? Ground forces caught in the open with no defense have been sitting ducks for airplanes since World War I. If NATO draws the wrong conclusions from this I'd say there is something seriously wrong with the officers responsible for doctrine and force balance. That would be the grave problem, not that airplanes can still do what they have been able to do for the last 93 years.

Officers don't decide about war or peace, or about the mission of the military as a whole.
Officers don't decide on military budgets either.

[Ken White]

Why? Ground forces caught in the open with no defense have been sitting ducks for airplanes since World War I. If NATO draws the wrong conclusions from this I'd say there is something seriously wrong with the officers responsible for doctrine and force balance. That would be the grave problem, not that airplanes can still do what they have been able to do for the last 93 years.

METT-TC...

You're correct -- if that's in the desert or open terrain; urban, woods, jungle, even the Arctic snows, are different. It's not nearly so certain. Far from it.

His point is the same as yours -- people can draw the wrong 'lessons' from flawed perceptions and unique circumstances. See Desert Storm.

People are indeed the actual grave problem.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Entrophy,

It may be true that MG is as weak as some suggest and that a demonstration of political will and a little air power is all that's needed to ensure his exit, but as a tautology, it's not very convincing.

As I stated earlier I have only reviewed very limited open source materials on this, so I don't have a personal assessment on how weak Qadhaffi is, but history indicates that when a bully comes in with an asymmetrical power advantage (air power) and it doesn't quickly achieve its mission it will change the character the fight, and over time we risk making Qadhaffi the good guy in the eyes of the Arab world. I think air power is great is for punative raids, limited fire support, etc., but it has limited value if that is all we're (coalition)using to enforce the UN mandate. Unfortunately our technology advantages have lowered the bar to commit military forces, due to our perceived superiority (less risk), although we have learned repeatedly that air power has serious limitations.

Two questions: The U.S. said it wouldn't put boots on the ground, does that imply that other nations won't? Where are Arab nation's military forces?

So my question is this: What if this assumption is wrong? What if air power isn't enough? How will we escalate when we've already drawn a big red line limiting our actions? And that's really the problem with this "strategy." If the goal is to remove MG, then remove MG. Half measures (air power) along with wishful thinking is very risky. I say this as a strong air power advocate, but I think I understand the limitations of what air power can do when it's divorced from the ground element.

If we clearly articulate and stick to the limited goal of tempoarily stopping the slaughter and state we are not going to take ownership of this problem we may be able to limit the noise coming from blame the West club. Since the West has once again stepped in and did what the Arab countries seem incapable of, we should start asking where are the regional leaders? Where is the Arab world and their recommended solutions and leadership? In some ways we appear to be mercenaries for the oil princes.

Secondly, assuming MG is overthrown or otherwise killed, what then? Advocates for this intervention are saying that what happens next is up to the Libyans.

We won't know until it happens, but we need to stay out of it. We have a long and successful history of non-intervention in internal politics, and a long and unsuccessful history of intervention in other nation's internal affairs.

[carl]

Officers don't decide about war or peace, or about the mission of the military as a whole.
Officers don't decide on military budgets either.

All very true. But officers are the ones who educate the politicians and officers are the ones who come up with the doctrine and make the force requests. And, officers are the ones who oversell and push things like "effects based warfare". That is how I see it for the most part in the US. i don't know about Germany.

[Presley Cannady]

Well, that didn't take long.

[Ken White]

At least, this LINK would seem to so indicate...

Also, not to intrude too heavily into some else's discussion but to address the US side of that...

All very true.

Yes, it is but I think what you believe you see may not be what is there.

But officers are the ones who educate the politicians and officers are the ones who come up with the doctrine and make the force requests.

In my observation, the amount of 'education' politicians are willing to seek is microscopic, the amount which they'll accept is only slightly larger. One cannot educate the unwilling...

Correct on the doctrine and the force requests -- but officers are no better at accurately predicting the future than you or I -- or anyone else. In the US, the force structure requests made, bad and good, are rarely met; the whims of Congress rule.

And, officers are the ones who oversell and push things like "effects based warfare".

Some Officers -- most don't buy into such foolishness -- but even those who do oversell it bear generally less responsibility than the politicians who are all too eager to buy it because it seems like an inexpensive way to do business...

The politicians are the ones who think warfare can be done on the cheap and delightedly buy into the airpower can do it all routine. It will never be cheap and airpower will never do it all -- or even most of it.

[Rex Brynen]

Well at least in this place my fretting about being able or not able to destroy the dictator's heavy equipment was for naught. The French don't fool around.

It was US F-15s and AV-8s, not the AdA.

[Rex Brynen]

Well, that didn't take long.

It should be noted that it wasn't the Arab League condemning the bombing--it was Amr Moussa, the Arab League Secretary-General (not at all the same thing).

I've yet to see a statement from an Arab capital criticizing the attack. Most of the official media outlets I've checked have no official statement, or relatively neutral reporting.