And Libya goes on...

[CrowBat]

If ports are open in the east (where the oil is anyway) and closed in the west due to instability (and increasing lack of oil to operate things), how long does it take for events to play out?

Obviously, this is the crucial question (i.e. how long can the regime hold out at the current rate of fighting).

Usually, countries have anything between 6 and 12 months of strategic reserve in fuels, something like 6 months in ammo and spares etc. But, here we're talking about Libya. Following the 1973 War, they were buying a lot more arms, equipment and spares than they could need in years.

Just one example: they purchased a total of 110 Mirage 5s in the early 1970s. Although a large number of these was sent to Egypt during the 1973 War with Israel (where at least a handful was shot down), and they saw plenty of fighting not only against Egypt in 1977, but also in Chad, from 1981 until 1988, etc., there were still no less but 54 of them in 1st class condition, with less than 1000hrs on their clocks when Pakistan decided to buy them, in 2004 (together with a significant reserve of spares, including some 50 spare engines). The Libyans never operated more than four squadrons of these fighters, and at least one third of the fleet was always kept in stored condition. They would regularly replace used aircraft with stored examples, and so on. Thus, none of the aircraft became "spent" even after 40 years in service.

Another example: at the start of the uprising in Libya, on 17 February, a transport loaded with 2,000 rifles and US$18 Million in cash arrived in Kufra. These weapons and money were destined to arm and pay the locals so they would fight for the regime. The locals "captured" (i.e. grounded) that plane, armed themselves with rifles, deposited the money at the local bank, and said "no thanks" to the regime.

Overall, there is really plenty of armament stored around various parts of Libya. Much can be found in a number of depots around Benghazi (like the one that flew to the Mars, two nights ago), but particularly so in the area between Syrte and al-Jufra, in central Libya, and then again around Tripoli.

Provided it can get enough fighters, the regime is likely to be able to go on like this for several years.

IMHO, only two things would make sense for the international community to do in this situation:
- saturated and permanent jamming of all means of communication in the hands of the regime (also cutting off all of its sat comms);
- total blockade of aerial traffic to and from Libya (impossible until last foreigners are out, and there are currently still more than 1 Million of them there).

[Fuchs]

I doubt that hardware is of much relevance in this conflict.
Determination (loyalty to your side, combat morale) are going to be more important in the next weeks.

He's no going to stay in power if only the equivalent of an effective light brigade sides with him.

[Steve the Planner]

Crow:

I think you are starting to draw the bead.

Of those fighters and stores, how many are in Tripoli and under control?

In that whole scenario, what are the critical points than can be targeted?

You hit one---communications. But even that can be highly targeted, with jamming at minimal key points, and knocking out specific towers, all by low-tech rebels with hand-held or SUV-deployed arsenals.

The one thing that is overwhelming from Small Wars is how, under so many scenarios short of Big Army to Big Army, the vulnerabilities can be simply exploited in an environment without strong popular support in areas immediately surrounding critical facilities.

[M-A Lagrange]

I don't get it about all this no fly and military stuff.

Me neither, should not be that difficult to ground G air capacities once and for ever, with or without security council permission.

Do the math. Two million or so folks in Tripoli, a large metropolitan city which has no indigenous food/water supply.

Two million people need how much food, water, medical supplies, on a daily basis, to be happy and productive?

International assets are already frozen, and could, for example, be earmarked for humanitarian relief to the east (but not to the west), so trade, and especially new weapons, will be chaotic at best, begging the question of whether even a naval blockade is critical. If no access to global credit, what shipments need to be intercepted?

Apparently, G can leave decades without receiving external support. The questio is rather how long it will take for them to get weak enough to flip the coin of popular support. In fact it can take ages especially as you cannot have a official blocus on basic life saving items as food and water.

[Bob's World]

Well, there is the small moral dilemma for the West.

Qaddafi the despot in Libya is applying military force to suppress the insurgent segment of his populace.

Karzai the despot in Afghanistan is applying military force to suppress the insurgent segment of his populace.

We started off clean with Karzai, but allowed him to drag us into the sewer with manner of government we allowed him to create and operate, dedicating ourselves to keeping him in power as the situation continues to worsen. Supporting the leader rather than the populace; supporting the government rather than the nation state. Such are the slippery slopes of such relationships.

Now we have a populace standing up to the despot Qadaffi, who we have only recently opened relations with in the name of counterterrorism (which in fact was Qadaffi suppressing this nationalist movement with our blessing under the auspices of our global war on terrorism). If we follow the path we've taken in Afghanistan we pile on and help Qaddafi suppress the movement.

But we've painted Qadaffi as a bad guy for decades, so that doesn't fly. But if we support this populace directly, how do we continue to suppress the Afghan populace?

Or, probably more pressing in our government leader's minds: What happens when Dubai, the UAE and Saudi Arabia follow Libya? Who do we help there? The despots or the people?

My vote is for the people, but even as I cast that vote, I appreciate why "moral courage" is a value we hold up high, as it will take tremendous moral courage for the US to get straight so that we are on the same side of this issue on every front. At some point we need to do that. To support the despots who guard our interests while at the same time attacking the despots who either refuse to work with us or where our interests are low creates a strategic communications of such hypocrisy that severely damages our national image and influence.

When a sinner sins, no one cares much (right Charlie Sheen?). But if you are going to hold yourself out as some holier than thou entity, when you sin everyone notices. So we need to either back off on our rhetoric, or ramp up on our consistency of action IAW our rhetoric. Pick one. We've been playing a shady game of influence in the Middle East since WWII, the wheels started coming off on 9/11, and we are definitely dragging a axle at this point. Time to clean up our act.

[AdamG]

Chivers on Libyan MANPADs

Friday’s New York Times covered fears that looted Libyan arms could find their way into terrorists’ hands. The article’s emphasis is on heat-seeking, shoulder-fired, anti-aircraft missiles and the threats they pose to civilian aircraft.

But it is worth noting on this blog, which discusses military small arms from many different perspectives, that the looting of the stockpiles of traditional infantry arms raises serious long-term security concerns, too. Once machine guns, assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades slip from state arsenals, they invariably travel. Their migration to other users and other wars is all but certain. Their grim effects can last decades.

http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/...er=rss&emc=rss

[Bob's World]

In 1987, the year the first SU-17 was shot down by a stinger missile over Afghanistan, some 30 Soviet aircraft were shot down.

It would be a very different operation if a similar year were had by the Taliban against the current coalition.

Yet one more reason to side with the populace in Libya. Cut AQ out of the picture, or at least be in position to compete to buy up such missiles as they enter the marketplace. Also small states are easily deterred from employing such systems or selling such systems to our opponents. Individuals and non-state actors are largely immune to our current family of deterrence tools.

Many states that the US sells arms to could easily follow this same path that Libya is on in the near future. Makes one look at the $60 B arms deal with the Saudis announced a few months back in a new light. Hopefully there weren't any shoulder fired missiles in with the F-15s, Longbows and Blackhawks...

[CrowBat]

Crow:

Of those fighters and stores, how many are in Tripoli and under control?

In and around Tripoli, the regime should have an equivalent of three brigades (5th, 32nd and one called Kuwelidi al-Hamidi). Large parts of these are busy assaulting az-Zawiya since four or five days.

In Tripoli there is also Mitiga AB, where much of the LARAF is currently concentrated, including at least a squadron of MiG-23s, remnants of Mirage F.1ED squadron, and several transport and helicopter units (including a squadron each of Mi-8s, Mi-24s and CH-47Cs, plus one unit equipped with An-26s; then one "police" squadron flying A.109s and a unit equipped with UAVs). It appears they moved most of operational G-2/J-21s and SF.260s from Misurata to this place as well.

However, this is not only about "what's in Tripoli": as mentioned above, the regime still controls two huge air bases in central Libya (Syrte and Hun), with immense underground depots in between. They have one squadron each of Su-22s, Su-24s (between 3 and 5 aircraft), Mi-24s, and Mi-8s there at least, plus another brigade of ground forces.

Yet another Army brigade is active between Misurata and Beni Wallid (it attacked Misurata yesterday, but lost an equivalent of a company in the process).

The ballance of forces under regime's control (those on the eastern side of Tripoli, plus those along the border to Tunisia and Algeria) equal to another brigade.

In that whole scenario, what are the critical points than can be targeted?

Provided you're talking about theoretical targets for air strikes by the West or neighbours or a coalition of the both....IMHO, in the current situation there would be four major targets:

- Bab Azizzia barracks in Tripoli
- Syrte AB (to keep the LARAF there grounded)
- concentration of regime troops besieging az-Zawiya (the latter is also of major humanitarian concern, IMHO)
- Mitiga AB (to keep the LARAF grounded in the West too).

I declare myself a "democracy zealot", and consider this a popular, mass uprising of internal and secular forces in Libya. Their protests were initially peaceful: they turned viollent due to a brutal and merciless reaction from the regime. Right now, only the regime could stop the fighting, which it clearly refuses to do, since that would mean it would give up: the choice the rebels are facing is to stop fighting and get slaughtered if they do, or die while attempting to bring the regime to fall.

My conclusion is that - regardless what the rebels say - the regime has to get hit in a most massive fashion possible, and be forced to give up.

[TROUFION]

MA Lagrange-

I think you may have misunderstood me a little. I was not thinking 'arranged peace' I was thinking more along the lines of Libiyan Democracy and freedom garaunteed by Eygptian force of arms. In other words Eygpt with an UN mandate intervenes forcefully and takes out Mummaur. Then helps stabilize the country. If we want democracy to succeed this would be a good option. Far better than US forces going to help. -T

[M-A Lagrange]

MA Lagrange-

I think you may have misunderstood me a little. I was not thinking 'arranged peace' I was thinking more along the lines of Libiyan Democracy and freedom garaunteed by Eygptian force of arms. In other words Eygpt with an UN mandate intervenes forcefully and takes out Mummaur. Then helps stabilize the country. If we want democracy to succeed this would be a good option. Far better than US forces going to help. -T

I well understood you from the beginning and I do agree with the idea that a ground US intervention is not needed and may be dangerous. Not needed because it will only serve the US to finaly fight a just war after several years of feeling missused. And that's not a good reason to interviene. Also because I believe that the populace in Libya is not willing. And that's a good reason to not intervening.
But unlike Bob, I do believe that and air strike that would destroy G air capacities and a logisticall support for the rebels is the right solution.

The problem with the UN is that they do not know how to do stabilization. Very few people know it and most of the time it is due to context. The UN have no idea of what context means and most of them even less of what stabilizing means.

What is important, and I will support Bob on this is to send a message, the right one this time. Not only to Libya but to the whole region: we support the people against crazy evil dictators. That would be the best PSYOP ever.

[AdamG]

The 1st of September marks the anniversary of the opening of the major stage of Libya's Great Man-Made River Project. This incredibly huge and successful water scheme is virtually unknown in the West, yet it rivals and even surpasses all our greatest development projects. The leader of the so-called advanced countries, the United States of America cannot bring itself to acknowledge Libya's Great Man-Made River. The West refuses to recognize that a small country, with a population no more than four million, can construct anything so large without borrowing a single cent from the international banks.

http://poorrichards-blog.blogspot.co....html#comments

[Fuchs]

In and around Tripoli, the regime should have an equivalent of three brigades (5th, 32nd and one called Kuwelidi al-Hamidi). Large parts of these are busy assaulting az-Zawiya since four or five days.

Judging by news reports, I'd rather suspect a small battalion equivalent is skirmishing near that city. A multi-brigade assault would produce other results.

[Presley Cannady]

Judging by news reports, I'd rather suspect a small battalion equivalent is skirmishing near that city. A multi-brigade assault would produce other results.

Three brigade equivalents would be just north of a third of the whole army prior to the unrest. I doubt Qaddafi can manage the capital and holding onto the West and have enough strength left over to do much more than wave the bloody shirt in the East. Not yet, at least.

[CrowBat]

Judging by news reports, I'd rather suspect a small battalion equivalent is skirmishing near that city. A multi-brigade assault would produce other results.

I said "three brigades in and around Tripoli", of which "large parts" are attacking az-Zawiya.

These three brigades have around 6,000 troops: the population of az-Zawiya is differently reported at between 250,000-300,000 people, majority of whom sided with rebellion, and about 1,000 of whom might be armed (including up to nine T-72s they have captured so far; six of these when part of the locally based battalion of the Kuwelidi "Brigade" sided with them). A single attack on Sunday included 35 T-72s attacking them from the East (Tripoli side), and other 11-12 simultaneously from the West (foreign reporters confirmed the presence of similar numbers of MBTs in the area), plus BMP-1s and ZSU-23-4s. If only 30% of rebel claims can be trusted, they destroyed over 20 MBTs and a similar number of APCs so far, plus caused around 300 casualties to the regime.

I'm really not that good in ground forces, but isn't 35 the usual complement of an armoured battalion equipped with T-72s? Well, at least that sounds rather like slightly more than a "small battalion" in my ears.

The secular assumption smacks of whistling in the dark due to the absence of polling data to the contrary--or whatosever, for that matter.

Yes, there is no polling data, but I trust myself to conclude the uprising in Libya is definitely no "al-Qaida-launched insurgency" aiming at establishing some "Qaliphate", as claimed by the regime and some of the media in the West. The essence is the same like that behind the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as unrests in Algeria, Bahrain, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere - i.e. the economy, human rights and power-sharing, not religion.

*********

BTW, the regime troops captured by the rebels in az-Zawiya told their interrogators their superiors told them they "must" take that town "by Wednesday". Any ideas why should Wednesday be important?

[TROUFION]

M-A L,

I look at the UN as a tool to provide legitimacy. The UN doesn't do much on its own. It does however in old west terms have the capacity to deputize a military force and provide it legitimacy. Any action taken against Mummaur should if possible be done with UN support in this manner. Again if a duly deputized African force, perhaps Eygptian and Tunisian (maybe Morrocan too), directly supported the rebels against Mummuar and provided forces to liberate Libya, under UN deputization it would work far batter than any US intervention. Nothing would prevent the US from shaping it, helping with SF and $. The more help the rebels can be given to end it fast before Mummuar can recover or other less reputable elements get involved the better.

-T

[RTK]

I'm really not that good in ground forces, but isn't 35 the usual complement of an armoured battalion equipped with T-72s? Well, at least that sounds rather like slightly more than a "small battalion" in my ears.

You're right. IIRC 3x companies of 10, plus HQ tanks. 35 is right around the number of T-72s in a tank battalion under the old order of the battle.

Ken White, a better scout than I, will be sure to correct my math if I'm wrong.

Recall that Qadafi restructured the Libyan army in the 80s to Bde and Bn centric organization because he was paranoid of organized assassination attempts.

[Rex Brynen]

These three brigades have around 6,000 troops: the population of az-Zawiya is differently reported at between 250,000-300,000 people, majority of whom sided with rebellion, and about 1,000 of whom might be armed (including up to nine T-72s they have captured so far; six of these when part of the locally based battalion of the Kuwelidi "Brigade" sided with them). A single attack on Sunday included 35 T-72s attacking them from the East (Tripoli side), and other 11-12 simultaneously from the West (foreign reporters confirmed the presence of similar numbers of MBTs in the area), plus BMP-1s and ZSU-23-4s. If only 30% of rebel claims can be trusted, they destroyed over 20 MBTs and a similar number of APCs so far, plus caused around 300 casualties to the regime.

Excellent details, CrowBat. What's your sourcing on the number of MBTs deployed? KOed?

I'm doubtful about claims of 20 MBT's destroyed, unless they're counting all AFVs.

[Presley Cannady]

Yes, there is no polling data, but I trust myself to conclude the uprising in Libya is definitely no "al-Qaida-launched insurgency" aiming at establishing some "Qaliphate", as claimed by the regime and some of the media in the West. The essence is the same like that behind the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as unrests in Algeria, Bahrain, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere - i.e. the economy, human rights and power-sharing, not religion.

Isn't picking the rosier of a set of scenarios based nothing more than "trusting yourself" the very definition of whistling in the dark? It's presently impossible to estimate the contribution of religious fanaticism in any of these squabbles, though it is abundantly evident that Islamists stood to benefit--and did, if for no other reason than prisoner releases--in both Egypt and Tunisia. In Egypt, it remains to be seen how Islamists deal with a military leadership historically more hostile to their interests than Mubarak. In Tunisia, where's the downside at all for Ghannouchi and the like?

But if we're going to boiling it down to instinct, then I trust myself to conclude that an Islamic radical with a rifle beats a latte sipping university student with a Facebook wall nine times out of ten.

[Presley Cannady]

I declare myself a "democracy zealot", and consider this a popular, mass uprising of internal and secular forces in Libya.

The secular assumption smacks of whistling in the dark due to the absence of polling data to the contrary--or whatosever, for that matter.

[BushrangerCZ]

just read on news that SAS CPT got arrested in Lybia by insurgents, and released some hours later...
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...detainees.html