And Libya goes on...

[CrowBat]

Libyan SAMs are not really an issue. Their IADS was never completely constructed, never overhauled since Libya "opened" again and thus hopelessly obsolete (no pice of equipment there is "younger" than 30 years, except if they've got some more modern MANPADs, recently). There are currently only a few SAM-sites in Tripoli and Syrte areas that are active. The SA-5 sites in Syrte look on the ground exactly like that SA-2 site near Tobruq which can be seen on some of the photos that surfaced the last few days: rusty missiles, abandoned who-knows-how-many years ago, and goats in between...

So, that's not really that much of a problem.

But, something like NFZ over Libya makes next to no sense if not the entire country is covered, particularly its borders to (Libya-friendly) countries like Chad and Niger, but also these very long borders to Algeria, Egypt and Sudan.

The area that would have to be covered by such a NFZ would be huge, and require much more assets - and foremost bases. Sigonella, Suda Bay, Akrotiri would be a literal "drop of water on hot rock": even if Algeria and Egypt might cooperate, Sudan would definitely not work with the UN.

But...it's from Chad, Niger, Mali and Sudan that the regime in Tripoli is still hauling plenty of foreigners into the country, via its southern borders (there is at least one flight every day into every of these countries, launched from Mitiga AB, in Tripoli). Yet, it's also only from there that any coalition enforcing such a NFZ could reach crucially important places like the large Sebha AB, in SW Libya, which is another - and as of yet entirely untouched - Qaddaffi's stronghold.

Theoretically, the French could "take over" in Chad (they run the country any way), and use such places like Faya Largeau, which has a well-developed airfield. Perhaps even clean up the mess left after the Libyan defeat at (Libyan-constructed) Ouadi Doum in 1987, further north, and make use of that airfield. But that would still require Deby's agreement - and plenty of tanker assets. And, any base in northern Chad would be not only extremely isolated, but also vulnerable to long-range raids of Sudan-supported Chadian opposition, based in Darfur (read: potential for spread of the conflict in Libya).

Countries like Mali and Niger are that only by names: the government of Mali, for example, is entirely unable to exercise control over its entire territory, and thus the country became a safe heaven for this "al-Qaida of Magreb" in recent years. So, "going in" there, just in order to base a few AWACS and support assets for example, would be quite messy (as much as it would probably please Algerians). The situation in Niger might be slightly better, but only "slightly", then good airfields in the north of that country are as scarce as water...

[Rex Brynen]

Libyan SAMs are not really an issue.

My argument, paradoxically, is that they're potentially a bit of a liability for Qaddafi, since SEAD can be used as an excuse to hit a much larger target list, especially when other military facilities are proximate to air defences.

For those interested, the approximate deployment of the Libyan SAM network can be found here (you can also download the KMZ file for Google Earth). It doesn't show the operational readiness or functional capabilities of systems, of course--but it does show what might be hit where.

[Entropy]

I spent much of the 1990's supporting the Iraq NFZ's and did the same in the Balkans.

Regarding Libya, yes, tactically, it's pretty easy as far as the threat goes. Practically, it's very resource intensive. But what's the point? What's the objective? If we want the rebels to win, there are lots of ways to do that with a lot more surety than a NFZ. To me, cynical bastard that I am, it looks like something from the good intentions fairy - a low risk way to be seen as "doing something."

[Rex Brynen]

I spent much of the 1990's supporting the Iraq NFZ's and did the same in the Balkans.

Regarding Libya, yes, tactically, it's pretty easy as far as the threat goes. Practically, it's very resource intensive. But what's the point? What's the objective? If we want the rebels to win, there are lots of ways to do that with a lot more surety than a NFZ. To me, cynical bastard that I am, it looks like something from the good intentions fairy - a low risk way to be seen as "doing something."

I think it is partly that, but it is also 1) some folks talking up the idea without any sense of the requirements or likely military impact on Qaddafi, and 2) other folks wanting to do more, but recognizing that given current political constraints a NFZ might currently be the most that is possible.

What I am suggesting (but not necessarily recommending) is that you could use a NFZ as political cover for a rather more ambitious set of airstrikes intended to degrade the regimes core capabilities, and not simply the LAF and Libyan SAM network.

This doesn't eliminate the risk, however, from the regime's possible unconventional responses (holding foreigners hostages, flying civilian human shields, etc).

[Entropy]

Rex,

I understood your point and you're right, we could make the target list pretty wide if we wanted to and use a NFZ as a cover. But again, what's the objective? Is it our intention to militarily assist the rebels in overthrowing Qaddafi and forming a new government? Well, what if a NFZ and additional strikes aren't enough? What do we know about these rebels - are they worth our support? If they are what happens if/when the NFZ fails to dislodge Qaddafi? In that case we have to either escalate or we end up with Iraq circa 1993 - an endless NFZ that accomplishes nothing.

[CrowBat]

What I am suggesting (but not necessarily recommending) is that you could use a NFZ as political cover for a rather more ambitious set of airstrikes intended to degrade the regimes core capabilities, and not simply the LAF and Libyan SAM network.

Agreed. The probably most "cost & time effective" would be a mix like that from 1995, when NATO bombed the Serbs. Air attacks pinned the Serbs down and destroyed their C3 capability while the Croats launched their ground offensive. Eventually, this brought an end to the war.

For all practical purposes, any declaration of a NFZ over Libya is likely to end in a similar situation - which means there is a guaranteed "exit strategy" too: as soon as Qaddaffi is away, there is no purpose of a NFZ any more.

Crowbat-

I agree, Libya is a pretty big country. Still, only slightly larger than Iraq, it's do-able. All the significant infrastructure and the entire IADS is on the coast as has been pointed out, so that helps. You don't really need to patrol to the southern border even if you're trying to interdict the flow of folks/supplies from the south - open desert most of the way so you could hit them downstream.

You mean, it would be sufficient to cut off the airborne "flow of supplies" by blocking the area of Tripoli alone?

OK. But, what are you going to do with all the Libyan troops holding places like Sebha ("the capital of the south"), Ghat and al-Wigh? Even if Qaddaffi falls, it's unlikely they're going to give up. Not only that they are separated from the rest of the country by 300+ km of desert, but they also have enough supplies to survive "for years" and are certainly not keen to give up if facing the ICC. Means: at best, you've got a situation where the country is split.

If it were decided that a no fly zone were a good thing, could we approximate it with some Aegis destroyers stationed just offshore?

A good idea would be to post one off Benghazi and protect the town from the threat of regime's Scud brigades that are still operational in the Syrte area. It's quite obvious that the rebel oppinion changed meanwhile, so they would probably be quite pleased by some ABM protection.

But, moving one in direction of Tripoli is rather likely to end in another IranAir-Tragedy (from 1988): the problem with ships is that they have long-range radars and weapons, but are not as flexible as (manned) interceptors to "go there" and check what kind of aircraft is underway around.

Finally, regarding NFZs over Iraq and Bosnia, in general: these were effective, I've got little doubts about this. However, the problem was that both came too late. The one in Iraq was imposed only once the Kurds and Marsh Arabs (plus a division of the Iranian IRGC or so supporting them) were smashed by the Iraqi military, also with help of chemical weapons. Subsequently, it was maintained for ten years, leaving the regime to recover and continue with attrocities. The one in Bosnia was imposed only after the war on the ground largely ended in a stalemate, but hundreds of thousands were already ethnically cleansed.

Eventually, both were brought to an end only through direct military action.

Let's hope that a NFZ over Libya is not going to be imposed much too late, and perhaps also bring that decisive direct military action at a much earlier date.

[Bob's World]

The US is sending out a dangerous Strategic Communications in our posture on Libya. That message is:

"The US will not back up despotic leaders when challenged peacefully by their populaces, but if the government responds with military violence to suppress the people we will not do anything about that either."

That heavy sigh of relief you hear is from a handful of despotic leaders over on the Arabian Peninsula who had been sweating it following Tunisia and Egypt. Now they are most likely just making sure their most loyal troops are properly postured to act.

This is like the Groundhog seeing his shadow. 6 more years of GWOT. We have given hope to Despots and bin Laden both.

(Oh, and how do our good allies the Saudis thank us?

"Libya produced 1.6 million oil barrels per day before fighting forced companies to evacuate workers. Most of that production is shut down.

Ali Naimi, the Saudi oil minister, said the kingdom has about 3.5 million barrels per day of spare capacity that could be brought online"

Oh, well, so long as it could, Meanwhile the US is quickly funding through higher oil prices the $36 B in reforms the King is offering his people in an attempt to fend of Friday's "day of rage."

[carl]

Now that US and EU decided to stand by the rebels: it's time for action.
The only advantage, part from military experience, that G and his troops have is the control of the air.

Sure a NFZ is not that easy to set. But the rebels are running out of time! A Kosovo like operation (Air and only air op) to support the rebels would defenitively weight the balance in the right direction.

The US is sending out a dangerous Strategic Communications in our posture on Libya. That message is:

"The US will not back up despotic leaders when challenged peacefully by their populaces, but if the government responds with military violence to suppress the people we will not do anything about that either."

Those are both very good points.

Crowbat: I don't think you would need to post a destroyer off Tripoli to have a good effect. Protecting the front line and Benghazi from air strikes would have a good effect, if only psychological. I have read that air strikes have a very bad effect on the morale of inexperienced people so stopping them may do more good than we would think.

If we were to establish a no fly zone that would change circumstances to the point where I think small ground teams with SA-18s would be very useful.