And Libya goes on...

[CMSbelt]

The media has a lot of coverage lately regarding the possibility of NATO military action in Libya. A no-fly zone is the most commonly discussed option; however, providing arms to the “rebels” is also mentioned as being a more likely course of action.

Yesterday, however, “The Secretary General said NATO has no intention to intervene in Libya. However, he said, ‘as a defence Alliance and a security organisation, it is our job to conduct prudent planning for any eventuality.’ The Secretary General stressed that NATO is in close coordination and consultation with other international and regional organisations, including with the United Nations, the European Union, the Arab League and the African Union.” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-07D13...news_71277.htm

Something I find curious about all this is the dearth of information about the opposition forces/rebels in Libya. (I’m not sure which term is appropriate. “Rebels” seems to imply more coherence and cohesion than has been apparent thus far.) I’ve seen no profiles in the major media on the leaders or anything indicating their objectives beyond the overthrow of Qaddafi. Has anyone else?

Among the reasons US White House Press Secretary Jay Carney gave for not supporting arms transfers at this point: "it would be premature to send a bunch of weapons to a post office box in eastern Libya." Kori Schake reports: “As [US] Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell judiciously pointed out, we know little about the anti-Qaddafi rebels. We're still combating weapons we gave the mujaheddin to fight Soviets in Afghanistan, and dealing with the radicalization of that society from civil war. Libyan rebels do not appear lacking in weaponry, as military units have defected bringing their equipment, and Libyans are creatively using the means available to them (like bulldozers).” http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/post...rid_of_qaddafi.

Sadly lacking in all the public discourse is any strategic sensibility. This is normal in the major media but currently seems to be the case even among public policy/national security/foreign policy blogs that are normally more analytical. And, it also looks like many political leaders have yet to read General Rupert Smith’s The Utility of Force. I suppose one could stretch things and argue about 24-hour flights for surveillance of Libya, but I’d like someone to explain how enforcing a no-fly zone would not be military action.

So, what is the best strategic case for any US or NATO intervention in Libya?

As for ENDS, for the sake of argument let’s say that stopping the killing is a vital interest (whether or not we include this really doesn’t matter if we accept the next premise.) More tangibly, we all know about oil and it’s importance to the economies of NATO members. The following link has an illuminating chart regarding the effect of Middle East unrest upon the price of oil: http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com...ming_oil_ports.

Also see the following charts on who imports oil from Libya: http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com...ap_feb_25_2011.

I would argue that getting rid of Qaddafi per se is not a vital interest. Whether such a result would benefit the people of Libya, and the populations of NATO member states, would depend upon what came in the wake of an overthrow. But: #1 The nature of the Libyan opposition forces/rebels is too uncertain to project any idea what life would be like under their rule should they defeat Qaddafi; and #2 At least within recent history, the ability of certain NATO members (if not NATO in toto) to build a stable, peaceful, and prosperous state after deposing a government is also highly uncertain. (See: Iraq, invasion of, 2003.)

At least superficially, outlining the ENDS is the easy part. But, what about WAYS and MEANS? (To save space, I’m consciously comingling WAYS and MEANS but argue this is not critical in this particular instance.) Simply put, I cannot find a balance between ENDS, WAYS, and MEANS that meets the criteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.

Diplomatic pressure is being brought to bear on the Qaddafi regime by individual nations and the UN. As a political-military alliance, statements by the NAC can add to the total diplomatic effort, but it’s hard to see how this will have much effect on a government willing to kill so many of its own citizens in order to stay in power.

The Informational element of national and international power/influence is generating wide public outrage at the actions of the Qaddafi regime. (It appears that Al-Jazeera’s coverage is even getting favorable reviews among some American elites: http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/arc...ident_obama_6/ & http://www.theworld.org/2011/02/al-j...act-on-libya/#)

Yet, any the impact on the current Libyan regime would be indirect at best. Unmentioned in the media thus far, a related effort would be to provide information/intelligence to the opposition forces/rebels. If the right leaders can be found, information on the disposition, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of Qaddafi’s armed forces could be very useful to them. Such action would very likely be on a national basis rather than by NATO as a whole. While presenting a lower risk than the employment of military force, the wisdom of supporting the opposition forces/rebels in this manner is questionable given the caveat previously mentioned: we have little idea regarding the long-term intentions of the people trying to overthrow Qaddafi. These efforts could easily turn out to be enabling the replacement of the Qaddafi regime by something as bad or even worse.

As for the Economic element of power, on February 26, the UN Security Council voted to impose and arms embargo and financial sanctions on Libya. Most nations are following suit, some unilaterally imposing stronger measures. http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-...07-715800.html. However, the history of sanctions indicates success is rare, and never quick.

This obviously brings us to the Military element of power, possibly wielded by NATO. The imposition of a no fly zone by NATO (or a coalition of the willing) may initially seem attractive as an alternative that is relatively low risk to friendly forces. However, enforcement of a no-fly zone still entails risk. There is little doubt that NATO air forces could easily overmatch those of Libya, but Libya’s surface-to-air missile systems are sufficient to give pause when considering ground attack: http://www.foxnews.com/slideshow/wor...ences/#slide=1 (Additionally, the history of no-fly zone enforcement probably includes as many, if not more, incidents of fratricide as enemy aircraft successfully shot down.)

While the opposition forces/rebels would benefit somewhat from the elimination of the air threat, Qaddafi’s artillery and tanks are much more problematic. What happens next if Qaddafi parks his airplanes but increases his use of artillery, armor, and mechanized infantry against opposition forces/rebel and unarmed protestors? Would NATO throw its hands up and say “we’ve done all we can, you are on your own again” or would the temptation to go from air superiority to ground attack missions be too great? Qaddafi’s air defenses are reported to include SA-2, SA-3, SA-5 Gammon, and SA-8b Gecko, SA-7 Grail, and SA-9/SA-13. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Libya).

Suppressing most of these may require the use of pre-emptive missile attacks and would probably cause NATO aircraft to fly at altitudes that make ground attack less effective and greatly increase the odds of accidental civilian casualties and collateral damage. Furthermore, many of the opposition forces/rebels appear to be members of the Libyan armed forces who switch sides and took their military equipment with them. Telling “friend” from foe in ground attack missions will be extremely difficult for NATO air forces. We also don’t know what use opposition forces/rebels will make of their own military equipment if freed from an air (and possibly ground) threat. How would they treat unarmed pro-Qaddafi civilians? In terms of stopping the killing, it is not clear that a no-fly zone will have much of an impact.

If a no-fly zone evens out the odds between the Qaddafi and the forces fighting him, the result could easily be freezing or extending the conflict. This could have the unintended effect of taking Libyan oil off the market for an extended period.

Given these risks, the odds are low that the imposition of a no-fly zone would produce either a net reduction in civilian deaths or stabilization of the oil markets.

What about committing NATO ground forces? As they say, “Never Say Never,” but in no particular order: #1 if NATO can’t meet requirements in Afghanistan, where will it get troops for Libya? #2 Historically, this is unlikely to occur without trying something less drastic such as a no-fly zone first (which is a bad idea for the reasons above). #3 This would require a UN Security Council Resolution and some of the permanent members are unlikely to endorse the precedent of intervention against a sovereign government merely because it kills a lot of its own people.

Nonetheless, even if the predicted utility of actually employing military force is low there may be some value in threatening its use. I think Qaddafi is too cagey to fall for this but it might encourage him to exercise more restraint but this may be what we are seeing.

My prediction is that a no-fly zone will be proposed to show solidarity with the opponents of the Qaddafi regime, but in the full knowledge that such a resolution will be vetoed certainly by China and probably by Russia.

[SWJ Blog]

Considerations on Libya

Entry Excerpt:

Considerations on Libya
by Steven T. Brothers

We must prevent Qaddafi from more efficiently slaughtering his own people. This can be accomplished with intervention. Yet, we must carefully weigh the risks lest a hazy contingency plan creep into a muddling campaign.

As a military officer I know that no fly zones (NFZ) and air strikes are not easy to implement, nor are they necessarily effective. Libyan air defenses would need to be suppressed. We could lose aircraft. Combat search and rescue (C.S.A.R.) personnel deployed to save downed pilots could be killed or captured. Also, our laser-guided bombs would require soldiers – on the ground –to direct them to their targets.

Those who say an NFZ would be “easy” point to Operation Northern Watch over Iraq as proof. Yet, much of Iraq’s air defenses were destroyed in the Gulf war. Further, Iraqi air defenses were easier to find and destroy. Libya does not have such a capacity; what it has is more dangerous: scores of shoulder-fired missiles that are tougher to locate.

Complicating this is a dangerous absence of information about the opposition. Although Secretary of State Clinton said the U.S. is “reaching out” to the rebels we should be skeptical of any intelligence information provided to us. We do not need a Libyan version of the Iraqi informant “Curveball” feeding us false tips in order to further a narrow agenda.

Also, much of the opposition are former government employees which have not been paid in days. Should this drag on for weeks – and this is certainly possible – there is a risk of the opposition fracturing. Rival leaders might then capitalize on U.S. ignorance and seek support for personal power grabs.

Also, what happens after Qaddafi is toppled? Libya does not have the civil capacity and structures that Tunisia and Egypt have. Libya is – dangerously so- more like Yemen. It lacks the mechanisms to provide basic services, which themselves can check the kind of hopelessness and desperation that feeds violence.

We also must determine how far we are willing to go. When does a no fly zone turn into a no drive zone? Qaddafi’s aircraft should be grounded but he also possesses equally efficient means: tanks, artillery, and gun trucks. Also, according to Human Rights Watch, the Red Crescent, and other relief organizations, there is a humanitarian crisis developing. Qaddafi’s forces are sealing off supply routes. Qaddafi is using food as a weapon. If we plan on assisting here, this will require “boots on the ground.”

Reminiscent of Somalia, our soldiers would face the difficult task of discerning allies from enemies. A sizeable portion of the opposition is former military, many of whom still wear the same uniforms and use the same equipment as Qaddafi’s forces. This makes a corner stone of any military intervention - the rules of engagement - extremely problematic.

We have not adequately evaluated the political risks. Most Libyans would resent the presence of foreign troops. If we overreach, we risk alienating the next generation of Libya’s leaders and the young people that will chart its political future.

If the opposition’s supposed leadership asks for an intervention then they may lose legitimacy. Libyans see this as their revolution and want to emulate the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences with little outside help. The opposition has already appropriated dozens of tanks, attack helicopters, and the critically important anti-aircraft weapons. It may take a while but they might be able to accomplish this on their own.

Others have suggested inserting Special Forces teams to assist the rebels. An apparent rag-tag unprofessional gang, the rebels are led by a few professional soldiers. We could assist by sending teams to help train and lead them. Yet, this is also risky: A U.K. SAS team was captured by a faction of the opposition that considered them invaders. Also, the Libyan opposition is not the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan. There is no Ahmad Shah Masoud – nor the legacy of a martyred one – to rally around. We do not have a twenty-plus year history of assisting the Libyan rebels. There may be a leader in the making but they have yet to assert themselves.

There are more workable options. While the U.N. has taken measures to prevent more weapons from getting to Qaddafi what about personnel? The U.N., the Arab league and the African Union must pressure those countries that have supplied the mercenaries in order to prevent more from arriving. Also, the E.U. –although it has frozen Qaddafi’s assets – must also freeze those of the Libyan state. Until the opposition is in control of the treasury, this is an option worth considering.

Qaddafi’s ruthlessness rivals that of Idi Amin, Charles Taylor, and Nicolae Ceausescu. Under his leadership, rebel soldiers are bound, gagged, shot, and set on fire while merciless guns for hire execute civilians. He must be stopped. Yet, before we rush to rattling our sabers, our policy makers must build a multinational consensus, weigh the risks, and always respect the wishes of the Libyan people.

Major Steven T. Brothers is an Army Middle East Foreign Area Officer and Graduate Student at the Center for Middle East Studies at Harvard University. His comments do not necessarily reflect those of the US Army, the US Government, or Harvard University.

Editor's Note: While we will present all options for intervention, SWJ does not maintain an official position. Rather, we want to facilitate the discussion.



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[SWJ Blog]

Once-Secret Iraqi Documents Offer Lesson for Libya

Entry Excerpt:

Once-Secret Iraqi Documents Offer Lesson for Libya by Yochi J. Dreazen, National Journal. BLUF: "An analysis of the documents by the U.S. Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center found that Libya sent more fighters to Iraq on a per-capita basis than any other Muslim country, including Saudi Arabia. Perhaps more alarmingly for Western policymakers, most of the fighters came from eastern Libya, the center of the current uprising against Muammar el-Qaddafi."



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[SWJ Blog]

Operation 'Odyssey Dawn' begins against Libya

Entry Excerpt:

United States and British warships launched at least 110 land-attack cruise missiles against 20 Libyan air defense targets. Admiral Samuel Locklear, USN, abaord USS Mt. Whitney, is in command of the combined joint task force.

The BBC also reports that Western aircraft bombed targets in Tripoli. This follows an attack on Libyan armored vehicles near Benghazi by a French aircraft. According to NBC News, there are no U.S. aircraft over Libya.

Nothing follows.



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[SWJ Blog]

Blue Birds and Wolverines in Libya: Cinematic Considerations for Military Intervention

Entry Excerpt:

Blue Birds and Wolverines in Libya: Cinematic Considerations for Military Intervention
by Patrick McKinney

On March 17, 2011, the United Nations authorized military force to protect the people of Libya from the forces of its ruler, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Two days later, the United States, France, and England, commenced military action against Libyan air defenses, and command and control sites in preparation for a no-fly zone. As the international community starts action in Libya, words of caution are in order. Seen by some as a lower-cost alternative to ground forces, a no-fly zone intends to protect Libyan civilians and opposition forces from the Qaddafi regime, but such a mission is not without risks. As political and military leaders prepare for action, they should pause for a few hours and watch two films of the 1980s; 1986’s Iron Eagle and 1984’s Red Dawn, and consider the lessons of the Blue Bird and the Wolverines.

Patrick McKinney served as a United States Army field artillery and military intelligence officer, and deployed as a platoon leader in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom IV. He has watched both films since childhood, and they accompanied him on his deployment. He now resides in Alexandria, VA. The views expressed in this piece are his own.



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[SWJ Blog]

The Battle for Libya

Entry Excerpt:

Over at the The New York Review of Books, Nicolas Pelham offers another look into defining and describing the motivations and interest of those rebelling in Libya in his article "The Battle for Libya."

BLUF Tucked between the Mediterranean and the Sahara, the Libyan town of Brega was a rather somnolent back-of-the-beyond place on the Gulf of Sidra in the north of the country. Oil workers went there for its high wages and decent schools—an engineer at the Sirte Oil Company earned ten times more than his counterpart in the armed forces.

No longer. Brega, which sits on an oil lake, has become a battlefield in the fight against the government of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. Bombs drop among oil depots filled with hundreds of thousands of barrels, and in the past two weeks, the company managers have had to deal with four changes of regime. To hedge bets they keep in touch with both the rebels in Benghazi, to the east, and the Qaddafi regime in Tripoli, to the west.

The battle for Brega and a nearby but larger terminal, Ras Lanuf, has significantly upped the stakes in Libya’s conflict. It is being fought halfway between Colonel Qaddafi’s tribal heartland of Sirte and the rebel base in Benghazi, a city of 800,000, and has drawn traditional desert tribes into the revolution, including the large Maghraba and Zawiya clans, on whose coastal scrubland Brega lies. It also threatens to draw in an outside world jittery that southern Europe’s nearest oil supplies are now jeopardized.

Much more at The New York Review of Books



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[CWOT]

My assumption is that AQ will try to take credit and take advantage of the Libyan uprising. I think AQ-LIFG linkages with the rebels have been overstated thus far. But, I don't think we should be naive about AQ types trying to influence key jihadi leaders in Darnah.

Here's six things I think we (US) should begin doing now to offset AQ ambitions. Would enjoy any further thoughts on what the U.S. should be considering. What else should we be doing?

1. End the Gaddafi regime immediately- Opposition to Gaddafi links rebels generally amenable to the West with jihadi's affiliated with LIFG-AQ types. The longer LIFG-AQ types remain embedded with other Libyan opposition groups, the stronger the bonds will be between them. Eliminating the Gaddafi regime will allow for more moderate rebel groups to emerge and repel AQ aggression.

2. Push moderate rebel leaders to the forefront- The West should move to place a face on the Libyan opposition. Strategic communications should be implemented quickly to demonstrate to the world that the Libyan opposition is clearly not the result of AQ inspiration. This could be accomplished through publicized communication with select opposition leaders and widely broadcast television interviews with key rebel partners allied against Gaddafi and LIFG-AQ linked groups. Current amorphous descriptions of the Libyan opposition create ambiguity allowing for biased interpretation; ambiguity easily capitalized on by AQ elements taking credit for a revolution they missed.

3. Don’t waste an opportunity-The U.S. wanted to counter jihadi elements in Darnah three years ago. The NFZ and the vacuum created by the crumbling Gaddafi regime should not be wasted. If AQ moves to bolster their position in Libya, the West should be prepared early to use soft and hard power options directly and through surrogates.

4. Isolate Darnah if necessary- LIFG-AQ support and presence in Darnah has existed for a long time. The West should move aggressively to monitor and isolate Darnah if it goes the way of AQ. Own the border crossing from Egypt. Monitor desert crossings with aerial surveillance. Control the coast through the Navy. Darnah is one of the few places AQ might reside where the West retains distinct capabilities to monitor the region from land, sea and air.

5. Engage the EU reference an AQ Libyan safe haven - Should AQ gain a safe haven in Libya, the greatest threat will initially be to Europe. The U.S. has proceeded responsibly by letting NATO take the reins of the NFZ. EU countries need to step up in the CT effort in Libya. Italy, France and the UK all have reason to get engaged.

6. Prepare for something other than democracy in Libya - I hope lessons learned from trying to institute democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan reasonably moderate the West’s vision of Libya’s political future. Freedom comes in many forms and often time incrementally. Libya remains a tribal, oil dependent country. Constructing a unified democracy without occupation is likely impossible. Libya may find renewed political stability and economic vitality quicker if it pursued an emirate type structure; a form closer to the original Barbary states or similar to the UAE. Can the West accept this? Can they help this happen? This will be tough. Bottom line: a weak democracy is more beneficial to AQ while stronger sub-states can be a useful counter against AQ aggression.

From:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=187

[Bob's World]

In a slightly different take, I don't think we need to counter AQ in Libya. I think we need to out compete AQ in Libya for the trust of the populace (I almost wrote "support," but we don't need the support of the Libyan populace, their reforming/emerging government does, we "merely" need to earn their trust.

Part of earning that trust will be in how we treat those who have affiliated with the LIFG. While this has been the most active, most closely tied with AQ, tip of the iceberg of the dissatisfied populace of Libya, they are part of that populace. Instead of isolating, I would move now to take them off of the terror list and ensure that they have an appropriate voice in what happens next.

To ignore those who have committed their lives to staying and fighting for freedom for years because we disagree with the ideologies they have adopted, or who they had to turn to for assistance now that they are on the cusp of achieving their Ends is the classic mistake we always make. We overlook the rough, dirty fighters and become enamored with some smooth expat opportunist who is less offensive to our sensibilities and throw our lot in with such, and elevate them into power as the new dictator that now owes allegiance to the US and our interests. It's time to break that model. It sure as hell isn't working for us in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan we elevated such "moderates" and attempted to "isolate" those who we felt were too close to AQ. In so doing we crafted a situation that ensured the current insurgency there and us being stuck once again (as in Vietnam, as in Iraq, etc) battling to sustain what we have created against resistance from the populace we have foisted such governance upon.

Less is more. I think we need to beware the Johnny come lately "moderates," and we need to keep an open mind in regard to those who we have struggled with in the past. To exclude the LIFG is to ensure that most active segment stays in the AQ camp and continues to wage international terror on their behalf. We need to let Libyans decide what the fate of the LIFG is, and also allow them to decide who they think should lead them.

[davidbfpo]

My assumption is that AQ will try to take credit and take advantage of the Libyan uprising.

I find it difficult today from my armchair to see how AQ, more particularly LIFG & AQIM, can claim 'credit' when it is a local rebellion that has survived and made gains to date due to Western air power. A rebellion in which the Jihadists are a minority, yes, I know so were the Bolsheviks in 1917 Russia. Plus the reported acclaim by those in eastern Libya for the Western action and responses of civilians to the downed US pilots.

If anything AQ has been singularly quiet on its contribution in Tunisia, Egypt and now Libya.

[CWOT]

Instead of isolating, I would move now to take them off of the terror list and ensure that they have an appropriate voice in what happens next.

Yes, I'm all for engagement, I was focusing more on isolating if they begin to pursue the jihadi route and start talking caliphate. It would be excellent if we aligned and engaged with LIFG remnants before AQ attempts to reinforce.

We overlook the rough, dirty fighters and become enamored with some smooth expat opportunist who is less offensive to our sensibilities and throw our lot in with such, and elevate them into power as the new dictator that now owes allegiance to the US and our interests.

Yes, I wrote about this reference Egypt and AlBaradei. It felt really Chalabi like, and I hope we don't try that in Libya.

To exclude the LIFG is to ensure that most active segment stays in the AQ camp and continues to wage international terror on their behalf. We need to let Libyans decide what the fate of the LIFG is, and also allow them to decide who they think should lead them.

The U.S. needs to reevaluate all its so called enemies in North Africa and the Middle East. I'm waiting to see how the Muslim Brotherhood turns out in Egypt. They are in the driver's seat for the government's future in Egypt. The U.S. has to engage with them, and the Muslim Brotherhood is too big in Egypt not to have a seat at the table.

[CWOT]

AQ completely missed out on these uprisings and it really hurts their credibility. That's why I think AQ has to get active in the next few months. If they can't begin meddling in these revolutions then their era is over. It's been ten years, they've missed the fall of all their so called "Apostate regimes" they have argued against. That's why I'm interested in Libya. I think there are only a handful actively aligned with AQ currently residing in Libya. But, there are another handful waiting in other AQ campaigns that I imagine will want to relocate back home.

[SWJ Blog]

Lessons for Libya?

Entry Excerpt:

Lessons for Libya?
Flawed Policy and the Inevitability of Military Failure: The Anglo-French Suez Expedition of 1956
by Brian C. Collins

Download The Full Article: Lessons for Libya?

Thesis: The disastrous outcome of the Anglo-French expedition of 1956 was not the result of tactical incompetence, but rather a consequence of flawed policy.

Discussion: It is critical for policy-makers to not only understand the difficulties of armed intervention, but also the commitment of will required. If policy limitations preclude waging the type of war necessary to achieve strategic objectives, the pursuit of other options becomes imperative. Professional military members expend a great deal of energy to understand the relationship between politics and war. It would be wise for policy-makers to do the same so as to avoid the pitfalls experienced by the British and French in 1956. Tactically, the British and French - in concert with the Israelis - mobilized, deployed, and employed a diverse military force to compel the fall of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egyptian government. Operationally, the campaign required a degree of coordination between not only national entities, but branches within the armed forces as well which had yet to be exhibited in an operation of such limited size and scope in the twentieth century. Strategically, geo-political influences and factors forced the withdrawal of British and French forces before ever achieving the purpose for which the military campaign was intended – the removal of the Nasser. This paper examines the Anglo-French expedition to identify the root causes which lead to this tremendous failure in order to provide lessons for the national leadership of today.

Conclusion: The failure of the Anglo-French expedition of 1956 was clearly the result of flawed policy, not tactical incompetence. The political establishment’s failure to anticipate reaction in the context of Cold War balance of power politics, their discount of options other than military action, and insistence upon planning to obtain limited objectives, all contributed directly to the ignominy which would follow.

Download The Full Article: Lessons for Libya?

Lieutenant Colonel Brian C. Collins, USMC is the Deputy Foreign Policy Advisor at Headquarters, US Special Operations Command. The views expressed herein are his own.



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[SWJ Blog]

Forging a Libya Strategy

Entry Excerpt:

Forging a Libya Strategy: Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration by Andrew Exum and Zachary Hosford, Center for a New American Security Policy Brief.

While the situation in Libya continues to change rapidly, the most prudent course of action for the United States is to execute a strategy that would minimize the U.S. commitment to Libya and protect the United States from a potentially protracted and resource-intensive conflict, according to this policy brief by Center for a New American Security (CNAS) experts Andrew Exum and Zachary Hosford.

In Forging a Libya Strategy: Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration, authors Exum and Hosford argue that U.S. interests in Libya, which include the protection of civilians and providing momentum to the revolutionary fervor sweeping the region, come at a potentially high cost to the United States. In addition, continued engagement may detract focus and resources away from other critical issues in the region and globally. Exum and Hosford offer four policy recommendations for the United States that limit the U.S. expenditure of blood or treasure:

Use Positive and Negative Incentives to Force Moammar Gadhafi from Power. The United States and its allies should continue to use international financial sanctions to help force Gadhafi from power. The United States should also press an African or Arab nation to accept Moammar Gadhafi and his family into exile. While that means Gadhafi could depart Libya as a free man, it would help end what promises to be a protracted and bloody civil war.

Halt Direct Military Operations. Now that the U.S.-led naval attacks and air strikes have prevented a humanitarian crisis, the United States should refrain from further direct military operations in Libya and only contribute military assets that fill capability gaps in coalition forces conducting operations related to the enforcement of the no-fly zone or arms embargo.

Help Build a Coalition To Provide Non-Military Support. The administration should work to build support among the nations of Africa, Europe and the Arabic-speaking world to provide aid to the people of Libya – to include police trainers, rule-of-law specialists and all the other means necessary for successful stabilization operations.

Be Willing to Accept the Status Quo Ante Bellum. Should the allied intervention end with Gadhafi still in power, and he again threatens military action against anti-government rebels and civilians, the United States should not re-engage militarily. The Obama Administration, meanwhile, will have plenty of other opportunities – in Syria, Egypt, Bahrain and elsewhere – to support the popular revolutions and demonstrations in the Arabic-speaking world.

Forging a Libya Strategy: Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration



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[SWJ Blog]

President Obama on Operations in Libya, 28 March 2011

Entry Excerpt:







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[SWJ Blog]

On Libya, Obama avoids George W., but becomes George H.W.

Entry Excerpt:

In his speech last evening at the National Defense University, President Obama explained the humanitarian impulse and the defense of America’s values and interests that led him to intervene in Libya’s civil war. Obama gave a passionate explanation of why he acted in Libya. But he failed to convincingly explain how his Libya policy will work in the future and why it will achieve success. Obama explicitly promised that his Libya policy will not turn into President George W. Bush’s policy for Iraq. Instead, Obama’s Libya policy is mimicking almost step-for-step the other Bush policy for Iraq, that of George H.W. Bush.

In my March 4, 2011 column at Foreign Policy, I first drew the comparison between the Obama administration’s handling of Libya and the situation in Iraq 20 years ago, just after Kuwait’s liberation from Saddam Hussein’s forces. Events in Libya since then and Obama’s speech last night have only reinforced the comparison.

Click below to read more ...



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[SWJ Blog]

Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy

Entry Excerpt:

Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy
By Christopher M. Blanchard
Acting Section Research Manager
Congressional Research Service
March 29, 2011

Summary:

Over forty years ago, Muammar al Qadhafi led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in the name of nationalism, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Opposition groups citing the same principles are now revolting against Qadhafi to bring an end to the authoritarian political system he has controlled in Libya for the last four decades. The Libyan government’s use of force against civilians and opposition forces seeking Qadhafi’s overthrow sparked an international outcry in February and early March 2011, and a stalemate began to break in favor of the Qadhafi government, threatening civilians in opposition-held areas. The United States and other European and Arab states are now carrying out military operations in Libya to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which was adopted on March 17 and authorizes “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians. Qadhafi and his supporters have described the uprising as a foreign and Islamist conspiracy and are attempting to outlast their opponents. Qadhafi remains defiant amid the dismantling of his military by coalition air strikes. His supporters threatened to respond to attacks by striking civilian and military targets in the Mediterranean region.

Resolution 1973 calls for an immediate cease-fire and dialogue, declares a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, and authorizes robust enforcement measures for the arms embargo on Libya established by Resolution 1970 of February 26, “while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.” As of March 28, U.S. military officials reported that U.S. and coalition strikes on Libyan air defenses, air forces, and ground forces had neutralized the ability of Muammar al Qadhafi’s military to control the country’s airspace and were increasingly focused on targeting pro-Qadhafi ground forces found to be continuing to violate Resolution 1973 through attacks on Libyan civilians. President Obama has said the United States will not introduce ground forces and has called for Qadhafi to step down. The no-fly zone called for in Resolution 1973 is in place and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is assuming command of coalition operations. The United States and international partners are providing humanitarian assistance to displaced persons in temporary camps in Tunisia and Egypt.

Until recently, the United States government was pursuing a policy of reengagement toward Qadhafi after decades of confrontation, sanctions, and Libyan isolation. President Obama now has joined some leaders in asserting that Muammar al Qadhafi must ultimately give up power, although that outcome is not called for explicitly in Resolution 1973. Obama Administration officials highlight a number of non-military steps the U.S. government has taken to achieve that objective, while military operations to protect Libyan civilians continue. U.S. steps include new targeted sanctions established in Executive Order 13566. Some Members of Congress expressed support for U.S. military intervention prior to the adoption of Resolution 1973, while others disagreed or called for the President to seek explicit congressional authorization prior to any use of force. Some executive-legislative consultation occurred prior to the start of U.S. military operations, and, on March 21, President Obama sent a letter to Congress outlining U.S. military objectives and operations, but not explicitly seeking congressional authorization.

Many observers believe that Libya’s weak government institutions, potentially divisive political dynamics, and current conflict suggest that security challenges could follow the current uprising, regardless of its outcome. Some opposition figures have formed an Interim Transitional National Council which claims to represent all areas of the country and is seeking recognition and material support. In evaluating U.S. policy options, Congress may seek to better understand the roots and nature of the conflict in Libya, the views and interests of key players, and the potential consequences of the military action under way and other policy proposals under consideration.

<a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/doc/CRSLibyaUnrestandUSPolicy.pdf">Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy

[AdamG]

Since it's worthy of it's own thread.

Rebel fighters aren't waiting around as an international coalition debates whether to do more to arm and train them in battling Col. Moammar Gadhafi's troops. They've ramped up a crash training course for volunteers in hopes of better organizing the improvised army that is struggling to make sustained military gains against the autocratic regime.

In a sprawling cement lot of a military base in the rebels' stronghold of Benghazi, two teenagers practice setting up the heavy tripod barrel and base of a mortar system as a trainer watches carefully.

One of the new rebel recruits undergoing training is 32-year-old academic Anas Abu Buker, a communications engineer from the small city of Baida, two hours from Benghazi. Abu Buker was set to enter a doctoral program at Washington State University until the revolution of Feb. 17 radically changed his plans.

"Two weeks ago, I was lecturer at university," he says. "Right now I should be in the U.S. doing my Ph.D."

http://www.npr.org/2011/04/01/135023...me-to-organize

And what, one may ask, has happened to the members of the Libyan military forces who, it was claimed, had defected to the revolution in droves? They, especially the officers, are increasingly scarce on the front line. The Shabaab claims that former soldiers were too slow in moving forwards, while the defectors in turn accuse the volunteer fighters of lack of discipline.

The rebels' operations are further undermined by an absence of command and control. On Monday two men standing within a hundred yards of each other, "Captain" Jalal Idrisi and "Major" Adil Hassi, claimed to be in charge of the fighters who were meant to be attacking Ajdabiya. A brief advance soon turned into a chaotic retreat. Major Hassi then claimed that the misjudgement in going forward had been Captain Idris's idea. But why didn't they liaise? "We haven't got communications equipment" he responded. But the Captain is standing just over there, journalists pointed out. "I don't talk to him," said Major Hassi.

http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion...e-2251298.html

[AdamG]

BREGA, Libya -- Libyan rebels with military training began on Friday turning away inexperienced volunteers from the front lines here in an effort to salvage their battle against Moammar Gadhafi's better trained forces.
The effort came as Mustafa Abdel Jalil, the leader of the rebel council, announced that the rebels would consider negotiating with Gadhafi if the Libyan leader withdraws his forces from eastern cities and allows peaceful protests. It was the most specific proposition for talks that the rebels have offered since the revolt began in February.
The decision to separate the untrained and ill-equipped volunteers from the rebels' "special forces" is the first concrete sign that the rebel leadership is taking steps to bring some kind of organization to the anti-Gadhafi military effort, which to date has looked more like a weekend road rally than a battlefield operation. At the first sign of gunfire, most of the rebel forces dash to their waiting vehicles and race away from the battlefield.
"It's a strategy. We have to do this," said a 32-year-old rebel who asked to be identified by only his first name, Jamal, as he waited at a checkpoint 20 miles behind the front line, where only fighters with heavy weapons were allowed to go forward. "The further you go (toward the front line), the more confusing it gets."

Read more: http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/04/0...#ixzz1IKeZw6gu

[AdamG]

Rebel source tells Al Jazeera about training offered by US and Egyptian special forces in eastern Libya.

US and Egyptian special forces have reportedly been providing covert training to rebel fighters in the battle for Libya, Al Jazeera has been told.

An unnamed rebel source related how he had undergone training in military techniques at a "secret facility" in eastern Libya.

He told our correspondent Laurence Lee, reporting from the rebel-stronghold of Benghazi, that he was sent to fire Katyusha rockets but was given a simple, unguided version of the rocket instead.

"He told us that on Thursday night a new shipment of Katyusha rockets had been sent into eastern Libya from Egypt. He didn't say they were sourced from Egypt, but that was their route through," our correspondent said.

"He said these were state-of-the-art, heat-seeking rockets and that they needed to be trained on how to use them, which was one of the things the American and Egyptian special forces were there to do."

The intriguing development raises several questions, about Egypt's private involvement and what the arms embargo exactly means, said our correspondent.

"There is also the question of whether or not the outside world should arm the rebels, when in fact they [rebels] are already being armed covertly."

Our correspondent added that since the rebels appear to be receiving covert support in terms of weaponry and training, it is not surprising that they are not inclined to criticise NATO openly.

Video here
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/af...443133798.html

[AdamG]

At the training ground inside a former Gaddafi military base on the edge of Benghazi on Thursday more than 1,000 young men were gathered for instruction in the use of Kalashnikovs, mortars and rockets.

Some of the recruits put on a show of bravado. They claimed to be on the march to Tripoli to topple Gaddafi. But there was a more sober feeling among the bulk of volunteers, and the men showing them how to shoot, not flee.

A few weeks' training only goes so far against a more experienced and better disciplined force. The volunteers know that mostly they are at the camp to learn how to defend their homes if Gaddafi's troops make a push toward Benghazi.

Britain is hatching a plan to send experienced soldiers, such as former members of the SAS, to train the rebel army under the cover of private security companies paid for by Arab states. The revolutionary council's line on the prospect of foreign trainers is diplomatic.

"We will appreciate any friendly nation training our fighters," said Mustafa Gheriani, a council spokesman. "Our preference is for trainers of Arab origin but we appreciate the help from wherever it comes."

But at the training base there is suspicion.

"Why do they want to send trainers?" asked Bejou. "If they are talking about just a few weeks' training what's the point? We are doing that. If they are talking about long-term training they are talking about a long war and more people dying. That could turn this into a civil war. We don't want a long war. If Nato, the allies, want us to be in Tripoli we could be there in seven hours."

The talk of training for a longer war only fuels growing suspicion in Benghazi that Nato is abandoning the west's commitment to use air power to protect civilians. It was interpreted by the rebels as meaning western powers would destroy Gaddafi's army and clear the way for them to march into Tripoli.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011...-camp-training