If it were decided that a no fly zone were a good thing, could we approximate it with some Aegis destroyers stationed just offshore? Those missiles are fairly long ranged, the radars are very good and the main road runs along the coast. How close though I don't know.
The idea would be to give the rebels some visible support, destroyers are easy to see. But at the same time not put any troops ashore and avoiding complications that would come with that. Politically we could be seen as actually doing something concrete to help, which might help us if the rebels win. But by not putting troops ashore, it would still be their victory if they can manage it.
Strategically, the goal would be to topple the dictator, but we would only be willing to put so much into achieving that goal. It would be a limited effort for a big goal. If the dictator won he wouldn't be any more mad at us than he is now.
I don't know much about naval operations but it might be easier logistically than a no fly zone enforced by aircraft flying over the country.
This is just an idea by a forever civilian so please eviscerate it if it has no merit.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Now that US and EU decided to stand by the rebels: it's time for action.
The only advantage, part from military experience, that G and his troops have is the control of the air.
Sure a NFZ is not that easy to set. But the rebels are running out of time! A Kosovo like operation (Air and only air op) to support the rebels would defenitively weight the balance in the right direction.
Agreed. The probably most "cost & time effective" would be a mix like that from 1995, when NATO bombed the Serbs. Air attacks pinned the Serbs down and destroyed their C3 capability while the Croats launched their ground offensive. Eventually, this brought an end to the war.Originally Posted by Rex Brynen
For all practical purposes, any declaration of a NFZ over Libya is likely to end in a similar situation - which means there is a guaranteed "exit strategy" too: as soon as Qaddaffi is away, there is no purpose of a NFZ any more.
You mean, it would be sufficient to cut off the airborne "flow of supplies" by blocking the area of Tripoli alone?
OK. But, what are you going to do with all the Libyan troops holding places like Sebha ("the capital of the south"), Ghat and al-Wigh? Even if Qaddaffi falls, it's unlikely they're going to give up. Not only that they are separated from the rest of the country by 300+ km of desert, but they also have enough supplies to survive "for years" and are certainly not keen to give up if facing the ICC. Means: at best, you've got a situation where the country is split.
A good idea would be to post one off Benghazi and protect the town from the threat of regime's Scud brigades that are still operational in the Syrte area. It's quite obvious that the rebel oppinion changed meanwhile, so they would probably be quite pleased by some ABM protection.
But, moving one in direction of Tripoli is rather likely to end in another IranAir-Tragedy (from 1988): the problem with ships is that they have long-range radars and weapons, but are not as flexible as (manned) interceptors to "go there" and check what kind of aircraft is underway around.
Finally, regarding NFZs over Iraq and Bosnia, in general: these were effective, I've got little doubts about this. However, the problem was that both came too late. The one in Iraq was imposed only once the Kurds and Marsh Arabs (plus a division of the Iranian IRGC or so supporting them) were smashed by the Iraqi military, also with help of chemical weapons. Subsequently, it was maintained for ten years, leaving the regime to recover and continue with attrocities. The one in Bosnia was imposed only after the war on the ground largely ended in a stalemate, but hundreds of thousands were already ethnically cleansed.
Eventually, both were brought to an end only through direct military action.
Let's hope that a NFZ over Libya is not going to be imposed much too late, and perhaps also bring that decisive direct military action at a much earlier date.
The US is sending out a dangerous Strategic Communications in our posture on Libya. That message is:
"The US will not back up despotic leaders when challenged peacefully by their populaces, but if the government responds with military violence to suppress the people we will not do anything about that either."
That heavy sigh of relief you hear is from a handful of despotic leaders over on the Arabian Peninsula who had been sweating it following Tunisia and Egypt. Now they are most likely just making sure their most loyal troops are properly postured to act.
This is like the Groundhog seeing his shadow. 6 more years of GWOT. We have given hope to Despots and bin Laden both.
(Oh, and how do our good allies the Saudis thank us?
"Libya produced 1.6 million oil barrels per day before fighting forced companies to evacuate workers. Most of that production is shut down.
Ali Naimi, the Saudi oil minister, said the kingdom has about 3.5 million barrels per day of spare capacity that could be brought online"
Oh, well, so long as it could, Meanwhile the US is quickly funding through higher oil prices the $36 B in reforms the King is offering his people in an attempt to fend of Friday's "day of rage."
Last edited by Bob's World; 03-09-2011 at 11:49 AM.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Considerations on Libya
Considerations on Libya
Entry Excerpt:
Considerations on Libya
by Steven T. Brothers
We must prevent Qaddafi from more efficiently slaughtering his own people. This can be accomplished with intervention. Yet, we must carefully weigh the risks lest a hazy contingency plan creep into a muddling campaign.
As a military officer I know that no fly zones (NFZ) and air strikes are not easy to implement, nor are they necessarily effective. Libyan air defenses would need to be suppressed. We could lose aircraft. Combat search and rescue (C.S.A.R.) personnel deployed to save downed pilots could be killed or captured. Also, our laser-guided bombs would require soldiers – on the ground –to direct them to their targets.
Those who say an NFZ would be “easy” point to Operation Northern Watch over Iraq as proof. Yet, much of Iraq’s air defenses were destroyed in the Gulf war. Further, Iraqi air defenses were easier to find and destroy. Libya does not have such a capacity; what it has is more dangerous: scores of shoulder-fired missiles that are tougher to locate.
Complicating this is a dangerous absence of information about the opposition. Although Secretary of State Clinton said the U.S. is “reaching out” to the rebels we should be skeptical of any intelligence information provided to us. We do not need a Libyan version of the Iraqi informant “Curveball” feeding us false tips in order to further a narrow agenda.
Also, much of the opposition are former government employees which have not been paid in days. Should this drag on for weeks – and this is certainly possible – there is a risk of the opposition fracturing. Rival leaders might then capitalize on U.S. ignorance and seek support for personal power grabs.
Also, what happens after Qaddafi is toppled? Libya does not have the civil capacity and structures that Tunisia and Egypt have. Libya is – dangerously so- more like Yemen. It lacks the mechanisms to provide basic services, which themselves can check the kind of hopelessness and desperation that feeds violence.
We also must determine how far we are willing to go. When does a no fly zone turn into a no drive zone? Qaddafi’s aircraft should be grounded but he also possesses equally efficient means: tanks, artillery, and gun trucks. Also, according to Human Rights Watch, the Red Crescent, and other relief organizations, there is a humanitarian crisis developing. Qaddafi’s forces are sealing off supply routes. Qaddafi is using food as a weapon. If we plan on assisting here, this will require “boots on the ground.”
Reminiscent of Somalia, our soldiers would face the difficult task of discerning allies from enemies. A sizeable portion of the opposition is former military, many of whom still wear the same uniforms and use the same equipment as Qaddafi’s forces. This makes a corner stone of any military intervention - the rules of engagement - extremely problematic.
We have not adequately evaluated the political risks. Most Libyans would resent the presence of foreign troops. If we overreach, we risk alienating the next generation of Libya’s leaders and the young people that will chart its political future.
If the opposition’s supposed leadership asks for an intervention then they may lose legitimacy. Libyans see this as their revolution and want to emulate the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences with little outside help. The opposition has already appropriated dozens of tanks, attack helicopters, and the critically important anti-aircraft weapons. It may take a while but they might be able to accomplish this on their own.
Others have suggested inserting Special Forces teams to assist the rebels. An apparent rag-tag unprofessional gang, the rebels are led by a few professional soldiers. We could assist by sending teams to help train and lead them. Yet, this is also risky: A U.K. SAS team was captured by a faction of the opposition that considered them invaders. Also, the Libyan opposition is not the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan. There is no Ahmad Shah Masoud – nor the legacy of a martyred one – to rally around. We do not have a twenty-plus year history of assisting the Libyan rebels. There may be a leader in the making but they have yet to assert themselves.
There are more workable options. While the U.N. has taken measures to prevent more weapons from getting to Qaddafi what about personnel? The U.N., the Arab league and the African Union must pressure those countries that have supplied the mercenaries in order to prevent more from arriving. Also, the E.U. –although it has frozen Qaddafi’s assets – must also freeze those of the Libyan state. Until the opposition is in control of the treasury, this is an option worth considering.
Qaddafi’s ruthlessness rivals that of Idi Amin, Charles Taylor, and Nicolae Ceausescu. Under his leadership, rebel soldiers are bound, gagged, shot, and set on fire while merciless guns for hire execute civilians. He must be stopped. Yet, before we rush to rattling our sabers, our policy makers must build a multinational consensus, weigh the risks, and always respect the wishes of the Libyan people.
Major Steven T. Brothers is an Army Middle East Foreign Area Officer and Graduate Student at the Center for Middle East Studies at Harvard University. His comments do not necessarily reflect those of the US Army, the US Government, or Harvard University.
Editor's Note: While we will present all options for intervention, SWJ does not maintain an official position. Rather, we want to facilitate the discussion.
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in this case, however, I'm talking about military traffic in civilian aircraft (unlike Saddam, there is some value to Qaddafi in moving troops and supplies by air), or possibly civilian traffic in military aircraft (intended to provoke a shoot-down).
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
If we're going to do this, then we shouldn't be half-assed about it. A NFZ is not enough in my judgment - if we're going to help the rebels, we should embed small teams with combat controllers to provide fire support to rebel formations and make this civil war as short as possible.Now that US and EU decided to stand by the rebels: it's time for action.
The only advantage, part from military experience, that G and his troops have is the control of the air.
Also, I think the Europeans need to take the lead on this.
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
Those are both very good points.
Crowbat: I don't think you would need to post a destroyer off Tripoli to have a good effect. Protecting the front line and Benghazi from air strikes would have a good effect, if only psychological. I have read that air strikes have a very bad effect on the morale of inexperienced people so stopping them may do more good than we would think.
If we were to establish a no fly zone that would change circumstances to the point where I think small ground teams with SA-18s would be very useful.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Strategy?
NFZ is a tactic. Very doable, relatively low-risk although not risk-free, but still a tactic. To what purpose? What further expectations will this raise?
As far as the strategic message to the extremists, what happens if the NFZ doesn't change anything on the ground? Does this make the US look like a "weak horse" once again? Conversely, even if effective, might it support the Al Qaeda narrative of "Crusaders killing Muslims to steal their oil"?
As to using a NFZ as an excuse for wider ground attack missions, what would be the second and third order effects? Just because a lot of Libyans want to get rid of Qaddafi by force doesn't mean they want someone else bombing their country. The historical record is that such interventions are more likely to unify the population under the current regime than cause them to rise up against it.
Overthrowing Qaddafi might be a desirable objective, but then what? Why do we think the near-term outcome of deposing Qaddafi in Libya would be more favorable to US interests than at least the first 5 years after we got rid of Saddam turned out to be?
If Qaddafi is defeated, with or without external intervention, the odds of political chaos and a humanitarian disaster ensuing are pretty high. Further slaughter as the winners take revenge and/or continue the fighting to decide who amongst them will replace Qadaffi is also rather likely.
Merely deposing Qaddafi isn't going to make Libya suddenly look like Switzerland (or even Jordan, to use a less sarcastic metaphor).
The Colin Powell warning about "You break it, you buy it" is well worth keeping in mind here.
"Just do SOMETHING" rarely turns out to be good policy.
Yeah, what CMSBelt said. George will also has some good questions that need answering in today's WAPO:
* The world would be better without Gaddafi. But is that a vital U.S. national interest? If it is, when did it become so? A month ago, no one thought it was.
* How much of Gaddafi's violence is coming from the air? Even if his aircraft are swept from his skies, would that be decisive?
* What lesson should be learned from the fact that Europe's worst atrocity since the Second World War - the massacre by Serbs of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica - occurred beneath a no-fly zone?
* Sen. John Kerry says: "The last thing we want to think about is any kind of military intervention. And I don't consider the fly zone stepping over that line." But how is imposing a no-fly zone - the use of military force to further military and political objectives - not military intervention?
* U.S. forces might ground Gaddafi's fixed-wing aircraft by destroying runways at his 13 air bases, but to keep helicopter gunships grounded would require continuing air patrols, which would require the destruction of Libya's radar and anti-aircraft installations. If collateral damage from such destruction included civilian deaths - remember those nine Afghan boys recently killed by mistake when they were gathering firewood - are we prepared for the televised pictures?
* The Economist reports Gaddafi has "a huge arsenal of Russian surface-to-air missiles" and that some experts think Libya has SAMs that could threaten U.S. or allies' aircraft. If a pilot is downed and captured, are we ready for the hostage drama?
* If we decide to give war supplies to the anti-Gaddafi fighters, how do we get them there?
* Presumably we would coordinate aid with the leaders of the anti-Gaddafi forces. Who are they?
* Libya is a tribal society. What concerning our Iraq and Afghanistan experiences justifies confidence that we understand Libyan dynamics?
* Because of what seems to have been the controlling goal of avoiding U.S. and NATO casualties, the humanitarian intervention - 79 days of bombing - against Serbia in Kosovo was conducted from 15,000 feet. This marked the intervention as a project worth killing for but not worth dying for. Would intervention in Libya be similar? Are such interventions morally dubious?
* Could intervention avoid "mission creep"? If grounding Gaddafi's aircraft is a humanitarian imperative, why isn't protecting his enemies from ground attacks?
* In Tunisia and then in Egypt, regimes were toppled by protests. Libya is convulsed not by protests but by war. Not a war of aggression, not a war with armies violating national borders and thereby implicating the basic tenets of agreed-upon elements of international law, but a civil war. How often has intervention by nation A in nation B's civil war enlarged the welfare of nation A?
* Before we intervene in Libya, do we ask the United Nations for permission? If it is refused, do we proceed anyway? If so, why ask? If we are refused permission and recede from intervention, have we not made U.S. foreign policy hostage to a hostile institution?
* Secretary of State Hilary Clinton fears Libya becoming a failed state - "a giant Somalia." Speaking of which, have we not seen a cautionary movie - "Black Hawk Down" - about how humanitarian military interventions can take nasty turns?
* The Egyptian crowds watched and learned from the Tunisian crowds. But the Libyan government watched and learned from the fate of the Tunisian and Egyptian governments. It has decided to fight. Would not U.S. intervention in Libya encourage other restive peoples to expect U.S. military assistance?
* Would it be wise for U.S. military force to be engaged simultaneously in three Muslim nations?
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
Actually Qaddafi staying and seriously opening talks and embracing reforms with his populace is superior to him running off into exile.
But the problem the US has is that we do a lot of lecturing on values and human rights; then when a populace dares to act out we look away.
The question for the US is if we have vital interests at stake in how this plays out. Not in if Qaddafi stays or goes, but in how it plays out in deciding that and how our role is perceived. The entire Arabian Peninsula is teetering as we type, and our actions could well affect whether that stabilizes, or which way it tips.
It is the pent up rage of these populaces that AQ has fed upon, this is the festering boil of oppression that has fed the war on terrorism for 15 odd years. Now it is rupturing, and that pressure will either finally be relieved, or it will be reasserted by either the current or new management. How ever it plays, the West will be judged by these populaces, and if we play this wrong, terrorism continues and may get worse. If we play it right things begin to heal.
This is far more important than Afghanistan is for getting to resolution in the war on terror. Afghanistan is just where AQ planted the flag, but North Africa and the AP are where the people who support their movement live in varying states of oppression.
For Libya, this is all about Libya. But for the US this is far, far larger.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Bob,
That's all well and good, but what, specifically, would you have the US do?
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
That, my friend, is the Billion dollar a day question.
The first thing is to understand why these populaces have been supportive of AQ, why they are dissatisfied with their current governance, and why they tend to act out against the West in a effort to create change.
Next is to not fixate on Libya for Libya's sake, other than as one of many target audiences for whatever it is we do. It should by helpful for the Libyan people, but it must be shaped to the much larger strategic effect desired.
Next is to engage all of the dozen or so nations involved privately and diplomatically to lay out where we stand and what we are going to do in Libya, and what we are prepared to do with each of them depending on which way they self-determine to go. That is the thing about self-determination and free will, it opens the door to make some bad decisions with bad consequences. We should have learned by now that there is a communication gap between the west in general, the US in particular, and this region (like Saddam thinking he had a formal green light to take Kuwait). We must be clear.
As to Libya specifically, I lean toward making a deal with Qaddafi to allow him to stay in power for some set term to shape a way forward with heavy Arab/UN involvement in exchange for a truce with his people. If he refuses, up the ante a bit. Figure out what his pressure points are and apply pressure. To simply call for him to step down is probably the wrong thing. To just fly in and start blasting is also probably the wrong thing. (At least at first)
This is all so incredibly foreseeable that State should have a big play book that they are walking the President through with the Joint Chiefs right now. Not holding my breath, but we can catch up if they don't have that homework done.
Part of this play would absolutely to squeeze the Saudis to ramp up production for some surge time to keep the global economy stable.
Just some quick thoughts. But we need to open the aperture, step back, and get strategic if we want to maximize this opportunity.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Having Qaddafi remain in power as part of a political strategy is a non-option.
1) The man is deeply unpopular in Libya, and indeed across the Middle East. The international community would be seen as complicit in protecting him.
2) The man is crazy. This is not a term I use lightly, but it fully applies in this case. I think the chances he will ever voluntarily leave power or step down are close to zero.
3) Despite the changes in the Egypt and Tunisia, the Arab world is still a club of dictators, and has little credibility (or interest) in a democratic transition in Libya, even if they would like Qaddafi to go.
4) As we know from Cambodia, a heavy UN presence is no guarantee that a dictator will actually leave in the end. Some 17 years after losing the 1993 elections (guaranteed by 21,500 UNTAC peacekeepers, at a cost of $1.5 billion), he is still effectively in power.
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
He seems to have been very calculating in many regards and is probably no more crazy than Muhammed Saeed al-Sahaf, Saddam's propganda minister, was.
Fuchs,
Crazy and calculating are not mutually exclusive attributes.
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
Background reading
From two acknowledged experts and from different viewpoints. From a UK-based think tank, the Quilliam Foundation, written by a senior, ex-LIFG member:http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/im...libya22feb.pdf
By a UK-based academic analyst:Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/alison-...ard-road-aheadThe military-political deadlock in Libya between supporters and opponents of the Gaddafi regime leaves a pervasive uncertainty over the country’s future. But even greater challenges will follow this conflict.
davidbfpo
No Fly Zone - looking back
There is some historical irony in the discussion on imposing on Libya a No Fly Zone (NFZ) given the role of Italy, as the nearest NATO state and with its somewhat craven policy stance on Libya until recently (Yes, the UK has a few issues too).
During the unification of Italy, notably when Garibaldi with a volunteer army landed in Sicily the Royal Navy (RN) had a presence on the scene to dissuade the capable Neapolitan navy from intervening. A 'No Ship Zone' (NSZ).
Less certain now; was there not a similar role by the RN during the wars of independence in Spanish ruled Latin America? Plus an element of discretion over expertise and more.
davidbfpo
Bob,
you've got some excellent points.
For example:
The US is sending out a dangerous Strategic Communications in our posture on Libya. That message is:
"The US will not back up despotic leaders when challenged peacefully by their populaces, but if the government responds with military violence to suppress the people we will not do anything about that either."
- and also:
The first thing is to understand why these populaces have been supportive of AQ, why they are dissatisfied with their current governance, and why they tend to act out against the West in a effort to create change.
But the idea of keeping Qaddaffi in any kind of position - power or not - in Libya, sorry, that is a complete "no-no".
We need not going very much into details about internal situation in Libya. It's very simple: if the pro or contra decision for a foreign intervention in that country (sanctioned by the UN or not, "limited to NFZ" or not) depends upon the answer to the question "are they pro or contra AG", then we all should better pack our rucksacks right away, get our rifles and hurry up to Libya - in order to fight for the rebels there and against Qaddaffi.
Namely, it's precisely such creatures, such tyranns like Qaddaffi, it's their behaviour, their orders to crush not only this uprising but also so many others in the past "regardless the price", that have caused what you call "populace supportive of AQ". It's such monsters that have created a situation in which somebody came to the idea to create something as monstrous as AQ - and that's all anybody needs to know (or think about) in this case.
Why is it up to the USA to decide Qaddafi's fate, one way or another?
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
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