And Libya goes on...

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan:

Ditto with this "Whole of Government" BS. Where has that ever worked?

They do love that whole "Three Cups of Tea" charade, but actual governance is just plain hard and messy---everywhere.

Governance is certainly hard and messy, and even hard and messy governance has to evolve to suit the conditions in any given place. It cannot be installed or provided. We can drink all the tea in China and then some,and we still can't "create" a stable state or stable governance in Libya, Somalia, or Afghanistan.

[JMA]

I've said before that your political acumen was suspect-- as the Hungarian Goulash indicates -- but praised your military skill. That military suggestion of yours re: Misrata brings my judgement of your judgement into grave question...

Good thing I don't dish out my opinions of others freely around here.

Ken, because the current and probably the most inept US Administration in history has said there will be no "boots on the ground" does not mean that the use of ground forces is not an intelligent military option to those nations serious about bringing a quick end to the violence in Libya. (I think Gates may well be the problem here)

In the following article (published after my comments) by Rear Admiral Chris Parry RN (retired):

We can't put boots on the ground in Libya – but what about fins?

I particularly agree with a statement of his which I have alluded to in one of my earlier posts (I seem to remember):

We are, to paraphrase Tacitus, creating a stalemate and calling it peace.

Then there is this:

Royal Marines could be sent in to Libya as thousands flee fighting

I believe this figure could be 600 Marines as this article (which I found this morning) alludes to:

Britain to Send 600 Navy Marines, Ships to Libya, Times Says

I say, do it Britain and good on yer (and if you need a 58 year old to pass the ammo I'll get my kit out of the museum and report for duty )

I also still maintain that by rerouting the the Marine Brigade and 2 & 3 Para from Afghanistan to Cyrus/Malta (either/or or both) is still the best solution to kill two birds with one stone. Get the troops out of (America's war) Afghanistan and (apply an effective force level to) deal effectively with the situation in Libya.

[JMA]

Libyan rebels pay a heavy price for resisting Gaddafi in Misrata
With 1,000 dead and a further 3,000 injured, the two-month-old war has taken its toll on the people of the city

So much for the wording from UNSC Resolution 1973 in this regard:

Protection of civilians

4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, ...

Then this:

Drones can be used by Nato forces in Libya, says Obama

First comment. Thought it was obvious that UAVs were needed in Libya all along.

Second, this needs a specific Presidential authorisation?

Thirdly, the Brits have hit 58 targets in three weeks around Misrata being around two and a half per day. That's pretty pathetic. Who else has done what?

As the killed photojournalist Tim Hetherington posted on Twitter:

"In besieged Libyan city of Misrata. Indiscriminate shelling by Gaddafi forces. No sign of Nato."

[Tukhachevskii]

@ JMA

You know what I'd love to know is what You would do seeing as you seem to be the font of all wisdom. It's lovely sitting back and criticising the situation from your throne ain't it?

How would you frame the problem?

What is the "end state" you would seek to effectuate?

What strategy would you utilise to acheive that end (being aware of the paucity of means which will determine the ways you seek your end and of the disparate goals of the equally disparate parcitipants)?

[Ken White]

Good thing I don't dish out my opinions of others freely around here.

Oh? Hadn't noticed -- though you do get high marks for sly flanking attacks as opposed to direct frontal assaults...

Ken, because the current and probably the most inept US Administration in history has said there will be no "boots on the ground" does not mean that the use of ground forces is not an intelligent military option to those nations serious about bringing a quick end to the violence in Libya. (I think Gates may well be the problem here)

On the first item, possibly correct. On the second, the question really is whether "those nations" should be serious -- or involved at all, really -- in Libya. We differ on that. I would agree that if it's going to be done, it should be done properly but contend that knowledge that it likely would not be should have been included in the planning (I use that word loosely...).

On the last, you're probably correct --though I'd call it a voice of reason and not a problem.

(and if you need a 58 year old to pass the ammo I'll get my kit out of the museum and report for duty )

You young people are so impetuous...

I also still maintain that by rerouting the the Marine Brigade and 2 & 3 Para from Afghanistan to Cyrus/Malta (either/or or both) is still the best solution to kill two birds with one stone. Get the troops out of (America's war) Afghanistan and (apply an effective force level to) deal effectively with the situation in Libya.

That expansion makes more sense than your original effort but the problem is still that you and the others who advocate(d) this operation are, I believe, not considering what comes after the 'successful' military operation. Removing Qaddafi is really not a difficult task for either the France, the UK or the US among others -- what follows is almost certain to be more problematic and that, not the military effort, is the real rub.

As it is in all such operations. It's great to wish to save the world or parts of it but the populace saved can and most often does then unsave itself with rather dire results...

[JMA]

@ JMA

You know what I'd love to know is what You would do seeing as you seem to be the font of all wisdom. It's lovely sitting back and criticising the situation from your throne ain't it?

How would you frame the problem?

What is the "end state" you would seek to effectuate?

What strategy would you utilise to acheive that end (being aware of the paucity of means which will determine the ways you seek your end and of the disparate goals of the equally disparate parcitipants)?

What are we dealing with here? Lets go once again to UNSC Resolution 1973:

Protection of civilians

4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory,...

add this one:

6. Decides to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians;

...add the arms embargo and the asset freeze.

OK so the next part of the play is for the politicians to convert that into a mission for the military.

In 1986 the then UK Prime Minister said:

“You cannot run the details of an operation by politicians around the Cabinet table. You can set straight criteria, strict parameters, strict rules of engagement. Then, the precise way in which those are carried out is up to the Military.”

So the military would receive instructions as to the:

1. Objective
2. Means
3. Area
4. Time

... followed by the political aspects which would typically include the size of the force and the rules of engagement.

So the supplied Objective becomes the Commander's Aim and the rest of the stuff being imposed limitations.

Within the Brit context the the first Principle of War is The Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. To comply with this principle the following is important:

Within his strategic directive, a commander may have several courses of action open, each of which would fulfil the aim. The selection of the best course will lead to the mission and outline plan being issued, the mission being a statement of the aim and its purpose. The aim passed on to subordinate commanders may be precise or expressed in unambiguous and attainable with the forces available. Once decided the aim must be circulated as widely as security allows so that all can direct their efforts to achieve the aim.

Pause

Fast forward to now.

We know that the US/NATO action has failed to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack while succeeding in enforcing the no-fly-zone.

Looking at the above where would you see the problem lying? With the objective and its limitations as passed to the military by the politicians or a failure to comply by the military?

... please submit your answer before the next lesson...

[Dayuhan]

OK so the next part of the play is for the politicians to convert that into a mission for the military.

You missed an important step.

The UN resolution authorizes member nations to act. It does not require or obligate them to act. So before any mission is framed for the military, policy makers have to determine whether they want to act at all, and if so, the extent to which they want to act. Obviously this decision has to involve factors not directly pertaining to Libya, such as involvements elsewhere, available means, domestic political support, compatibility with other policies, and on and on. Costs, benefits, and potential consequences have to be reviewed.

Many UN member nations have decided not to act at all. Others have chosen limited action. That's their choice to make: authorization to act doesn't require or obligate anyone to act.

You can't "betray someone to whom you have no obligation.

[jmm99]

Yes, the Res. does provide policy options for member states - "no go", "some go" - which I'm not addressing.

Of more interest to me, is that the Res. says "no all the way go" -

4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory,...

The UN Lord giveth and the UN Lord taketh away.

The final proviso would seem to exclude, say, a MAGTF - which has been the US military option of choice over the last 200 years "to protect civilians and civilian populated areas". (180 Landings of US Marines from 1800-1934) - not all were about killing. Check out David Porter (since I yap about him re: pirates) - Puerto Rico 1824 (p. 157 pdf):

Commodore Porter landed with 200 Marines and sailors (officers and men), and addressed a letter to the Alcalde, dated November 12th, reciting the facts of the injury, demanding explanation and atonement, threatening to make the town responsible in case of refusal, and dispatched it by Lieutenant Stribling under a flag of truce. One hour was given for a reply. Lieutenant H.N Crabb, with 27 of his Marines was ordered to place himself in advance of the column and escort the flag of truce to the town. When within a short distance of the town the Marines halted to await the return of Lieutenant Stribling. A short time afterward he returned, in company with the Governor and Captain of the Port, who humbly apologized for the wrong they had done and promised thereafter to respect the rights of American officers. This apology was accepted, and after marching through the town the party returned to their vessels.

Commodore Porter was later CMd for exceeding his authority.

With respect to ground forces, the Res. is definitely a legal constraint on military planning options - ne c'est pas ?

BTW: I am opposed to any US intervention in this matter for policy reasons, which I'm not going to restate here. But, if you do decide to "do it", do it right.

Regards

Mike

[Pete]

Field Marshal Sir JMA is hereby invested with the Order of the Garter and shall hereby be known, by All Ye present, by the following commission that is thus hereby endowed:

"By the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India, Commander of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Moral Conscience of the Western World."

[Dayuhan]

if you do decide to "do it", do it right.

That of course leaves the question of what's "right"... and "right" always depends on the specific policy objectives that are in play.

In the case of the US, despite all the rhetoric about protecting civilians, I suspect that the objective is not about removing MG or protecting civilians. It's about positioning the US somewhere between "we don't give a $#!t" isolationism and "it's broke, git in there and fix it" interventionism.

Purely in terms of interests, of course there's no reason for the US to be involved at all. Even if the Resolution allowed it (which it doesn't), the last thing the US wants is to be occupying another country and trying to cultivate "governance" in yet another inherently unstable "nation". Nothing there but trouble for us, and we've enough of that sort of trouble already. Of course sitting back and doing absolutely nothing is also not consistent with the image the US wants to portray... hence limited involvement in an operation led by others and within constraints established by the UN is a fairly obvious answer. It means we're not going to be the cavalry coming over the hill to Save And Protect Everybody, but that's not what we want to be or what we're trying to be.

Actions often seem irrational or incompetent to those who misconstrue the objective.

[SWJ Blog]

This Week at War: Billions for Libya?

Entry Excerpt:

Is NATO willing to pay what it will cost to take out Qaddafi?

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) The cost of getting serious in Libya

2) Mexico's drug cartels try to control the message -- and spark a media insurgency

The cost of getting serious in Libya

A pattern has emerged in the Libyan conflict. Every setback to the rebels' prospects has resulted in an escalation of military activity by NATO. The alliance's initial intervention five weeks ago began when a powerful pro-Qaddafi armored column approached Benghazi, the rebel capital. This week, nasty house-to-house fighting in Misrata compelled Britain, France, and Italy to each send about ten military advisors to Benghazi. President Barack Obama did his part this week when he dispatched two Predator drones to Libya's skies. The NATO advisors sent to Benghazi are the vanguard of what is likely to be many more Western "boots on the ground" in Libya.

It is now clear that the Western policymakers who opted for intervention in Libya underestimated the resilience and adaptability of Qaddafi's military forces. These Western leaders -- perhaps led astray by the apparent ease with which air power alone compelled Serb leaders in Belgrade to abandon Kosovo in 1999 -- similarly overestimated what air power could accomplish against Qaddafi. The result is, at best, a military stalemate, assuming Misrata can hold out.

Libya's rebels, now openly supported by NATO, are far from accomplishing the de facto objective of the campaign, the removal of the Qaddafi family from Libya. The rebels and Western leaders had hoped that Qaddafi would quickly flee or be overthrown by a palace coup or an uprising in Tripoli. These may yet occur. But hoping for them is not a strategy. If anything, a month of combat has toughened Qaddafi's troops and his remaining inner circle. With Western prestige now heavily committed, what will it actually take to get rid of Qaddafi?

Assuming that Western leaders have ruled out a ground invasion of Libya, the only other course of action around which NATO can build a campaign plan is to prepare the rebel forces in Benghazi for the long march down the coast road to Tripoli. Such a course of action will provide NATO with an organizing concept and give the alliance the initiative. Anything less is just hoping for the best.

Click below to read more ...



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[jmm99]

from jmm99

BTW: I am opposed to any US intervention in this matter for policy reasons, which I'm not going to restate here. But, if you do decide to "do it", do it right.

As to "do it right", IFF you decide "to roll", then you grant a complete hunting license to such as David Porter (then) or Jon Custis (now; as an example of a reasonable military mind).

They will not kill everything in the forest. In fact, they will usually not kill anyone but the knuckleheads who come at them - and I would not want to be among those knuckleheads (IIRC from 2003).

"Porter-Custis" know the difference between "OOTW" and "W" (writing in "Old Style"). The UN War on Libya is a "Limited War" - therefor to me, FUBAR. ?

I've seen too many of those to be a cheerleader. But, if we have to dance, I want the adverse dancers to suffer big time - real "big time". And that is a very good reason why intervention should be seldom (for me).

Regards (and hopefully this clarifies from whence I am; and please do not mistake me for whom I am not)

Mike

[Dayuhan]

As to "do it right", IFF you decide "to roll", then you grant a complete hunting license to such as David Porter (then) or Jon Custis (now; as an example of a reasonable military mind).

I've no doubt that either would be able to roll up the bad boys in the field and remove the senior bad guy from power in short order and with exemplary efficiency... but is that really what we want to do? The last few times we've done that we ended up bogged down in a morass of occupation with all the burdens of expensive and ineffectual "state-building". It is very difficult for us to extricate and walk away from positions like that, and we really don't want another such commitment on our plate.

I can understand and sympathize with the idea that if we're not going to take it all the way we should do nothing at all, but I can also see how those with the unpleasant responsibility of making policy might see some penalties in that course as well. The idea of "limited war", and of trying to do more than nothing but less than everything, may be by definition FUBAR, but it's something we're likely to be stuck with on occasion for quite a while. Strategy is the servant of policy and policy often imposes constraints that make life difficult for those who have to make strategy. In this case I don't envy either policymakers or strategy makers.

Regards (and hopefully this clarifies from whence I am; and please do not mistake me for whom I am not)

I didn't mean to mistake you for who you are not; apologies if it sounded that way. Some of the comments were primarily intended for others who frequent this thread.

[JMA]

You missed an important step.

The UN resolution authorizes member nations to act. It does not require or obligate them to act. So before any mission is framed for the military, policy makers have to determine whether they want to act at all, and if so, the extent to which they want to act. Obviously this decision has to involve factors not directly pertaining to Libya, such as involvements elsewhere, available means, domestic political support, compatibility with other policies, and on and on. Costs, benefits, and potential consequences have to be reviewed.

Many UN member nations have decided not to act at all. Others have chosen limited action. That's their choice to make: authorization to act doesn't require or obligate anyone to act.

You state the obvious.

In the case of Libya however, the US belatedly stepped up to the plate and led the process to get resolution 1973 passed. So you think they got more than they wanted/needed?

Yes then the politicians need to make the decisions like you mention. This they sadly seem to do in a haphazard and disorganized way (from a military point of view) where decisions seem to be worked out in conference. This is mainly why these operations are doomed to failure from the outset.

On the other hand the military has a much more formal approach. The US doctrine on this is probably available online the British maybe not.

The US politicians are likely to load the military objective with so many "limitations" that it is virtually unworkable. Why for this Libyan exercise they even appointed a "Political Committee" to oversee the actual operation. Little wonder it has turned out to be a complete shambles. The communist Political Commissar comes to the US military per kind favour of the Obama administration.

A good Command Sergeant Major at the Libyan operations HQ would by now have got a squad together, rounded up this Political Committee, marched them into the courtyard, had them blindfolded and then shot.

OK, so we are at the point where I was with Tukhachevskii. Maybe you want to give it a shot?

Given what we know about how this operation has unfolded what Objective with accompanying limitations do you think the politicians presented to the military?

[JMA]

With respect to ground forces, the Res. is definitely a legal constraint on military planning options - ne c'est pas ?

Mike, you have a definition for foreign occupation force?

[Dayuhan]

In the case of Libya however, the US belatedly stepped up to the plate and led the process to get resolution 1973 passed. So you think they got more than they wanted/needed?

Weren't you saying earlier in this thread that the British and French led that process, with the US rather reluctantly following?

Given what we know about how this operation has unfolded what Objective with accompanying limitations do you think the politicians presented to the military?

Roughly, and of course oversimplified:

Degrade Libyan air defenses, ground forces, logistics, communications and other support facilities to the greatest extent we can achieve within one week, using air and naval assets.

At this point we will relinquish primary responsibility to the British, French, and other allies. Further assistance will be provided at their request, with requests evaluated on a case-to-case basis.

[JMA]

The UN War on Libya is a "Limited War"

Be careful with the use of the term "Limited War".

During the Cold War era Limited War as opposed to Total War or General War was used to describe a conflict where the use of nuclear weapons was not an option.

The Brits tend to talk more about Regional Conflicts and the Concept of Limitation and because all Regional Wars would be subject to limitation and constraint the continued use of the term Limited War can only only lead to confusion.

Any soldier: Does the US doctrine agree or differ?

[M-A Lagrange]

According to the french news paper Le Figaro, Gadaffi troops received the order to withdraw from Misrata.

http://fr.news.yahoo.com/80/20110423...s-554568f.html
(Sorry, in French)

Just like in Kosovo, it's when the external powers get upset and start to send ground troops (so called liaison officers or diplomatic advisers) that air strike operations start to be fruitful. Not to forget the use of drones with capacity to target precisely mortar and snipers...

Now, let's take it up to the end!

[JMA]

Weren't you saying earlier in this thread that the British and French led that process, with the US rather reluctantly following?

Yes that was true up to the point when the US Administration realised that they had to get involved then in keeping with US practice being if they get involved they are going to run the show - previously described by me as the desire to be the bride at every wedding and the baby at every Christening - they moved in and elbowed the Limeys and the Frogs out of the way.

Remember now?

[M-A Lagrange]

JMA,

We have to face the fact that US are limiting their involvement in Africa to places where they can get access to oil and let the roastbeef and the froggies take the lead in places they can limit China access to oil...
They are in Nigeria, South Sudan and Uganda... France is in Ivory Coast and Lybia...
I don't think it's a bad idea to share leadership according to context.
The problem now is to find out how RSA will be able to maintain her claim to be a permanent security council member to represent Africa.