And Libya goes on...

[JMA]

JMA,

I think you are getting your apples mixed in with my oranges a bit here. Rather than agonizing over the tactual inability to "fix" the enemy, it may be more instructive to step back and ask what exactly the Brits were doing in South Africa and what exactly the US is doing in Afghanistan and what they hoped to gain from their respective operations.

Not sure I am Bob. Who would be crazy enough to want to take any of the larger/major powers with "much more conventional warfare"? Take look back at the South Ossetia war where Georgia made a miscalculation over Russian willingness to resort to military action (and the unwillingness of the US to support them in the face of and at the risk of some real war).

So in this and the previous response I am addressing the likelihood of "much more conventional warfare" in the future.

Yes, I guess one could step back and find a few small points about any different action/war which will render the lessons learned tenuous (in some peoples minds). I say that one (certainly the US) should learn (or better should have studied and learned from) from the British experience of fighting wars all over their empire and the world against disparate enemies. Most often arriving in a new land to face a new enemy with an arrogance in the officer corps (who knew it all from past campaigns) to ensure early reverses against any but the most inept enemy.

To excuse their history of more losses than victories the Brits will tell you that in a war all you need to do is win the last battle.

Like the Brits in the Boer wars who threw "numbers" rather than brain power at the problem so have the US begun to use "surges" as their means of overwhelming their enemies (as a variation on that theme). May have worked in South Africa circa 1900 and in Iraq but maybe not so good in Afghanistan (time will tell).

Neither were on their home turf, but my understanding is that the British intent was to stay, setup shop, and establish dominion and governance over the region and all who lived there. Killing off all who opposed such an arrangement works, as was well demonstrated in North and South America.

May I suggest you need to improve upon your understanding of the events around the two Boer wars

The US goals in Afghanistan are quite different. "All" (in quotes, because even this is infeasible) the President has asked us to do is “to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.” I believe that would make the "enemy" AQ rather than the Taliban, and any earth that gets "scorched" in the process is not going to belong to either the US or AQ, now is it?

Is that what is happening on the ground?

But that does not matter. The fact remains that the US and Brit forces in Afghanistan has no chance of winning any war there against the Taliban, the heroin producers and dealers, or anyone else. Bad strategy, tactical restrictions and in too many cases just plain poor soldiering give a prognosis of no hope in hell.

[snip]

No, our problem is not a tactical one, our problem is that we have mischaracterized the nature of AQ in general, and then allowed ourselves to get into a supporting operation of helping the Northern Alliance gain power in Afghanistan and then defending them against the other half of the society that was represented by the Taliban.

The problem is a tactical one in that without tactical competence the goals (of the US president, what ever they may be at any given moment) cannot be realised.

[snip]

[JMA]

Now it is time to move on to the next phase, perhaps a "World Power without Empire"? Who knows, but events such as are unfolding now across the middle east are shaping that transition right now. We miss all of that if all we do is stare into the flames.

As much as some would prefer to ignore the fact the US needs oil and access to natural resources and world trade it is clearly obvious that intervention will be needed from time to time to ensure the above.

Looking at the US as an outsider it is obvious and understandable that the US needs to secure its access to oil, resources and trade and will do what it needs to do to ensure that. Sometimes not pretty but necessary.

(As an aside probably the only thing of value that the worst world leader in the last 50-60 years (Carter) attempted was to promote alternative sources of energy. Had this and drilling in the Arctic been actively promoted and pursued then maybe, just maybe, that together with tying up oil supplies from South America and West coast Africa then the issues in the middle east would be somewhat less of a problem today. What were the idiots in State doing all this time?)

It doesn't help (as I have stated before) that US policy radically changes every eight years.

That Gbagbo (in the Mickey Mouse country - Ivory Coast) can refuse to take a call from the US president means that he has seen around a million killed in the Rwandan genocide while the US saw no need to "get involved". It has seen brutal dictators like Mugabe all across Africa thumb their noses at the US and other western powers and get away with it. So what has he (and others like him) got to fear?

Then just like the Hungarians, still waiting (from 1956) for the US to come to their aid... as are the Iraqi Shias from 1991 and now the Libyans in 2011. The Shias can be forgiven (as they took the example of Kuwait) but the Libyans are obviously slow learners. The message is simple... you can't rely on the US.

The problem for the US is that it cannot go home and sit in the corner and suck its thumb unless it finds oil and a bunch of natural resources at home and can trade to a satisfactory internally or at most locally.

A great nation badly governed the US needs to start to take foreign affairs a little more seriously, I humbly suggest.

[Ken White]

(As an aside probably the only thing of value that the worst world leader in the last 50-60 years (Carter) attempted was to promote alternative sources of energy. Had this and drilling in the Arctic been actively promoted and pursued then maybe, just maybe, that together with tying up oil supplies from South America and West coast Africa then the issues in the middle east would be somewhat less of a problem today. What were the idiots in State doing all this time?)

We agree on all that, as for the State Department, not totally their fault -- they knew all that and pushed it but a series of Presidents who were far more concerned with their party's fate and domestic politics paid no attention to them.

It doesn't help (as I have stated before) that US policy radically changes every eight years.

As many of us have stated. It's also been stated that's not going to change. We're stuck with it. S'okay, it has merit in other ways.

Then just like the Hungarians...The message is simple... you can't rely on the US.

Regettably -- to many of us here -- that's partly true but there is one big caveat -- you can rely on us if DC believes a strong domestic interest is involved.

A great nation badly governed the US needs to start to take foreign affairs a little more seriously, I humbly suggest.

Humble? Surely not.

No need to be in any event, you have two valid points there -- regrettably, that's unlikely to change a great deal, domestic priorities will always trump barring a really major trauma or until we are no more and the electoral process won't change so -- do you have any other ideas?

[Dayuhan]

As much as some would prefer to ignore the fact the US needs oil and access to natural resources and world trade it is clearly obvious that intervention will be needed from time to time to ensure the above.

It might be possible to hypothesize a situation where intervention in other countries is necessary to secure access to resources or trade, but it's far from inevitable, and no such circumstances exist today, either where the US is intervening or where it is not. The Europeans, Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, Australians, Canadians, Indians, Brazilians and a fair number of others enjoy unfettered access to trade and resources without any need for military intervention, why should matters be any different for the US?

(As an aside probably the only thing of value that the worst world leader in the last 50-60 years (Carter) attempted was to promote alternative sources of energy. Had this and drilling in the Arctic been actively promoted and pursued then maybe, just maybe, that together with tying up oil supplies from South America and West coast Africa then the issues in the middle east would be somewhat less of a problem today. What were the idiots in State doing all this time?)

Possibly the idiots at State deviated from idiocy long enough to realize that there is no way the US can "tie up" oil supplies in South America, West Africa, or anywhere else.

The failure to develop alternative energy supplies is not a failure of policy, but a consequence of the oil glut: no amount of "promotion" was going to stimulate meaningful investment in alternative energy with oil below $30/bbl. Not drilling in the Arctic and in US offshore areas was, in retrospect, rather smart: it held those (largely hypothetical) reserves in place against future depletion. Better to leave your oil in the ground when oil is cheap (as it has been for most of the last 35 years) and pump it when it's expensive.

That Gbagbo (in the Mickey Mouse country - Ivory Coast) can refuse to take a call from the US president means that he has seen around a million killed in the Rwandan genocide while the US saw no need to "get involved". It has seen brutal dictators like Mugabe all across Africa thumb their noses at the US and other western powers and get away with it. So what has he (and others like him) got to fear?

Then just like the Hungarians, still waiting (from 1956) for the US to come to their aid... as are the Iraqi Shias from 1991 and now the Libyans in 2011. The Shias can be forgiven (as they took the example of Kuwait) but the Libyans are obviously slow learners. The message is simple... you can't rely on the US.

Why would they "rely on the US" in the first place? How is it the business of the US to come to the rescue of the Libyans, Ivorians, Zimbabweans, Rwandans etc? The Iraqi Shi'a have a legitimate complaint, to the extent that the US actively encouraged them to rebel, but I can't see how any of the others ever had any reason to expect to be rescued by Americans. As far as I know the US has never been appointed saviour of the world.

The problem for the US is that it cannot go home and sit in the corner and suck its thumb unless it finds oil and a bunch of natural resources at home and can trade to a satisfactory internally or at most locally.

Or one might say that if the US faces a realistic prospect of a need to intervene in a situation that actually has an impact on US access to trade or resources, it would be very unwise for the US to commit limited military resources to situations that have no such impact. We might very well need those resources for a situation that does pose a problem for us, why should we apply them in situations that do not pose such a problem? Resisting the temptation to further overextend a capacity that is already overextended and might in the future be badly needed is hardly thumb-sucking.

[Fuchs]

As much as some would prefer to ignore the fact the US needs oil and access to natural resources and world trade it is clearly obvious that intervention will be needed from time to time to ensure the above.

That's how Japan entered WW2.

They fared much better once they accepted that being peaceful and willing to pay global market price yields much greater success.

This should be a warning.

[Bob's World]

Oil is a global market. Yes, the US needs oil. Lots of Oil. The only thing more desperate than the requirement of the US to buy oil is the requirement of oil producing nations (that are typically one-trick ponies in terms of their economies) to sell oil.

And, if push came to shove, no one can push or shove harder than we can. Cut a frago at CENTCOM, and 12 days later 50% of the world's known oil reserves not in US hands currently would be. So access to oil had never been the issue.

The issue has always been one of price and distribution of oil profits.

If there were a major rebellion in Saudi Arabia tomorrow and bin Laden came to power there, a few things would happen the day after tomorrow:

1. Saudi Arabia would still sell as much or not more oil than they have been;

2. New contracts far less favorable to Western oil companies would be cut, stripping them of their current profit margins and forcing a less favorable deal upon them;

3. Oil companies and the exiled royals would all scream bloody murder, painted in terms of "Islamism" "Injustice" etc.

4. Robbed of the sanctuary of his current non-state legal status, bin Laden would be rolled up; and we would probably foolishly conduct another 12-day operation to put the Saudi family back in power in exchange for even better profit margins for the oil companies, but with US citizens still paying the same price at the pump.


So, I stand by my points. The US does not need to get better at the tactics of colonial powers of days gone by, but we can learn a great deal from the strategies of such powers that could be helpful. Things to do, things not to do. The primary thing we need to put at the top of the "not to do" list, is the establishment and protection of illegitimate governments placed and sustained in power specifically to support our interests. Better to become less controlling and more flexible in working with whatever form of government the locals come up with.

The next major global upheaval will not come from other countries not selling oil to the US; what would be far more likely to drive that would be if the US stopped buying oil from other countries. We didn't switch from the stone age to the bronze age because we ran out of stones; and we won't switch from the oil age to the "whatever comes next" age because we ran out of oil either. The real race should be for cornering the market on "whatever comes next." That will be the country that dominates the globe at the end of this century.

[Dayuhan]

If there were a major rebellion in Saudi Arabia tomorrow and bin Laden came to power there, a few things would happen the day after tomorrow:

Not really what anyone's afraid of. There might be a rebellion, but bin Laden wouldn't come to power tomorrow. Bin Laden probably wouldn't come to power at all, he has no real support base that wants him to take power in the Kingdom.

Nobody would come to power tomorrow, and that's the problem. The risk is that there would be a prolonged period of instability and disorder, possible damage to oil facilities or a flight of key personnel due to security risks, and consequently an inability to produce and sell oil. Certainly any government that came to power would want and need to sell oil, but if the facilities were badly damaged or the technical staff had all run away, they couldn't. If there were an extended period with no government clearly in power, there wouldn't be anyone buyers could reliably deal with or who could manage the facilities. That situation wouldn't last forever, of course, but it could last long enough to push oil prices very high and cause serious economic dislocation all over the oil importing world.

Libya today is a good example. Gadhafi needs and wants to sell oil, and the rebels would love to sell oil if they could. They just can't do it while they're fighting a war.

The next major global upheaval will not come from other countries not selling oil to the US; what would be far more likely to drive that would be if the US stopped buying oil from other countries. We didn't switch from the stone age to the bronze age because we ran out of stones; and we won't switch from the oil age to the "whatever comes next" age because we ran out of oil either. The real race should be for cornering the market on "whatever comes next." That will be the country that dominates the globe at the end of this century.

There's no real prospect of "countries not selling oil to the US". Again, that's not what we need to be concerned about. The immediate concern is that one or more major producers could suffer major production impairments at the same time due to sustained domestic conflict, and not be able to sell oil to anyone. That would result in a major price spike that would negatively impact us, and the Chinese, and the Europeans, and the Koreans, Japanese, Taiwanese, Indians, etc. It wouldn't be US-specific and it wouldn't be caused by hostile governments refusing to sell to us, it would be a matter of conflict reducing available supply and forcing prices up.

Farther down the road there's concern that oil will begin to run out before "whatever comes next" comes along.

Whatever might happen if the US stopped buying oil is not likely to happen any time soon, and probably wouldn't be anything we needed to care much about.

[Dayuhan]

That's how Japan entered WW2.

They fared much better once they accepted that being peaceful and willing to pay global market price yields much greater success.

This should be a warning.

They fared much better because the post-WW2 world was a very different place from the pre-WW2 world. Before WW2 they didn't have the option of paying global market price, because there wasn't one. Colonies sold raw materials to their owners, and bought finished goods from them. Tariff walls kept others out. If you had no colonies you had to conquer raw materials and markets to gain access.

It's been a pretty positive change overall.

[Fuchs]

That's not correct.

Having a rubber plantation in a colony wasn't much more than having a rubber plantation in a foreign country is nowadays.

The Dutch didn't need all the crude oil from Indonesia, the Brits didn't need all that natural rubber from Malaya ... etc.


Yet, maybe you can explain why national excess production of today ends up on the world market while national (including colonies) excess production of 1940 didn't?

Fact is that no country had serious problems with supply of raw materials before either world war unless it hadn't the money for it or was embargoed for its aggressive foreign policy.


The whole "colonies / global power projection for secure access to raw materials" idea is a racket.

[Bob's World]

probably should have put quotes around "sold" in the "colonies sold oil to their owners", but yeah, agree that the current model is better.

The one big flaw in it is the retention of the powerful urge to sustain particular governments in power for the very stability issues you mention. Good for business, and also good for national interest management.

As to Mr. bin Laden, I agree he is never going to be the King of Saudi Arabia, or the head of any kind of Caliphate. Pure AQ propaganda, latched onto and inflated by the thousands of extra intel people we have brought on in recent years at high level force provider HQs as well as operational HQs, that frankly really don't have anything better to do, and don't have much if any training in insurgency to begin with.

We do, however need to be very focused on "whatever comes next" because it won't just come bubbling up out of the ground "when shooting at some food" like oil does. We're actually going to have to develop some complex science and technologies; and that means expanding both the quantity and the quality of our hard science education base in the US and programming big money like we did with NASA. NASA was a smart move, as it paralleled Defense without adding money to Defense spending and focused thinking and funding in critical areas that elevated our entire society. Similarly with the Manhattan project prior to that. Perhaps the future of energy is in space and NASA is still the right vehicle, and dominating space will be as critical as dominating the Sea has been, so we should put a focused effort to that end.

Meanwhile, it will be fossil fuels that keep things running for the next foreseeable future. Coal and gas, as well as oil. Bigger reserves reduce the risk of turmoil from point disruptions such as today's Libya drama, or tomorrow's Saudi drama (or the day after tomorrow, but it is coming); as will the development of coal and nuclear energy plants (though Japan's dramas will probably cause us to remain in the dark ages on nuclear energy). A more effective system of pricing and production will smooth those rough spots as well. Saudi Arabia could surge capacity far in excess of what is disputed in Libya but has no interest to do so, so doesn't. There should be some price for their protection from external threats, we should start making them pay it.

But all of this hints at the Cold War, post-WWII structures of governance, security and commerce straining under old age and growing irrelevance. The US committed to holding onto a golden age status quo does not help matters. Time for world leaders to come together and get serious about how to best manage such matters in the emerging world. History tells us that won't happen though. We'll let it break as the benefactors of the current system cling to holding it in place, then fight a major war, and then the victors will establish the next new system.

[JMA]

That's how Japan entered WW2.

Insecurity over the vital supply of oil can lead to desperate actions.

They fared much better once they accepted that being peaceful and willing to pay global market price yields much greater success.

Did they have a choice? And remember too that they were being "looked after" by Uncle Sam at that time (and still are to some extent).

Who may I ask underwrites this free trade? If there were not some guarantor to keep the system "free" and the prices market related and not manipulated by the likes of an OPEC how long would it all remain free?

And who would prevent another similar incident like the 1973 oil crisis

This should be a warning.

And what warning would that be? That unless "someone" guarantees the free flow of oil and trade nations will from time to time be forced to resort to war in an attempt to secured these?

[JMA]

Oil is a global market. Yes, the US needs oil. Lots of Oil. The only thing more desperate than the requirement of the US to buy oil is the requirement of oil producing nations (that are typically one-trick ponies in terms of their economies) to sell oil.

Buy and sell at what price? And with a reliable supply? These are the key.

Stability in the oil market is not only in the US national interest but an international necessity. There are probably 100 Mickey Mouse countries which face massive economic hardship if the oil price continues to rise. Of course the US and the EU will not be immune to the effects of a continued oil price rise.

OPEC has demonstrated in the past that they can manipulate oil supplies with little effect upon the oil producing nations themselves (because in many cases the proceeds of oil do not go into their economies) but the industrialised nations can't manage a disruption to the supply of oil. Who holds the cards?

And, if push came to shove, no one can push or shove harder than we can. Cut a frago at CENTCOM, and 12 days later 50% of the world's known oil reserves not in US hands currently would be. So access to oil had never been the issue.

Quite frankly Bob the trick is to never let it get to that. Of course that 12 days will depend on whether the Chinese and the Russians agree with the US action. If they don't then what?

Good old fashioned Gunboat Diplomacy still has its place in the world... if the powers that want to exercise it are believed to be serious.

At points in the past the State department through the CIA probably did pre-empt situations early and before they were allowed to escalate into a real crisis. But as successive US presidents have become more and more indecisive such actions through State and the CIA have declined. To the point where State and the CIA are now filled with equally weak kneed people (at the top) incapable of any such actions.

A study of the "unrest" in Arab states gives a good view of just how ineffectual the US ability to influence foreign matters of nation interest has become. (Note: a wildly fluctuating oil price is not in the US national interest).

BTW... just help me here. Apart from GWB which was the last US president who had the balls to make the big decisions (whether right or wrong)?

[Fuchs]

And who would prevent another similar incident like the 1973 oil crisis

I don't care who or what does.
The out-of-proportion military budget of the U.S. has for one 100% proved its utter uselessness against oil price hikes. Evidence: Just about every oil crisis! Including the last one, how can this already be forgotten/ignored???
How obvious does it need to be? Do oil prices need to hike by 25% every time the U.S. military budget is being raised in order to make the point obvious enough?

-------------------------------

This is part of my frustration with military policy discussions; people ascribe utility to military expenditures that are mere fantasies, disproved by centuries of history beyond doubt. Yet still, people cling to these fantasies about what military power can do, about how useful influence is and so on.
You can smash the facts on them and they simply ignore them, sticking to their beliefs instead - and promoting the ongoing epic waste of resources.


Same with military might / influence / force projection / whatever other waste of money in regard to oil prices.
There is simply no relationship, not even a superficial correlation.

The only proved, cost-efficient strategies for secure access to resources are
#1 don't piss others off (by being aggressive)
#2 trade fair
#3 emphasise redundancy, don't allow a single supplier to dominate your imports (unless we're talking about unimportant things like nutmeg)
in combination.

Military budgets are incredibly cost-inefficient in regard to securing resources - and the use of military power for such purposes is considered to be rather offensive and illegitimate in most of the world. In the end, violation of strategy #1 creates about as many disadvantages as influence gained with military power might ever create advantages.

[JMA]

Lots of little guys -- think the 1930s, once removed...That's the "Not really" -- it's not an inability, it is unwillingness, two very different things.

A political unwillingness translates into a military inability IMHO. How are soldiers supposed to do they job if they are not given the tools or not allowed to use them to maximum effect?

Unfortunately, the problems thus generated are that unwillingness creates excessive own casualties and sends a bad message on ability and / or capability that can lead some to misjudge.

Yes, if you mean that a politically induced military failure leads an observer to question the military rather than the politicians.

Alas, we've had that problem for many years and that's why the US should not play an active or overt part in these sorts of wars.As Bob's World pointed out the British had reason to stay and do that -- or believed they did. We have no such impetus and we do not need to do these things. There is absolutely no reason for us to play to the strengths of others and hopefully, that will finally dawn on the power structure. My sensing is that it's finally starting to penetrate though there are of course the few odd, old Cold War fighters Bob properly denigrates...

Sorry, but I believe my analogy (using the Boer wars and Afghanistan) holds good. In both cases it took too long to figure out how to conduct those wars. The bad news in Afghanistan is that there will be no final battle or peace treaty to decide the end of the war, only another ignoble withdrawal which will go down in history as another war loss for the US.

The point being the British were forced to play to their adversary's strengths. We do not have to do that, yet we continue to try to do so and it's stupid.

Tell me more... what did the Brits do?

You'd think the Politicians would learn but they don't seem to do so...Or expresses just the thought that some bunch of idiots may try to take on another bunch and we can either join them or, far better, just watch and be prepared to reject idiocy if it approaches.

Not enough soldiers reject the politicians strategy while still serving (which is sad but pensions are important and al that).

Yes as long as some precocious kid from some Ivy League university believes that when he is appointed to some position in government as a thank you for helping with a campaign he immediately is an expert in that field then the slope is still steep and the way down is still potentially far. Add to that the "smart guy" presidents and veeps (yes Obama and Biden) who don't don't know it from Shinola yet are framing military policy. The mind boggles. Its all very sad.

[Ken White]

A political unwillingness translates into a military inability IMHO. How are soldiers supposed to do they job if they are not given the tools or not allowed to use them to maximum effect?

It's a bit more complex than that. The political problems are quite significant but there's also a purely military reluctance to do some things on two counts; marginal training has reduced trust and confidence making commanders, in some cases, reluctant to push out; there is a sensing that the political constraint will bring this to no good end therefor commanders are reluctant to risk people on adequately aggressive patrolling and missions. Add in the societally induced risk aversion inherent most everywhere in today's world and you have a recipe for unwillingness.

That unwillingness, BTW is not so much a decision, unconscious or otherwise, to avoid casualties as it is a desire to avoid waste -- not precisely the same thing.

Yes, if you mean that a politically induced military failure leads an observer to question the military rather than the politicians.

Yes.

Sorry, but I believe my analogy (using the Boer wars and Afghanistan) holds good. In both cases it took too long to figure out how to conduct those wars.

That's true as we both have said with respect to Afghanistan, I assume based on what I've read that it is also true for the British - Boer wars.

The bad news in Afghanistan is that there will be no final battle or peace treaty to decide the end of the war, only another ignoble withdrawal which will go down in history as another war loss for the US.

Possibly true. We'll see.

Tell me more... what did the Brits do?

This is an excellent summary:

""The Boer Wars are a reminder of how a relatively small force with solid local support were able to run circles around a large conventional army which was too slow to adapt to the conditions on the ground and the tactics of the enemy. It took a policy of scorched earth to finally break the back of the rebellion (a policy which the Brits would rather not talk about even today).""

Insurgents and the like will always be more flexible and innovative while displaying more decentralized initiative than any big Army -- size is an impediment all its own...

My point was that by attempting these incursions, we are playing to the opponents strengths and while some such interventions may be inevitable, most can be avoided by producing far better trained forces that do not have to undergo a learning curve in each new endeavor; by having better (just halfway decent... ) intel and more competent diplomacy. Militarily, we need to be more competent in the basics and to add the capability to conduct strategic raids with flexible forces as opposed to relying on mass and opponent attrition. The Pentagon has constrained the Politicians by having a too limited menu of capabilities. It also needs to get out of the diplomatic business and force State to do their job. We can't cure the domestic focus or electoral cycle problem but can fix those Pentagon related things...

Not enough soldiers reject the politicians strategy while still serving (which is sad but pensions are important and al that).

Regrettably true -- also true is the fact that some stick around in spite of political tribulations to attempt to alleviate some of the damage as they know the Pols will always be able to keep digging down until they reach someone who will do even more harm...

Life, as they say, is just not fair...

Yes as long as some precocious kid from some Ivy League university believes that when he is appointed to some position in government as a thank you for helping with a campaign he immediately is an expert in that field then the slope is still steep and the way down is still potentially far. Add to that the "smart guy" presidents and veeps (yes Obama and Biden) who don't don't know it from Shinola yet are framing military policy. The mind boggles. Its all very sad.

Cheer up, things could be worse.

So I cheered up and sure enough things got worse...

[Pete]

About 20 years ago I read a news story that said the State Department Foreign Service revamped its personnel system using the U.S. Army's officer personnel policy as a model. The idea was that alternate specialties be introduced so people would be "well rounded" as opposed to specializing in only one specific area. Hence a jack-of-all-trades element may have been introduced. The news story said the big losers in the reform were those who built careers upon being experts on specific nations and regions -- I suspect they had come to be regarded by many in Washington as nay-sayers prone to stating all the reasons why a proposed policy that sounded good in Washington wouldn't work when applied to a particular nation overseas.

[Ken White]

About 20 years ago I read a news story that said the State Department Foreign Service revamped its personnel system using the U.S. Army's officer personnel policy as a model. The idea was that alternate specialties be introduced so people would be "well rounded" as opposed to specializing in only one specific area. Hence a jack-of-all-trades element may have been introduced...

That 'generalist' idea screwed up the Army so State -- and others in the USG copied it. Not because it's better for the agency, organization or mission -- it is not and most understood that at the time. However, it really makes the job of the Personnel weenies a whole lot easier...

Now that they're pretty much through screwing up the Oficer Corps, to compound the felony, the Army is revamping the WO program and is trying to 'generalize' them.

And the NCOs and many civilians. Soon all the folks in and with the Army will know nothing about everything...

We're nuts...

[Pete]

The newspaper article on personnel management in the Foreign Service mentioned facilities management as one of the alternate specialties, the idea being that basic housekeeping tasks at embassies and consulates be carried out on a more standardized basis. That part sounded reasonable to me.

I recall reading in either Matthew Ridgeway's or Max Taylor's memoirs a plea that the State Department be made into a stronger institution. It was a several-paragraph essay near the end of the book.

[Dayuhan]

Buy and sell at what price? And with a reliable supply? These are the key.

Stability in the oil market is not only in the US national interest but an international necessity.

Possibly so, but the US does not have the capacity to impose oil price stability. Neither has anyone else.

OPEC has demonstrated in the past that they can manipulate oil supplies with little effect upon the oil producing nations themselves (because in many cases the proceeds of oil do not go into their economies) but the industrialised nations can't manage a disruption to the supply of oil. Who holds the cards?

There's no real concern over OPEC deliberately manipulating the price of oil to an unsustainable point. OPEC members are way too heavily invested in the global economy to have any interest in provoking global economic upheaval: they have more to lose than to gain. At this point, somewhat ironically, OPEC and the west have a similar vested interest in sustaining oil prices at a consistently high level: OPEC because high prices make them money, the West because high prices discourage consumption and promote alternative energy development.

The worry is that major producers will be knocked off line by domestic conflict. It's a real concern, and given the way many oil-producing nations are governed it is likely to happen (Nigeria stands out as a top candidate). It's not something that either OPEC or the US has the power to prevent or cause. It happens when it happens.

Good old fashioned Gunboat Diplomacy still has its place in the world... if the powers that want to exercise it are believed to be serious.

Possibly so, but I can't see how that point has been reached today, at least not for the US. There's no US interest in Libya strong enough to warrant unilateral intervention, still less in any of the other current conflict zones. Certainly not in Zimbabwe or the Ivory Coast.

At points in the past the State department through the CIA probably did pre-empt situations early and before they were allowed to escalate into a real crisis. But as successive US presidents have become more and more indecisive such actions through State and the CIA have declined. To the point where State and the CIA are now filled with equally weak kneed people (at the top) incapable of any such actions.

The world has also changed a bit. The US is not a sole superpower and no longer has the capacity (if it ever did) to preempt and direct at will. It's not a question of balls and bluster; whether we have them or not, the US is not in a position to dictate outcomes. That fact needs to be recognized, especially by those whose decisions actually get implemented. Backseat bluster is easy; it has no consequences.

A study of the "unrest" in Arab states gives a good view of just how ineffectual the US ability to influence foreign matters of nation interest has become. (Note: a wildly fluctuating oil price is not in the US national interest).

Absolutely true... and you'd best learn to live with it, because it isn't going to change. For better or worse, the US has no power to direct and dictate to the rest of the world, regardless of interest. The US cannot impose oil price stability, at the point of a gun or in any other way.

If Gadhafi falls, there might be a quite positive impact on oil supply: Libya is believed to have quite extensive undiscovered reserves, and many promising areas have seen no meaningful exploration for 40 years. Political and security-related obstacles to development in Iraq, Iran, Libya and others may have created a substantial untapped reserve, potentially a real advantage down the line.

Of course if Gadhafi holds on and suppresses the rebellion, we have an interesting situation. Even the Arab League has now come out against him, and it remains to be seen how all those who wanted him out will react if (likely when) he doesn't fall. Will there be sanctions, and will the sanctions be observed, given the scarcity of oil? Likely to be an interesting situation. Not cataclysmic, but interesting...

[Dayuhan]

The one big flaw in it is the retention of the powerful urge to sustain particular governments in power for the very stability issues you mention. Good for business, and also good for national interest management.

What oil-producing states have governments that are being sustained by outside influence, at least where domestic threats are concerned? I can't think of any offhand.

The problem with assuming that we sustain these governments is that the assumption leads us to believe that we can influence these governments by threatening to withdraw our sustenance. Assuming influence that we cannot actually wield is an unsound basis for policy decisions.

Saudi Arabia could surge capacity far in excess of what is disputed in Libya but has no interest to do so, so doesn't. There should be some price for their protection from external threats, we should start making them pay it.

What we're seeing now is less a scarcity premium than an uncertainty premium; it's not actually driven by supply shortfall and a short-term supply increase would probably not alter the price equation dramatically. It's not likely to last in any case: event-driven price spikes generally resolve pretty quickly.

I personally think it's not at all a bad thing to have oil prices volatile, and high enough to hurt. It reminds us of things we need to keep in mind, and a bit of pain now can save us a lot more down the line if it keeps us focused on long-term plans to diversify energy sources.

I don't think we protect the Saudis; we protect our own interests. In any event it's not likely that we can demand that they let us dictate oil production levels in return for actions that we undertake for our own purposes and in our own perceived interests.