The North Caucasus: Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia

[Jedburgh]

Military Jama’ats in the North Caucasus: A Continuing Threat

The Russian Military Campaign in the North Caucasus: Is a Victory in Sight?

The Rise and Fall of Arab Fighters in Chechnya


For those with a continued interest, there is the Jamestown Foundation's North Caucasus Analysis.

[Strickland]

Both the Jamestown Foundation and CSIS have held events on the North Caucasus situation over the past several weeks. Each has reports on their websites.

[Jedburgh]

Russian Analytical Digest, 5 Jun 07: The North Caucasus

ANALYSIS
The Russian-Chechen Conflict and the Putin-Kadyrov Connection
Mark Kramer, Cambridge, MA

ANALYSIS
Separatism and Islamic Extremism in the Ethnic Republics of the North Caucasus
Akhmet A. Yarlykapov, Moscow

MAPS
Administrative Map of the North Caucasus
Physical Map of the North Caucasus

DOCUMENTATION
Table: The Southern Federal District. An Overview of Main Statistical Indicators
Timeline: Terror Related Incidents in the North Caucasus Since the Death of Shamil Basayev

OPINION SURVEY
Why Did War Begin Again in Chechnya in 1999? (Levada)
Chechnya After the Death of Basayev (VTsIOM)
Ramzan Kadyrov, President of Chechnya (FOM)
Russian-Georgian Relations (VTsIOM)
Interethnic Tensions November 2005 – April 2007 (Levada)

[Jedburgh]

The Economist, 2 Jun 07: The Warlord and the Spook

...War with Russia has deformed Chechnya. But perhaps more than anything else in Russia's post-Soviet history, the forgotten Chechen wars have shaped the angry and authoritarian country Russia has become.

Mr Putin made Mr Kadyrov president; but Chechnya helped to make Mr Putin himself president of Russia. Were it not for the air of emergency engendered by the second Chechen war, which began when Mr Putin was prime minister, the lightening rise of this obscure ex-KGB officer would have met more resistance. The war, and the string of mysterious apartment bombings that preceded it, brought the FSB (the renamed security service that Mr Putin briefly led) back to the centre of Russian politics. And it has been the cause, or the pretext, for many of the hard-line policies of the Putin presidency.

Russia's gathering suspicion towards the West can be traced in part to the autumn of 2004, and Beslan....

[Jedburgh]

CSRC, 22 Aug 07: North Caucasus: Problems of Helicopter Support in Mountains

Key Points

* The Mi-8 helicopter accident on 27 April 2007 in south Chechnya emphasised the appalling state of Russian military helicopter aviation.

* By 1999 the average age of Mi-8 helicopters was 15-20 years old and that of Mi-24 helicopters was 20 years or older. On average 70% of the helicopter park required repair with one third needing major components.

* Since then, 13 years of conflict have passed without replacement helicopters and new modern designs, even before the first conflict (1994-1996) almost 100% of the attack Mi-24 helicopters were worn out. Transport helicopters have been worked to the limit.

* At least 10 of the 18 helicopter crashes in Chechnya in the last five years can be attributed to pilot error or equipment malfunction; 205 servicemen died.

* MOD chose to buy Mi-28 (Night Hunter) on grounds of cost in preference to Ka-50 (Black Shark) and Ka-52 (Alligator) regarded by military experts as better aircraft. All three will now be bought in small numbers until 2015.

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation, 27 Aug 07: The Ingush Jamaat: Identity and Resistance in the North Caucasus

....The current situation in Ingushetia is similar to that in Chechnya on the eve of the second military campaign of 1999. The local authorities are unable to control the situation within the republic, the resistance is unable to overthrow the government, and numerous internal problems (of refugees, inter-clan and inter-party conflicts) remain unresolved, with the Ingush government only too happy to write them off as a consequence of the situation in the Prigorodnyi district.

Slowly, and largely due to the policies of the Russian government, the Ingush are getting used to the idea that they are living in a war zone. This invariably leads to a growth in the idolization of the armed resistance among the youth, with many willing to participate in the activities of such groups. The psychological outlook of those living through war is always different from those living in peacetime. Such individuals inherently start to see everything in terms of casualties and military victories. In tragedy, they no longer pay attention to the victims, but view what goes on as a simple consequence of the environment. This grim worldview makes people less willing to sacrifice themselves for the abstract ideas offered by “Yedinaia Rossia” and the unified state. The intelligentsia begins emphasizing the positive aspects of the military conflict, making the youth more nationalistically inclined and aggressive toward other ethnic groups. This comes in addition to the normally higher level of nationalistic and patriotic attitudes found among those living in a wartime situation....

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 18 Sep 07: 49 Steps To Improve Human Rights and Security in the North Caucasus

For well over a decade, the North Caucasus has been the site and source of rising levels of violence, instability, and terrorism. After a cease-fire ended the first Chechen war in late 1996, terrorist bombings and incursions in Dagestan provoked the Russian government to send federal troops back into Chechnya in October 1999. The ensuing military conflict produced massive military and civilian casualties, streams of refugees, shocking brutality against civilians, and a surge in terrorist actions in the south and elsewhere in Russia. The most dramatic events included the seizure of a Moscow theater by terrorists in October 2002, the downing of two airplanes and a metro bombing in downtown Moscow in August 2004, the vicious raid on a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, in September 2004, and an October 2005 assault on police and security forces by local youths and terrorists in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria. Though seldom reported in the Western press, less spectacular explosions, targeting civilians and officials, have occurred on an almost daily basis for several years now in southern Russia. Apart from such overt acts of violence, longer-term tensions among the many different ethnic groups that reside in the region, reportedly rampant police brutality, and sustained poverty have led some observers to portray the area as a powder keg for extremism and Islamic radicalization.....

[Jedburgh]

A two-part piece from the Jamestown Foundation's Chechnya Weekly:

The Dagestani Jamaat (Part 1)

The Dagestani Jamaat "Shariat" is the direct successor of the Dagestani Jamaat supposedly destroyed on the orders of Vladimir Putin in August and September of 1999. As such, it is one more example of how inefficient a military response is for suppressing an ideological opponent. It is possible to destroy bases, to destroy active participants, but it is quite impossible to destroy an underlying ideology using tanks and planes. Since the large-scale military operation carried out in Dagestan in August-September 1999, Salafi teachings have spread throughout the whole of Dagestan, especially enjoying popularity among the youth of the republic. Thus, Salafi ideology has become a form of protest against Russian policies in Dagestan. It is worth noting that while not all the members of the Dagestani Jamaat are dedicated Salafi adherents, all of them stand united in the anti-Russian struggle, making this ideology a unifying force. There are also small groups in the armed resistance movement in Dagestan that are not controlled by the Jamaat, but they still identify themselves with the resistance movement forces.....

The Dagestani Jamaat (Part 2)

....Jamaat structures are uniform across the North Caucasus and do not vary due to ethnic or regional differences, perhaps in rare exceptions. For nearly eight years, one of the best-known leaders of the Dagestani Jamaat was Rappani Khalilov, a native of the city of Buinaksk and an ethnic Laks. He was replaced as commander of the Dagestani sector of the Caucasus Front by Amir Abdul-Madzhid, who also began as a member of the “Shariat” Jamaat at the start of the second military campaign in Chechnya in 1999 and was one of Khalilov’s closest associates. The “Shariat” Jamaat has units across the entire republic. The republic is divided into zones, such as the Buinaksk, Gubden, Makhachkala, Kizliar, Khasavyurt, Botlikh and others. Amir Abdul-Madzhid himself and others in the sector’s command are members of the Military Council of the Shura under Dokka Umarov and, since Umarov’s recent proclamation of a “Caucasian Emirate,” Amir Abdul Madzhid has been made “Vali of the Vilyat of Dagestan”–that is, the resistance’s de facto ruler in Dagestan. All of the vilayets are united under the leadership of Dokka Umarov, who is considered the personal ruler of this “virtual” emirate, but in fact, each vali is autonomous not by virtue of the formation of an emirate, but strictly due to the absence of authority of Dokka Umarov among those fighting under the flag of the resistance movement......

[Penta]

Insofar as there's a "native" form of Islam in the Caucasus, what is it? Sunni? Shiite? Salafi? Sufi? Some other variety?

[bourbon]

Channel One "Uncovers" a Turkish-U.S. Plot in the Caucasus, The Jamestown Foundation: Chechnya Weekly, April 24, 2008.

Russian state television’s Channel One on the evening of April 22 broadcast a putative documentary film made by Kremlin correspondent Anton Vernitsky called “Plan 'Kavkaz'” (The Caucasus Plan). The film purports to show how Turkey, the United States and Great Britain attempted at the start of the 1990s to divide Russia into small parts not controlled by the federal center. The film featured Berkan Merrikh Yashar, born Abubakar—a Turkish-born ethnic Chechen who claims to be a journalist who once worked for Radio Liberty in Munich and a politician with close connections to the Turkish leadership.

Yashar states in the film that at the start of the 1990s he prepared a political platform for separating Chechnya from Russia and that there were several sources financing this project. He claims, among other things, that passports for the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria were printed in France while "many tons" of Ichkerian banknotes, which resembled U.S. currency, were printed in Germany. Yashar says that Western special services did not really care about the independence of the peoples of Caucasus but were acting only in the interest of their "personal profit." He also claims that Western special services tried to convince Muslim muftis in Russia—not only in Chechnya, but also in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan—to break away from Russia because of religious differences. He also refers to the self-exiled Russian tycoon and his former partner, the late Badri Patarkastishvili, stating that they were involved in questionable deals in the Caucasus.

[Sarajevo071]

Insofar as there's a "native" form of Islam in the Caucasus, what is it? Sunni? Shiite? Salafi? Sufi? Some other variety?

The Sufism of the Naqshbandi tariqa (or brotherhood).

[Ray]

Caucasus embraces Islam

http://www.kafkas.org.tr/english/kultur/din.html

[Jedburgh]

Russia Profile, 22 Jul 08: Similar, But Different: Radical Islam is the universal challenge in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan

The Northern Caucasus today has diverse problems that are impossible to solve “using the same measure.” However, as this region “awakens” and bears witness to an increase of protesting attitudes, the Caucasus, more than ever before, needs a comprehensive Russian strategy of development.

Despite multiple reports about the stabilization of the situation in the Russian Caucasus, the number of problems in this region does not decrease on a daily basis......

[bourbon]

The Jihadi Insurgency and the Russian Counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus, by Gordon M. Hahn. Post-Soviet Affairs, Volume 24, Number 1 / January-March 2008.

Abstract
A political scientist reviews the vicissitudes of the Caucasus jihadi insurgency and Russia's counterinsurgency efforts since 2005, drawing on the press, jihadist websites, and scholarship on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. The development of jihadi-oriented fighting units, the rise and decline of Maskhadov's supremacy, the rise of Islamist elements, the Chechen separatist movement and the expansion of the jihad, Moscow's counter-jihadi successes, the jihadi network after the death of Basayev, and the rise and career of Ramzan Kadyrov are examined. These events are analyzed in terms of the dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency conflict.

39 Page pdf at the link.

I've been looking for examinations of Russian counterinsurgency in the Kadyrov era. Came across this and thought I would share it.

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Chechnya Weekly, 21 Feb 08:

Dagestan's Expanding Insurgency

....Now that Putin’s presidency is ending it is important for him to remind the public of his political achievements. During his February 4 trip to Botlikh, Putin talked a lot about the events of August 1999, especially about the Dagestani local militia's support for the Russian troops that fought the Basaev/Khattab-led insurgents. “There were many wounded and killed among the local population,” Putin said at the meeting in Botlikh. “Please do not forget about these people and their families”.

Apart from other aims, Putin’s visit to Botlikh was meant to highlight the success of his Caucasus policy and show that the residents of Dagestan support the federal government, just as they did in August 1999. Nevertheless, current events in Dagestan demonstrate the opposite: the area of hostilities in the republic is expanding. War reports from the region mention more and more districts of Dagestan that have never before appeared in the news as scenes of battles between the rebels and police forces.....

[zenpundit]

I generally like Jamestown stuff but this struck me as really weird.

Isn't a "Vilyat" a corruption of an Ottoman Turk administrative division? When did the Ottomans rule Daghestan ? Golden Horde, sure. Persians, definitely. Why would Wahabbist neo-salafi loons use antique Turkish terminology when a good Wahabbist would see Ottoman sanjaks as corrupt former oppressors of "true Islam" ?

Maybe I have missed something somewhere ?

[Jedburgh]

I generally like Jamestown stuff but this struck me as really weird.

Isn't a "Vilyat" a corruption of an Ottoman Turk administrative division? When did the Ottomans rule Daghestan ? Golden Horde, sure. Persians, definitely. Why would Wahabbist neo-salafi loons use antique Turkish terminology when a good Wahabbist would see Ottoman sanjaks as corrupt former oppressors of "true Islam" ?

Maybe I have missed something somewhere ?

It is a term that is used in many Central Asian states: Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - none of which were ever under Ottoman rule. In Dagestan, they can also be referred to as rayons, but wilayat is a common usage.

[zenpundit]

It is a term that is used in many Central Asian states: Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - none of which were ever under Ottoman rule. In Dagestan, they can also be referred to as rayons, but wilayat is a common usage.

Thank you Jed, that clarifies -and makes linguistic sense for some of the CA examples.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 3 Jun 08: Russia’s Dagestan: Conflict Causes

....Large-scale war is unlikely to develop in Dagestan, but violence can be expected to continue to be caused by competition over lands and jobs, spillover from Chechnya and the rise of local jihadi groups. The origins of the present jihadi-inspired violence are in the “hunt for the Wahhabis” carried out by the Dagestani authorities after the 1999 Chechen incursion and the arbitrary persecution of pious youth by local law enforcement officers. The violence in Dagestan’s streets is also fed by the movement of rebels and Islamist militants across the porous border with Chechnya, as well as by the republic’s omnipresent corruption and criminality. Rival clans, led by President Aliyev and Makhachkala’s mayor, Said Amirov, duelled for control of economic and political assets in 2007, as the street troubles intensified.

Reprisals by local and federal security forces have failed to curb the violence; instead they seem to be escalating it. The troubled March 2007 electoral campaign and the growing number of attacks on local officials and assassinations carried out by Islamic militants suggest Dagestan faces a violent future.

[Jedburgh]

HRW, 25 Jun 08: Counterinsurgency, Rights Violations, and Rampant Impunity in Ingushetia

The Chechnya armed conflict affected stability and the security of communities across the North Caucasus region of Russia, and continues to do so. In Ingushetia, the republic into which Chechnya’s conflict overflowed, the grave conflict dynamics of its larger neighbor have arisen. For the past four years Russia has been fighting several militant groups in Ingushetia, which have a loose agenda to unseat the Ingush government, evict federal security and military forces based in the region, and promote Islamic rule in the North Caucasus. Beginning in summer 2007, insurgents’ attacks on public officials, law enforcement and security personnel, and civilians rose sharply.

Human Rights Watch condemns attacks on civilians and recognizes that the Russian government has a duty to pursue the perpetrators, prevent attacks, and bring those responsible to account. Attacks on civilians, public officials, and police and security forces are serious crimes. Russia, like any government, has a legitimate interest in investigating and prosecuting such crimes and an obligation to do so while respecting Russian and international human rights law. Regrettably, Russia is failing to respect or to adhere to these laws. Law enforcement and security forces involved in counterinsurgency have committed dozens of extrajudicial executions, summary and arbitrary detentions, and acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment....

Complete 112 page report at the link.