US Declaration of Independence and the current situation in Afghanistan

[carl]

Robert C. Jones:

When the Taliban was running the place wasn't the shoe pretty much on the other foot and couldn't have the complaints enumerated been made by the Afghans who weren't Taliban? And if MO and the boys win, won't it be that way again?

[Bob's World]

Robert C. Jones:

When the Taliban was running the place wasn't the shoe pretty much on the other foot and couldn't have the complaints enumerated been made by the Afghans who weren't Taliban? And if MO and the boys win, won't it be that way again?

The Taliban also ran a government that was extremely exclusive, and thus the existence of the Northern Alliance. I am not posting this to be "pro-Taliban." The nature of the Afghan system of patronage has historically favored certain groups and excluded others. The Pashtuns in the macro; and then certain tribal and family groups regionally and locally. This will not change overnight, but can change if government structures are designed to specifically guard against the natural "win-lose" dynamic of Afghan patronage.

As I have posted often, the current constitution of Afghanistan codifies and reinforces this natural bias of patronage and has elevated and focused all patronage in a single man. This disrupts the natural systems of self-governance in Afghanistan far more than the Taliban did with their approach to governance. But a new constitution designed not to reinforce the negative aspects of patronage, but instead to modernize patronage in ways that reinforce local leader authority and influence, while ensuring that every Afghan has equal rights and opportunity under the law could derail the natural cycle of conflict and insurgency in this country.

Also worth noting is that the Taliban were able to sustain their control over governance with a very minimalist approach to support by Pakistan; whereas Karzai's government, we have decided, requires this insanely robust degree of support to survive. So either the current model of government is worse than the last, or our "experts" have grossly exaggerated the threat and the ways and means to counter the same.

For the US and the coalition, and the Afghan people, the only real "win" is if we get to a system that includes everybody. That demands reconciliation. Suppressing half to submit to the other half is not a sustainable option. If this were a colony and Karzai was our colonial puppet government here to manage our interests for us? Sure, but he isn't. Our COIN doctrine, however, is derived from that colonial model and it shows.

[Dayuhan]

The nature of the Afghan system of patronage has historically favored certain groups and excluded others. The Pashtuns in the macro; and then certain tribal and family groups regionally and locally. This will not change overnight, but can change if government structures are designed to specifically guard against the natural "win-lose" dynamic of Afghan patronage.

I think this may be a bit backwards. Government structures naturally flow from and reflect the cultures and societies they spring from. If Afghans design a government it will very naturally reflect Afghan political culture... unless you're proposing that somebody else should do the designing.

Of course political cultures can and do evolve, and the systems they produce evolve with them. Whether a political culture can be "evolved" by imposition of structures not deriving from that culture is another question. Seems an unlikely prospect to me.

One of the odder illusions embraced in our Afghan enterprise is the notion that Afghans were going to stop governing like Afghans simply because we put them in power. Of course Afghans will govern like Afghans. They will do so no matter what we say or do.

[Bob's World]

I think this may be a bit backward. Government structures naturally flow from and reflect the cultures and societies they spring from. If Afghans design a government it will very naturally reflect Afghan political culture... unless you're proposing that somebody else should do the designing.

Of course political cultures can and do evolve, and the systems they produce evolve with them. Whether a political culture can be "evolved" by imposition of structures not deriving from that culture is another question. Seems an unlikely prospect to me.

One of the odder illusions embraced in our Afghan enterprise is the notion that Afghans were going to stop governing like Afghans simply because we put them in power. Of course Afghans will govern like Afghans. They will do so no matter what we say or do.

To put checks and balances on Patronage so that one clan cannot legally dominate another is not "changing how Afghans govern" any more than imposing speed limits is "changing how Americans drive." All it is doing is creating structures to ensure that one element of the populace does not exceed their rights to the detriment of others.

This is a natural evolution of their current system, allowing it, and their society to move on to a new level, less tied to a disruptive and destructive cycle of wide swings of who has power and who does not, and the associated legal disputes over land ownership and acts of fiscal and physical vengeance that accompany the same.

It is the current government, that we helped shape and create, that is a change of how Afghans govern, converting a historic system of patronage into a national Ponzi scheme.

[Ken White]

This is a natural evolution of their current system, allowing it, and their society to move on to a new level, less tied to a disruptive and destructive cycle of wide swings of who has power and who does not, and the associated legal disputes over land ownership and acts of fiscal and physical vengeance that accompany the same.

I'm afraid I don't share your confidence. You've been there since I have but I doubt the change has been significant enough to allow such an evolution. We'll see.

[Dayuhan]

To put checks and balances on Patronage so that one clan cannot legally dominate another is not "changing how Afghans govern" any more than imposing speed limits is "changing how Americans drive." All it is doing is creating structures to ensure that one element of the populace does not exceed their rights to the detriment of others.

This is a natural evolution of their current system...

That would depend on who is doing the putting and the creating. If Afghans are doing if, on their own initiative and for their own purposes, that's a natural evolution. If we try to do it or we try to compel them to do it, on our initiative and for our purposes, that's imposition and it will not work.

If the only way we can achieve our goals in Afghanistan is to introduce US-style "good governance", then we're in deep scheisse and we need to reassess our goals, because that's something we can't do.

[Bob's World]

That would depend on who is doing the putting and the creating. If Afghans are doing if, on their own initiative and for their own purposes, that's a natural evolution. If we try to do it or we try to compel them to do it, on our initiative and for our purposes, that's imposition and it will not work.

If the only way we can achieve our goals in Afghanistan is to introduce US-style "good governance", then we're in deep scheisse and we need to reassess our goals, because that's something we can't do.

For the UMPTEENTH time, I have never promoted "US style good governance" for anyone except the US. This is your paradigm, to argue continuously against something that I have never advocated for.

What I have argued, is that there are tremendous lessons to be distilled from the US experience.

What I have argued is that the US Constitution is in fact a masterpiece of COIN written by a uniquely qualified group of men who had in their adulthood been leaders of resistance under an oppressive government; been revolutionary insurgents, and at the time of the shaping of the Constitution found themselves increasingly in the role of the counterinsurgent.

One could argue that GIRoA shares that history, and true enough, except that France did not stay in the US and dedicate the lives of the their military, their national treasure and reputation to staying and protecting a fatally flawed US government under the articles of Confederation against the violent protest of the American populace. France wisely recognized that their interests had been served, and went home. By our staying and dedicating ourselves to GIRoA's survival we enable them to cling to a flawed model that is beneficial to the core founding members, and few else, in their society. We enable the insurgency by trying to defeat the insurgency.

This leaves us two options. Pull a France and just go home is one option. It's not "quitting" or "losing" any more than walking away from a gaming table in Vegas is "quitting" or "losing." It's hard to know when you are at peak winnings, usually one loses more than one gains before they walk away, and those that commit to staying until they are "up" almost always lose it all.

The second option is to focus on the primary source of causation in virtually all insurgency situations: The national government and the unwanted foreign presence. One must identify and address reasonable fixes in the first that are most egregious to the Afghan people; and one must minimize the second.

We have adopted a strategy that does the opposite on both counts. We create a functional sanctuary around GIRoA and protect them; while increasing our foreign presence to make that happen. The first fuels the Revolution; the second fuels the Resistance.

"Respect" is not a US concept. "Justice" is not a US concept. "Legitimacy" is not a US concept. The natural tendency to act out illegally and often violently against government when one has no trusted, certain and legal means to affect government is not a US concept. Happy to field any arguments from any who thinks they are.

What is a US concept in many ways is for government to put checks and balances upon itself to guard against abuses in all of these key areas; and to design and protect the populace's legal options to affect government in reasonable ways. That is the COIN genius of the US Constitution. The specific measures adopted? Those are what was right us then, and the interpretation has modified over time to stay current with the US society. Afghans will need to sit down and apply their own culture to their own situation to guard against these same critical human dynamics.

But they won't do it if we guard the status quo; and it won't work if just the Northern Alliance participates to the exclusion of the Taliban either. Someone needs to force the issue to bring everyone to the table and sort this out. Or we can go with option one and just go home. But to stay and protect GIRoA and enable a dysfunctional insurgency-causing form of government, while suppressing their rebellious populace and building their own capacity to go out and do the same is frankly both grossly American, and grossly un-American at the same time. The first because it is what we always do when in someone else's country. The second because it is something we would never do at home.

[Dayuhan]

For the UMPTEENTH time, I have never promoted "US style good governance" for anyone except the US. This is your paradigm, to argue continuously against something that I have never advocated for.

Yes, umpteen times at least, but the substance of your posts on the nature of "good governance" invariably reveal an overwhelmingly American perception of what good governance is and what changes other people need to make to achieve it.

What I have argued, is that there are tremendous lessons to be distilled from the US experience.

Possibly so, but holding ourselves up as an example of how governance ought to be done is likely to be perceived as chest-thumping arrogance, not edification. If we have to choose an example, we mighty want to choose one that the populace in question identifies more closely with

The second option is to focus on the primary source of causation in virtually all insurgency situations: The national government and the unwanted foreign presence. One must identify and address reasonable fixes in the first that are most egregious to the Afghan people; and one must minimize the second.

Are you proposing that the US "fix" Afghan governance? Why would we think we have the capacity to do that?

As I've said umpteen times myself, the way governments govern is not a consequence of institutions or documents, it's a consequence of the national political culture: the way people perceive power and the way power is wielded, the way they perceive relations among the various subsets of the populace and between those subsets and the national government. We can't change the political culture by changing the documents or the institutions. If the new structures are incompatible with the political culture they will simply be ignored. A Constitution in itself has no power at all: whatever influence it has lies in the will of the people and their various leaders to follow it..

This is why "nation-building" and "state-building" are such inherently flawed constructs. Nations and states aren't built, they grow. They reflect the political culture of the societies they govern. We can't build or shape those cultures. Those cultures can evolve and grow, and the nations and states can evolve and grow with them, but they won't evolve at our bidding or in a direction of our choice. The process through which they evolve is often going to be messy, whether or not that suits our interests and preferences.

"Respect" is not a US concept. "Justice" is not a US concept. "Legitimacy" is not a US concept. The natural tendency to act out illegally and often violently against government when one has no trusted, certain and legal means to affect government is not a US concept. Happy to field any arguments from any who thinks they are.

The idea that "good governance" is by definition governance by Us and not by Them, and that the best governance is the one that is dominated by your sub-populace and excludes your rivals, is also not a "US concept". It still prevails in much of the world.

"Respecty", "legitimacy", etc may not be "US concepts", but different people may define those in very different ways.

Afghans will need to sit down and apply their own culture to their own situation to guard against these same critical human dynamics.

What if their own culture, and their own recent history, tell them that the way to sort it out is not to sit down and talk, but to fight and win and impose your will on the other guy, because he will do the same to you if he can and there is no way you can ever possibly trust him to follow any agreement you could possibly sit down and make?

A zero-trust, winner-take-all culture is not going to become something else because we want it to become something else.

But they won't do it if we guard the status quo; and it won't work if just the Northern Alliance participates to the exclusion of the Taliban either. Someone needs to force the issue to bring everyone to the table and sort this out. Or we can go with option one and just go home.

If those are the options, we'd better just go home, because we can't force other people to come to a table and work things out. Even if we could, how long do you think an agreement reached under duress and effectively imposed by an outside power is going to last?

I know you'll say you're not proposing to impose an agreement, but in effect you are. If we FORCE them to come to a table (which they would never do of their own accord) and we FORCE them to reach an agreement (which they would never do of their own accord) the content of the agreement is irrelevant: it's forced, it's unnatural, and it will not last.