Yemen: all you want (2011-2015)

[CWOT]

This week, Frank Cilluffo and I co-authored an article on the spread of AQAP, the collapse of Yemen and a small window of counterterrorism opportunity that is currently available.

We advocate for the use of drones and SOF to remove AQAP's key leaders planning attacks on the U.S.

Yemen's shift to a 'failed' state provides the U.S. an opportunity to engage AQAP without being forced to go through the Saleh regime.

We are also interested in how Yemen is indicative of future scenarios the U.S. will face and how we can identify alternative CT & COIN strategies that are effective and efficient in disrupting threats from failed and weak states.

For those interested, the article is available here at the Homeland Security Policy Institute via this link:

http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/iss..._yemenAQAP.cfm

Looking forward to any of your thoughts on this issue....

[davidbfpo]

Clint,

As the main thread on the Yemen has referred to IIRC the Yemen has used the AQ threat to secure US support, when in fact AQAP was not a substantive threat to the Yemen:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=12784

Your paper clearly shows there is an AQAP threat beyond the Yemen, notably to the USA and others from a very small cell within AQAP. For a host of reasons this high value target group we have assumed are located in the empty spaces or lightly populated areas. Will an ungoverned / failing Yemen state (not society) expand those sanctuaries?

My own "armchair" suspicion is that the target group will remain in the empty spaces. If they move to the towns your policy option is out, simply due to potential collateral damage IMO.

How much of AQAP is in fact Yemeni, Saudi and others?

The USA needs to have a far better information operations campaign in the Yemen to enable such a policy option of drones and SOF. Most Yemeni appear focussed on regime change and not AQAP's presence. How does such a campaign work in that society. It appears to be "We're AQAP hunting with all our resources, but are reluctant to help regime change".

Clearly drones and SOF action can go wrong, e.g. hitting a tribal wedding. How will the local population respond? A prompt apology and damage payments may help - elsewhere something the USA has been reluctant to do.

The important objective is to reduce the AQAP target group as they pose an external threat and not lose Yemeni neutrality or support.

As for your wider question that will have to wait and has been the subject of several threads methinks:

We are also interested in how Yemen is indicative of future scenarios the U.S. will face and how we can identify alternative CT & COIN strategies that are effective and efficient in disrupting threats from failed and weak states.

[CWOT]

I posted the original introduction[/URL] to an article written by Frank Cilluffo and Clint Watts. The debate has continued on this topic and we would enjoy hearing the perspective of CT/COIN practitioners as we search for viable solutions to counter AQAP in Yemen.

Last week, Gregory Johnsen of Waq-al-Waq crafted a thoughtful response to our article “Yemen & Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Exploiting a Window of Counterterrorism Opportunity.” Below is our response to further what we believe to be a particularly important debate. We will begin by addressing Johnsen’s conclusion and then discuss each of his points individually. For each point of debate, we attributed original quotes from the article as Cilluffo and Watts and quotes from Gregory’s post at Waq al Waq as Johnsen.

Johnsen- “I think this is what happens when smart people tackle a complex problem in an environment they don’t know particularly well. “

While we respect Johnsen’s knowledge of Yemen, we likewise believe his criticisms reflect what happens when smart regional experts encounter a complex enemy they don’t know particularly well.

Ten years of American counterterrorism efforts demonstrate that the best way to defeat al Qaeda is to go directly after al Qaeda. Bin Laden’s personal notes articulate that building schools in Afghanistan didn’t slow down al Qaeda but drone strikes halted many of their operations. Johnsen’s title “The Allure of Simple Solutions” suggests the only way to deter AQAP in the near term is via a complex solution instituted through a failed Saleh regime or its successor. Pursuing such a solution will fail to stop AQAP’s immediate threat to the United States and is not feasible in light of the current situation in Yemen.

As we noted in our original article, we believe our recommendation is neither comprehensive nor simple, but instead the best option for achieving immediate U.S. national security interests with regards to AQAP. If we’ve learned anything from the past ten years, it is ‘yes’ sometimes simple (as distinguished from simplistic) strategies with clear goals and objectives work far better in achieving our near term interests than costly, complex strategies spread across convoluted bureaucracies. Increased use of drone and SOF forces, when executed as designed, can help eliminate the immediate threat of AQAP and improve U.S. options for pursuing a long-run Yemen strategy less encumbered by counterterrorism concerns.

We respect Johnsen’s opinions and rely on his analysis of Yemen to improve our perspective. However, we have yet to see any other feasible near or long-term U.S. strategy for mitigating the threat of AQAP. We welcome any feasible alternative solution put forth. However, until that time, the U.S. must protect its citizens and interests. The AQAP threat remains acute and inaction is not an option.

We thank Gregory Johnsen for his thoughtful analysis and look forward to his policy recommendations with regards to Yemen. We’ll quickly respond to each of his individual points below with short rebuttals.

For the complete discussion on Dr. Gregory Johnsen's assumptions, we invite those interested to read further at the Homeland Security Policy Institute:
http://securitydebrief.com/2011/07/1...%80%99s-chaos/http://securitydebrief.com/2011/07/1...%80%99s-chaos/

[davidbfpo]

CWOT has tried to get a response on SWC with his two thoughtful comments, but to no avail - this does happen here and can be rather predictable.

Perhaps the linked SWJ article will prompt reflection and response(s). See 'Yemen: Testing a New Coordinated Approach to Preventive Counterinsurgency':http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...ew-coordinate/

Note please there are two threads on Yemen, 2010 & 2011, plus IIRC a couple of others.

[davidbfpo]

CWOT and his colleague have returned to this issue, which is within the wider, global debate over the use of drones and the US strategy to pursue terrorism.
SWC has a long running thread on drones 'Using drones: principles, tactics and results': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7385

Building on their past work on Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Watts and Cilluffo revisit the use of drones in Yemen, offering context to ongoing debates about U.S. counterterrorism strategy as well as recommendations regarding the way forward. The authors review what drones and Special Operations Forces (SOF) have accomplished over the past year, explore why AQAP has continued to thrive, and explain what critics of drones misunderstand about operations in Yemen. Watts and Cilluffo go on to urge continued improvement of intelligence to better the accuracy of drone strikes, and argue in favor of greater transparency and accountability in drone operations. The authors recognize that "drones alone cannot entirely defeat AQAP," and call for the development of "a larger, long-run strategy...for pursuing U.S. counterterrorism objectives in Yemen."

Link:http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/iss...208_Drones.cfm