Yemen: all you want (2011-2015)

[ganulv]

In the places I'm familiar with American Citizen Services is typically staffed by the youngest of the young. It seems like it's a post nobody else wants, thus pushed off on the least senior as a necessary rite of passage on the way to bigger and better things.

Is American Citizen Services the same as Consular Affairs? I should try and learn about the workings of the State Department but their employees make me uneasy in the way that dentists do most other people. It’s a legacy of having lived in Central America in the early ’90s, where public opinion of the U.S. Department of State was neck–in–neck with that of the CIA.

[davidbfpo]

In Part 1 in The Frontline video report there was a short clip of Yemeni town that was defending itself from AQAP, IIRC it was Lawdar.

Al-Jazeera has a good summary piece 'Making sense of Yemen's feuding factions' and refers to such self-defence activity:

Local Popular Resistance Committees, made up of tribal militia fighters from various southern regions, are also fighting al-Qaeda in the current offensive. They have been attributed with successes against the group, using their local knowledge and warfare tactics. Not much is known about these groups, as most announcements on the war are made by Yemeni authorites. Some of the groups may be made up of southern seccessionist fighters, who, although seeking independence from the northern government, are also opposed to al-Qaeda.

In such a complicated environment I am not surprised that such groups are not supported by the divided Yemeni state. Should others engage with them? Yemen is not Afghanistan nor Iraq, if these groups multiply, we would be mistaken not to have links with them - a "bottom up", people-based approach COIN advocates wish for.

[davidbfpo]

An optimistic commentary by a "boots on the ground" observer; which starts with:

Although the GCC supported transitional regime has not turned Yemen into a revolutionary state, by comparison with what is happening elsewhere, the situation at the moment shows more positive signs than could have been expected: the forces of the uprisings are working to participate in the national dialogue, the transitional regime is working to weaken and remove most of the remnants of the previous era and is preparing for a new and hopefully more democratic future.

I liked this - hence emphasis, even if without details:

Secondly, thanks to the new military leadership which is seriously committed to putting an end to the fundamentalist insurrection, the rebels have been dislodged from their stronghold in Abyan Governorate, pushing them back into Shabwa which was their main base for a number of years. Immediately after this achievement last week, moves have started in Shabwa and already some of their strongholds are falling, thanks to the establishment of local ‘popular committees’ who are ‘encouraging’ them to leave.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-l...to-be-followed

[davidbfpo]

Helen Lackner returns with a "boots on the ground" assessment of the situation in the Yemen:http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-l...hose-interests

Rightly she lauds the critical role of non-government factors in defeating AQAP in the southern provinces; yes, once again tribes came to the fore. Her wider cautionary remarks on the weakness of the Yemeni state are familiar, although I expect the West and other friends downplay what the Yemeni people wants are.

In parallel there is a less optimistic, external factors first review on SWJ:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...esolution-2051

[davidbfpo]

After watching the Yemen from afar this will not come as a great surprise. The article's sub-title is:

Ali Abdullah Saleh's government colluded with al Qaeda and duped the West. Has anything changed since his ouster?

It ends with:

It's the highest-level leaders, who don't actually believe in the preachings of Ansar al-Sharia, but who manipulate them to remain in the government or bring a particular party to power.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...n_on?page=full

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to CWOT on Twitter for this AEI PPT, twelve slides and you know far more:

This slide deck provides information on AQAP’s leaders, both current and former, and their networks.

Link:http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen...tember-27-2012

Interesting comment by Leah Farrell on Twitter, which asked whether any analysts from way back in the early 1990's were still in government service who'd recognise the names and the networks.

[davidbfpo]

An excellent article on this forlorn country, by Gregory Johnson's new book 'The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's War in Arabia' and an excerpt is on FP Blog:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...emen?page=full

A details a country that under President Saleh appeared to effortlessly pull the right levers with the USA and so he ends with:

After more than a decade of on-again, off-again aid to Yemen, the al Qaeda branch in Yemen is stronger than it was on September 11, 2001. The money the United States has spent in Yemen has enriched dozens and the missiles it has fired into the country have killed hundreds -- and yet AQAP continues to grow.

There is an excellent contrast on Clint Watts blog, with several linked articles by others:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=817

Has AQAP retreated under pressure from the state's security forces or the tribal militias? What have drone strikes done? More than stopping AQAP's use of vehicles.