Yemen: all you want (2011-2015)

[AdamG]

Sanaa, Yemen (CNN) -- A suicide bomber dressed in a military uniform killed at least 101 soldiers Monday at the central security headquarters in Yemen, Interior Ministry officials said.

More than 70 were injured, with some in critical condition, authorities said.

The blast targeted a military parade rehearsal in Sabeen Square in the capital Sanaa, said Mohammed Albasha, a spokesman the Yemeni Embassy in Washington.

He said that it was too early to know who was responsible but that suicide attacks are "the hallmark of al Qaeda."

http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/21/wo...html?hpt=hp_t3

[davidbfpo]

Yemen seems to have receded from the foreground, although the suicide bomber attack on a Central Security Forces (CSF) parade, which killed one hundred did get a mention - missing that the commander of the CSF is a Saleh family member.

The Lowy Institute draws attention to a week-old Frontline report, which has several key sections and ends in a town which has rejected AQ - after they killed a tribal chief - and only the locals fight off AQ's attacks, the army isn't interested. One wonders if this replicates the rejection of AQ in Irag?

Link:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJtbhFimI8c

Hat tip to Leah Farrell's reactivated blogsite:http://allthingscounterterrorism.com/

The film is highly commended by a US academic expert, Gregory Johnsen, of Waq al-Waq, on the Yemen and I have linked the Q&A after the film was broadcast and this passage struck me:

Over the past two-and-a-half years the US has managed to kill several mid-level commanders within AQAP, but at the same time it has also killed several civilians. In December 2009, AQAP had roughly 200-300 members and controlled no territory. Today it has over 1,000 members and controls significant amounts of territory in Abyan and Shabwa. This begs a very simple question: Why has AQAP grown so strong in such a short time? Now, I don’t think US drone and airstrikes are the only reason for the rapid growth of AQAP – one also has to consider the collapse of the Yemeni state in 2011 – but in my view it is certainly one of the key factors.

Link:http://bigthink.com/ideas/frontline-...yemen?page=all

The Australian analyst, Sarah Phillips, provides some context and touches upon the very murky aspects:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...y-to-fail.aspx

There's also a short interview with her:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...wo-videos.aspx

Want more to read, there's a pointer to this US journalist's blogsite:http://armiesofliberation.com/

[CWOT]

This week, Frank Cilluffo and I co-authored an article on the spread of AQAP, the collapse of Yemen and a small window of counterterrorism opportunity that is currently available.

We advocate for the use of drones and SOF to remove AQAP's key leaders planning attacks on the U.S.

Yemen's shift to a 'failed' state provides the U.S. an opportunity to engage AQAP without being forced to go through the Saleh regime.

We are also interested in how Yemen is indicative of future scenarios the U.S. will face and how we can identify alternative CT & COIN strategies that are effective and efficient in disrupting threats from failed and weak states.

For those interested, the article is available here at the Homeland Security Policy Institute via this link:

http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/iss..._yemenAQAP.cfm

Looking forward to any of your thoughts on this issue....

[davidbfpo]

Clint,

As the main thread on the Yemen has referred to IIRC the Yemen has used the AQ threat to secure US support, when in fact AQAP was not a substantive threat to the Yemen:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=12784

Your paper clearly shows there is an AQAP threat beyond the Yemen, notably to the USA and others from a very small cell within AQAP. For a host of reasons this high value target group we have assumed are located in the empty spaces or lightly populated areas. Will an ungoverned / failing Yemen state (not society) expand those sanctuaries?

My own "armchair" suspicion is that the target group will remain in the empty spaces. If they move to the towns your policy option is out, simply due to potential collateral damage IMO.

How much of AQAP is in fact Yemeni, Saudi and others?

The USA needs to have a far better information operations campaign in the Yemen to enable such a policy option of drones and SOF. Most Yemeni appear focussed on regime change and not AQAP's presence. How does such a campaign work in that society. It appears to be "We're AQAP hunting with all our resources, but are reluctant to help regime change".

Clearly drones and SOF action can go wrong, e.g. hitting a tribal wedding. How will the local population respond? A prompt apology and damage payments may help - elsewhere something the USA has been reluctant to do.

The important objective is to reduce the AQAP target group as they pose an external threat and not lose Yemeni neutrality or support.

As for your wider question that will have to wait and has been the subject of several threads methinks:

We are also interested in how Yemen is indicative of future scenarios the U.S. will face and how we can identify alternative CT & COIN strategies that are effective and efficient in disrupting threats from failed and weak states.

[CWOT]

I posted the original introduction[/URL] to an article written by Frank Cilluffo and Clint Watts. The debate has continued on this topic and we would enjoy hearing the perspective of CT/COIN practitioners as we search for viable solutions to counter AQAP in Yemen.

Last week, Gregory Johnsen of Waq-al-Waq crafted a thoughtful response to our article “Yemen & Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Exploiting a Window of Counterterrorism Opportunity.” Below is our response to further what we believe to be a particularly important debate. We will begin by addressing Johnsen’s conclusion and then discuss each of his points individually. For each point of debate, we attributed original quotes from the article as Cilluffo and Watts and quotes from Gregory’s post at Waq al Waq as Johnsen.

Johnsen- “I think this is what happens when smart people tackle a complex problem in an environment they don’t know particularly well. “

While we respect Johnsen’s knowledge of Yemen, we likewise believe his criticisms reflect what happens when smart regional experts encounter a complex enemy they don’t know particularly well.

Ten years of American counterterrorism efforts demonstrate that the best way to defeat al Qaeda is to go directly after al Qaeda. Bin Laden’s personal notes articulate that building schools in Afghanistan didn’t slow down al Qaeda but drone strikes halted many of their operations. Johnsen’s title “The Allure of Simple Solutions” suggests the only way to deter AQAP in the near term is via a complex solution instituted through a failed Saleh regime or its successor. Pursuing such a solution will fail to stop AQAP’s immediate threat to the United States and is not feasible in light of the current situation in Yemen.

As we noted in our original article, we believe our recommendation is neither comprehensive nor simple, but instead the best option for achieving immediate U.S. national security interests with regards to AQAP. If we’ve learned anything from the past ten years, it is ‘yes’ sometimes simple (as distinguished from simplistic) strategies with clear goals and objectives work far better in achieving our near term interests than costly, complex strategies spread across convoluted bureaucracies. Increased use of drone and SOF forces, when executed as designed, can help eliminate the immediate threat of AQAP and improve U.S. options for pursuing a long-run Yemen strategy less encumbered by counterterrorism concerns.

We respect Johnsen’s opinions and rely on his analysis of Yemen to improve our perspective. However, we have yet to see any other feasible near or long-term U.S. strategy for mitigating the threat of AQAP. We welcome any feasible alternative solution put forth. However, until that time, the U.S. must protect its citizens and interests. The AQAP threat remains acute and inaction is not an option.

We thank Gregory Johnsen for his thoughtful analysis and look forward to his policy recommendations with regards to Yemen. We’ll quickly respond to each of his individual points below with short rebuttals.

For the complete discussion on Dr. Gregory Johnsen's assumptions, we invite those interested to read further at the Homeland Security Policy Institute:
http://securitydebrief.com/2011/07/1...%80%99s-chaos/http://securitydebrief.com/2011/07/1...%80%99s-chaos/

[davidbfpo]

CWOT has tried to get a response on SWC with his two thoughtful comments, but to no avail - this does happen here and can be rather predictable.

Perhaps the linked SWJ article will prompt reflection and response(s). See 'Yemen: Testing a New Coordinated Approach to Preventive Counterinsurgency':http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...ew-coordinate/

Note please there are two threads on Yemen, 2010 & 2011, plus IIRC a couple of others.

[davidbfpo]

CWOT and his colleague have returned to this issue, which is within the wider, global debate over the use of drones and the US strategy to pursue terrorism.
SWC has a long running thread on drones 'Using drones: principles, tactics and results': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7385

Building on their past work on Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Watts and Cilluffo revisit the use of drones in Yemen, offering context to ongoing debates about U.S. counterterrorism strategy as well as recommendations regarding the way forward. The authors review what drones and Special Operations Forces (SOF) have accomplished over the past year, explore why AQAP has continued to thrive, and explain what critics of drones misunderstand about operations in Yemen. Watts and Cilluffo go on to urge continued improvement of intelligence to better the accuracy of drone strikes, and argue in favor of greater transparency and accountability in drone operations. The authors recognize that "drones alone cannot entirely defeat AQAP," and call for the development of "a larger, long-run strategy...for pursuing U.S. counterterrorism objectives in Yemen."

Link:http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/iss...208_Drones.cfm

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Jihadica for a perplexing story on US information operations (IO) in the Yemen, which is almost an IO itself.

Several months ago, President Obama signed an executive order establishing an interagency center to coordinate the US government’s public messages against terrorist organizations. A major component of this Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) was in the news lately for its clever campaign against AQAP on Yemeni tribal forums.

Link:http://www.jihadica.com/state-depts-...da-propaganda/

It sounds on-target at first:

...the State Department has for a year and a half now tried to counter Al Qaeda's affiliate in the Arabian Peninsula by rhetorically shooting down the group's propaganda when it pops up on Yemeni tribal forum websites....Within 48 hours, our team plastered the same sites with altered versions of the ads that showed the toll Al Qaeda attacks have taken on the Yemeni people,

Except that:

...in many places in Yemen there is no Internet or even electricity

The linked story is:http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign...-war-is-fierce

On the broader aspects back to Jihadica:

More broadly, people are unaware of the complexities of government messaging against terrorist organizations. To shed light on these subjects, the first coordinator of the CSCC, Ambassador Richard LeBaron (now retired), has given me permission to post his recent remarks on what he learned during his tenure. It’s very instructive for anyone interested in counter-propaganda and how the US government is coping with the new information environment.

Link to the remarks is embedded and is in docx format - so unread by moi,

[davidbfpo]

An intrepid BBC lady journalist, Yalda Hakim reports from southern Yemen, where she asks is the use of drones creating as many enemies as they are killing? Hat tip to Gregory Johnsen via Twitter.

Podcast (13 minutes):http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-23606812

In which many Yemeni's giving their answer, ordinary people and the Foreign Minister, whose answer is:

I've heard this argument, there might be some truth to it ... but no alternative.

There is a main thread on the Yemen, into which this will be merged:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=12784

[davidbfpo]

A short review article 'Yemen al Qaida group appears to think globally, act locally', a month after the predicted massive attack:http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/0...#storylink=cpy

[AdamG]

Dual post.

A U.S. command and control center in Yemen, used to direct drone strikes against al Qaeda havens in the country, was the target of a massive terrorist attack in the country late last month.

The Sept. 30 attempted assault on the military base in Mukalla on the country's southeastern coast was initially seen as an attempt by al Qaeda's Yemen faction to establish new strongholds in the country.

But the terrorist group, known as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), now claims the attack was an attempt to take out the U.S. command node in Mukalla and hamper American drone strikes in the country.

Read more: http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill...#ixzz2hnq0xqry

[davidbfpo]

Yemen has not gone away, although no SWC posts this year so far.

Well there is ample reporting that this weekend the USA and the Yemen have launched drone strikes and SF at a number of militant / AQAP targets. At one point there was specualtion that the target was AQAP's leading IED expert.

Several links: 1) LWJ http://www.longwarjournal.org/archiv...#ixzz2zX3W8veO

2) Just Security http://justsecurity.org/2014/04/21/o...ise-questions/

3) Gulf News, included as it actually spoke to some locals http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/yemen/...emen-1.1322000

[davidbfpo]

A remarkable BBC World Service documentary, by an Arab lady journalist, who somehow talks to the key factions. Note it was placed on the website on the 21st March:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-31994769

The BBC's explanation:

A rebel group from the North of Yemen has taken over the capital and drastically changed Yemen's political landscape. Engaged in a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Houthis have brought Yemen to the brink of collapse. But who are Yemen's Houthis? What do they want? How have they come to take control of huge parts of the country? Safa Al-Ahmad from BBC Arabic has spent 3 months following the Houthis and also gets extraordinary access to their arch-enemies, the Sunni tribal leaders and other fighters loyal to Al-Qaeda.

This is an update on an earlier post of a BBC World Service radio Q&A, 28 minutes long; a mix of politics and humanity:

Lyse Doucet talks to journalist Safa al-Ahmad who has recently returned from filming a documentary in Yemen for BBC Arabic. Yemen is on the brink of civil war after Houthi rebels seized large swathes of the country including the capital, Sanaa, at the end of last year. Safa tells Lyse about some of the extraordinary encounters she had in the making of the film as she negotiated her way through Houthi checkpoints and into Al Qaeda held terrain. In a country that’s become increasingly difficult to report from Safa has poignant stories from a nation fast falling apart.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p02lszv7

[AdamG]

Tangential thought - if the rebels are upping the ante with this SCUD, what's next? A non-HE warhead?

Saudi Arabia said it shot down a Scud missile fired by Yemen's Houthi rebels and their allies early Saturday at a Saudi city that is home to a large air base, marking a major escalation in the months-long war.

Two missiles launched from a Patriot missile battery shot down the Scud around 2:45 a.m. Saturday local time around the southwestern city of Khamis Mushait, the official Saudi Press Agency reported.

The agency did not report any casualties in the attack, which marked the first use of a Cold War-era Scud by the rebels since Saudi-led airstrikes began in March.

Khamis Mushait is home to the King Khalid Air Base, the largest such facility in that part of the country. Saudis on social media reported hearing air raid sirens go off around the city during the attack.

The agency blamed the Shia Houthi rebels and their allies loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Yemen's state news agency SABA, now controlled by the Houthis, said the rebels and their allies fired the Scud.

http://america.aljazeera.com/article...d-missile.html

[CrowBat]

Few 'additional details' in this regards:

- The SS-1c Scud-B missiles in question are operated by the Yemeni Army, not by Hothis; that is: by units of the Yemeni Army that sided with Houthis.

- Three Scuds were fired at Khamis Mushyat during that first attack, although it's unclear whether they were fired simultaneously, or something like 'during that night'; two fell well away from defended areas, one was shot down by the PAC-2 site protecting the local air base.

- Another, meanwhile fourth, Scud attack was reported on 9 June.

- Meanwhile, there are reports about movement of YA's SS-21 TELs in direction of the Saudi border, i.e. that at least some of these have survived the aerial onslaught and might be brought into action.

- Yemeni Army surely does not operate any kind of WMDs, otherwise Riyahd would be running a bigger PR-campaign than Bush admin did in regards of Iraqi WMDs, back in 2002.

[CrowBat]

...to make things 'better': meanwhile it became known that the C-in-C RSAF, Gen Mohammad Ahmad ash-Shi'lan passed away on 10 June...

...there are already rumours it was a heart-attack during one of attacks on Khamis...

[davidbfpo]

Iona Craig is a respected journalist, who has lived in Yemen for four years till December 2014 and has a fascinating report having been in Aden:http://america.aljazeera.com/article...e-houthis.html

Tasters:

....the reality on the ground does not reflect the depiction and rhetoric coming from Yemen’s far-off leaders and their foreign backers in Riyadh.....Not only has the Saudi-led aerial campaign that began on March 26 failed to push back the Houthis as intended, but it has also been unable to prevent the group's continued expansion in a conflict that is now being fought on at least six fronts across the country.

[SWJ Blog]

Countering Extremism in Yemen

Entry Excerpt:

Countering Extremism in Yemen:
Beyond Interagency Cooperation
by Kaz Kotlow

Download The Full Article: Countering Extremism in Yemen

Extremism, especially violent extremism, is a clear threat to the national security of the United States. It is widely believed that effectively addressing quality of life issues, encouraging peaceful conflict resolution and enhancing political inclusion are critical to neutralizing extremist messaging, helping prevent the development and spread of violent extremism. Traditionally, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and The United States Department of State (DOS) are the primary agencies for development, with Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in support. But traditional “interagency cooperation” has often not resulted in effective programs. The U.S. Government (USG) should maximize integration of effort, bringing all government elements together from inception to planning and assessment, of a single coherent plan. DOD assets, from doctrine to personnel and funding, can be of great benefit in helping create and execute those integrated efforts.

Download The Full Article: Countering Extremism in Yemen

Colonel Kazimierz "Kaz" Kotlow, USA is currently a visiting Senior Service Col-lege Fellow at The Washington Insti-tute. Most recently, he served as the Defense and Army Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, a post he previously held at the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon. Colonel Kotlow also deployed as a political/military advisor to the Multinational Force (MNF) Commander, III Corps, in Baghdad, Iraq. Prior to his postings as a Foreign Area Officer, Colonel Kotlow served as a Special Forces detachment commander, deploying multiple times to Eritrea and Kuwait to train host nation forces in infantry operations and demining. The views expressed herein are his own.



--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Yemen: Testing a New Coordinated Approach to Preventive Counterinsurgency

Entry Excerpt:

An American-designed strategy attempts to link counterinsurgency and traditional development programs in Yemen and thereby provide a model that can be applied elsewhere. Rapidly changing conditions with simultaneous multiple small wars impair the ability to design and implement such a challenge. At the same time, there are legitimate questions about the thinking that went into the original formulation.



--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Book Review: Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.