That is a great find, davidbfpo. I was looking at some photos from the Houla massacre earlier. When one sees children that have been murdered that way it provokes a visceral reaction (in me anyway), but raw emotions have no place in geopolitical decision-making. Decisions like these have to be made rationally. Even if you are inclined to believe that the US should take more of a role in policing the world Mr. Landis makes some salient points about how much good the US could actually do over there, and what it is likely to cost.

When we hear about, or especially when we see pictures of, dead children it is natural to want to do something about it. The problem is that for some the go to reaction is to call for military intervention. We do have the most powerful military in the world, bar none. Removing Al-Assad would probably be fairly easy but, as Mr Landis points out, that is not the problem, it is the aftermath. It was the aftermath of both Iraq and Afghanistan that created so much pain for us and I have seen no compelling reason to believe that the aftermath of any intervention in Syria would be any less painful. Loyalists of the current government will almost certainly form an insurgent movement once Al-Assad is removed. This will be especially true if Al-Assad manages to escape being killed or captured. This could be exacerbated by the lack of a coherent opposition which means that a post revolution government might not have control of a significant portion of the militias that remain after the war. Some of these militias are going to want to take revenge against minorities who they believed were loyal to Al-Assad. At least some of these minorities will feel compelled to join the insurgency just for self-preservation (as happened in Iraq, particularly among the Shia) thus strengthening the insurgency.

Western intervention would speed the overthrow of the Al-Assad regime but might very well strengthen any insurgency as loyalist forces are rapidly overwhelmed and opposition forces find themselves in control of the state before they can consolidate control over their own forces. Paradoxically, a slower overthrow of the government (i.e. without direct Western intervention) may actually weaken any insurgency that forms as loyalists have time to defect (which they will as money dries up and popular unrest increases) and other minorities are given the opportunity to prove that they are not especially loyal to Al-Assad. Diehard loyalists may also be more inclined to stand and fight against a homegrown revolution than they would be against the overwhelming military might of a Western power. That is preferable to them joining an insurgent movement.