Syria: a civil war (closed)

[AmericanPride]

Nobody in Syria has the power to overthrow the government and defeat the army. Nor do I see the momentum of such a power building, despite selective mainstream media coverage of the "progress" of Syria's armed resistance in battling the army and enticing defections. It's precisely because that Syria is not a petro-state (it's a state with few natural resources at all actually) that stability and state formation has settled around the military, much like in Egypt. The military is essentially Syria's welfare-patron program (at the most basic level, it provides a job), and it's what holds the state together. What will entice the Army to defect to a decentralized, foreign-sponsored movement that will most likely reduce the influence of the military in the government? The rebels need more support than selective media coverage and global solidarity to overcome the guns and tanks of the Syrian army.

[tequila]

I think you're overestimating the level of loyalty and cohesion in the Syrian Army, especially amongst the lower, mostly Sunni ranks, and also discounting the role played by the Baath Party and associated security services in the Syrian state.

The Baath Party has no real counterpart in the Egyptian context, and the Syrian internal security forces are much more powerful than their Egyptian counterparts. The Army, OTOH, is correspondingly weaker. Mubarak had to go when the generals told him to - can you imagine Syrian generals throwing out Assad or his family? Quite the opposite.

I agree that the Syrian rebels need more than goodwill and media coverage to overthrow the Assads. But the Assads have been afraid to use the majority of the Army against the protests - and not out of fear of bad media coverage, but likely because they do not fully trust largely conscript Sunni units to attack largely Sunni cities.

[Uboat509]

Nobody in Syria has the power to overthrow the government and defeat the army. Nor do I see the momentum of such a power building, despite selective mainstream media coverage of the "progress" of Syria's armed resistance in battling the army and enticing defections. It's precisely because that Syria is not a petro-state (it's a state with few natural resources at all actually) that stability and state formation has settled around the military, much like in Egypt. The military is essentially Syria's welfare-patron program (at the most basic level, it provides a job), and it's what holds the state together. What will entice the Army to defect to a decentralized, foreign-sponsored movement that will most likely reduce the influence of the military in the government? The rebels need more support than selective media coverage and global solidarity to overcome the guns and tanks of the Syrian army.

The security apparatus may be stronger than the rebels but it does not exist in a vacuum. How long can they remain dominant with resources for the regime drying up and supplies starting to flow to the rebellion? Guns and tanks need resources to work. How big are Syria's reserves of fuel and ammunition? How long can Assad afford to pay the Army? How much tangible support is Assad actually getting from its few remaining friends? Petro-states can always find someone willing to pay for their oil. Syria has nothing to offer and the world wide attention on this has probably made sanctions more effective than past sanctions on other states have been.

[tequila]

Syria has nothing to offer and the world wide attention on this has probably made sanctions more effective than past sanctions on other states have been.

Russia and Iran disagree - I think this may be critical in the coming months. Iran can provide trained personnel through Hizbullah and IRGC cadres, while both can provide fuel and arms in abundance.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to the Oxford Research Group (ORG) for the pointer to Jonathan Steele's report after a visit to Syria; first ORG's summary:http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.u...nswer_dialogue

Steele's reporting:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...ed-own-mandela and:http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n06/jonathan-steele/diary

[AmericanPride]

I have no idea how long Assad can sustain his forces in the field. The foreign aid for syria's rebels is not that substantial. They can stand their ground in localized fights but they surely cannot mount offensive operations. Syria still has friends - not many but they're around and they have guns and money to toss around.

[davidbfpo]

An interesting article IMHO, curious to see the references to the FLN in Algeria; this could appear in the thread on Media & UW.

So does Syria’s uprising need more technologically savvy multimedia activists? Or – to be blunt – does it require more people inside the country blowing things up? In the end, which poses the greater threat to a repressive regime: its atrocities being instantly relayed across the world on Twitter, or a well-armed, tightly organised insurgency?

The 13 months of Syria’s revolt have starkly illustrated the limits of social media as an engine of revolution, and of the claims made for the internet’s transformative power.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ads-hands.html

[davidbfpo]

A BBC News report from Idlib Province and a very curious photo of a Free Syrian Army (FSA) member carrying a M4 rifle, with a telescopic sight. Such a weapon does not IMO sit easily alongside the regular footage of the FSA with their AK's, RPD's etc. Have the Gulf States already started shipping in such weapons? Not to overlook the 'black market' and other local users.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17734946

The reporter also observes:

the conundrum of Kofi Annan's plan....Not all government forces have withdrawn from residential areas. It calls for a political process to address the aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people. Yet the difference between what the opposition wants and what President Assad is prepared to agree to is greater than ever. The lasting effect of the violent assault in this area is to harden positions and make compromise almost unthinkable.

[AmericanPride]

A BBC News report from Idlib Province and a very curious photo of a Free Syrian Army (FSA) member carrying a M4 rifle, with a telescopic sight. Such a weapon does not IMO sit easily alongside the regular footage of the FSA with their AK's, RPD's etc. Have the Gulf States already started shipping in such weapons? Not to overlook the 'black market' and other local users.

This appeared in the WSJ at the end of last month. And like you stated, one can't overlook the black market (especially with the Iraq War 2003 - 2011). Also interesting is the (apparent) ramp up of public policy discussions about developing plans for US intervention in the country.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Londonistani for identifying a Canadian-Syrian's blogging on Syrian, background analysis and on a quick scan making observations I've not seen before, notably the extent of support for the Bashir regime:http://creativesyria.com/syriapage/