Syria: a civil war (closed)

[Rex Brynen]

Does anyone have a practical, realistic proposal for taking action? If so, what is it?

Damn you Dayuhan, and your constant insistence that strategies be concrete, practical, and realistic.

[Bob's World]

Damn you Dayuhan, and your constant insistence that strategies be concrete, practical, and realistic.

I think he implied that the strategy was in fact all of those things, he merely wanted to talk about the specific tactical tools that might be applied.

Like all tactical problems, be it have a conversation and apply carrots and sticks; or take that hill and apply fire and maneuver; I would not presume to bore anyone to death with one or two of a thousand different ways either one of those tactical problems might play out. Also, in each, the opponent always gets a vote, so what one thinks they will do going in is often very different to what ends up being applied once all is said and done.

[Rex Brynen]

I think he implied that the strategy was in fact all of those things, he merely wanted to talk about the specific tactical tools that might be applied.

There is no strategy without some discussion, or at least recognition, of operational capabilities. Strategy is about linking means and ends. Certainly you need to know what the objective (or policy, in CvC terms) is. But you also have to know what means are available, and how they can realistically be employed.

In the case of Syria (or Bahrain, to cite a parallel thread), the engagement of international actors fundamentally depends on what their leverage is. It isn't simply a minor detail to be left to the "tacticians."

[Ken White]

There is no strategy without some discussion, or at least recognition, of operational capabilities...It isn't simply a minor detail to be left to the "tacticians."

There's no sense in limiting ones self to operational capabilities -- not to mention realities and the all important political permissions, foreign and domestic -- when one can do unconstrained grand concepts which will, of course, always work as hoped. Hoped as opposed to planned or designed...

Eschew stultification!!!

[Dayuhan]

I think he implied that the strategy was in fact all of those things, he merely wanted to talk about the specific tactical tools that might be applied.

Now I'm confused... what strategy are we talking about here? Has somebody offered one? If so, what is it?

I don't see much in the way of strategy on the table. I see a general goal of seeming involved without becoming committed, but I'm not sure that qualifies as a strategy.

I do not consider that goal a bad thing in itself. I'm sure we've all heard the old line about involvement and commitment. Think of bacon and eggs: the chicken is involved, the pig is committed. I'm not at all sure we want to be the pig in this particular plate of bacon and eggs, especially in a part of the world where pigs (and intervening foreigners) are held in generally low regard.

A grand strategy for dealing with the "Arab Spring" could hurt us as well as help us. For one thing, excessive attachment to a grand strategy might force us into a counterproductive and predictable pattern, and we might try to apply it in places where it is not appropriate: despite similarities, each of these cases is different and requires a different response. For another, it might tempt us to try to lead and initiate in an environment where we are and should be essentially reactive, not proactive. If this is about self-determination, we have to react to what is determined and to the process through which it is determined. We can't try to lead or initiate, because if we do it isn't self-determination any more.

We have to accept that our leverage in many of these cases is very limited, and plan accordingly. There are few things more pointless and self-destructive than pursuing goals that one hasn't the capacity to achieve, or declaring that we must act without proposing a course of action.

We should not assume that this "Arab Spring" is going to usher in a golden age of democracy, or that our intervention can make it do that. Realistically, given the known complexity of transitions out of dictatorship, it's likely to be the precursor to a long hot summer, and there are excellent reasons why we shouldn't be too much a presence in there. Somebody will be burned, and it's likely to be us if we're exposed.

[Dayuhan]

Foreign Affairs just published this review of American options on Syria...

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...ns-in-damascus

Says a fair bit about why efforts to date haven't done much, and suggests a change in direction, but actually says very little about specific options for advancing the recommended policy. That seems revealing: when no methods are suggested, in generally means the author can't think of any.

[Entropy]

It seems to me we have conflicting goals and no strategy. On the one hand, we want dictators gone and we want representative government because we think that should be the natural state of "man." On the other hand, we want stability and we also want to consider the positions of our allies who are closer to the "problem" and who will bear the costs of whatever transpires. Then there is domestic US politics which, along with everything else, serve to constrain our viable options.

Sometimes problems don't have viable solutions.

[Bill Moore]

Sometimes problems don't have viable solutions.

It would also be helpful to remember that we don't have to act. We obviously feel compelled to act because of our national and personal values concerning human rights, representative government, etc., but just because we hope these revolutions throughout the Arab world will bring a brighter tomorrow, we really don't know what the outcome will be. Assuming the regime is overthrown in Syria it may result in more bloodshed and prolonged instability as various factions fight for power. We have seen a splintering of the resistance in Libya, and suspect we'll see the same in Syria if it isn't suppressed.

Questions we need to ask:

Why do we feel we need to act? (once it again it seems we're jumping to the conclusion we "have" to act, and the reality is we don't understand the nature of the problem yet).

Are their feasible courses of action we can pursue that will shape the situation for the better?

[Bill Moore]

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/08/170673.htm

SECRETARY CLINTON: Good morning. For months, the world has borne witness to the Asad regime’s contempt for its own people. In peaceful demonstrations across the nation, Syrians are demanding their universal human rights. The regime has answered their demands with empty promises and horrific violence, torturing opposition leaders, laying siege to cities, slaughtering thousands of unarmed civilians, including children.

The Asad government has now been condemned by countries in all parts of the world and can look only to Iran for support for its brutal and unjust crackdown.

BREAK

All along, as we have worked to expand the circle of global condemnation, we have backed up our words with actions. As I’ve repeatedly said, it does take both words and actions to produce results. Since the unrest began, we have imposed strong financial sanctions on Asad and dozens of his cronies. We have sanctioned the Commercial Bank of Syria for supporting the regime’s illicit nuclear proliferation activities. And we have led multilateral efforts to isolate the regime, from keeping them off the Human Rights Council, to achieving a strong presidential statement of condemnation at the UN Security Council.

Has anyone heard official comments from China, Russia, Iran etc. on the situation in Syria?

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

This week much was made on the BBC radio about a Russian statement:

In my discussions with President Assad during our personal conversations and in our correspondence I have been advocating one principal idea: that he should immediately launch reforms, reconcile with the opposition, restore civil accord, and start developing a modern state. Should he fail to do that, he is in for a grim fate, and we will eventually have to take some decisions on Syria, too. Naturally, we have been watching developments very attentively. The situation is changing, and so are our objectives.

Link:http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/08/05/54246871.html

My initial response to your question:

.. the first UN Security Council statement condemning the state violence against civilians. Traditional friends of Syria, such as the Russians and Chinese, went along with the statement, and other council members (Brazil, South Africa and India) also dropped their reservations and backed a statement that had taken months of diplomatic haggling.

Russian support for the statement seemed to reflect a real shift in position in Moscow, where President Dmitry Medvedev said that if President Assad did not bring about serious changes quickly, he would face "a sad fate".

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14467849

[Bob's World]

Several thoughts,

First, I stand by my initial comment as to a framework for an approach rooted in consistency, private diplomatic dialogs, clear public messages, and tailored approaches of carrots and sticks driven by US interests and refined by the afore mentioned private dialogs.

"Doing nothing" may well indeed be the COA that makes the best sense coming out of such an approach, but doing nothing does not mean simply ignoring a major issue that lies in the middle of a region where several very real US national interests come together, and where so much of the post-Ottoman Empire, Post WWII Western manipulations have acted to shape events, borders, governments, etc to where we are today.

I am no expert on Syria. I know that it is an ancient nation astride a major historic key terrain of North-South; East-West trade routes. I know we allowed (excuse me, opted to "do nothing") the French to carve Lebanon off of Syria following the fall of the Ottomans under the auspices of "self-determination", but with a period of mentoring until they were ready to truly govern them selves. I know we have a complicated relationship with Syria due to our support to Israel, and more recently our invasion and subsequent government shaping of Iraq.

Basically a "headline" understanding that would make any specifics I might suggest lucky shots at best, and I won't be baited by playground bullies like Dayuhan into playing that game.

As to what China and Russia might do? These nations are guided by their own interests, and are mature enough not to be baited either. They are wisely happy to allow the US to jump in and stir things up and wait and see what opportunities might arise from that. Add our Euro allies to that as well. Patience is a trait we are not famous for, and it is one that comes with maturity, and we are still a "young, strong country" and act like one. As our strength continues to fade we too will learn the patient wisdom of middle age, but we are not there yet.

I do think that calling for Assad, or any other leader, to step down is a rash mistake. Certainly at this point in the game. Creating power vacuums is rarely a good idea, far better to encourage modest reforms (again, privately, guided by fundamental principles, but tailored by the culture, populace, governance etc of those it actually affects). We can apply such a modest reform approach in more critical situations such as Israel or Saudi Arabia if need be, but would we call for leaders there to step down? Unlikely; but certainly those leaders must assume that we might. Our "hot-cold" unpredictable responses discomfort our allies at least as much as our "enemies."

Syria is important. Geo-strategically important. Historically important. (something Afghanistan, btw, is not). We base our current priorities for engagement by where perceived threats currently occupy capitals or rent office space. Such intel driven thinking is a very reactionary approach to foreign policy. Far better that remember that the "threat lay-down" is just an overlay that goes on the map, and focus on the map itself guided by a clear-eyed and narrowly tailored perspective on what our truly vital interest are, and where those interests manifest on the planet, in space, and possibly in cyber dimensions.

[Dayuhan]

First, I stand by my initial comment as to a framework for an approach rooted in consistency, private diplomatic dialogs, clear public messages, and tailored approaches of carrots and sticks driven by US interests and refined by the afore mentioned private dialogs.

I stand by my comment - it seems to be becoming a mantra - that in the absence of real, material, tangible carrots and sticks, private dialogue and public message, no matter how consistent, mean nothing. We can't simply assume that these carrots and sticks are available: unless somebody can explain exactly what they are and how they can be applied, they do not exist.

I know we allowed (excuse me, opted to "do nothing") the French to carve Lebanon off of Syria following the fall of the Ottomans under the auspices of "self-determination"

We allowed?? How so? At that time the British and French were the dominant players in the region; the US had nothing to say about it. Nobody asked our permission, and we weren't in a position to allow or disallow anything. We "opted to do nothing" because it was way over our horizon and we had nothing to do about it and no reason to do anything about it.

I do think that calling for Assad, or any other leader, to step down is a rash mistake. Certainly at this point in the game. Creating power vacuums is rarely a good idea

Calling for Assad to step down is not going to create a power vacuum. It's not as if it's going to happen just because we call for it.

far better to encourage modest reforms (again, privately, guided by fundamental principles, but tailored by the culture, populace, governance etc of those it actually affects).

Reforms, modest or otherwise, are also not going to happen just because we encourage them. Encouragement means nothing unless (as I said, it's a mantra) the encouragement is supported by those real, material, tangible carrots and sticks.

We can apply such a modest reform approach in more critical situations such as Israel or Saudi Arabia if need be

We can apply the approach of calling for reform in those places, but those calls are not going to be translated into an actual program of reform - indeed those calls will do nothing beyond underscoring our impotence - unless they are backed by... need I repeat it?

All this talk of calling and demanding and encouraging without specifying what leverage is to be used to back the calls and demands and encouragement reminds me rather forcibly of an old cautionary tale...

A physicist, and engineer, and an economist survive a shipwreck. They salvage a quantity of canned food and drink, but have no way to gain access to the contents. After agreeing to apply their professional expertise to the problem, the physicist proposes heating the cans until the pressure inside bursts them. The engineer suggests using a sling to hurl the cans against the rocks to break them open. The economist looks up with infinite pride and suggests "assume a can opener".

Speaking of carrots and sticks without explaining what they are places you, I fear, in the position of the economist, assuming a can opener. The scurvy uneddicated able seaman who drags himself out of the surf in time to point out that there isn't any can opener... well, he's the playground bully.

[Bob's World]

To Dayuhan: Yawn.

Your history is flawed regarding the Post-WWI scramble for the crumbs of the Ottoman empire. Wilson allowed Britain and France to twist lofty positions he brought to Versailles, and we were so concerned about avoiding any US entanglement in the Middle East that might demand US troop presence that we did little to prevent what our two "allies" unleashed on the region.

Otherwise your counters largely skirt or twist the points I made in efforts to return to your own mantra, so not much to respond to there. I have no problem with you having your own platform of ideas, but build it on your own foundation for once. You need not always bulldoze your way through my posts looking for places to hammer up your little additions.

Again, my position is sound, and I stand by it. I'm not sure what your position is, so have little to come back with in that regard.

We must focus on important things, regardless of how "hard" they might be. No country or person who avoids important things due to concerns over how difficult they might be as ever contributed much to society. But as I say, our current approaches for determining what is "important" has become horribly off balanced and are too short-term, threat-focused rather than long-tern interest and geopolitically focused. Similarly our techniques for engagement appear to be either launch a military attack or a verbal attack and miss that critical middle ground of calm diplomacy backed by credible influence and credible response capabilities.

Perhaps our leadership, like yourself, has come to doubt that the US possesses such credible influence. That is sad on both counts; but tragically so on the part of the former if that is true.

[Ken White]

... Wilson allowed Britain and France to twist lofty positions he brought to Versailles, and we were so concerned about avoiding any US entanglement in the Middle East that might demand US troop presence that we did little to prevent what our two "allies" unleashed on the region.

Wilson didn't 'allow' the British and French to do anything, they did what they wanted to do and he was powerless to stop it. He may have wished to but his -- and others -- penchant for trying to interfere in the actions of other nations notoriously failed on most counts. You seem to wish to follow in his footsteps and advocate that we continue to try to interfere where we have little or no business??? Strange.

I do agree that there was then reluctance to avoid US troop presence in the ME -- pity that thought didn't last longer. We have puttered around there without a real need to do so and have gotten enmeshed in things we do not fully understand all so we can feel good about US projection and "influence." Assinine.

Is the ME really of great and abiding interest to the US -- or have we foolishly, very expensively and quite unnecessarily made it seem that it should be?

Again, my position is sound, and I stand by it.

As you are certainly entitled to do -- realizing, of course, that some of us do not agree, believing that elements of your position may have merit but the total stance does not really seem all that sound.

As I've said before, your vision is okay, your implementation is lacking in specifics and IMO in political viability. You cannot just brush aside the political factors (particularly with respect to the US domestic segments), they will impact what you propose and do so quite heavily. Your goal is admirable, but a route is required and it has to be realistic...

We must focus on important things, regardless of how "hard" they might be. No country or person who avoids important things due to concerns over how difficult they might be as ever contributed much to society. But as I say, our current approaches for determining what is "important" has become horribly off balanced and are too short-term, threat-focused rather than long-tern interest and geopolitically focused. Similarly our techniques for engagement appear to be either launch a military attack or a verbal attack and miss that critical middle ground of calm diplomacy backed by credible influence and credible response capabilities.

As always, I agree with the sentiment expressed there. We disagree on the proper adjustment, though...

Perhaps our leadership, like yourself, has come to doubt that the US possesses such credible influence. That is sad on both counts; but tragically so on the part of the former if that is true.

The issue is not whether we possess real influence, it is how we should use that we do have.

[Bob's World]

No, the US in 1919 was not "powerless" relative to the UK and France in 1919; we merely lacked the interest or will to weigh in on the issue of the region newly freed from Ottoman control. The people and leaders of the region wanted true independence and we could have indeed championed that endstate, but instead did nothing when Britain and France wrapped a colonial land grab in the cloak of liberty. I suspect we can both agree that if Teddy Roosevelt had won the election of 1912 he would have played the same cards that Wilson was dealt quite differently. Better? Who knows, but certainly he would not have stood idly by feeling "powerless."

I think I am on solid ground that the US is indeed well-served by maintaining influence in the Middle East. Our problem is that the manipulative approaches we applied throughout the Cold War to do that are IMO obsolete, and we have yet to figure out how to maintain influence in less obtrusive ways. We are in an era of transition and there is not playbook. What we have done will not work, what we are doing is not working. To do nothing is hardly apt to produce better results.

For the most part the people and the governments of the region are sorting things out for themselves, which is always best. We do not need to shape outcomes, but I believe it is wise to act in a way that might prevent these tenuous transitions from escalating horribly out of control in a manner that nudges the shaky economies of the West over the edge.

Also, in what world is the suggestion that we are better served by our President or Sec State sitting down in private to talk with leaders such as Assad in the current situation, rather than launching public proclaimations from afar for him to stand down as we just did, an example of improper involvement?

[Bill Moore]

davidbfpo, thanks for the input from Russia and the UN. It helps frame the issue in my pee brain.

Posted by Bob's World

"Doing nothing" may well indeed be the COA that makes the best sense coming out of such an approach, but doing nothing does not mean simply ignoring a major issue that lies in the middle of a region where several very real US national interests come together, and where so much of the post-Ottoman Empire, Post WWII Western manipulations have acted to shape events, borders, governments, etc to where we are today.

I do think that calling for Assad, or any other leader, to step down is a rash mistake. Certainly at this point in the game. Creating power vacuums is rarely a good idea, far better to encourage modest reforms (again, privately, guided by fundamental principles, but tailored by the culture, populace, governance etc of those it actually affects). We can apply such a modest reform approach in more critical situations such as Israel or Saudi Arabia if need be, but would we call for leaders there to step down? Unlikely

Agreed that we have important national interests in the region, so disengagement is not a good option for a number of reasons, so the debate in my view should focus on how we engage. I think carrots and sticks are overly simplistic and are perceived as imperialistic in nature and as such the targeted regime generally refuses to play, regardless of how irrational we believe their behavior may be.

I'm not a human behavior professional, but like all of us I'm an astute observer of behavior and it is no surprise to me that when the bully steps into situation and demands certain actions that the response will be defensive/reactionary in nature, and the target of our wrath is more likely to dig in his heels and continue down the undesired path regardless of our carrots and sticks, or more accurately because of our carrots and sticks.

While it is too late for Syria (and numerous other countries where we have missteped historically), it may be better to consider a response where we engage future Assads and help them solve their problems, to give them an honorable way out of the situation by quietly suggesting reforms, putting elections on the table once order is restored, offering Assad and his family sanctuary in another country is desired, etc. This won't be a reasonable or feasible course of action in many cases, but on the other hand once we mobilize world support (always will have dissenters and opportuntists) to put pressure on the regime, the regime tends to become stronger and more abusive in response to this pressure. The pressure alone is not sufficient, and it may be counter productive to our interests. I think we're at a point now where we, our allies, or some corporation (tongue in cheek) will have to sponsor a resistance movement if we want change, and of course that change will create a power vacuum as Bob stated, and we will not be able to control the outcome. We could also be responsible for the deaths of thousands in the ensuing violence as different factions struggle for power. I realize this is hypothetical, but that doesn't mean it is improbable. On the other hand, if we actually worked with Assad (and maybe we did during the early phases of this), and he was receptive to making real changes that would allow him to stay in power without using the iron fist method maybe the outcome would be better for all.

I trust we have a lot of smart people looking at this, but I also fear that a lot of smart people will be sidelined if their ideas do not conform to the politically correct view in D.C. (that view shifts based on whomever is in power, or whatever the national narrative is at that time, such as don't lose another country to communism).

Dayuhan, as for viable (not necessarily desirable) options at this point, I think it is low level support to the rebels, and continued to support to isolate Assad, since we already went down this path. I don't see a way to turn it around at this point.

[Ken White]

No, the US in 1919 was not "powerless" relative to the UK and France in 1919; we merely lacked the interest or will to weigh in on the issue of the region newly freed from Ottoman control.

Thank you for at long last acknowledging a point I've been making to you for a couple of years.

The US was, indeed, not powerless. Please note that I did not say we were, I said Wilson was powerless, a quite different thing. Wilson was the President and at the height of his pulpit power -- and he knew the US would not play his silly game, so HE was powerless to impeded British or French stupidity and cupidity in the former Ottoman Empire.

Thus my often made point that the best ideas in the world HAVE to consider US domestic political reality as it is, not as we wish it were. You always elide or sidestep that. You can do so. Wilson could not, nor could TR have done so -- nor will future US Presidents be able to do so.

The people and leaders of the region wanted true independence and we could have indeed championed that endstate, but instead did nothing when Britain and France wrapped a colonial land grab in the cloak of liberty. I suspect we can both agree that if Teddy Roosevelt had won the election of 1912 he would have played the same cards that Wilson was dealt quite differently. Better? Who knows, but certainly he would not have stood idly by feeling "powerless."

Perhaps, I'm not a TR fan -- he was a dangerous meddler also, worse than Wilson in many respects -- but my belief is that he would not have interfered with the events to any significant degree for the same reason -- the US was not interested, no matter how interested, nosy or noisy the transitory Prez of the day happened to be. We were later ill served because TR's cousin happened to get interested, mostly because he had a war to win. Unintended consequences rule many things...

I think I am on solid ground that the US is indeed well-served by maintaining influence in the Middle East.

I'm sure you do and also know that many agree with you. I and others disagree. Our follies in the ME are mostly induced by American impatience, short-termism and failure to take a long view (yes, that's redundant but the problem is redundantly bad...).

Our problem is that the manipulative approaches we applied throughout the Cold War to do that are IMO obsolete...

I agree but would extend that back to WW II; we didn't do that very well, either...

...we have yet to figure out how to maintain influence in less obtrusive ways. We are in an era of transition and there is not playbook.

There are many who have figured out various ways to employ or not to employ influence. Unfortunately, most of those ways have supporters, more or less vociferous and influential and our Congroids listen to all of them and support most -- hard to get a coherent 'policy' with that going on.

IMO, that's a feature, not a bug and it is useful iof considered and employed as a feature and not ignored as a mere minor bug because it is anathema to those who want coherence and a focused policy. The US of A just doesn't do that...

A smart Strategos would figure that out, harness it and slowly bring those discordant voices to some harmony. Probably cannot be done on one Watch, Long view again needed...

What we have done will not work, what we are doing is not working. To do nothing is hardly apt to produce better results.

May, may not. Wouldn't hurt to try. Either way, I think it important to consider that the actions of others will impact whatever we do or do not do and it might be beneficial if we concentrated on things we know we can affect as opposed of trying to affect things the same way on different days when our effect is proven to be less than effective.

...might prevent these tenuous transitions from escalating horribly out of control in a manner that nudges the shaky economies of the West over the edge.

I think you're attacking the symptom instead of the disease. If the West's economies were in even halfway decent shape, the ME would be a total non-problem (which it almost is anyway...).

Also, in what world is the suggestion that we are better served by our President or Sec State sitting down in private to talk with leaders such as Assad in the current situation, rather than launching public proclamations from afar for him to stand down as we just did, an example of improper involvement?

Other than, to use an RCJ simile, me banging on your door to yell at you in a loud voice so the neighbors can hear me berating / pleading that you need to stop beating your wife -- with full knowledge that what I'm doing can range from having no effect whatsoever to inciting you to do worse things openly or more discreetly while telling me ever so politely "Thanks, I'll do something..." and either way, making my self look sort of ineffective and thus losing another step in the influence market? That world?

[Dayuhan]

Your history is flawed regarding the Post-WWI scramble for the crumbs of the Ottoman empire. Wilson allowed Britain and France to twist lofty positions he brought to Versailles, and we were so concerned about avoiding any US entanglement in the Middle East that might demand US troop presence that we did little to prevent what our two "allies" unleashed on the region.

What, specifically, could have been done to prevent the British and French from doing what they pleased? Not hypothetically, realistically, given the domestic political constraints of the time and the international position of the US at that time. You say we could have "championed that endstate", but what specific actions could have been taken, what tangible carrots and sticks could have been applied to achieve that endstate... again, given the real constraints of domestic politics and the US position at that time?

Again, my position is sound, and I stand by it.

It would certainly be sound if you could tell us what specific forms of influence you propose to use to achieve it. Ken said it better and more concisely than I can: your goal is admirable, but a route is required and it has to be realistic. Without that realistic route, no position is sound. We can speak all day of whether gradual reform or regime change is "better", but unless we have a realistic route to achieving either, it's just hollow talk. What we think is "better" really doesn't matter. It's not about us and we aren't going to decide what happens. We are not in control... which is a good thing, IMO, as I suspect we'd end up in a deep pile of nasty if we were in control.

Similarly our techniques for engagement appear to be either launch a military attack or a verbal attack and miss that critical middle ground of calm diplomacy backed by credible influence and credible response capabilities.

Perhaps our leadership, like yourself, has come to doubt that the US possesses such credible influence. That is sad on both counts; but tragically so on the part of the former if that is true.

Ok, fine... what's the credible influence? What are the carrots and sticks, and how do you propose to apply them? How are we supposed to use them if nobody knows what they are? Are we to simply assume influence with no idea what it's built on?

Also, in what world is the suggestion that we are better served by our President or Sec State sitting down in private to talk with leaders such as Assad in the current situation, rather than launching public proclaimations from afar for him to stand down as we just did, an example of improper involvement?

I wouldn't say a private conversation is improper, just that it's not likely to accomplish anything unless it's supported by real influence: meaning those specific, material, tangible carrots and sticks. Until we know what those are and how we're willing to apply them, I don't see what we're going to achieve with a private conversation... not that it would remain private for long.

What would you want the President or SecState to say in such a conversation... and why do you think Assad would listen? We're not exactly on his most trusted list.

As for my own position, I'm not fully comfortable with the current course of action, but I haven't got a better idea, so I'll refrain from criticizing it. I can think of all manner of glorious goals, but there's no point in talking about them, because I can't propose any realistic means by which they might be achieved. I don't see where that credible influence is going to come from, and I don't see any practical carrots and sticks that we can apply to influence the situation. If you do see them, please tell us what they are... but please also recognize the futility of talking about influence or carrots and sticks without defining what they are, what they're based on, and how they will be applied.

I apologize if that sounds like bullying, but building an noble edifice on a foundation of quicksand seems a dangerous endeavor to me.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Ken,

I think you're attacking the symptom instead of the disease. If the West's economies were in even halfway decent shape, the ME would be a total non-problem (which it almost is anyway...).

Unless you're suggesting we have no interests in the Middle East and / or that we should become isolationists (perhaps we should, but it seems those who have pushed globalism to the extreme have already won that battle and I don't see how we can turn back at this point), I don't understand how you can claim the ME is almost a non-problem.

From an economic stand point, keeping the oil and gas flowing is vital to a number of economies around the globe, and if say the economy in Italy tanks because it isn't getting gas from Libya, it will damage the Eurozone as a whole, and the world economy as a whole. Economics is always in our interest, and unfortunately we have tied (perhaps there was no way to avoid it) our economic performance to the overall global performance. Its the old butterfly flapping its wings again.

Politically and culturally we have ties to Israel and the instability in the ME may or may not result in an increased threat to Israel, but it is telling that the Muslim Brotherhood leaders in Egypt have publicly stated they desire to invalidate the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. If Israel is attacked by these States that will impact the U.S. in a number of ways I suspect.

In regards to GWOT, if the U.S. doesn't support popular movements (support doesn't need to be anything more than making public statements) in the ME, then we leave an opening for the extremists to do so. We don't want the extremists shaping the narrative, and while they may end up shaping it in the long run, to claim it isn't in our interest just doesn't seem to mesh with the reality of the current global political and economic system.

I guess if we ignored all this it would eventually work out in the long run, and it may even work out quicker and for the best if we didn't meddle, but I can the some of the reasons we feel compelled to meddle.

[Ken White]

Unless you're suggesting we have no interests in the Middle East and / or that we should become isolationists (perhaps we should, but it seems those who have pushed globalism to the extreme have already won that battle and I don't see how we can turn back at this point), I don't understand how you can claim the ME is almost a non-problem.

In reverse order, no desire for isolationism on my part, more global engagement would be better -- but that engagement should not be led, as it is now, by DoD.

I can and do claim the ME is almost a non-problem for the US -- but that is not necessarily the case for the ME itself, for Europe or those in the far east that need ME oil. The ME becomes a problem for us only in so far as it affects those others AND we clumsily try to ameliorate their concerns. Which is what we're doing and that, alone is why the ME seems to be so important to so many (a number of whose jobs depend on finding crises in which to putter or about which to think...).

I'm personally far from convinced we should be doing that saving the World thing though I acknowledge the Foreign Policy establishment totally disagrees and accept that my opinion is a minority position. I take some small solace in being out in the cold by knowing I've been right on more in the last 50 years or so than they, most, have -- and IMO, they're getting worse, not better...

From an economic stand point, keeping the oil and gas flowing is vital to a number of economies around the globe, and if say the economy in Italy tanks because it isn't getting gas from Libya, it will damage the Eurozone as a whole, and the world economy as a whole.

Thank you for supporting my point -- the ME is not important to us, it is to others and we have to or want to be seen as being concerned by their concern.

...Economics is always in our interest, and unfortunately we have tied (perhaps there was no way to avoid it) our economic performance to the overall global performance...

Don't think it could have been or should have been avoided -- BUT what should have happened is that we should have allowed / forced the rest of the world to stand up on their own and not rely on us to fix things. You are correct that the flow of that oil is critical to some; I'm not at all sure that means it is our job to make their critical problem into our problem. It would perhaps be better for us and them if they took care of their problems and we took care of ours.

Not least because we really do NOT do a good job of fixing the problems of others...

Politically and culturally we have ties to Israel and the instability in the ME may or may not result in an increased threat to Israel, but it is telling that the Muslim Brotherhood leaders in Egypt have publicly stated they desire to invalidate the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. If Israel is attacked by these States that will impact the U.S. in a number of ways I suspect.

I'm reminded of the words of Secretary of State George Catlett Marshall to Harry Truman in 1948: "Mr. President, I serve at your pleasure but if you recognize Israel, I will not be able to vote for you in the next election."

You've just made another of my oft stated (overstated??? ) points -- most of our 'foreign' policy is simply US domestic political policy expanded to the minimum amount. That "minimum amount" is always present and causes all sorts of trouble. It gets us into half baked, ill thought out schemes with one eye, one hand and both legs firmly planted in the US and poor attention and minimal effort devoted to ALL the foreign issues (and that same meddling insures there are always plenty of those out there...). That doesn't work and we have sixty recent years of history to prove it.

In regards to GWOT...

There is no such thing. There is massive over reaction to some events for domestic political purposes. Some good is being done in the ME, SEA and elsewhere but much of it is wheel spinning for effect. Afghanistan at this point comes to mind. Iraq came to mind in 2005 or so; 2003 was necessary IMO, what followed was not. Not at all.

...if the U.S. doesn't support popular movements (support doesn't need to be anything more than making public statements) in the ME, then we leave an opening for the extremists to do so. We don't want the extremists shaping the narrative, and while they may end up shaping it in the long run...

That's the theory. I disagree. First, public statements not backed up with action create an aura of hypocrisy and the World, quite rightly, does not trust us because we too often say one thing and do another. I'll also point out that our governmental system is chaotic and that means we will always be behind the curve in the information battle unless an existential threat pops up -- Terror as in the "GWO" on is NOT an existential threat. All we have done in trying to get in, keep up and / or win the 'information battle' is make ourselves look like a bunch of chumps. US Governmental incompetence and US Media incompetence simply make efforts to compete worse than doing nothing. The bad guys are going to win that one and while I understand we cannot just concede, we can realize that we will always be the disadvantaged player and adjust accordingly. Stark honesty would be a great first step...

Secondly, supporting popular movements is fraught with problems. We emasculated our Humint capability in the 70s and 80s so we were and still are essentially operating half blind. Thus we know little to nothing about who or what we're supporting (much less why...). Given history since WW II, I submit we'd have been far better off had we not supported popular movements (and a few unpopular ones as well) but have simply been even handed about it and avoided sticking our nose into it with and aiming to influencing who won. In most cases, our true interests were effected little to not at all.

...or to claim it isn't in our interest just doesn't seem to mesh with the reality of the current global political and economic system.

Now there, I agree with you. Emphasis on "current" and "system." We are the player and victim in a massive case of unintended consequences and the world system that now exists is in large measure a product of US machinations from WW II, through Bretton Woods and the UN. The problem is that in democratic nations, the turnover in politicians adversely impacts planning and follow through ability and in our case, that is particularly acute. We consistently if inadvertently shot ourselves in the foots (plural incidents ). Looks like we're determined to continue doing that, the "current system" virtually demands it...

That doesn't mnake it right, just reality -- I'm for rightful reality, m'self.

All that said, we are where we are and the majority that thinks the ME is one of our 'vital interests' has, as you said, won that one. I'm with Bob Jones on recognizing that but saying it did not have to be this way and that we can -- we should -- do better.

I guess if we ignored all this it would eventually work out in the long run, and it may even work out quicker and for the best if we didn't meddle, but I can the some of the reasons we feel compelled to meddle.

As can I. One big one I see is that our government wide budgeting process seeks thing in which to meddle, our various personnel and personal systems reward meddling and those things won't change much (they can, however, be worked to be advantageous) -- but seeing them is not necessarily believing them...